国际税收制度及我国涉外税收优惠

一、国家间划分税收管辖权的实质在国际投资活动中,对跨国投资者的征税问题原则上由国内法加以规范。依照国际法,每个主权国家除受到国际条约和国际习惯的限制以外,都可以采用它们认为最合适的原则和规定来行使税收管辖权。因而,税种的多少、税率的高低、税负的轻重,各国通常是有差异的。国家主权的属地优越权反映在国际税收上表现为收入来源地管辖权;属人优越权反映在国际税收上则表现为居民管辖权。     

跨国电子商务对国际税收管辖权的挑战及应对策略

跨国电子商务给国际贸易带来便利的同时,也对国际税收管辖权带来挑战,使传统居民税收管辖权、收入来源地税收管辖权的执行遇到困难,且便利国际避税行为、严重影响一国经济利益。面对跨国电子商务带来的挑战,国际社会提出不少观点与解决方案,然而都存在缺陷,不能很好解决跨国电子商务带来的问题。解决跨国电子商务下的税收管辖权问题,要强化跨国电子商务税收征管,以＂比特税＂形式对电子商务关税及其它流转税征收,厘清税收管辖权等。     

电子商务环境下若干税法及税收问题的研究

电子商务作为21世纪信息时代的一种新兴的重要贸易活动,它突飞猛进的发展和特有的交易方式,对现有的税收法律制度提出了严峻的挑战,动摇了传统税收法律制度适用电子商务税收及相关问题的平衡状态。本文针对电子商务税法中的若干问题展开分析,探求可行的解决方案,以期为促进我国电子商务税法的完善提供参考。     

电子商务中的税收法律问题探讨

电子商务的发展使现行税收法律制度面临着挑战。应在坚持公平、中性、国家税收主权和适当优惠的原则下,修改、完善税收实体法和税收征管法,构建我国电子商务下的税收法律体系。     

电子商务与税收管辖权冲突问题研究

电子商务是以信息经济为基础的新型贸易方式,它的广泛应用和发展,给传统的税收管辖权制度带来了严峻的挑战.本文从分析电子商务的特性入手分析税收管辖权冲突的原因及解决的对策.     

电子商务与税收管辖权冲突问题研究

电子商务是以信息经济为基础的新型贸易方式,它的广泛应用和发展,给传统的税收管辖权制度带来了严峻的挑战。本文从分析电子商务的特性入手分析税收管辖权冲突的原因及解决的对策。     

电子商务税收管辖权模型与实现

本文分析了互联网商业中存在的税收问题,提出了电子商务税收管辖权的几种模式。在此基础上探讨了两个问题．其一是全球电子商务的最适宜的税收管辖权模型应是基于消费者,其二是基于消费者的管辖权模型如何实现。     

我国电子商务税收问题探讨

我国电子商务的快速发展,为企业节约了成本,提高了效率;满足和提升了消费需求,改善民生,带动就业;为国民经济的发展创造着新的增长点.然而,电子商务也对现行税收原则、制度和征管模式提出了全面的挑战.本文结合我国的国情和电子商务的发展状况,基于税收中性、税收公平、财政收入、国家主权等的原则,提出从宏观层面加大科技产业的资金投入与扶持力度,提高税收征管人员的综合素质水平,健全和完善现行税收法律制度,提高公民自觉纳税的意识,加强国际间的交流与合作等;微观层面上对电子商务、特别是网络零售商设置较高的起征点,对电子商务适用合适的税种,确定合理的电子商务税收管辖权,电子商务出口退税的同步实施,“宽税基、低税率”的税收良性循环,为我国电子商务的快速发展及相关税收政策的制定提供借鉴.     

论电子商务条件下税法设计的基本原则

电子商务作为全新的贸易形式,具有交易虚拟化、全球化、隐蔽化和成本低廉等特点。电子商务活动虽然使现行税法中的某些规定不能适用或不能完全适用,但是,其并未对税收法律关系本身产生根本性的影响,因此,完善电子商务时代的税收法律制度仍应遵循税法的基本原则,即税收法定原则、税收中性原则、税收公平原则、税收效率原则和税收社会政策原则。     

电子商务对税收的影响及解决对策

电子商务是一种全新的市场运作方式,伴随着这种新型贸易方式的出现和发展,市场交易中部分商品的性质发生了变化,从＂有形＂变为＂无形＂。因此,适应传统贸易方式的税收征管制度及税收法律法规已远远不能适应电子商务贸易方式下的税收征管。从六个方面阐述了电子商务对税收的影响,并提出了一些相应的解决对策,以保证电子商务市场的正常运行。     

离岸金融税收征管法制及其在中国的构建

离岸金融税收征管法制主要涉及税收征管原则、国际避税和税收管辖权冲突等问题。实行优惠税制,是全球各离岸金融市场所在国在税收征管方面奉行的一项普遍原则,但各离岸金融中心在税收优惠程度上存在差异。在构建中国离岸金融税收征管法制的过程中,中国在税收征管原则上可以采取中等程度的税收优惠政策,在避税问题上也应采取适中的容忍态度并可以尝试通过预约定价（APA）机制来调整关联企业在离岸市场上的转移定价行为,在离岸金融税收管辖权冲突的解决上应积极参与国际协调。     

The effect of a progressive taxation scheme on the endogenous formation of jurisdictions

This paper analyzes the effect of a progressive taxation scheme on the segregative properties of the endogenous formation of jurisdictions. Households living in the same place form a jurisdiction which aims to produce a local public good and implement a redistribution policy by granting every household a demogrant of an amount determined by the jurisdiction. In every jurisdiction, production of local public services and the demogrant are financed with a local tax based upon the households wealth. Local wealth tax rates and the level of the demogrant are exogenously determined in every jurisdiction. Households are free to leave their jurisdiction for another jurisdiction that would provide them with their highest utility. We found that the existence of a demogrant seems to mitigate the segregative properties of endogenous jurisdiction formation, because the condition identified by Gravel and Thoron to ensure segregation of any stable jurisdiction structure remains necessary, but is no longer sufficient.     

