Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy

Does an inflation conservative central bank à la Rogoff (1985) remain desirable in a setting with endogenous fiscal policy? To provide an answer we study monetary and fiscal policy games without commitment in a dynamic, stochastic sticky-price economy with monopolistic distortions. Monetary policy determines nominal interest rates and fiscal policy provides public goods generating private utility. We find that lack of fiscal commitment gives rise to excessive public spending. The optimal inflation rate internalizing this distortion is positive, but lack of monetary commitment generates too much inflation. A conservative monetary authority thus remains desirable. When fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy each period, the monetary authority should focus exclusively on stabilizing inflation. Monetary conservatism then eliminates the steady state biases associated with lack of monetary and fiscal commitment and leads to stabilization policy that is close to optimal.     

Fiscal policy and fiscal reconstruction in Japan

This paper investigates the macroeconomic effect of fiscal policy and the fiscal reconstruction movement in Japan. I first summarize Japanese fiscal policy in the recent years and discuss sustainability of government deficits. Then, I investigate the macroeconomic effect of Japanese fiscal policy and evaluate the plausibility of the Keynesian and non-Keynesian effects. I also analyze political constraints in the fiscal reconstruction attempts and the possibility of crowding-in effect of fiscal reform. Finally, I discuss some measures for the successful fiscal reconstruction reform in the near future. JEL Code H30 · H60     

Stress testing the EU fiscal framework

This study evaluates the efficiency of the cyclically-adjusted budget balance (CABB) as the central gauge in the reinforced European fiscal framework for evaluating fiscal discipline. We do this by means of a simulation experiment. We use an estimated DSGE model to simulate all the macroeconomic data needed to assess the CABB according to the official EC methodology. Additionally, the model contains an expenditure fiscal rule that accounts for non-automatic variation in the budget, which allows us to observe the true discretionary measures of fiscal policy. Our results indicate that the EC methodology frequently fails to identify the true fiscal policy stance and also frequently fails to correctly signal potential violations of the SGP limit on structural deficit. In the latter case triggering corrective fiscal contractions to comply with the SGP results in increased macroeconomic instability. In addition, we show that allowing for a bigger role for stability-oriented discretionary policy and thus relaxing the SGP limit on structural deficit could enhance the stabilization efficiency of fiscal policy without reducing the degree of compliance with the Maastricht Treaty. These conclusions apply to small countries in a monetary union as well as large countries with independent monetary policy.     

Accrual accounting and Australian fiscal policy

Australian governments have recently moved from cash accounting to accrual accounting. Accrual accounting has been accompanied at the national government level by the introduction of a new key fiscal policy measure: the ‘fiscal balance’. This paper explains and evaluates this new fiscal measure. It concludes that, given the present fiscal policy of the Australian government, fiscal balance is a superior fiscal policy measure to the ‘cash’ budget balance measure which it replaced. However, from the alternative ‘golden rule’ policy standpoint, fiscal balance is not a meaningful fiscal policy measure — although its stock counterpart, net financial liabilities, certainly is.     

Local fiscal equalisation based on fiscal capacity: the case of Austria

This paper deals with local fiscal equalisation in Austria. The system of intergovernmental relations in Austria includes different regulations in order to equalise differences in the fiscal capacity of the municipalities. This leads to so‐called ‘compensation effects’, because additional revenues from a local government's own tax are (at least partly) compensated by losses from equalisation grants. This paper carries out a detailed analysis of these compensation effects. It is shown that they create strong fiscal disincentives for the local governments: on average, 55 per cent of additional revenues from the communal tax (which is the most important of a local government's own taxes) are compensated by losses of equalisation grants. In extreme cases, local governments can lose up to 144 per cent of the additional tax yields collected. These local governments would be better off if they made no effort to increase their tax base.     

Assessing long-term fiscal developments: A new approach

We use a new approach to assess long-term fiscal developments. By analyzing the time-varying behaviour of the two components of government spending and revenue - responsiveness and persistence -, a feature not captured by automatic stabilisers, we are able to infer about the sources of fiscal deterioration (improvement). Drawing on quarterly data, we estimate recursively these components within a system of government revenue and spending equations using a Three-Stage Least Square method for eight European Union countries plus the US. The results suggest that significant changes in the fiscal stance (including those related to the current crisis) are reflected in the estimates of persistence and responsiveness.     

