Corporate payout policy in dual-class firms

We examine corporate payout policy in dual-class firms. The expropriation hypothesis predicts that dual-class firms pay out less to shareholders because entrenched managers want to maximize the value of assets under control and the associated private benefits. The pre-commitment hypothesis predicts that dual-class firms pay out more to shareholders because firms use corporate payouts as a pre-commitment device to mitigate agency costs. Our results support the pre-commitment hypothesis. Dual-class firms have higher cash dividend payments and total payouts, and they use more regular cash dividends rather than special dividends or repurchases, compared to their propensity-matched single-class firms. Dual-class firms with severe free cash flow-related agency problems and few growth opportunities rely even more on corporate payouts as a pre-commitment mechanism. We also rule out the alternative explanation that dual-class firms pay out more because super-voting shareholders lack the ability to generate home-made dividends by selling shares since super-voting shares are often non-tradable or very illiquid.     

Staggered Boards,Managerial Entrenchment,and Dividend Policy

Motivated by agency theory, we explore the potential impact of managerial entrenchment through staggered boards on dividend policy. The evidence suggests that firms with staggered boards are more likely to pay dividends. Among firms that pay dividends, those with staggered boards pay larger dividends. We also show that the impact of staggered boards on dividend payouts is substantially stronger (as much as two to three times larger) than the effect of all other corporate governance provisions combined. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the notion that dividends help alleviate agency conflicts. Thus, firms more vulnerable to managerial entrenchment, i.e., firms with staggered boards, rely more on dividends to mitigate agency costs. Aware of potential endogeneity, we demonstrate that staggered boards likely bring about, and are not merely associated with, larger dividend payouts. Our results are important, as they show that certain governance provisions have considerably more influence than others on critical corporate activities such as dividend payout decisions.

Cash dividends,stock dividends and subsequent earnings growth

This study examines the association between dividend payout ratios and subsequent earnings growth using a unique dataset on Taiwanese firms paying dual dividends. The practice of paying dual dividends, which is quite common in Taiwan, gives rise to a novel ‘balanced-dividend hypothesis’ to be addressed in this study. The main thrusts of the hypothesis are that high cash-dividend payouts may reduce agency costs, and that high stock-dividend payouts provide a signal of optimism. The empirical evidence shows that a significant positive association between dividend payout ratios and subsequent earnings growth exists only in the dual-dividend payouts sample. After further dividing the whole sample according to their cash-to-stock ratios, the significantly positive association between dual-dividend payouts and subsequent earnings growth is discernible only in the balanced-dividend sub-samples.     

Agency problems,product market competition and dividend policies in Japan

This study investigates whether product market competition reduces agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in Japan. In particular, we examine firms’ dividend policies in competitive versus concentrated industries. In a large sample of Japanese firms, we find that firms in more competitive industries pay more dividends, are more likely to increase dividends and are less likely to omit dividends. Furthermore, the impact of firm‐level agency problems on dividend payouts is weaker in highly competitive industries. The results suggest that product market competition can be an effective industry‐level governance mechanism that can force managers to disgorge cash to outside investors.     

Dividend payout strategies and bank survival likelihood: A cross-country analysis

In this cross-country study, we examine whether dividend payout decisions affect the survival likelihood of banks. Using unique international banking data from 11 countries from 2010 to 2019, we find that higher levels of cash dividend payouts increase a bank's survival likelihood, as paying dividends lowers agency problems and cost of debt and facilitates greater public monitoring. Our extended analysis shows an inverted U-shaped relation between large dividends and survival likelihood. At higher levels, payout is related to a safer position of banks in terms of default; however, at very high levels of dividends, when the levels of payouts exceed a threshold, such payout lowers the likelihood of survival. We additionally investigate the effect of the bank type to assess whether differential effects could be realised under the constrained dividend model of Islamic banks compared to the conventional banking model. Our results, interestingly, show that the positive effect of dividend payouts on bank survival is more pronounced in conventional than Islamic banks. This finding is explained by the dominant liquidity management challenges pertaining to the Islamic banking business model in which banks retain more cash and pay lower dividends. Our findings offer important insights and policy implications for regulators, bankers and a broad set of stakeholders engaging with both banking sectors.     

