外商技术转移、创新激励与东道国引资政策——走自主创新道路,我们能依靠外国技术吗？

文章在累积创新框架下建立一个附加拍卖的动态博弈模型,研究东道国企业利用外商技术转移实现技术升级的微观机制,以及东道国政府旨在改善社会福利的引资政策。研究后发现:对于核心技术,外商总有激励进行技术封锁;对于一般技术,外商愿意将其技术许可给东道国以赚取垄断利润;东道国企业只有坚持自主创新才能获得技术模仿的机会并最终突破外商对核心技术的封锁;若东道国政府能使外商将核心技术授权给本国企业,本国企业将绕过自主创新从而直接进行模仿创新,若不能有效控制外商技术转移方式但可对仅转移设备等"硬"核心技术的方式采取有效限制,可降低潜在技术模仿成本从而减少东道国激励本国厂商进行创新的补贴成本。最后,文章讨论了我国利用外资推动技术升级的方式。     

Strategic Environmental Policy Under Incomplete Information

This paper introduces incomplete information into recent analyses of strategic environmental policy. It is shown how asymmetric information between planners and producers affects national incentives to impose strategic environmental standards on domestic industries in international oligopolistic competition. Relative to the full-information case, incomplete information is likely to mitigate allocative distortions originating from strategic behaviour. A countervailing effect, tending to raise distortion, is however revealed from the analysis. This effect is absent when governments intervene in free trade through direct production subsidies. The results suggest that incentives to capture foreign rents are less reduced due to private information, when environmental standards, rather than direct production subsidies, are the strategic instrument.     

Transfer Prices, Tariffs, and Content Restrictions

The efficacy of a local content requirement as an employment enhancing policy in the host country is weakened in the presence of transfer price manipulation by a vertically and horizontally integrated multinational firm. For given host and foreign country tax rates, there is a threshold tariff above which the aggregate real effects of transfer price manipulation are unambiguous and below which these effects are ambiguous. Stricter content restrictions reduce benefits to host country factors, and higher tariffs increase benefits to host country factors in the presence of resale price constraints and endogenous-limit transfer prices.     

多种要素扭曲是否推动了中国企业出口

本文使用1999-2007年工业企业数据样本分析了包括资本、劳动及中间品在内的要素市场相对扭曲程度,并考察其是否能解释中国企业出口的独特成本优势。结论认为：中国制造业企业存在严重要素价格扭曲,不同要素的价格扭曲程度差异化较大。劳动力价格扭曲现象普遍存在,经济发展以牺牲劳动力价格市场化为代价。国有企业比重较大的行业资本价格相对较低,而私营企业比重较大的行业则资金成本较高。能源、原材料相关行业以及外资企业比重较大的行业中间品价格偏低;经过实证检验,要素市场扭曲的确对企业出口倾向起到推动作用,企业将获得的成本优势转化为出口优势,这表明低廉的要素价格是中国产品在国际市场中具有竞争力的重要原因。     

Strategic interoperability standards and trade taxes

In a two-country international trade framework, the paper considers the interplay between the governments' incentives for conducting traditional trade policies and their incentives for the policies toward compatibility between the products of the firms competing in the international market. The model assumes that one domestic and one foreign firm supply partially incompatible products for the home country market while consumers value both variety and a network externality. Motivated by the benefits of the network externality, the home government sets a standard requiring the foreign firm to guarantee a minimum level of compatibility between its own product and the product of the domestic rival. The paper analyzes the home country standard setting and import tariff policies as well as the incentives of the foreign country for imposing the export tax and conducting a policy which enhances the degree of compatibility between the rival products in the export market.     

Conservation of biodiversity and economic development: The concept of transferable development rights

For ecological and economic reasons it is more cost effective to conserve habitats rather than species, and hence biodiversity conservation becomes a land use issue. Since in developing countries, land is the most important productive asset, the opportunity costs of conservation are forgone development, while the benefits from conservation are distant and largely external to the host country. The concept of transferable development rights (TDRs), which has been extensively applied to conservation of historical buildings in urban areas, is extended and adapted here to the conservation of biodiversity, both within a country and globally. Creation of a market for TDRs makes effective the latent demand for and supply of biodiversity conservation and generates benefits for both the supplier (developing countries) and the demander (developed countries). The paper explores the conditions and public interventions necessary for the creation of an active market for TDRs. It also proposes a number of mechanisms such as credits and offsets for purchase of TDRs against domestic regulations and conservation taxes in the developed countries.     

International cross-listing and stock market development in emerging economies

Why have emerging equity markets grown so rapidly since 1990? First, it is shown how international cross-listings can transform a segmented local equity market from an equilibrium of low liquidity and market capitalization to an integrated market with high liquidity and market capitalization by altering the incentives of companies and individuals to participate in the market. Second, benefits of international cross-listings for domestic stock market development and welfare across emerging equity markets are found to be negatively related to both the degree of correlation between the domestic and world equity market and the relative size of the domestic equity market. Third, the price impact of international listing is shown to depend on the liquidity conditions in the domestic market prior to listing.     

