Continuous-time delegated portfolio management with homogeneous expectations: can an agency conflict be avoided?

In a continuous-time framework, the issue of how to delegate an investor’s portfolio decision to a portfolio manager is studied. First, we solve the first-best problem. For the second-best case, a specific quadratic contract is introduced resolving the agency conflict completely in the sense that the solutions to the first-best and second-best problems coincide. This contract can be implemented if the investor is able to observe the value of the growth optimal portfolio at her investment horizon. If the investment opportunity set is assumed to be constant, in equilibrium the value of the market portfolio is a sufficient statistic for the value of the growth optimal portfolio. Throughout the paper, we assume that the investor and the manager have homogeneous expectations about the investment opportunity set. This, however, does not necessarily mean that investor and manager are symmetrically informed about all prices.

Maximizing an equity portfolio excess growth rate: a new form of smart beta strategy?

It has been claimed that, for dynamic investment strategies, the simple act of rebalancing a portfolio can be a source of additional performance, sometimes referred to as the volatility pumping effect or the diversification bonus because volatility and diversification turn out to be key drivers of the portfolio performance. Stochastic portfolio theory suggests that the portfolio excess growth rate, defined as the difference between the portfolio expected growth rate and the weighted-average expected growth rate of the assets in the portfolio, is an important component of this additional performance (see Fernholz [Stochastic Portfolio Theory, 2002 (Springer)]). In this context, one might wonder whether maximizing a portfolio excess growth rate would lead to an improvement in the portfolio performance or risk-adjusted performance. This paper provides a thorough empirical analysis of the maximization of an equity portfolio excess growth rate in a portfolio construction context for individual stocks. In out-of-sample empirical tests conducted on individual stocks from 4 different regions (US, UK, Eurozone and Japan), we find that portfolios that maximize the excess growth rate are characterized by a strong negative exposure to the low volatility factor and a higher than 1 exposure to the market factor, implying that such portfolios are attractive alternatives to competing smart portfolios in markets where the low volatility anomaly does not hold (e.g. in the UK, or in rising interest rate scenarios) or in bull market environments.     

Timing and diversification: A state-dependent asset allocation approach

Abstract

The influence of changing economic environment leads the distribution of stock market returns to be time-varying. A conditionally optimal investment hence requires a dynamic adjustment of asset allocation. In this context, this paper examines the improvement in portfolio performance by simulating portfolio strategies that are conditioned on the Markov regime switching behaviour of stock market returns. Including a memory effect eliminates the empirical shortcoming of discrete state models, namely that they produce a standard and an extreme state in stock returns. So far, this has prevented the regimes from being used as a valuable conditioning variable. Based on a discrete state indicator variable, is presented evidence of considerable performance improvement relative to the static model due to optimal shifting between aggressive and well diversified portfolio structures.     

The Agency Effect of Repurchases on Closed‐End Funds

Share prices rise after companies announce repurchases, but there are differing views as to why this happens. Repurchases are announced by closed‐end funds when their discounts are widening (market‐to‐book is falling). The immediate post‐announcement effect is a small jump in a fund's share price, but the main effect occurs over the next four years during which time there is significant outperformance both of the fund's price and of its investment portfolio. Liquidity of the shares does not change. Repurchases, if executed, reduce the size of a fund and therefore the manager's fees. Our findings are consistent with directors using the threat of repurchases to discipline managers whose investment performance has been poor, leading to a closer alignment of pay and performance.     

Optimal portfolio selection and compression in an incomplete market

We investigate an optimal investment problem with a general performance criterion which, in particular, includes discontinuous functions. Prices are modelled as diffusions and the market is incomplete. We find an explicit solution for the case of limited diversification of the portfolio, i.e. for the portfolio compression problem. By this we mean that any admissible strategy may include no more than m different stocks concurrently, where m may be less than the total number n of available stocks.     

Dynamic portfolio strategy by loss-averse fund managers facing performance-induced fund flows

In a continuous-time framework, we establish an optimal dynamic portfolio strategy for a loss-averse fund manager facing performance-induced fund flows. Using the martingale approach, we derive closed-form solutions to both the optimal terminal value and optimal dynamic strategy of the fund under management. The model shows that the loss-averse manager strives to earn high returns in good market conditions at the risk of losing all investments at the terminal date in bad market conditions. The prospect of higher fund inflows induced by superior performance motivates fund managers to take more aggressive investment strategies, increasing the fund's risk exposure, whereas the prospect of fund outflows due to underperformance has no impact on the fund manager's investment decision. While the prospect of higher fund inflows increases dynamic optimal wealth as well as optimal terminal wealth in good market conditions, in bad market conditions, it reduces dynamic optimal wealth and results in a higher chance of a complete loss at the terminal date. Finally, a manager with a higher degree of loss aversion tends to take a conservative investment strategy with a lower risk exposure especially in bad market conditions, leading to a lower dynamic and terminal wealth in good market conditions and also a lower chance of a complete loss in bad market conditions.     