Monetary versus fiscal policy in India: an SVAR analysis

Conventionally, the policymakers relied on three policy alternatives to manage business cycles – debt-financed government spending, debt-financed tax rebate and interest rate. While the first two are fiscal policy instruments, the latter is a monetary policy instrument. This paper aims to capture interactions among Indian monetary and fiscal policy actions, and the impact of such policy actions on select macroeconomic variables for the period 1990Q1–2011Q4. The policy actions are identified using the sign restrictions approach combined with magnitude restrictions in a Structural Vector Autoregression framework, and interpreted using impulse responses and variance decomposition. The results show that Indian monetary policy responds to tax rebate shocks and spending shocks differently. In the case of a tax rebate shock, Indian monetary policy responds by reducing interest rates thereby accommodating fiscal expansion. On the opposite, monetary policy seems not to accommodate expenditure shocks. Interestingly, the monetary policy shock is accompanied by a fiscal expansion that threatens the credibility of the central bank actions, thus indicating fiscal policy dominance. A comparison of the efficacy of the policies suggests that the interest rate is more effective in stimulating output. Out of the two fiscal policy instruments analysed, the tax rebate seems to be the better option for stimulating output considering the output-debt trade-off.     

Sub-nationals' risk premia in fiscal federations: Fiscal performance and institutional design

The recent debt crisis in Europe highlighted the importance of institutional design and, in particular, bail-out clauses in determining States' risk premia in fiscal or quasi-fiscal federations. This paper examines the determinants of sub-national governments' risk premia in fiscal federations using secondary market data for the USA, Canada, Australia and Germany. It finds that, as for central governments, fiscal fundamentals matter in the pricing of risk, and sub-national governments with higher public debt and larger deficits pay higher premia. However, this relationship is not uniform across federations and it differs with institutional arrangements. In particular, market pricing mechanisms are less effective in presence of explicit or implicit guarantees from the central government. We show that when sub-national governments depend on high transfers from the central government (i.e., when there is some form of implicit guarantee from the center), markets are less responsive to sub-national governments' fiscal fundamentals. Using primary market data, the paper also shows that high transfer dependency lowers the probability of sub-national governments to borrow on capital markets.     

Government investment and fiscal stimulus

Effects of government investment are studied in an estimated neoclassical growth model. The analysis focuses on two dimensions that are critical for understanding government investment as a fiscal stimulus: implementation delays for building public capital and expected fiscal adjustments to deficit-financed spending. Implementation delays can produce small or even negative labor and output responses to increases in government investment in the short run. Anticipated fiscal adjustments matter both quantitatively and qualitatively for long-run growth effects. When public capital is insufficiently productive, distorting financing can make government investment contractionary at longer horizons.     

How big (small?) are fiscal multipliers?

Contributing to the debate on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal stimuli, we show that the impact of government expenditure shocks depends crucially on key country characteristics, such as the level of development, exchange rate regime, openness to trade, and public indebtedness. Based on a novel quarterly dataset of government expenditure in 44 countries, we find that (i) the output effect of an increase in government consumption is larger in industrial than in developing countries; (ii) the fiscal multiplier is relatively large in economies operating under predetermined exchange rates but is zero in economies operating under flexible exchange rates; (iii) fiscal multipliers in open economies are smaller than in closed economies; (iv) fiscal multipliers in high-debt countries are negative.     

Federal fiscal transfers in monetary unions: A NOEM approach

In the debate over EMU, a widely accepted view is that a federal fiscal mechanism is needed for the participating states to cope with asymmetric shocks. In this paper, we explore the properties of federal fiscal transfer schemes with regard to their capability to stabilize national consumption, production and employment. We consider direct transfers among private sectors and indirect transfers among national fiscal authorities. We show that federal fiscal arrangements can provide perfect insurance. Our analysis builds on the New Open Economy Macroeconomics framework which allows us to portray the transmission of shocks and the properties of transfers in detail. JEL Code E42 · E63 · F33 · F42     

The value of fiscal discipline for oil-exporting countries

The value of fiscal discipline is assessed by analyzing the role of fiscal policy as a transmission mechanism of oil price shocks in oil-exporting small open economies. Fiscal policy is an important propagation channel. Taking policy as given by the data, the model can successfully explain the responses of key macroeconomic variables, but it is unable to explain these responses under counterfactual fiscal frameworks. Interestingly, fiscal policy also seems capable of regulating the size of pass-through. Furthermore, fiscal policies that insulate the economy from oil price shocks seem to be welfare improving over procyclical ones.     

A reexamination of state fiscal health and amnesty enactment

We use event history analysis to separately model a state’s first and then repeated tax amnesties and test the revenue yield versus the fiscal stress hypotheses using a panel of annual data from all 50 states for the period 1982–2010. We also split our sample into two sub-periods, 1982–1988 and 1989–2010, to more easily compare our results to other studies and to see if there is a significant difference between early tax amnesties and more recent ones. We find that state fiscal stress is more important than the potential yield from an amnesty, particularly for more recent amnesties. Our findings contrast with the existing literature which found evidence that states are likely to enact tax amnesties due to a revenue yield motive rather than a fiscal stress motive.     

