Competition in banking and the lending channel: Evidence from bank-level data in Asia and Latin America

This paper examines how banking competition affects the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel. We apply a two-step estimation procedure using bank-level panel data for commercial banks in 10 Asian and 10 Latin American countries during the period from 1996 to 2006. In the first step we measure the degree of banking competition by applying the methodology proposed by Panzar and Rosse (1987). In the second step we estimate a loan growth equation where the explanatory variables include the Panzar–Rosse measure of banking competition. The estimation results provide consistent evidence that increased competition in the banking sector weakens the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel. This is especially true for banks in Latin American countries and banks of small size, low liquidity, and low capitalization. We also discuss the policy implications of the main findings of this paper.     

Market structure and competitive conditions in the Arab GCC banking system

This paper investigates the market structure of Arab GCC banking industry during the years of 1993–2002 using the most frequently applied measures of concentration k-bank concentration ratio (CRk) and Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and evaluates the monopoly power of banks over the ten years period using the ‘H-statistic’ by Panzar and Rosse. The results show that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE have moderately concentrated markets and are moving to less concentrated positions. The measures of concentration also show that Qatar, Bahrain and Oman are highly concentrated markets. The Panzar–Rosse H-statistics suggest that banks in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE operate under perfect competition; banks in Bahrain and Qatar operate under conditions of monopolistic competition; and we are unable to reject monopolistic competition for the banking market in Oman.     

Competition and Concentration in the New European Banking Landscape

This paper measures the degree of concentration and competition in the enlarged European Union (EU) banking environment over the period 1998–2002. In the empirical part we opt for a methodology as proposed by Panzar and Rosse based on a non‐structural estimation of market competition. Our results suggest that European banks were operating under conditions of monopolistic competition and that bank interest revenues in the 10 new EU member states was earned under conditions of higher competition than those that existed in the old EU banking countries. The opposite result was observed for total operating revenues. Smaller banks earn interest income in a less competitive environment than larger banks, while the opposite is observed for total revenues.     

Are Competitive Banking Systems More Stable?

Using the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic as a measure of competition in 45 countries, we find that more competitive banking systems are less prone to experience a systemic crisis and exhibit increased time to crisis. This result holds even when we control for banking system concentration, which is associated with higher probability of a crisis and shorter time to crisis. Our results indicate that competition and concentration capture different characteristics of banking systems, meaning that concentration is an inappropriate proxy for competition. The findings suggest that policies promoting competition among banks, if well executed, have the potential to improve systemic stability.     

Does cross-ownership affect competition?: Evidence from the Italian banking industry

The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the effects of cross-ownership among Italian banks on competition in the national banking sector. This aim is pursued by measuring and comparing the degree of competition between banks involved in the web of cross-ownership and banks that are not involved. The bank's degree of competition is measured by applying the methodology developed by [Panzar, J.C., Rosse, J.N., 1987. Testing for monopoly equilibrium. Journal of Industrial Economics 35, 443–456.] The econometric results provide empirical evidence that, in the period 1996–2000, Italian banks involved in cross-ownership were less competitive than the other national credit firms, thus supporting the view that cross-ownership may represent an obstacle to industrial competition.     

Foreign participation and banking competition: Evidence from the Indonesian banking industry

Foreign participation in Indonesian banking has expanded from the establishment of foreign de novo banks into the acquisition of existing local banks. The increase in foreign participation has therefore not been associated with a growing number of banks. This study aims to examine the competitive behavior of foreign and local banks as a competitive banking industry is important in boosting economic efficiency and economic growth. This study also examines the role of modes of entry of foreign banks on competition, either through the establishment of foreign de novo banks or the acquisition of local banks. The recent methodological refinements of the Panzar–Rosse method developed by Bikker et al. (2011) are employed to estimate the level of competition among local and foreign banks. Generally, the foreign banks, particularly foreign de novo banks behaved more competitively than local banks, and their penetration is therefore important in creating a contestable market. This study found that in terms of assets, on average foreign de novo banks were smaller, more efficient, and had lower overhead costs, so they could offer lower loan rates and disburse more loans. The recent consolidation in the Indonesian banking industry may have an adverse impact on competition as it restricts the establishment of foreign de novo banks.     

Does the expansion of regional cross-border banks affect competition in Africa? Indirect evidence

This article investigates how bank competition has evolved in Africa following the recent penetration and expansion of regional cross-border banks over the past decade. We examine changes in competition in the banking industry of seven African countries highly affected by this recent phenomenon. The evolution of competition is evaluated through three different non-structural measures of competition (Lerner index, Panzar–Rosse model, and Boone indicator). With the exception of results from the Lerner index, our findings show an intensification of competition since the mid-2000s. This period corresponds to the rapid expansion of regional cross-border banks in the zone, indicating that this expansion has promoted competition in banking sectors in Africa.     

