P2P网络借贷的风险与监管

P2P（peer-to-peer）网络借贷是指通过第三方网络平台,实现个人对个人的小额借款。P2P网络借贷的主要风险有借款人违约的风险、糟糕的分散化投资组合、网络借贷公司的经营风险、利率上升的风险等,由于P2P网络借贷涉及的投资者人数众多,借款人承担的利率远高于银行贷款利率,客观上存在较大坏帐风险。在现阶段的投资者缺乏“责任自负”观念的情况下,一旦出现问题很容易引发群体性事件。通过及早实施必要的监管,可以大大降低该行业的风险。     

P2P网络借贷违约风险的影响因素研究

互联网金融的发展使得P2P网络借贷引起人们关注,借贷违约风险也必须引起重视。本文使用美国P2P网络借贷平台Lending Club2007年至2012年的数据,采用Logit模型对P2P网络借贷违约风险的影响因素进行分析,最终得出的结论是,贷款期限、借款人工作情况、财务状况、信用评级、住房情况和贷款用途对贷款违约风险都具有显著影响。     

信贷市场存在行业歧视吗——以P2P网络借贷为例的研究

P2P网络借贷是互联网金融的主要业务模式之一,也是一种新型的信贷模式。不同于传统信贷模式,P2P网络借贷依托互联网技术撮合借贷双方直接完成信用交易,无须传统金融中介参与。借助人人贷平台的大数据优势,本文研究发现:中国P2P网络借贷市场存在行业偏好,具体表现为工作行业会对借款的满标率、成功率产生显著影响;进一步研究发现,该偏好其实是一种行业歧视,投资者以出借资金安全性或者损失投资预期收益为代价而选择投资于违约风险高的部分行业的借款人,即使在IT行业、金融/法律行业工作的借款人可以显著地提高投资人的福利,但其资金可得性并没有相应的提高;从解决机制来看,借款人完成工作认证、提高信息质量可以降低行业偏好,但不能消除行业歧视。     

P2P网络借贷平台风险管理研究

互联网金融在我国呈现出了爆发式的增长,尤其是P2P网络借贷市场,无论是平台数量还是市场借贷数额,都呈现快速增长的趋势,这对我国金融体制改革有着巨大的推动作用。一方面我们看到了P2P网贷行业的巨大发展前景,另一方面我们也必须正视P2P网贷平台的风险。本文认为P2P网络借贷平台主要问题有信息不对称问题、征信体系问题、风险管理模式问题、网络技术安全问题、内部员工管理问题和可能涉及投资人洗钱风险。这些风险严重影响了P2P网贷市场的发展,因此,P2P网络借贷平台必须加强风险管理,加强借款人审核力度,引入第三方担保机制,加强投资人审核,杜绝洗钱风险,同时也要加强内部员工管理,维护平台网络技术安全,加强信息披露。通过这些措施来摆脱困境,提升平台竞争实力。     

P2P网络借贷信用风险保障机制研究

P2P网络借贷模式中,平台不承担信用风险,信用风险的实际承担者是贷款人。在实际操作中,平台负责贷款审批和违约追讨等信用风险管控工作,而贷款人只能根据平台提供的信息进行出借,也就意味着P2P网络借贷中,风险管控者和风险承担者出现了分离。出于追求更高利益的考虑,平台有放松贷款风险管控的可能。这就造成了贷款人需要承担更大的信用风险,进而抑制行业的发展。因此,为打破抑制,平台就必须提供保障机制,以降低投资者的担忧。     

我国P2P网贷平台风险防范研究

P2P网贷是微金融运营模式的创新,主要为解决个人借贷和小微企业融资难问题,P2P网贷使得长期被压抑的民间金融需求获得释放。P2P借贷手续方便、灵活、快捷,自2007年引入中国以来,P2P平台在我国发展迅速。在其高成功率的背后,存在政策风险、信贷技术风险、信用风险、监管风险等诸多风险。而这些风险的源头,与P2P网络借贷平台法律制度缺失、监管职责不明、征信体系不完善等息息相关。因此,应当建立健全相关法律规范,明确P2P网贷平台的法律性质和监管主体,完善资金担保及托管服务。规范和促进行业健康发展,使其发挥积极作用具有一定的借鉴意义。     

共享金融下P2P网络借贷风险和发展机遇

共享金融作为一种新兴的金融业态和一个金融资源供求双方的直接交易系统,在推动共享经济发展以及实现"普惠金融"方面具有独特的优势。P2P网络借贷作为互联网金融的经典形式,加速了从传统金融到共享金融的演变进程,但同时也伴随着风险。本文站在出借人角度,将P2P网络借贷风险分为平台自身问题风险和借款人违约风险,选取2015年3月到2016年2月的数据样本和案例,深入分析问题平台的风险因素,找出共享金融背景下P2P网络借贷平台未来的发展机遇,为P2P网贷行业的发展提供理论基础。     