The role of the state in fiscal theory

This paper traces the nexus between fiscal theory and the theory of state as it emerged from the close of the 18th century to date. Four variants of the fiscal state are distinguished. First, there is the classical view of the service state, needed to adjust for externality-based market failure, and to do so to approximate a market solution. Next, there is the welfare state, designed to correct the market-determined state of distribution, based on what society views as a fair or optimal pattern. Attention then turns to the communal model, where individuals recognize communal as well as private concerns. Finally, note is taken of the flawed state, where maximizing behavior of governmental agents shifts attention from market to policy failure. The changing nexus between state and fiscal theory, and its place in various fiscal traditions is noted.Paper presented at the first Plenary Session on Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the Role of the State, IIPF Congress, Lisbon, August 21, 1995.     

A balance-sheet approach to fiscal sustainability

This paper proposes an alternative methodology to assess fiscal sustainability. Our balance-sheet approach (BSA) relies on estimating separately all of a government's assets and liabilities as opposed to focusing only on the burden of explicit liabilities. In our approach, assets are primarily the present discounted value of taxes, and liabilities include explicit liabilities but also the present discounted value of expenditures. Using the value of assets and liabilities, we compute the government's balance sheet, and therefore net worth. We then evaluate the response of net worth to growth, commodity prices or real exchange rate shocks. By computing a value for the government's net worth, our methodology allows an assessment of fiscal sustainability that is less reliant on the analyst's assumptions than traditional debt sustainability analysis (DSA).     

Quantifying the cyclically adjusted fiscal stance for India

Taking cue from recent debate in the literature, we attempt to disentangle cyclically adjusted fiscal balance (CAB) for India broadly using the methodology recommended by the IMF, an indigenous revenue elasticity for India and a range of potential output estimates. Our results indicate that after initial success in containing CAB, it increased considerably during the crisis period. Notwithstanding a positive output gap in the post-crisis period (2009–11) and subsequent increase in inflation, the CAB continued to be expansionary, with limited withdrawal of expansionary stance, albeit a reduction in fiscal impulse. This calls for further reforms and binding framework that can withstand business cycles.     

A modern history of fiscal prudence and profligacy

Drawing on a newly collected historical dataset of fiscal stocks and flows, we analyze the determinants of variation, both across countries and over time, in how fiscal policy responds to increases in the government debt-to-GDP ratio. The fiscal data comprise revenues, primary expenditures, interest bill, and government debt for 55 countries for up to two hundred years. The policy response (increase in the primary fiscal balance in response to debt increases) is found to be significantly weaker when sovereign borrowing costs are low, inflation is high, and potential economic growth worsens unexpectedly. These results are robust to political factors.     

Zoning and fiscal interdependencies

Although there are strong theoretical reasons to regard optimal zoning and fiscal policies as simultaneous decisions, most empirical studies have focused on one type of decision or the other. Even fewer attempts have been made to study interdependencies between competing towns in their selection of zoning and fiscal policies. If these interdependencies are prevalent, autonomous local governments may pursue zoning, taxing, and spending policies that are locally rational but socially inefficient. In this study, an optimization model of the local economy is used to illustrate the nature of these interdependencies and to specify an appropriate empirical test. Data from 164 Connecticut townships are used to estimate the empirical model.     

Cyclical fiscal policy,credit constraints,and industry growth

What are the effects of cyclical fiscal policy on industry growth? We show that industries with a relatively heavier reliance on external finance or lower asset tangibility tend to grow faster (in terms of both value added and of labor productivity growth) in countries that implement fiscal policies that are more countercyclical. We reach this conclusion using Rajan and Zingales׳s (1998) difference-in-difference methodology on a panel data sample of manufacturing industries across 15 OECD countries over the period 1980–2005.     

Sovereign risk premia: The link between fiscal rules and stability culture

There is a growing empirical literature studying whether permanent constraints on fiscal policy, such as fiscal rules, reduce sovereign risk premia. Nevertheless, it remains an open question whether these rules are effective genuinely or just because they mirror fiscal preferences of politicians and voters. In our analysis of European bond spreads before the financial crisis, we shed light on this issue by employing several types of stability preference related proxies. These proxies refer to a country's past stability performance, government characteristics and survey results related to general trust. We find evidence that these preference indicators affect sovereign bond spreads and dampen the measurable impact of fiscal rules. Yet, the interaction of stability preferences and rules points to a particular potential of fiscal rules to restore market confidence in countries with a historical lack of stability culture.