中美欧贸易报复制度的比较研究

WTO体制下,贸易报复是争端解决的最后保障,但WTO争端机制旨在解决成员之间的争端,因此,要赋予私人请求本国政府对另一国家进行贸易报复的权利,仍然需要国内立法.目前,各主要大国都通过国内立法赋予本国国民权利,以请求本国政府对另一国家进行贸易报复,为争端解决的国内程序和国际程序的衔接提供了基础,使得本国国民可以通过国内程序启动WTO的争端解决程序.与美欧相比,我国关于贸易报复的立法和实践经验均不甚丰富,确实需要借鉴较为完备的美欧立法,完善我国的有关法律制度.     

Historical Learning in the Design of WTO Rules: The EC Sugar Case

The Uruguay Round Agreement made significant changes to the governance of international trade. Trade rules and dispute settlement mechanisms were altered and a series of specific agreements provided for liberalisation across economic sectors. The Agreement on Agriculture, arguably the most difficult and contentious to negotiate, permitted the continued use of trade‐distorting instruments, both domestically and at the border. Rule‐enforcement in agriculture therefore relies crucially on the clarity of the rules. This paper provides an in‐depth study of a unique and critical case for understanding the new rules: the EC sugar regime. This policy was challenged unsuccessfully under the pre‐Uruguay Round rules, but successfully under the new rules. This case is particularly valuable in allowing us to isolate the effect of the Uruguay Round on agricultural trade disputes: the policy under challenge was essentially unchanged and the legal actions addressed the same concern – excessive export subsidisation. Drawing on primary and secondary materials and interviews with key policy actors, sugar is used to illustrate how those involved in the multilateral process learned from particular rule weaknesses revealed in earlier cases, revising those rules in the Uruguay Round in such a way that dispute panels can more readily and objectively determine rule breaches.     

Ethische Maßstäbe für gerechte Regeln des Welthandels

Transparent and fair trade agreements, supportive institutions, and greater political and civil participation are necessary to make sure that ongoing economic development – which is hugely accelerated by international trade – will not leave millions of people behind or ruin the planet. Multilateral trade agreements have the potential to strengthen cooperation between nations, to increase human wealth and well being, and to serve the global common good. In order to do so, they must be based on several principles of justice, such as procedural justice, transactional justice, needs based justice, equal opportunity justice and intergenerational justice. If these principles are successfully applied, multilateral trade agreements can be much more effective in serving the global common good than trade fragmentation, protectionism or mercantilism ever could.     

Trade disputes,quality choice,and economic integration

Recent work demonstrates the importance of developing high quality output in order to compete in export markets and other recent studies verify the prevalence of fixed and ongoing trade costs while participating in those markets. I consider the joint choice of quality and export promotion costs when trade relationships are subject to temporary disputes. When transparency is low and macroeconomic instability is high, disputes arrive more frequently and, therefore, firms may inefficiently choose lower levels of quality and export promotion. These, in turn, build shallower trading relationships with less trade volumes and higher tariffs, and generate greater trade reductions during the more common trade disputes. Several institutional features of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism that are generally lacking in preferential trade agreements such as improved transparency, dispute investigation, and the provision to recommend asymmetric continuation payoffs can ameliorate these inefficient quality choice outcomes. Hence, lower quality output and lower quality trading relationships may be more endemic to countries that depend on preferential trading areas as opposed to the WTO.     

经调解产生的国际商事和解协议的执行困境与突破——兼论《新加坡调解公约》与中国法律体系的衔接

经调解产生的国际商事和解协议因缺乏统一高效执行机制而使其高效、经济、友好地解决国际商事争议的优势难以充分彰显。新近生效的《新加坡调解公约》为国际商事和解协议的统一高效执行提供了国际法律框架。中国尚未建立完整的调解立法体系,更没有独立的商事调解法,也未形成专业化和职业化的调解队伍,还未培育出成熟的社会诚信体系,有碍国际商事和解协议的执行。为有效应对国际商事和解协议的执行困境,在中国已签署《新加坡调解公约》的背景下,建议积极研究该公约与中国法律制度的衔接问题,完善商事调解法律规范并适时制定独立的商事调解法,建立专职调解员队伍,培育成熟的社会诚信体系。     

(When) Does Tit‐for‐tat Diplomacy in Trade Policy Pay Off?

In international relations, short‐run incentives for non‐cooperation often dominate. Yet, (external) institutions for enforcing cooperation are hampered by national sovereignty, supposedly strengthening the role of self‐enforcing mechanisms. This paper examines their scope with a focus on contingent protection aka tit‐for‐tat in trade policy. Highlighting various strategies in a partial equilibrium framework, we show that retaliation of non‐cooperative behaviour by limiting market access works as a disciplining device quite independently of supply and demand parameters. Our empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical results in that countries more frequently involved in WTO‐mediated disputes entailing tit‐for‐tat strategies pursue on average more liberal trade regimes.     