我国P2P网络借贷平台风险监管及防范北大核心CSSCI

随着我国经济以及互联网技术的不断发展,随着人们对投资理财需求的越来越大,P2P借贷进入我国市场后受到了广大投资者和借款人的追捧,行业规模不断扩张,交易规模快速增长,相关政策日益完善。然而,问题平台非法营运的存在以及行业监管的缺失,导致近几年我国P2P网络借贷平台问题频发。为进一步完善对我国P2P网络借贷平台风险的监管,避免给投资者造成巨大和难以弥补的财产损失,必须出台相关法律,明确监管主体,加强行业自律,防范法律风险;必须进行资金托管,设立风险准备金,防范经营风险;必须建立个人信用评价体系,设立风险分散机制,防范信用风险。     

我国P2P网络借贷风险分析及防范

随着我国互联网金融的发展,P2P借贷也应运而生。目前,我国P2P网络借贷的规模已经非常庞大。网络借贷在为人们的生活提供便利的同时,也暴露出种种风险,本文深入剖析了P2P网络借贷面临的监管不到位、P2P平台风险高、借款人失信风险大等问题,并提出了加强法制建设、将网贷纳入社会征信体系、加强网贷平台自身建设等政策建议,力图探索一条P2P网络借贷稳健高效的发展之路。     

中国P2P发展展望

随着近年来互联网金融的发展,作为目前互联网金融创新的P2P网络借贷,其平台得到了高速发展。近年来,其提供大众一种新颖的、高收益的理财方式,现阶段处于无要求、无标准、无监管的时期。网络借贷行业的收益率也远远超过传统理财机构,同时增大了原本还款能力不足的借款人违约概率。P2P网络借贷在欧美国家兴起,其借贷平台打破了传统的以银行为中介的借贷模式,创建了全新的以网络平台为媒介的新型借贷模式,为投资者提供了更多参与金融市场的机会。在多重因素的刺激下,中国P2P网络借贷平台在许多因素的促进下得到了快速发展,从而促进了越来越多的人对中国P2P的投资。     

次贷危机背景下我国商业银行对个人住房信贷风险的防范

美国次贷危机已演变成为了全球性的金融危机。我国商业银行的个人住房信贷扩张累积了较大风险与个贷危机,次贷危机的冲击将使个人住房贷款者信用风险的集中爆发,也会使房地产市场发展的不确定性风险加大等问题完全暴露。我国商业银行必须采取措施,提前防范其对银行体系内个人住房信贷所产生的不良影响,严格控制个人住房贷款者的信用级别,完善并严厉执行银行体系的内部控制,增强银行自身的流动性,加强金融创新监管,以全面保证商业银行信贷资产运作的安全性。     

Does Mood Affect the Efficiency of Credit Approval? Evidence from Online Peer-to-Peer Lending

Using a large dataset obtained from “Paipaidai,” an online peer-to-peer lending platform in China, we examine whether credit officers’ mood affects the efficiency of credit approval from a perspective of individual decision-making. Refering to studies in psychology and financial economics, we employ season, temperature and weather as mood proxies, and control the variables related to the quality of the loan to study credit approval behavior under different mood conditions. The results suggest that the efficiency of credit approval by individual credit officers is significantly correlated with their mood—a positive mood improves efficiency, while a negative mood reduces it. Specifically, loans examined under better mood conditions (e.g., during spring, comfortable temperatures, and sunny days) have a significantly higher probability of approval, but a lower probability of default if approved; and those examined under poorer mood conditions show a lower probability of approval and a higher probability of default if approved. This effect of mood is even stronger when a loan application is more complex, atypical, or unusual to evaluate. Moreover, investor sentiment, denoted by closed-end fund premiums, has the same effect on credit approval as well.     

Basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance

I analyse the role of multilateral financial institutions in a world of global capital markets assuming that they have an informational advantage over private lenders in the market for sovereign debt. I show that the adverse selection problem in this market may be solved through certification if the multilateral agency does not care too much about borrower country welfare. However, with lending the private information of the agency will be revealed whatever its weighting of borrower welfare vs. private lenders' profits. Multilateral lending on concessional terms also alleviates the moral hazard problem — that investment in creditworthy borrowers is reduced as private lenders seek to avoid ex post default by constraining credit.     

