Impact of international trade under dual labor markets

A country's unemployment rate can be affected by technology choice and the opening of international trade. This general equilibrium model examines the impact of international trade with the presence of dual labor markets in which manufacturing firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose technologies with different marginal and fixed costs to maximize profits. In a closed economy, it is shown that an increase in labor market efficiency or a population increase induces manufacturing firms to adopt more advanced technologies and the wage rate in the manufacturing sector increases. With the existence of a continuum of technologies, technology choice is not a source of firm heterogeneity. The opening of international trade leads to an increase in the wage rate in the manufacturing sector and the price of the agricultural good. When countries are identical, international trade always increases national welfare.     

Monopolistic Competition and North–South Trade

This paper examines the consequences of opening to international trade for a developing economy with open urban unemployment and rural–urban migration, where the urban sector is monopolistically competitive. It is shown that there exists a threshold level of urbanization prior to which increases in product variety will be reflected in increased urban unemployment, that opening to intra‐industry trade with a high‐wage economy (i.e. North–South trade) will reduce the rate of urban unemployment by a greater amount than intra‐industry trade with a similar economy, and that trade intervention in the South may lower welfare by reducing varieties produced in the North.     

Redistributing Gains from Globalisation*

This paper analyses the effects of redistribution in a model of international trade with heterogeneous firms in which a fair‐wage effort mechanism leads to firm‐specific wage payments and involuntary unemployment. The redistribution scheme is financed by profit taxes and gives the same absolute lump‐sum transfer to all workers. International trade increases aggregate income and income inequality, ceteris paribus. If, however, trade is accompanied by a suitably chosen increase in the profit tax rate, it is possible to achieve higher aggregate income and a more equal income distribution than in autarky, provided that the share of exporters is sufficiently high.     

Terms of Trade Shocks and Endogenous Search Unemployment: A Two‐Sector Model with Non‐Traded Goods

We develop a simple and tractable two‐sector search model featuring a non‐traded sector and endogenous search unemployment to examine the impact of terms of trade shocks on unemployment. We show that changes in terms of trade will not only lead to employment reallocation across sectors, as in the traditional trade models, but, more importantly, impact upon search unemployment within each sector. Specifically, we show that an improvement (deterioration) of terms of trade reduces (increases) unemployment rates in both traded and non‐traded sectors.     

Modern slavery,corruption, and hysteresis

We develop a model where firms profit from coercing workers into employment under conditions violating national law and international conventions and where corrupt public servants prosecuting violations of the rules are willing to turn cases down if bribed. Firms and public servants are heterogeneous. Firms benefit differently from the use of coerced labour whereas public servants have differing intrinsic motivations to behave honestly. Moreover, there is a socially determined warm-glow effect: honest public servants feel better if their colleagues are honest too. The determination of bribes is modelled via Nash bargaining between the firm and the corrupt civil servant. It is shown that multiple equilibria and hysteresis are possible. Depending on history, an economy may be trapped in a locally stable high-corruption, high-slavery equilibrium and major changes in government policies may be necessary to move the economy out of this equilibrium. Moreover, we show that trade bans that are effective in reducing slavery in the export industry tend to raise slavery in the remainder of the economy. It is possible that this leakage effect dominates the reduction of slavery in the export sector.     

PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE*

This article shows that state control of some industries may have contributed to the increase in European unemployment from the 1970s to the early 1990s. We develop a simple two‐sector model, one privately run and one publicly run, that has risk‐averse workers directing their search into one of the sectors. Assuming that the privately run sector is less able to insure its employees against uncertainty, we show that aggregate unemployment in this economy increases in response to an increase in economic turbulence.     

Technology Adoption,Export Status,and Skill Upgrading: Theory and Evidence

This paper develops a model of trade that features heterogeneous firms, technology choice and different types of skilled labor in a general equilibrium framework to explain within‐industry increase in the relative demand for skilled workers. Its main contribution is to investigate the impact of firms' export and technology choice decisions on skill upgrading. Only firms in the upper range of the productivity distribution produce for the foreign market using high‐technology. Since this technology is skilled‐biased, exporters that resort to modern technologies are more skill intensive. Empirical evidence is also provided to support the model's main predictions using plant‐level panel data from Chile's manufacturing sector (1990–1999).     