The Effect of Spillovers and Congestion on the Endogenous Formation of Jurisdictions

This paper analyzes the effect of interjurisdictional spillovers and congestion of local public services on the segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions. Households choosing to live at the same place form a jurisdiction which produces congested local public services, which generates positive spillovers to other jurisdictions. In every jurisdiction, the production of the local public services is financed through a local tax based on households' wealth. Local wealth tax rates are democratically determined in every jurisdiction. Households consume the available amount of public services in their jurisdiction and a composite private good. Any household is free to leave its jurisdiction for another that would increase its utility. A necessary and sufficient condition to have every stable jurisdiction structure segregated by wealth is identified: the public services must be either a gross substitute or a gross complement to the private good.     

Itemised Deductions: A Device to Reduce Tax Evasion

With direct incentives and sanctions being the most common instruments to fight tax evasion, the theoretical literature has tended to overlook indirect schemes, such as itemised deductions, in which one agent's behaviour affects the likelihood that others will declare their revenue. Itemised deductions provide an incentive for consumers to declare their purchases. This induces a partial shift in the demand from the black market to the legal one, for consumers need a transaction receipt to enjoy the tax deduction. I show that it is possible to increase tax proceeds by choosing a suitable level of itemised deduction, and this, for any level of taxation. Indeed, the cost for the tax authority on the consumers' side is more than compensated for by the extra proceeds generated on the sellers' side.     

Keeping it off the books: an empirical investigation of firms that engage in tax evasion

This article uses a unique dataset that contains detailed information on firms from around the world to investigate factors that affect under-reporting behaviour. The empirical strategy employed exploits the nature of the dependent variable, which is interval coded, and uses interval regression which provides an asymptotically efficient estimator provided that the classical linear model assumptions hold. These assumptions are investigated using standard diagnostic tests that have been modified for the interval regression model. Evidence is presented that shows that the firms in all regions engage in under-reporting. Regression results indicate that government corruption has the single largest causal effect on under-reporting, resulting in the percentage of sales not reported to the tax authority being 51.3% higher. Taxes have the second single largest causal effect on under-reporting, resulting in the percentage of sales not reported to the tax authority being 18.0% higher, followed by access to financing at 8.9% higher and organized crime at 7.6% higher. Inflation, political instability, exchange rates and the fairness of the legal system were found to have no effect on under-reporting. It is also found that there is a significant correlation between under-reporting and the legal organization of the business, size, age, ownership, competition and audit controls.     

税收流失的博弈分析

从财政交易制度框架内看,税收流失其实是一种交易成本。纳税人与税务当局的非合作博弈,不存在纯战略纳什均衡,但存在混合战略纳什均衡,即税务机关和纳税人分别以一定的概率随机选择稽查和逃税,同时,税收流失也表现为征税中存在的纳税与人政府、政府与纳税人以及政府、税务机关与税务人员三种委托代理问题。因此,依法治税的激励结构设计至少应包括四个方面：保证财政交易制度中的支出面与税收收入基本对称：优化税制;税务机关激励纳税人讲实话的制度安排,对税务人员的激励。     

Endogenizing leadership in tax competition

In this paper we extend the standard approach of horizontal tax competition by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by the competing jurisdictions. Following the literature on the endogenous timing in duopoly games, we consider a pre-play stage, where jurisdictions commit themselves to move early or late, i.e. to fix their tax rate at a first or second stage. We highlight that at least one jurisdiction experiments a second-mover advantage. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPEs) correspond to the two Stackelberg situations yielding to a coordination problem. In order to solve this issue, we consider a quadratic specification of the production function, and we use two criteria of selection: Pareto-dominance and risk-dominance. We emphasize that at the risk-dominant equilibrium the less productive or smaller jurisdiction leads and hence loses the second-mover advantage. If asymmetry among jurisdictions is sufficient, Pareto-dominance reinforces risk-dominance in selecting the same SPE. Three results may be deduced from our analysis: (i) the downward pressure on tax rates is less severe than predicted; (ii) the smaller jurisdiction leads; (iii) the ‘big-country-higher-tax-rate’ rule does not always hold.     

Federal TAX Competition – How does the Institutional Structure of a Country change Tax Outcomes?

The interrelations of taxation and federal structure have been extensively analysed from various perspectives. The present paper looks at two competing countries of different institutional structures. It examines how the tax rates set at each level of both countries vary in a given setting, when a federal and a unitary country compete for mobile tax base, or both countries are organised as federations. The paper discusses whether or not tax rates set in every jurisdiction will be too high or too low in equilibrium. The externalities triggered by a tax regime change are analysed and the respective impact on revenues is considered. The results essentially hinge on the relative strategic interaction of tax rates, as well as the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate.     

论我国税收源泉扣缴制度之完善

源泉扣缴是税款征收的重要方式之一,能有效地控制税源、节约税收成本、提高征管效率。我国源泉扣缴制度存在法律规定层级多、不同层级税收法律规定相抵触等问题。针对我国源泉扣缴制度中存在的问题,应在《税收基本法》中明确源泉扣缴的概念、原则;统一税收实体法中的相关规定,从而完善制度体系;在《税收征管法》中明确扣缴义务人的法律地位,改变扣缴义务人权利和义务失衡的状态,明确区分源泉扣缴和委托代征。