中小企业融资中的自有资金信贷机制

银行贷款收益取决于贷款利率和贷款风险两个因素。在贷款利率受到管制时,理性的银行为了实现期望利润最大化,要求企业提供足够抵押来规避贷款风险。我国中小企业由于自身特征及所处信贷环境的原因,银行向其贷款风险大,且得不到足够抵押品,也没有第三方提供担保,这就导致中小企业贷款难现象。因此,我国商业银行应该灵活运用抵押、担保、关系贷款和自有资金多种手段,积极构建中小企业的多层次信贷机制体系。     

Credit access for high-risk borrowers in financially concentrated markets: Do SBA loan guarantees help?

The Small Business Administration's (SBA) loan guarantee program was established to correct financial capital market inefficiencies and improve small business access to financial capital. However, the SBA loan guarantee program has been criticized for its failure to improve the performance of financial capital markets available to small businesses. This study considers the financial capital market failure created by lenders' monopoly power (specifically, financial market concentration) in financial capital markets. Based on this potential market failure, a model is derived to evaluate the behavior of lenders and borrowers in financial capital markets. Using the national Survey of Small Business Finance, this study compares the financial characteristics of small business borrowers with and without SBA loan guarantees, and provides a qualitative assessment of the SBA's ability to correct financial capital market inefficiencies. When considering only the interaction between borrower quality and the degree of financial market concentration, high-risk borrowers in high concentration financial markets have a higher probability of receiving an SBA loan guarantee than low-risk borrowers in low concentration financial markets. However, when other factors influencing the demand for financial capital are included in the model, only the borrower attributes (credit risk and age) are significant. While the SBA loan guarantee program appears to partially mitigate the effects of the market failure caused by financial market concentration for high-risk borrowers, the program appears to be better designed to address borrower risk, rather than credit market failure.     

Defaults in bank loans to SMEs during the financial crisis

We investigate the role of (business) collateral and (personal) guarantees alongside small and medium enterprise (SME), lending bank and loan characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, sectors, and geographic locations while controlling for unobserved time effects in predicting default at the peak of the financial crisis. First, we find a positive relation between collateral and default, and a negative relation between guarantees and default. Second, we find a negative relation between the joint influence of collateral and high credit score, and a positive relation between the joint influence of collateral and low credit score and default. We also find a negative relation between the joint influence of guarantees and high credit score. These findings are relevant for SME policies aimed at facilitating access to credit, reducing the cost of borrowing, and decreasing default; risk management of banks; and the application of theories of financial economics in the context of a financial crisis.     

Impacts of the borrower's attributes,loan contract contents,and collateral characteristics on mortgage loan default

This paper explores the factors influencing mortgage loan default and default probability by using the data from the mortgage loans of a case financial institution. The results indicate that the borrower's gender, the borrower's job position, whether the regional codes of the borrower's present residence and registered permanent residence are the same, the degree of relationship between the borrower and the guarantor, the loan-to-value ratio, the use status of collateral, and the located region of collateral are significantly positively correlated with the default probability. However, the education degree and the loan amount are significantly negatively correlated with the default probability.     

Consumer Credit Risk and Pricing

Previous academic studies viewed borrower rejection as a sign of market imperfections in the consumer credit markets, but this view was based upon the assumption that differences in the levels of borrower creditworthiness could not be accurately identified. Today, it is possible to differentiate between types of borrowers, and riskier borrowers can participate in credit markets if they are willing to pay relatively higher borrowing costs. Hence, a more critical issue concerning the performance of these markets should be whether loan prices correctly reflect the level of borrower credit risk. This paper reexamines consumer participation in credit markets looking specifically at issues related to the pricing of borrowers of different credit risk.     

企业资本结构和供应商融资:基于违约风险的考察

以2003—2009年间的1757个公司年度为样本,考察企业资本结构对供应商融资(应付账款和预付账款)的影响。研究发现:企业的资本结构(财务杠杆)对应付账款比例具有显著的负向效应;企业的资本结构(财务杠杆)对预付账款比例具有显著的正向效应;投资者保护程度较强的企业(国有控股企业和大规模企业)能够获得更多的供应商融资。     

商业性小额贷款公司能惠及三农和微小客户吗?

利用42家小额贷款公司的调查数据,剖析小额贷款公司的业务活动特征和影响小额贷款公司贷款覆盖深度的因素。通过描述统计和计量模型分析,研究发现:小额贷款公司倾向于服务微小企业和农村大户,其贷款以短期、非信用贷款为主,利率水平较高;采用的信贷技术、营业费用率、所在地区经济发展水平和金融市场的竞争程度对小额贷款公司的贷款覆盖深度有显著影响,而资产规模和资产回报率对小额贷款公司的贷款覆盖深度影响不显著。