Fund Manager Use of Public Information: New Evidence on Managerial Skills

We show theoretically that the responsiveness of a fund manager's portfolio allocations to changes in public information decreases in the manager's skill. We go on to estimate this sensitivity (RPI) as the R² of the regression of changes in a manager's portfolio holdings on changes in public information using a panel of U.S. equity funds. Consistent with RPI containing information related to managerial skills, we find a strong inverse relationship between RPI and various existing measures of performance, and between RPI and fund flows. We also document that both fund‐ and manager‐specific attributes affect RPI.     

Three Versions of Perfect Pay for Performance (Or The Rebirth of Partnership Concepts in Executive Pay)

During the 19th century and the first half of the 20th, the compensation of non‐founder managers of U.S. public companies was guided by partnership concepts. Andrew Carnegie made his senior staff coowners by selling them stock at book value. And Alfred Sloan gave the senior staff of General Motors a fixed percentage of the company's “economic profit.” But in the years since World War II, such partnership concepts have largely disappeared from executive pay. The current view of executive pay is guided by the concepts of “competitive pay” and pay components. But unlike the partnership models of the past, today's “human resources model” of executive pay fails to provide useful guidance to companies on how to achieve a consistent relationship between pay and corporate performance, as reflected in returns to shareholders. As the author argues, the model's insistence on providing “competitive pay” packages that are (1) based on size (that is, on revenue not profitability) and (2) “recalibrated” every year regardless of past performance has the effect of undermining management's incentives by rewarding poor past value performance with increases (instead of reductions) in sharing percentage, and penalizing superior value performance with reductions (instead of increases) in sharing percentage. In recent years, however, three different model pay plans have been proposed that provide both competitive pay and fixed pay leverage in relation to shareholder value. The author is the source of one of the three “perfect” pay plans. The other two are (1) the Dynamic Incentive Account proposed by Alex Edmans of London Business School and Xavier Gabaix of NYU and (2) the investment manager fee structure developed and used by Don Raymond, the chief investment strategist of the Canada Pension Plan. The author shows that cumulative pay under all three plans can be expressed as a function of cumulative market compensation (that is, the pay earned by one's peers over the life of the plan, thus reflecting pay levels for average performance) and cumulative value added (as reflected, say, in the company's TSR relative to the average of its peers' over the life of the plan)—and in the case of plans with equity‐like leverage, cumulative pay is the simple sum of cumulative market compensation and a fixed share of the cumulative value added. The plans reconcile retention and performance objectives more effectively than current practice because they provide competitive pay only for average performance, while using the partnership concept of fixed sharing of the value added to provide strong incentives.     

Portfolio returns and manager activity: How to decompose tracking error into security selection and market timing

We develop a new method for detecting portfolio manager activity. Our method relies exclusively on portfolio returns and, consequently, avoids the pitfalls associated with disclosed portfolio holdings. We investigate the link between activity and performance of actively managed U.S. equity funds from 2000 to 2007 and document robust evidence that future performance is positively related to past stock picking and negatively associated with past market timing. Finally, we find that portfolio manager activity is highly persistent over time, which supports the conclusion that stock picking increases performance while market timing decreases performance.     

Cross-border venture capital performance: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the determinants of cross-border venture capital (VC) performance in the Chinese VC market. We focus on the impact of foreign VC firms' (VCs') human capital and domestic entrepreneurs' experience on the performance of both VC investments and portfolio companies using logit and Cox hazard models. After controlling for portfolio company quality, domestic VC industry development, domestic exit conditions and a number of other factors, little correlation was evident between VC performance and foreign VCs' human capital, such as experience, networks and reputation. In contrast, the domestic entrepreneurs' experience is crucial to VC performance. In particular, if an entrepreneur has more general experience in terms of the number of companies previously worked for or more special experience in terms of the number of companies previously served as a CEO or top manager, a portfolio company is more likely to pull off a successful exit through IPO or M&A, and the VCs are also likely to shorten their investment duration in the portfolio company.     