Empirical assessment of the competitive conduct of Nigerian banks in a post-consolidation era

This paper is an empirical assessment of the level of competition in the Nigerian banking industry following the consolidation exercise, using a bank-level panel data, for the period 2005–2014. Empirical evidence from the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic reveals that market power in the Nigerian banking industry is consistent with monopolistic competition, which implies that firms are independent in their decision-making and conduct. This study innovates by incorporating non-interest income accounts in the assessment of revenue, and findings suggest that bank competitiveness decreases as revenue tends toward an inclusion of non-interest income or fee-based services.     

Evaluating the state of competition of the Greek banking industry

The present paper uses three different New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) approaches (Panzar–Rosse, Bresnahan–Lau and Hall–Roeger models) to investigate competitive conditions in the Greek banking sector over the period 1995–2004. One important event which has taken place in the Greek banking industry, especially after 1998, is a wave of mergers and acquisitions. This study also measures and compares the degree of banking competition in two sub-periods, 1995–1998 and 1999–2004, in order to investigate the effect of mergers and acquisitions on the competitive structure of Greek banking. The empirical results of the three models indicate a shift from competitive to non-competitive conditions when moving from the first to the second sub-period. This finding suggests that mergers and acquisitions have affected the level of completion of Greek banking, rendering the industry less competitive. Furthermore, taking into consideration the negative effects of mergers and acquisitions on technical efficiency and the total factor productivity of Greek banking (Rezitis, 2008), the empirical findings of the present study provide some indications that one of the outcomes of the Greek banks’ merging activities, at least in the short run, might be to attain market power and thus higher profits, rather than higher efficiency and lower costs.     

Consolidation and Competition in the Banking Industries of the EU Member and Candidate Countries

This paper investigates competitive conditions in the banking markets of all EU member and candidate countries over the period 1995-2007. The Panzar and Rosse (1987) model is implemented on bank-level data. In particular, the unscaled revenue equation is employed to assess market structure. Country-specific empirical results suggest a wide variation in the competitive conditions of the banking systems in the sampled countries. Nineteen banking systems are characterized as monopolistically competitive, nine as monopolies or perfectly colluding oligopolies, and two as perfectly competitive over the sample period. This study also investigates whether competition conditions changed over the sample period, using 2001 as an endogenously determined break year. The empirical evidence reveals that banking systems became less competitive after that time.     

Competitive conditions among the major British banks

This paper reports an empirical assessment of competitive conditions among the major British banks, during a period of major structural change. Specifically, estimates of the Rosse–Panzar H-statistic are reported for a panel of 12 banks for the period 1980–2004. The sample banks correspond closely to the major British banking groups specified by the British Banking Association. The robustness of the results of the Rosse–Panzar methodology is tested by estimating the ratio of Lerner indices obtained from interest rate setting equations. The results confirm the consensus finding that competition in British banking is most accurately characterised by the theoretical model of monopolistic competition. There is evidence that the intensity of competition in the core market for bank lending remained approximately unchanged throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, competition appears to have become less intense in the non-core (off-balance sheet) business of British banks.     

Competition in fragmented markets: New evidence from the German banking industry in the light of the subprime crisis

Of all of the EU member states, Germany has the largest banking market. However, not all German banking institutions necessarily face fierce competition. Because the industry is highly fragmented, strict separation of the three existing banking pillars may impede competition, with negative effects on financial stability. We assess the competitive stances of 1,888 universal banks from 2001 to 2009 by using the Panzar–Rosse revenue test. We find evidence that measuring competition at an average country level does not necessarily generate valid evaluations of fragmented markets. In addition, we find no clear indication that either the particular objectives of cooperative and savings banks or the legal protection of these institutions impedes competition or discriminates against private banks. Therefore, as long as the relationship between competition and financial stability is dubious, the overall effect and the social costs or benefits of political measures that influence the structure of the German banking market are at least questionable.     

The Panzar–Rosse revenue test and market power in banking

The Panzar–Rosse H statistic is a commonly used measure of market power in banking. It is widely believed that $H>0$ is inconsistent with significant market power. This study rigorously disproves that perception. Instead, the possibility of $H>0$ under conditions of substantial market power turns out robust to the timing of banks’ actions, relative costs, choice of strategic variable, degree of product differentiation, strategy (static or dynamic), and degree of heterogeneity in banks’ conduct (collusive versus fringe), and hence may be common in practice.     

Industrial Organization of Financial Systems and Strategic Use of Relationship Banking

Using standard Industrial Organization tools, we analyze the relation between competition in arm's length financial markets and the prevalence of close bank-firms ties. We show how the degree of competition between financial intermediaries affects the intensity of relationships between banks and client firms, and explore the idea that investment in bank-firm relationships can be used strategically by incumbent multi-product (universal) banks to limit competition in arm's length markets. The analysis implies that reforms designed to facilitate entry of new intermediaries may actually induce incumbent banks to increase investment in relationship banking, so that regulatory entry barriers are replaced by entry barriers created endogenously, namely, there is ``path dependence' in the market structure of financial systems. This result suggests that increased (potential) competition in the financial services industry will not always destroy bank-firm relationships but, on the contrary, may actually strengthen them.     