Multinational taxation and international emissions trading

Many studies have shown that the activities of multinational corporations are quite sensitive to differences in income tax rates across countries. In this paper I explore the interaction between multinational taxation and abatement activities under an international emissions permit trading scheme. Four types of plans are considered: (1) a single domestic permit system with international offsets; (2) separate national permit systems without trade; (3) separate national permit systems with limited offsets; and (4) an international permit trading system. For each plan, I model the incentives for the multinational firm to choose abatement activities at home and abroad and to transfer emissions credits between parent and subsidiary. Limits on trading across countries restrict efficiency gains from abatement, as is well known. But if available offset opportunities are limited to actual abatement activities, those activities are also more susceptible to distortions from incentives to shift taxable income. Transfer-pricing rules can limit but not always eliminate these distortions. In a system of unlimited international trading, abatement is efficiently allocated across countries, but tax shifting can still be achieved through intra-firm transfer pricing. From the basis of efficiency for both environmental and tax policies, the best design is an international permit trading system with transparent, enforceable transfer-pricing rules.     

Bilateral transfers and lending in international environmental cooperation

The paper analyzes environmental lending and transfers in a two country general equilibrium framework. The lender country chooses specific environmental investments which it finances in the neighbour country on the basis of the returns they generate for the lender. The gains from this kind of international environmental financing are illustrated with a numerical calibration of the model showing that the gains to the lender country may be fairly sizable in relation to the expenditure directed currently towards environmental protection. These gains, however, essentially depend on the terms of the environmental financing. We also find that debt-for-nature swaps do not in general produce efficient environmental protection if applied uniformly in international environmental financing.     

Price behaviour in the Italian manufacturing industry

This paper sets out to test the hypothesis that the price-cost margins of Italian manufacturing industries are influenced by excess domestic demand and by international prices of manufactured products. Using annual data (1956–1982) a mark-up equation is estimated for each of the twelve industries in which the manufacturing sector has been disaggregated. The ratio of industry price to average total cost is functionally related to the ratio of international price to domestic cost and a measure of excess demand. On the basis of the estimates, which are obtained by Maximum Likelihood techniques, and some specification tests, it is concluded that both factors influence pricing behaviour although their effect is not uniformly significant in every sector.     

Strategic Environmental Policies when Waste Products are Tradable

The paper deals with international trade in hazardous waste products when there is an international oligopoly market for waste, and both waste‐importing and waste‐exporting countries act strategically to utilize national environmental policies to attach rents arising from trade in waste. The authors model a multiple‐stage game where waste is generated in an industrialized country as a byproduct of production, and potentially is exported to some less‐developed countries, if not abated locally, or imposed on local residents at a cost of an environmental tax. In the market for waste, an oligopolistic supply is assumed. The demand for waste is perfectly competitive, with waste‐processing firms guided by marginal disposal costs and environmental taxes levied by foreign countries. With each country playing Nash, the analysis finds domestic and foreign taxes to be distorted from the Pigouvian taxes in such a way that the domestic (waste‐exporter) tax rate is set below, and the foreign tax rate is set above, the Pigouvian taxes. However, a global welfare optimum requires tax distortions in the opposite direction, in the sense that foreign environmental taxes must be set below the Pigouvian tax rate.     

INTERNATIONAL DEVIATIONS FROM THE LAW OF ONE PRICE: THE ROLE OF SEARCH FRICTIONS AND MARKET SHARE*

This article examines the size and persistence of international deviations from the law of one price in an industry with search frictions. Cost differences lead foreign and domestic firms to price differently within countries. When local firms are more common in each country, there are large and persistent price differences across countries. Large and persistent changes in international relative costs lead to large and persistent changes in international relative prices. Dynamic considerations imply that the amount of a cost shock firms pass through to prices is U‐shaped in the market share of firms receiving the shock.     

Transfer pricing rules and corporate tax competition

A multinational parent sells a non-marketed commodity to a foreign subsidiary that uses the product as an input to produce a product it then sells. The subsidiary is controlled by a local managing partner whose compensation consists of a lump-sum payment plus a share of the subsidiary's profit. The parent chooses an optimal transfer price taking into account incentives for the subsidiary's managing partner and taxes. Home and host governments impose corporate income taxes on the parent and subsidiary's respective profits subject to a transfer pricing rule (e.g. cost plus price method or comparable profit method). A Nash equilibrium is derived for effective tax rates chosen by home and host governments. We then examine harmonization and suggest that tax rates would be reduced.     

