Comparing Costs and Risks of Retirement Plans for Sponsors

This stochastic simulation analysis compares funding costs and volatilities for private sponsors of traditional defined benefit (DB), pension equity (PE), cash balance (CB), and defined contribution (DC) retirement plans. Plan provisions of equivalent benefit generosity in the different plan types are determined. The modeling includes current funding requirements and practices as well as a comprehensive set of uncertainties in asset and labor markets. The results show that costs and risks for sponsors vary significantly with plan types, investment and funding strategies, and participant demographics. The hybrid PE and CB plans exhibit characteristics of cost efficiency, as in the DB plan, and risk reduction, as in the DC plan, for plan sponsors under conventional investment strategies. These features are more saliently observed in the CB plan, but it is also more difficult to implement effective asset–liability management strategies for it.     

Risk Allocation in Retirement Plans: A Better Solution

The corporate world is reconsidering the cost‐effectiveness of defined benefit pension plans while contemplating a change to defined contribution plans. This article begins by examining the three primary risks faced by sponsors of most DB pension plans—investment risk, interest rate risk, and longevity risk—and shows how shifting these risks to employees through a DC plan would affect both the corporation and the individual. Although DC plans clearly help companies manage risks, they provide at best an incomplete solution for individual participants. This article describes an innovation in pension design—the Retirement Shares Plan (RSP)—that combines many of the best features of DB and DC plans. An RSP provides:

• ? predictable and stable cost to the plan sponsor, with little chance of unfunded liabilities;
• ? lifetime income, guaranteeing that retirees will never outlive their benefits;
• ? a benefit accrual pattern comparable to that of traditional pension plans that preserves value for older, long‐service employees; and
• ? potential inflation protection for retirees.

The RSP accomplishes this by allocating risk to sponsors and individuals differently than either a traditional DB plan or a DC plan. Unlike most DB plans, the RSP shifts investment and interest rate risks from plan sponsors to participants. Unlike DC plans, the RSP keeps longevity risk with the sponsor.     

On the Asset Allocation of a Default Pension Fund

We characterize the optimal default fund in a defined contribution (DC) pension plan. Using detailed data on individuals' holdings inside and outside the pension system, we find substantial heterogeneity within and between passive and active investors in terms of labor income, financial wealth, and stock market participation. We build a life‐cycle consumption‐savings model, with a DC pension account and an opt‐out/default choice, that produces realistic investor heterogeneity. Relative to a common age‐based allocation, implementing the optimal default asset allocation implies a welfare gain of 1.5% during retirement. Much of the gain is attainable with a simple rule of thumb.     

Florida's Pension Election: From DB to DC and Back

During the year 2002, the State of Florida's 600,000 public employees were given the choice of converting their traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plan into an individual‐account defined contribution (DC) plan with full control over asset allocation and investment decisions. To mitigate some of the risk and uncertainty in the decision, the State granted each employee electing the DC plan an additional option to switch back (i.e., change their mind once) at any point prior to retirement. This option has been labeled the 2nd election by the State and the cost of reentry is fixed at the accumulated benefit obligation of their pension entitlement, which is the present value of the life annuity. Our article presents some original analytic insights relating to the optimal time and financial value of this unique 2nd election. Although our model is deterministic in nature, we believe that it provides a number of intuitive insights that are quite robust. Our results can be contrasted with Lachance, Mitchell, and Smetters (2003) . We estimate that the increase in retirement wealth that arises from having the 2nd election is equivalent to at most 30 percent in future value, and only when utilized optimally. Furthermore, for most State employees above the age of 45, the 2nd election has little economic value because the DB plan dominates the DC plan from day one. Of course, it remains to be seen what percent of Florida's 600,000 employees will elect to behave rationally with their newfound pension autonomy.     