Schumpeterian competition and efficiency among commercial banks

In this paper, we aim to fill the gap in the banking literature by quantifying the impact that the Schumpeterian competition mode – i.e. competition through the launch of new products (or new varieties of products) – has on the cost and profit efficiency of a sample of commercial banks based in the United Kingdom. We estimate both a cost and an alternative profit frontier on an unbalanced panel of UK commercial banks over the period 2001–2012. The intensity of competition through product innovation is proxied by the trademark intensity (i.e. the ratio between the number of trademarks registered in a given year by all the commercial banks – net of the trademarks registered by the bank under observation – and the employment in the sector) in the commercial banking sector. Our results show that the (lagged) trademark intensity in the commercial banking sector does affect negatively the mean cost and profit efficiency in the sector but there is evidence that as trademark intensity increases in the sector, commercial banks react by improving their cost and profit efficiency.     

银行竞争提高了企业投资水平和资源配置效率吗？——基于分支机构空间分布的研究

银行贷款是我国企业融资的重要方式,在企业生产经营中发挥着举足轻重的作用。2006年和2009年,我国先后两次放松了商业银行分支机构市场准入规制,银行分支机构空间分布发生了较大变化,银行竞争水平和服务实体经济能力明显提升。本文利用2001-2012年国家统计局工业企业数据,以企业周边银行分支机构的数量衡量银行竞争水平,研究银行竞争对企业投资的影响。研究发现,银行分支机构数量的增加显著提高了企业投资水平和投资效率。进一步研究表明,银行分支机构数量增加对企业投资效率的提升作用主要表现在投资不足的企业和非国有企业中,企业融资约束降低和代理冲突减弱是银行竞争提高企业投资效率的主要原因。本研究拓展了银行竞争以及企业投资和资源配置效率的相关文献,对供给侧结构性改革和银行业高质量发展具有启示意义。     

The competitive implications of multimarket bank branching

Retail banking markets have traditionally been viewed as locally limited. However, recent studies have found evidence that large multimarket banking organizations tend to offer uniform interest rates for retail deposit accounts throughout the area that they serve, at least within a given state. This uniform pricing phenomenon raises questions about the continued relevance of the concept of local banking markets for both research and antitrust purposes.We address this issue by employing a model designed to explain the pricing behavior of single-market banks that face competition from multimarket banks. Empirical results are found to be consistent with the many implications of the model. We find that even with multimarket banks present in the market, local market concentration influences the pricing behavior of single-market banks; however, this relationship weakens as the market share of multimarket banks grows. We also find that, on average, multimarket banks offer lower deposit interest rates than do single-market banks operating in the same market, and, in most cases, greater multimarket bank presence is associated with lower deposit interest rates offered by single-market banks.     

Do more competitive banks have less market power? The evidence from Central and Eastern Europe

Studies that have explored the competitive behaviour of banks frequently arrive at divergent conclusions because they use different measures of competition. This study first discusses these various measures of competition and their divergence from a theoretical perspective and then employs them to measure the competitiveness of Central and Eastern European banks and to investigate whether more competitive banks really have less market power. We find that these banks increase their market power when there is low banking concentration and do not necessarily become less competitive. Moreover, a more concentrated banking market does not enhance the market power of banks and does not make them less competitive, and more competitive banks do not necessarily have less market power. This latter outcome ensues because revenue and production reactions to cost evolution are either positively related – or completely unrelated – to the competitive behaviour of banks.     

Islamic Banks,Deposit Insurance Reform,and Market Discipline: Evidence from a Natural Framework

Although it has been intensively claimed that Islamic banks are subject to more market discipline, the empirical literature is surprisingly mute on this topic. To fill this gap and to verify the conjecture that Islamic bank depositors are indeed able to monitor and discipline their banks, we use Turkey as a test setting. The theory of market discipline predicts that when excessive risk taking occurs, depositors will ask higher returns on their deposits or withdraw their funds. We look at the effect of the deposit insurance reform in which the dual deposit insurance was revised and all banks were put under the same deposit insurance company in December 2005. This gives us a natural experiment in which the effect of the reform can be compared for the treatment group (i.e., Islamic banks) and control group (i.e., conventional banks). We find that the deposit insurance reform has increased the market discipline in the Turkish Islamic banking sector. This reform may have upset the sensitivities of the religiously inspired depositors, and perhaps more importantly it might have terminated the existing mutual supervision and support among Islamic banks.     

Geographic Deregulation and Competition in the U.S. Banking Industry

We examine the effects of geographic deregulation on state‐level competition in U.S. banking markets over the period 1976‐2005. The empirical results confirm that the U.S. banks in general operated under monopolistic competition during the period examined. After partitioning the sample based on bank size we find that the market competition for large banks in Delaware, Oregon, and Rhode Island can be characterized as monopolistic while small banks in Arizona and Massachusetts seem to have operated under the conditions of perfect competition. The removal of geographic restrictions appears to have very limited and non‐uniform effect on state‐level competitive conduct. There is some evidence that the U.S. banking industry might have actually experienced a less competitive behavior in recent years due to increased market power of larger banks.