Trade liberalization and unemployment: Theory and evidence from India

A widely held view among the public is that trade liberalization increases unemployment. Using state and industry-level unemployment and trade protection data from India, we find no evidence of any unemployment increasing effect of trade reforms. In fact, our state-level analysis reveals that urban unemployment declines with trade liberalization in states with flexible labor markets and larger employment shares in net exporter industries. Moreover, our industry-level analysis indicates that workers in industries experiencing greater reductions in trade protection were less likely to become unemployed, especially in net export industries. Our results can be explained within a theoretical framework incorporating trade and search-generated unemployment and some institutional features of the Indian economy.     

The Losses from Trade Restrictions: Policy Dynamics with Firm Selection and Endogenous Markup

In this paper, I explore the aggregate effects of trade restrictions in a two‐country, dynamic, general equilibrium (DGE) model with firm selection and variable adjustment of markup. As a response to the trade collapse in the global crisis of 2008 and 2009, temporary trade restrictions have emerged in several countries. With analyzing the dynamics of a negative macroeconomic shock in the home economy first, and the subsequent introduction of trade restrictions in the foreign economy second, I show that both economies are in a worse position than they were during the economic downturn. The follow‐ups to the recession and trade restrictions are investigated through three mechanisms: (1) variable markup as a new avenue of increasing competitive pressure for producers (e.g. more competitive firms lower their markups); (2) average individual firms' specific productivity cut‐off, which induces their optimum export choice (e.g. an increase in the export productivity cut‐off means exporting becomes more difficult than before.); and (3) the movement of international relative prices (e.g. the real exchange rate and terms of trade).     

Job Creation, Job Destruction, and the International Division of Labor

The authors incorporate equilibrium unemployment due to imperfect matching into a model of trade in intermediate inputs. Firms are assumed to be price‐takers and their size is given by technology. Firms enter the market as long as expected profits cover the search cost they incur initially; jobs are endogenously destroyed by random shocks that affect firms’ price–cost margins. Trade increases productivity in the final good and then demand for each intermediate input. Steady‐state unemployment is reduced after trade integration because the rate of job destruction is reduced, which in turn induces an indirect positive effect on job creation. A more volatile environment faced by firms does not necessarily increase unemployment. However, the rate of job destruction unambiguously rises, and rises more under free trade.     

Whose Job Goes Abroad? International Outsourcing and Individual Job Separations

This paper focuses on the adjustment costs of globalisation by studying the effects of international outsourcing on individual transitions out of jobs in the Danish manufacturing sector for the period 1990–2003. A competing risks duration model that distinguishes between job‐to‐job and job‐to‐unemployment transitions is estimated. Outsourcing is found to increase the unemployment risk of low‐skilled workers, but the quantitative impact is modest. Outsourcing is also found to reduce the job change hazard rate for all education groups. Thus, the paper provides evidence for small adjustment costs of globalisation.     

Does it matter if growth is imported via terms of trade or trade volume increases?

This paper shows that to import growth via terms of trade or trade volume increases does matter when determining the degree of competition in the export sector that allows an economy to fully exploit its export market power.     

Public firms' merger,employment, and welfare in developing countries: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper examines the effect of a merger of state‐owned firms on wage gap, employment, and social welfare in a general equilibrium setting. For a developing economy with state‐owned firms in the urban sector, a merger via a reduction in the number of the urban state‐owned firms can reduce the cost of capital. It then lowers the skilled wage rate through the factor‐substitution effect, while it raises the unskilled wage by the inflow of capital to the rural sector and hence lowers urban unemployment. In addition, the reduction in the number of the urban state‐owned firms can yield a scale effect to the firms. The beneficial effects on higher urban output and less urban unemployment can improve social welfare of the developing economy.     

An Overlapping-generations Model of Escape Clause Protection

The paper explores the efficiency consequences of using temporary protection to ease adjustment following an unexpected, permanent improvement in a country's terms of trade. In the model, workers trade off the potentially higher wage that the export sector has to offer with a lower job acquisition rate. An unexpected improvement in the terms of trade surprises old workers who cannot undo the decisions they made while young. Some old workers who had not planned to search for work in the export sector end up changing their plans, adding to the pool of searchers, creating congestion. Temporary protection can reduce congestion and make the transition to the new steady state smoother. Moreover, there are conditions under which the congestion externalities lead to multiple steady‐state equilibria that can be Pareto‐ranked. Temporary protection may lead to a permanent change in the allocation of resources, and this permanent change may be welfare‐enhancing.     