Trade skirmishes safeguards: A theory of the WTO dispute settlement process

I propose a framework within which to interpret and evaluate the major reforms introduced to the GATT system in its transition to the WTO. In particular, I examine the WTO Agreement on Safeguards that has amended the GATT escape clause (Article XIX), and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) that resembles a court of law under the WTO. Using this framework, I interpret the weakening of the reciprocity principle under the Agreement on Safeguards as an attempt to reduce efficiency-reducing trade skirmishes. The DSB is interpreted as an impartial arbitrator that announces its opinion about the state of the world when a dispute arises among member countries. I demonstrate that the reforms in the GATT escape clause should be bundled with the introduction of the DSB, in order to maintain the incentive compatibility of trade agreements. The model implies that trade agreements under the WTO lead to fewer trade skirmishes but this effect does not necessarily result in higher payoffs to the governments. The model also implies that the introduction of the WTO court, which has no enforcement power, can improve the self-enforceability of trade agreements.     

The WTO,the Environment and Health and Safety Standards

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a product of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO was created in the last round of negotiations (Uruguay Round, 1986‐94) to provide a stronger set of institutions to administer the various agreements negotiated under the GATT framework. Because the WTO is more powerful than its predecessors, critics claim that it poses a threat to national sovereignty. Concerns about the ability of nations to set their own environmental and health and safety agendas have figured prominently in these critiques. In addition, critics suggest that the WTO prioritises trade objectives at the expense of environmental and health and safety objectives. The article explores the extent to which the WTO has been able to reconcile trade, environmental and health and safety objectives by analysing its rulings on these matters. Overall, this analysis suggests that the WTO dispute resolution process has balanced all three sets of objectives. However, it is important to note the small number of disputes to date; only 21of the 175 disputes before the WTO involve environmental and health and safety matters. Further, the WTO has issued decisions in only six of these cases.     

Aggressive Legalism: The Rules of the WTO and Japan’s Emerging Trade Strategy

Over the course of the last decade there has been a significant change in Japan’s trade strategy, one that has remained seriously unappreciated for both its contents and its policy implications. The heart of this unfolding strategy is the active use of the legal rules in the treaties and agreements overseen by the WTO to counter what the Japanese government deems to be the unreasonable acts, requests, and practices of its major trade partners. To wit, the Japanese government is deliberately using both the procedural and substantive rules of the WTO to matter to the results and outcomes of major trade disputes involving Japan. And in a relatively short time, it has shown how these rules can be made to serve as both ‘shield’ and ‘sword’ in high‐profile trade disputes. This is the strategy that Japan has embraced as the principal means of dealing with its major trade partners, and it reveals much about both a new Japan and the power of international law.     

中国自贸区建设现状及其对策研究

近年来,中国加快了自贸区建设的推进速度,截至2019年底,已签订了17个自贸协定。相对而言,中国签订的自贸协定规则覆盖面还比较小、规则标准还比较低。与此同时,以CPTPP、USMCA协定为代表的高标准自贸协定,形成了数字贸易规则、知识产权规则、国有企业规则等多个非传统领域规则。我国应坚持长期宏观战略利益高于短期经济利益、先广覆盖后高标准价值导向和大型新兴经济体与发达经济体自贸谈判并重的原则,从组织上建立直属于最高决策机构的高标准自贸区战略机构、加强对非传统领域议题的整理与研究、建立针对新规则的损益衡量指标体系、健全高标准自贸区谈判的产业受损补偿机制,加快推进我国高标准自贸区建设。     

Trade Negotiations in the Americas and What They Mean for You

The United States is engaged in two huge trade negotiations—the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership—that will have a profound impact on our economy and on the world trade system. These agreements can be an important template for new rules governing world trade, and they address some important new areas, such as regulatory issues. However, if they are to be a good template, U.S. negotiators have to alter some of their proposals, and these new agreements have to prohibit predatory trade practices, such as currency manipulation.     

The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO: A Brief History and an Evaluation from Economic,Contractarian and Legal Perspectives

Any rule‐based system has to include a mechanism for the enforcement of its rules and a means for settlement of disputes about alleged violation of rules. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded in 1947, and its successor the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that subsumed it in 1995, embody rules governing the global trading system as specified in various agreements that their members have entered into over time. Naturally, both had a dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). It was a primarily political one in the GATT and was transformed into a largely legalistic one in the multilateral agreement that established the WTO. This paper reviews the history and evaluation of the two DSMs and examines their efficiency based on appropriate criteria. It views them from three alternative and overlapping perspectives: political‐diplomatic, legal‐economic and social. It concludes with a discussion of the unresolved problems in the operation of the WTO's DSM and the prospects of resolving them in the ongoing Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.     