基金经理更换、股票联动与股票价格

基金经理更换打破了基金共同持股投资组合中股票的关联性,降低了股票收益率相关性,进而影响了股票价格。本文基于基金共同持股和基金经理更换构建了对冲投资组合,获得0.1%的日超额收益率。基金投资组合中股票收益率相关性能够解释这种超额收益率,本文发现基金更换经理后,新基金经理重建投资组合,打破了原投资组合中股票间的关联,股票收益率相关性减弱,基金共同持股程度高的股票价格受到了更大影响。基金的被动流动性冲击不能解释本文的发现。本文的研究表明基金经理变更等基金管理行为通过股票收益率相关性对股票价格产生了重要影响。     

A behavioural theory of the fund management firm

The paper outlines a behavioural theory of the fund manager (FM) firm comprising investment decisions (at stock and portfolio levels) by teams and individuals, and of an organisation process and contextual resource factors affecting decisions. FM organisational processes interacted with resources to enhance investment team decision conditions, costs and processes. Enhanced conditions and reduced decision costs were expected to improve the chances of FM success via new information production and better-quality decisions. These dynamic elements to FM firms can be interpreted as tentative organisational means to deal with major problems of behaviour, uncertainty and information asymmetry at the heart of the valuation, investment and performance problems facing FMs. Field research was conducted in 15 FM firms during 2004–2011. A grounded theory approach was employed in processing the data. This led to improvements in empirical understanding of behaviour within FM firms and markets. The results were discussed relative to relevant literature and previous grounded theory. This created a new conceptual tool to investigate FM underperformance and variety in FM styles. The paper demonstrated an empirically rich model of hierarchy, information production, capital allocation and other resource usage in financial institutions and discussed how this created further opportunities for research.     

Institutional investment flows and the determinants of top fund manager turnover

This study examines how the termination of superannuation investment mandates contributes to the departure of top fund managers in companies delegated the portfolio management role. Terminations of superannuation plan mandates increase the probability of a fund company changing the responsible fund manager. Objective‐adjusted returns are also significant managerial turnover considerations. These results illustrate that significant losses of superannuation fund clients act as an external control mechanism in the investment management industry that complements internal managerial performance measures.     

Portfolio performance and accounting measures of earnings: an alternative look at usefulness

Measures of economic performance, such as accounting earnings, working capital and cash flows, have been evaluated in tests of relative explanatory power of regressions of market returns on earnings, working capital and cash flows. We employ a different test. Using Basu’s (J Finance 663–682, 1977) investment trading strategy, we measure portfolio returns based on these three accounting measures of earnings. The objective is to ascertain whether investment performance also supports the findings of the explanatory power studies that accounting earnings is the premier measure of performance. The evidence does not support this conclusion. Our findings are at variance with prior conclusions that accounting earnings is more useful than cash flow. The Basu trading strategy is effective for all three measures. Excess market returns are observed for all three measures, even when controlled for risk and for low priced stocks. But accounting earnings portfolios do not dominate working capital or cash flow portfolios. In fact, the raw returns to cash flow portfolios are marginally (statistically) larger than accounting earnings portfolios. Economically, a dollar invested in a portfolio using accounting earnings to select the stock would have an accumulated value of 22.73 while the same dollar investment using cash flow instead of accounting earnings would accumulate a value of22.73 while the same dollar investment using cash flow instead of accounting earnings would accumulate a value of 33.94 over the same 16 years starting with the second quarter of 1988 and concluding at the end of the first quarter of 2004. Thus, our results have implications for the studies of explanatory power of different measures of earnings and their comparison in the US and other markets.     

Pension Plan Investment Management Mandates: An Empirical Analysis of Manager Selection

We examine the impact of several factors on the selection of portfolio managers for Australian pension plan mandates. Performance measures do not affect the probability of a mandate allocation. Pension sponsors tend to choose managers with top-quartile five-year performance who have recently beaten a market benchmark. Management expenses have a negative impact on a managers chances. A surprising result is sponsors tolerance for high portfolio trading costs. Mandates are spread across manager investment styles. The style and institutional attributes of preferred managers suggest trustees reputation and prudential concerns matter, particularly for the aggregate annual mandate allocations.     

The time‐varying performance of UK analyst recommendation revisions: Do market conditions matter?