Allocating Shareholder Capital to Pension Plans

This article discusses the corporate challenge of providing retirement income to employees while limiting the costs and risks of pension plans to the companies themselves by addressing five main questions:

• ? What are the major issues and challenges surrounding pensions? Although the pension shortfalls have been the focus of attention, the author argues that the more serious concern is the risk stemming from the mismatch between pension assets and pension liabilities— that is, the funding of debt‐like liabilities with equity‐heavy asset portfolios.
• ? To what extent do the equity market and equity prices reflect the shortfall in value and the mismatch in risk? While the author describes some evidence of the market's ability to capture pension risk, analysts' P/E multiples and management's assessments of cost of capital may still be distorted by failure to take full account of the risks associated with pension assets.
• ? How should management analyze and formulate strategic solutions? Without offering specific solutions, the author presents a framework for analyzing the problem from a strategic perspective that can be used in formulating a company's pension policy. In particular, the article recommends that companies take an integrated perspective that views pension assets and liabilities as parts of the corporate balance sheet, and the pension asset allocation decision as a critical aspect of a corporate‐wide enterprise risk management program.
• ? If a company chooses to make a major change in its pension policy, such as a partial or complete immunization accomplished by substituting bonds for stocks, how would you communicate the new policy to the rating agencies and investors?
• ? What are the major issues to be thinking about when contemplating a change from a DB plan to a defined contribution, or DC, plan? The author argues that DC plans without some corporate oversight or responsibility for results are not a long‐term solution.

     

Valuation, optimal asset allocation and retirement incentives of pension plans

We provide a framework in which we link the valuation and assetallocation policies of defined benefits plans with the lifetimemarginal productivity schedule of the worker and the pensionplan formula. In turn, we examine the retirement policies thatare implied by the primitives of the model and the value ofpension obligations. Our model provides an explicit valuationformula for a stylized defined benefits plan. The optimal assetallocation policies consist of the replicating portfolio independentof the pension liabilities. We show that the worker with retirewhen the ratio of pension benefits to current wages reachesa critical value which depends on the parameters of the pensionplan and the discount rate. Using numerical techniques we analyzethe feedback effect of retirement policies on the valuationof plans and on the asset allocation decisions.     

“De‐risking” Corporate Pension Plans: Options for CFOs

Until the stock market bubble burst in 2000–2002, most CFOs viewed their defined benefit pension plans as profit centers and relatively risk‐free sources of income. Since neither pension assets nor liabilities were reported on corporate balance sheets, and expected returns on pension stocks could be substituted for actual returns when reporting net income, the risks associated with DB plans were masked by GAAP accounting and thus assumed to have no bearing on corporate capital structure. But when stock prices and corporate profits fell together, the risks associated with conventional stock‐heavy pension plans showed up first in reduced pension surpluses (or, in many cases, deficits) and then later in higher required cash contributions and lower reported earnings. As a consequence, today's investors (and rating agencies) are viewing pension and other legacy liabilities as corporate debt, and demands for transparency and increased funding have triggered accounting changes and proposed legislative reforms that will further unmask the economics. This article aims to provide both private‐sector and public‐sector CFOs with suggestions for reducing and controlling the cost of providing for the retirement of their employees. Profitable, tax‐paying companies with DB plans should consider (1) funding any unfunded liabilities (if necessary, by issuing debt) and (2) reducing pension equity and interest rate exposures by shifting some (if not all) pension assets into bonds and defeasing the pension liability (achieving a tax arbitrage in the process). And in cases where the expected costs of maintaining DB plans outweigh the benefits, companies should consider freezing or terminating their plans and switching to a defined contribution (DC) or some form of hybrid plan. The authors also propose similar changes for public pension plans, where underfunding and mismatch problems are greater, less transparent, and in some ways less tractable than those of corporate DB plans.     

The 4% strategy revisited: a pre-commitment mean-variance optimal approach to wealth management

In contrast to single-period mean-variance (MV) portfolio allocation, multi-period MV optimal portfolio allocation can be modified slightly to be effectively a down-side risk measure. With this in mind, we consider multi-period MV optimal portfolio allocation in the presence of periodic withdrawals. The investment portfolio can be allocated between a risk-free investment and a risky asset, the price of which is assumed to follow a jump diffusion process. We consider two wealth management applications: optimal de-accumulation rates for a defined contribution pension plan and sustainable withdrawal rates for an endowment. Several numerical illustrations are provided, with some interesting implications. In the pension de-accumulation context, Bengen (1994)’s [J. Financial Planning, 1994, 7, 171–180], historical analysis indicated that a retiree could safely withdraw 4% of her initial retirement savings annually (in real terms), provided that her portfolio maintained an even balance between diversified equities and U.S. Treasury bonds. Our analysis does support 4% as a sustainable withdrawal rate in the pension de-accumulation context (and a somewhat lower rate for an endowment), but only if the investor follows an MV optimal portfolio allocation, not a fixed proportion strategy. Compared with a constant proportion strategy, the MV optimal policy achieves the same expected wealth at the end of the investment horizon, while significantly reducing the standard deviation of wealth and the probability of shortfall. We also explore the effects of suppressing jumps so as to have a pure diffusion process, but assuming a correspondingly larger volatility for the latter process. Surprisingly, it turns out that the MV optimal strategy is more effective when there are large downward jumps compared to having a high volatility diffusion process. Finally, tests based on historical data demonstrate that the MV optimal policy is quite robust to uncertainty about parameter estimates.     