Currency Undervaluation and Sovereign Wealth Funds: A New Role for the World Trade Organization

Two aspects of global imbalances – undervalued exchange rates and sovereign wealth funds – require a multilateral response. For reasons of inadequate leverage and eroding legitimacy, the International Monetary Fund has not been effective in dealing with undervalued exchange rates. This paper proposes new rules in the World Trade Organization to discipline cases of significant undervaluation that are clearly attributable to government action. The rationale for WTO involvement is that there are large trade consequences of undervalued exchange rates, which act as both import tariffs and export subsidies, and that the WTO's enforcement mechanism is credible and effective. The World Trade Organization would not be involved in exchange rate management, and would not displace the International Monetary Fund. Rather, the authors suggest ways to harness the comparative advantage of the two institutions, with the International Monetary Fund providing the essential technical expertise in the World Trade Organization's enforcement process. There is a bargain to be struck between countries with sovereign wealth funds, which want secure and liberal access for their capital, and capital‐importing countries, which have concerns about the objectives and operations of sovereign wealth funds. The World Trade Organization is the natural place to strike this bargain. Its General Agreement on Trade in Services already covers investments by sovereign wealth funds, and other agreements offer a precedent for designing disciplines for these funds. Placing exchange rates and sovereign wealth funds on the trade negotiating agenda may help revive the Doha Round by rekindling the interest of a wide variety of groups.     

论我国承认与执行“一带一路”国家民商事判决的制度完善

在“一带一路”合作推进过程中,与贸易有关的法律纠纷在所难免,完美地解决贸易法律纠纷势必涉及承认与执行他国法院判决的问题。本文探讨了我国与沿线国家之间关于外国民商事判决的承认与执行的完善路径,通过与沿线国签订相关的双边条约、积极参与国际公约和区域性公约的制定、完善国内立法以及借鉴《选择法院协议公约》的规定等,以期在“一带一路”进程中进一步提升司法合作,促进“一带一路”合作的顺利进行。     

Trade Policy and the Obama Administration

During his primary campaign, President Obama took an aggressive stance on trade, suggesting a protectionist drift in U.S. trade policy. However, it seems more likely that policy will focus more on enforcement of existing rights than on protectionist initiatives. The major influences on trade policy are likely to be multilateral approaches to trade problems, broad foreign policy concerns, the impact of trade policy on recovery from the current recession, and global climate change initiatives. Holdover initiatives on the World Trade Organization's Doha round and bilateral agreements will be joined by global climate change as the principal policy issues for the next few years.     

In or Out? Standards,Discretion, Compliance and the WTO

Self‐enforcement in international agreements in the presence of uncertainty in the form of shocks and imperfect information regarding the extent of compliance by other members is enhanced by the use of standards in performance of commitments. Standards are less precise than rules. They must be sufficiently demanding that undercompliance is distinguishable from non‐compliance. Discretion permits undercompliance as an alternative to renegotiation of commitments, safeguards and the filing of disputes. Undercompliance, particularly when restrained, is a lower cost and less confrontational resolution to addressing adverse shocks. Signatories are restrained in undercomplying so that the effects of their actions are imperfectly distinguishable from the effects of shocks. Compliance and evidentiary standards for formal disputes define the accomplishments of the agreement. Evidentiary standards serve as an important discipline to undercompliance even in the absence of formal disputes.     

Tarifeinheit versus Tarifpluralität: Konfliktintensität von Verhandlungen

In some industries, wage negotiations are conducted not only by labour unions covering the whole sector but also by craft unions representing single occupations. A comprehensive evaluation of wage disputes in Germany shows that craft unions are especially confrontational. Particular problems arise if several conflict-prone unions representing employees of the same company enter into competition with each other. The cumulative effects of such a situation can undermine the legal ban on industrial action while a collective wage agreement is in force. This damage could be limited by legislation regulating competition among trade unions and restoring exclusivity for wage agreements at the plant level (one company = one agreement).     

The U.S./EU Beef Controversy and a Proposed Framework for Resolving Standards Disputes in International Trade

While world trading institutions such as GATT and its successor, the WTO, have made significant progress in addressing tariff barriers as well as some non‐tariff barriers, trade disputes over product standards appear to be increasing in number and intensity. Product standards refer to measures governments take to ensure that products sold in their home market meet health, safety, and quality requirements consistent with the public interest. The longstanding controversy between the European Union and the United States over the export of hormone treated beef is used as a case study to illustrate the difficulty of resolving product standards disputes.     

Canada's Anti‐dumping and Safeguard Policies: Overt and Subtle Forms of Discrimination

Like many countries in the international trading system, Canada repeatedly faces political pressure from industries seeking protection from import competition. I examine Canadian policymakers’ response to this pressure within the economic environment created by its participation in discriminatory trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In particular, I exploit new sources of data on Canada's use of potentially WTO‐consistent import‐restricting policies such as anti‐dumping, global safeguards and a China‐specific safeguard. I illustrate subtle ways in which Canadian policymakers may be structuring the application of such policies so as to reinforce the discrimination inherent in Canada's external trade policy because of the preferences granted to the United States and Mexico through NAFTA.