Dividend payouts and catering to demands: Evidence from a dividend tax reform

Utilizing the 2012 dividend tax reform in China, this paper examines how firms make dividend payout decisions that cater to the controlling shareholders' demand, especially when controlling shareholders and outside minority shareholders have different dividend preferences. We find that firms increase dividend payouts when controlling shareholders demand higher dividends after the dividend tax reform. In particular, firms pay higher dividends when facing increased demand from controlling shareholders than when the demand is from minority investors. In addition, we find that firms that increase dividend payments due to the controlling shareholders' demand subsequently have more debt financing and poorer firm performance, suggesting that catering to the demands from controlling shareholders is subject to the Type II agency problem.     

CEO mobility and corporate payouts

We examine how chief executive officer (CEO) mobility affects corporate payouts. We exploit US state courts’ staggered adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) to obtain exogenous variation in mobility. We report several findings. First, we find that firms in IDD-adopting states increase dividend payouts, whereas the effect of IDD on share repurchases is insignificant relative to firms not in IDD-adopting states. Second, the increase in dividends is concentrated on firms run by CEOs having high ability. Third, CEOs increasing dividends are less likely to be forced to leave their jobs. Fourth, the increase in dividends is concentrated on firms run by early-career CEOs rather than retiring CEOs. Last, CEOs increasing dividends receive more favorable shareholders’ say on pay votes for higher pay. Our evidence supports the notion that restricted mobility induces CEOs to choose a dividend policy that enhances their positions with their shareholders.     

Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World

This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends.     

Executive Financial Incentives and Payout Policy: Firm Responses to the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut

We test whether executive stock ownership affects firm payouts using the 2003 dividend tax cut to identify an exogenous change in the after‐tax value of dividends. We find that executives with higher ownership were more likely to increase dividends after the tax cut in 2003, whereas no relation is found in periods when the dividend tax rate was higher. Relative to previous years, firms that initiated dividends in 2003 were more likely to reduce repurchases. The stock price reaction to the tax cut suggests that the substitution of dividends for repurchases may have been anticipated, consistent with agency conflicts.     

Cross-border enforcement of securities laws and dividend payouts

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, numerous countries signed a special nonbinding arrangement to enhance cross-border enforcement of securities laws. This agreement is the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (MMoU). This study examines whether and how a country's MMoU entry affects firms' dividend payout policies. Relative to domestic US firms, foreign firms cross-listed in the US report a significant increase in dividend payouts after their home country entered the MMoU. Furthermore, the effect of MMoU on corporate dividend payouts is pronounced for (1) firms with high agency costs, (2) countries with low external governance quality, and (3) countries with poor disclosure environments. Furthermore, we find that MMoU significantly changes the corporate governance structure. Our findings collectively corroborate the prediction of the dividend outcome model and are consistent with the notion that strengthening cross-border regulatory enforcement of foreign firms improves protection for outside shareholders and increases dividend payouts.     

Stop the presses! Or wait,we might need them: Firm responses to local newspaper closures and layoffs

Media as a whole has been shown to play an important role as an information source, information intermediary, and monitor of public firms, but much less is known about whether local newspapers play a similar role. We attempt to shed light on this issue, and we investigate if and how firms respond to changes in the local newspaper industry, where closures and layoffs have become the norm. Compared to a sample of matched control firms, we find that following newspaper closures and large industry layoffs, nearby public companies boost dividend payouts. This result follows from prior research suggesting that investors pressure managers to increase dividends in response to growing agency problems. Cross-sectional analyses confirm that our results are driven by geographically-concentrated firms that rely more heavily on local newspapers as a monitor and information source. Our findings suggest that local newspapers play an important role as an information intermediary and monitor of public firms, and that the disappearance of local newspapers exacerbates agency problems in nearby firms that tend to be remedied by higher dividends.     

Dividend Policies of Privately Held Companies: Stand‐Alone and Group Companies in Belgium

This study examines the dividend policies of privately held Belgian companies, differentiating between stand‐alone companies and those affiliated with a business group. We find that privately held companies typically do not pay dividends. Compared to public companies, they are less likely to pay dividends and they have lower dividend payouts. Our results also suggest that group companies pay more dividends than stand‐alone companies, consistent with the hypothesis that tax‐exempt group firms redistribute dividend payments on the group's internal capital market. Group companies pay higher dividends if they have minority shareholders.     

Investor protection,taxation, and dividends

We test the impact of taxes and governance systems on dividend payouts across countries. We show that, unlike previous studies, firms in strong investor protection countries pay lower cash dividends than in weak protection countries when the classical tax system is implemented, but they repurchase more shares to maximise their shareholders' after-tax returns. In weak protection countries, cash dividends and repurchases are low and less responsive to taxes. Our results suggest that when investors are protected, they weigh the tax cost of dividends against the benefit of mitigating the agency cost, but, when they are not, they accept whatever dividends they can extract, even when this entails high tax costs.     