This study examines the time‐varying performance of investment strategies following analyst recommendation revisions in the UK stock market, with specific emphasis on the impact of changing market conditions. We find a negative relationship between the recommendation performance and market conditions as measured in terms of past market return and market volatility. In particular, the upgrade (downgrade) portfolio generates significantly positive (negative) net abnormal returns in bad market conditions (e.g., the dot‐com bubble burst in 2000 and the credit crisis in 2007), but not in other periods of time. Moreover, our non‐temporal threshold regression analysis shows that the reported negative relationship disappears when market conditions become better, i.e., when the past market return (market volatility) is higher (lower) than a certain level, indicating the importance of taking non‐linearity into account in the long sample period as examined in this study. Our time‐series bootstrap simulations further confirm that the superior recommendation performance in bad market conditions is not due to random chance; analysts have certain skills in making valuable up/downward revisions in bad markets.     

Post‐Retirement Financial Strategies: Forecasts and Valuation

This paper uses a discrete‐time, discrete‐state Monte Carlo simulation model to evaluate representative strategies for investing and spending a fixed sum designed to fund consumption during the period after retirement. Two assets are considered – one providing a riskless real return, the other a market portfolio of bonds and stocks. A stochastic process for the returns from the market portfolio is proposed. Then a set of Arrow‐Debreu state prices is obtained on the assumption that the market portfolio is an efficient investment strategy. The model is used to forecast ranges of consumption and ranges of the ratios of year‐to‐year consumption, and also to estimate the values of components of future consumption.     

What's in Your 403(b)? Academic Retirement Plans and the Costs of Underdiversification

Sponsors of defined contribution retirement plans typically limit the investment choices of plan participants to a small number of investment managers and a limited number of investment vehicles. Such restrictions may limit excessive risk-taking by participants but also may preclude opportunities for efficient diversification. Many college and university 403 (b) plans have restricted investment choices to the retirement annuities offered by TIAA-CREF, the current manager of over half of all 403(b) contributions. Using 10 years of historical data, we study the efficiency of this TIAA-CREF opportunity set relative to a larger set that includes several standard index funds. Extrapolations must be interpreted -with caution. Assuming optimal rebalancing, depending on loss aversion and diversification constraints, the historical sample of returns implies that over a 20-year remaining work life, an employee -with an expanded menu that includes standard index funds could gain over 40% in terminal wealth compared to one who is restricted to TIAA-CREF retirement annuities. Even when a naive diversification strategy of equally weighting (1/n) all available funds is used, the expandedmenu outperforms the restricted portfolio by more than 25% over20years. These differences generally are significant at conventional levels based on parametric and nonparametric testing and do not appear to result from idiosyncratic market performance durinz the sample period.     

Demystifying the Management Structure Puzzle: an Empirical Investigation into the Drivers of REIT Internalization

Real estate investment trusts (REITs) have grown to become an important financial product in Asia, which today stands as the second largest REIT market in the world. Although existing literature has shown that externally managed REITs have underperformed their internally managed counterparts, the Asian REITs market has a strong preference for the external management model. This paper investigates the factors that drive REITs to internalize or deter them from internalizing their manager by studying the characteristics of 26 internalization subjects in Australia at their point of internalization. We compare their financial, corporate governance and portfolio characteristics to a control group. We find the MBR, the parent of the REIT manager, the asset size, and the geographic diversity of assets to be significant determinants of the probability of these REITs internalizing their manager. The low growth prospect faced by large Australian REITs that had a domestic investment focus motivates them to internalize their manager.     

Welfare effects of information and rationality in portfolio decisions under parameter uncertainty

We analyse and quantify, in a financial market with parameter uncertainty and for a Constant Relative Risk Aversion investor, the utility effects of two different boundedly rational (i.e. sub-optimal) investment strategies (namely, myopic and unconditional strategies) and compare them with each other and with the utility effect of full information. We show that effects are mainly caused by full information and predictability, being the effect of learning marginal. We also investigate the saver's decision regarding whether to manage her/his portfolio personally (DIY investor) or hire, against the payment of a management fee, a professional investor and find that delegation is mainly motivated by the belief that professional advisors are, depending on investment horizon and risk aversion, either better informed (‘insiders’) or more capable of gathering and processing information, rather than possessing the ability to learn from financial data. In particular, for very short investment horizons, delegation is primarily, if not exclusively, motivated by the beliefs that professional investors are better informed.