Trade Reform and Informal Wages

When trade reform contracts protected formal sectors in developing countries and the formal workers move to the informal sector for employment, does that reduce informal wages? Using a 2 × 2 Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson (HOS) structure with formal–informal production organization for the same commodity, we show that a tariff cut in the import‐competing sector increases both informal wage and employment under very reasonable assumptions. An increase in the price of the export commodity will also increase informal wages, although aggregate informal employment unambiguously falls even if the informal export sector is labor intensive. Furthermore, the formal–informal segmentation of each sector opens up an interesting, hitherto unexplored, possibility that the informal export sector may contract despite a price increase in this sector. Change in the overall size of the export sector is also ambiguous and conditional on the relative strengths of changes in these two segments.     

Environmental Protection in the Presence of Unemployment and Common Resources

This paper examines the effects of an export tax (on a processed resource good), the number of harvesters and an afforestation policy in a small, open economy with urban unemployment. The export tax increases the urban unemployment rate, but improves the quality of the environment. Here, the optimal export tax is lower than the adjusted marginal environmental damage. Reducing the number of harvesters has a similar resource allocation effect to that of an export tax. However, the afforestation policy can resolve the trade‐off between urban unemployment and the quality of the environment and may also improve the welfare of a country.     

Intra‐firm trade,exporting, importing,and firm performance

Abstract This paper examines firm heterogeneity in terms of size, wages, capital intensity, and productivity between domestic and foreign‐owned firms that engage in intra‐firm trade, firms that export and import, firms that import only, and firms that export only. As previously documented, heterogeneity between different groups of trading firms is substantial. Taking into account intra‐firm trade in addition to exporting and importing yields new insights into the productivity advantage previously established for exporting firms. The results presented here show that this premium accrues only to exporters that also import and to exporters that also engage in intra‐firm trade, but not to firms that export only. Using simultaneous quantile regressions, the paper illustrates that heterogeneity within different groups of trading firm is equally large. Some of this within‐group heterogeneity can be attributed to differences in trading partners.     

Job creation,job destruction,labour mobility and wages in Poland, 1988–19981

Longitudinal data from interviews with Poles of working age conducted in 1988, 1993 and 1998 combined with longitudinal firm‐level data present a detailed view of the transition from a state‐dominated to a market economy. Job losses in state firms and job creation in new private firms are the dominant employment changes, other than retirements from the labour force. In the Polish case, a significant proportion of this movement over the 1988–1998 period involves a spell of unemployment or exit from the labour force before obtaining a private sector job. This results in considerable job competition between workers leaving the state sector and those who are out of the labour force or unemployed. Income differences between the state sector and the de novo sector appear to have little association with mobility. These results suggest that movement to the new private sector is more likely to be the result of job loss than the result of people looking for better, higher paying jobs. Self‐employment plays an important role in the development of the private sector. People working on their own account have higher incomes than wageworkers and are likely to become owners employing additional workers. Incomes are higher in regions with high rates of job creation and depressed in regions with job destruction.     

Unemployment and Economic Integration for Developing Countries

While financial or trade integration between countries may increase the size of the market and aid the adoption of more advanced technologies, will it also increase the level of urban unemployment for a developing country? In this model, there is unemployment in the urban sector. Manufacturing firms engage in oligopolistic competition and choose increasing returns technologies to maximize profits. Financial firms provide capital to manufacturing firms and they also engage in oligopolistic competition. We show that an increase in the wage rate in the manufacturing sector changes neither the level of technology nor the level of employment in the manufacturing sector. While financial or trade integration between developing countries leads manufacturing firms to adopt more advanced technologies, the level and rate of employment in the manufacturing sector will not deteriorate.     

Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard

We consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth-constrained workers suffer from moral hazard. Specifically, effort on the job is non-contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract. Higher unemployment benefits affect the workers' outside option. The latter is improved for low-skilled workers. Hence they receive a larger share of the surplus, which strengthens their effort incentives and increases productivity. Effects are reversed for high-skilled workers. Moreover, raising benefit payments affects the proportion of successful matches, which induces some firms to exit the economy and causes unemployment to increase.