Dividend Payouts and Information Shocks

We examine changes in firms’ dividend payouts following an exogenous shock to the information asymmetry problem between managers and investors. Agency theories predict a decrease in dividend payments to the extent that improved public information lowers managers’ need to convey their commitment to avoid overinvestment via costly dividend payouts. Conversely, dividends could increase if minority investors are in a better position to extract cash dividends. We test these predictions by analyzing the dividend payment behavior of a global sample of firms around the mandatory adoption of IFRS and the initial enforcement of new insider trading laws. Both events serve as proxies for a general improvement of the information environment and, hence, the corporate governance structure in the economy. We find that, following the two events, firms are less likely to pay (increase) dividends, but more likely to cut (stop) such payments. The changes occur around the time of the informational shock, and only in countries and for firms subject to the regulatory change. They are more pronounced when the inherent agency issues or the informational shocks are stronger. We further find that the information content of dividends decreases after the events. The results highlight the importance of the agency costs of free cash flows (and changes therein) for shaping firms’ payout policies.     

Corporate social responsibility and dividend policy

This study outlines and tests two corporate social responsibility (CSR) views of dividends. The first view argues that firms are likely to pay fewer dividends because CSR activities lower the cost of equity, encouraging firms to invest or hoard cash rather than to pay dividends. The second view suggests that CSR activities are positive NPV projects that increases earnings and hence dividend payouts. The first (second) view predicts that firms with a stronger involvement in CSR activities should be associated with a lower (higher) dividend payouts. The finding supports the second view and is robust.     

Corporate Governance and Dividend Payout Policy: A Test Using Antitakeover Legislation

Managers strongly prefer not to pay dividends as dividend payouts reduce the amount of cash subject to managerial discretion ( Easterbrook, 1984 ; Jensen, 1986 ). Previous empirical tests of the relationship between corporate governance and dividend payout policy employ endogenous measures of this agency problem. Using a relatively exogenous measure that incorporates state antitakeover laws and the differences‐in‐differences approach, our analysis indicates that dividend payout ratios and propensities fall when managers are insulated from takeovers. The impact of antitakeover laws on dividend payouts is more pronounced for firms with poor corporate governance and small firms.     

Asymmetric Cost Behavior and Dividend Policy

Costs are sticky on average, that is, they fall less for sales decreases than they rise for equivalent sales increases. We examine the effect of this asymmetric cost behavior on a firm's dividend policy. Given investors’ aversion to dividend cuts, we predict that firms with higher resource adjustment costs and stickier costs pay lower dividends than their peers because they are less able to sustain any higher level of dividend payouts in the future. We find evidence consistent with this prediction. Further, using a regression discontinuity design that exploits variation in labor adjustment costs generated by close-call union elections, we provide evidence suggesting that the negative relation between cost stickiness and dividend payouts is driven by resource adjustment costs. Our paper sheds new light on the determinants of dividend policy and demonstrates the role of cost behavior in corporate decisions.     

Dividend payouts: Evidence from U.S. bank holding companies in the context of the financial crisis

We study dividend payouts of 462 U.S. bank holding companies before and during the 2007–09 financial crisis. Fama and French (2001) characteristics (size, profitability and growth opportunities) explain dividend payouts before and during the financial crisis. The agency cost hypothesis explains dividend payouts before and during (more pronouncedly) the financial crisis. The signaling hypothesis explains dividend payouts during the financial crisis. Regulatory pressure was ineffective in limiting dividend payouts by undercapitalized banks before the financial crisis. Our findings have implications for corporate finance and governance theories, and also for the regulatory reforms that are being discussed among policymakers.     

Dividend payouts under a societal crisis: Financial constraints or signaling?

Dividend payouts of Chinese firms are typically flexible and unstable, and firms have leeway to change dividends in response to a crisis. Using this setting, we document that Chinese listed firms tend to decrease dividend payouts under the coronavirus crisis, supporting our financial constraints hypothesis instead of the alternative dividend signaling hypothesis. The baseline result is robust to a series of sensitivity checks. Underlying mechanism tests show that the negative effect of COVID-19 on dividend policies is enhanced in high-constrained groups compared to that in low-constrained groups. Further analysis of crisis-related factors reveals that the main result is enhanced when firms engage in international diversification, when firms have greater labor intensity and when firms are nonstate-owned.