基于完全成本的碳酸稀土理论价格研究——兼论中国稀土资源定价机制改革

文章基于完全成本核算了2008-2010年碳酸稀土的理论价格,并与国内市场价格和出口价格进行了比较。研究发现,碳酸稀土的国内价格严重偏离其理论价格,市场价格严重扭曲。出口管制政策是校正稀土市场价格扭曲、弥补稀土资源折耗成本和生态环境外部成本补偿不足的一种手段,为我国政府在本次稀土国际贸易争端中提出出口管制政策是"基于保护资源和环境的考虑,为实现可持续发展"的观点提供了经验支持。破解当前稀土生产与出口内外困局的关键是改革稀土资源价格形成机制。文章提出了按照市场化原则和WTO规则改革稀土资源定价机制的政策建议。     

Efficient Cost Passthrough

This paper analyzes how far a regulated price should be adjusted to realized marginal cost in a stochastic environment. Lyon (1996) shows that partial cost passthrough will improve welfare relative to an exogenously fixed price cap even if incentives for effort supply are reduced. In this paper a simple regulatory mechanism is presented that achieves full cost passthrough and at the same time provides efficient incentives for effort supply.     

Environmental Protection for Sale: Strategic Green Industrial Policy and Climate Finance

Industrial policy has long been criticized as subject to protectionist interests; accordingly, subsidies to domestic producers face disciplines under World Trade Organization agreements, without exceptions for environmental purposes. Now green industrial policy is gaining popularity as governments search for low-carbon solutions that also provide jobs at home. The strategic trade literature has largely ignored the issue of market failures related to green goods. I consider the market for a new environmental good (like low-carbon technology) whose downstream consumption provides external benefits (like reduced emissions). Governments may have some preference for supporting domestic production, such as by interest-group lobbying, introducing a political distortion in their objective function. I examine the national incentives and global rationales for offering production (upstream) and deployment (downstream) subsidies in producer countries, allowing that some of the downstream market may lie in nonregulating third-party countries. Restraints on upstream subsidies erode global welfare when environmental externalities are large enough relative to political distortions. Climate finance is an effective alternative if political distortions are large and governments do not undervalue carbon costs. Numerical simulations of the case of renewable energy indicate that a modest social cost of carbon can imply benefits from allowing upstream subsidies.     

Foreign Direct Investment, Local Content Requirement, and Profit Taxation

We develop a partial equilibrium model of foreign direct investment (FDI) in which identical foreign firms locate themselves in a host country to compete in an oligopolistic market for a non-tradeable commodity. The host country, assumed to be small in the market for FDI, makes use of two instruments, viz., a profit tax and a local content requirement, to compete for FDI in the international market. We assume the existence of unemployment in the host country. The structure of optimal instruments and their relationship to the number, and the relative efficiency levels, of the domestic firms, are established     

稀土资源税对“寡头”国出口市场势力的影响研究

笔者主要从税收转嫁的角度分析“寡头”国的稀土资源税政策对其出口市场势力的潜在影响,在系统把握我国稀土产业链上下游布局,理清稀土生产、加工以及贸易结构的基础上,通过改变国内稀土生产函数,研究使得稀土贸易市场出清条件下的税收价格转移弹性.分析表明:“寡头国”资源税的征收除了倒逼国内稀土行业整合,提高行业集中度之外,还可以将部分的税负转嫁到国际市场,增加稀土出口市场势力和贸易利得.     

Global influences on UK manufacturing prices: 1970-2000

We introduce the first consistent series of domestic-product and related import price indices at the industry level for the UK, using the data to analyse both domestic and international determinants of UK manufactured product prices. Foreign influences on UK prices in domestic markets are always present, but domestic cost movements dominate. We show that the pass-through of world-price, tariff and exchange rate changes into product prices is partial in general and varies markedly between product categories. Standard tariff and exchange rate theories overstate price responses to global pricing determinants and fail to allow for variation between industrial sectors. Such theories can mislead when used for policy analysis and prediction.     

Pollution Accumulation and Firm Incentives to Accelerate Technological Change Under Uncertain Private Benefits

The paper explores the relationships between the design of public incentives and the policy-maker's desired timing of abandonment of a polluting technology, when this requires an irreversible private investment and the firm faces uncertain appropriable benefits from the technological change. Two regulatory approaches are examined. Firstly, we consider the quite common one of lowering the private investment cost, through a subsidy, in order to bridge the gap between the private and the policy-maker's desired timing of environmental innovation. Secondly, we consider a policy scenario where the regulator, instead of simply lowering the investment's rental price, also stimulates abandonment of the polluting technology by reducing – through appropriate announcements – the uncertainty surrounding the technological switch's private profitability. We then compare the two approaches and show the latter's benefits, in terms of the policy's effectiveness and/or budgetary savings.