Worries and plans as individuals approach retirement

The primary objective of an employment-based retirement plan is to provide a secure and adequate income for workers throughout retirement. In the defined contribution (DC) framework, asset accumulation is a means to the end, but not the end. Drawing retirement income from savings and paying for health care expenses in retirement are the two issues that concern individuals the most as they approach retirement. This article examines the attitudes of near-retirees regarding these risks and their plans for managing them. The author discusses how DC plan design can have a major impact on how individuals convert their retirement savings to retirement income; differences in survey responses between those who have consulted a financial advisor or other financial professional and those who have not; and the role of trust in implementing advice.     

Guaranteeing Defined Contribution Pensions: The Option to Buy Back a Defined Benefit Promise

After a long commitment to defined benefit (DB) pension plans for U.S. public sector employees, many state legislatures have introduced defined contribution (DC) plans for their public employees. In this process, investment risk that was previously borne by state DB plans has now devolved to employees covered by the new DC plans. In light of this trend, some states have introduced a guarantee mechanism to help protect DC plan participants. One such guarantee takes the form of an option permitting DC plan participants to buy back their DB benefit for a price. This article develops a theoretical framework to analyze the option design and illustrate how employee characteristics influence the option's cost. We illustrate the potential impact of a buy‐back option in a pension reform enacted recently by the State of Florida for its public employees. If employees were to exercise the buy‐back option optimally, the market value of this option could represent up to 100 percent of the DC contributions over their work life.     

Longevity risk, retirement savings, and financial innovation

Over the last couple of decades unprecedented increases in life expectancy have raised important concerns for retirement savings. We solve a life-cycle model with longevity risk, which can be hedged through endogenous saving and retirement decisions. We investigate the benefits of financial assets designed to hedge the shocks to survival probabilities. When longevity risk is calibrated to match forward-looking projections, those benefits are substantial. This lends support to the idea that such hedging should be pursued by defined benefit pension plans on behalf of their beneficiaries. Finally, we draw implications for optimal security design.     

The optimal asset allocation of the main types of pension funds: a unified framework

The existing literature deals with the optimal investment strategy of defined benefit (DB) or defined contribution (DC) pension plans. This article’s objective is to compare the optimal policies of different types of pension plans. This is done by first defining an original framework, which is based on the distinction between the nature of the guarantee—which can be internal or external—offered by or to a pension fund. This framework allows to establish links between optimization programs of DC, DB and targeted money purchase schemes. The case of an internal guarantee appears as a standard portfolio insurer’s problem. The second kind of guarantee, not analyzed in the literature yet with regard to the resulting optimal policy, is characterized by the existence of an option in the final wealth definition. Four funds are present in the internal guarantee optimal allocation: the speculative component, the preference independent guarantee- and contribution-hedge terms and the preference dependent state variable-hedge fund. The external guarantee program, solved with an original method using the principles of standard options theory, yields an optimal policy incorporating the delta of the option embodied in the final wealth definition. The conclusion is that the resulting optimal portfolio policy becomes riskier.

Defined Benefit or Defined Contribution? A Study of Pension Choices

We solve an empirically parameterized life‐cycle model of consumption and pension choices to show how expected earnings growth and risk affect the benefits of final‐salary defined benefit (DB) pension plans, relative to pension plans that are defined contribution (DC) in nature. We use micro data on the pension choices of individuals to provide evidence consistent with the model predictions: (1) individuals who expect a higher growth rate of earnings are more likely to choose DB final‐salary schemes, and (2) individuals who face a higher variance of persistent income shocks are less likely to choose DB final‐salary schemes. We control for cohort and age fixed effects in the empirical analysis.     

The Impact of DC Pension Systems on Population Dynamics

Abstract

This study investigates the risk inherent in defined contribution (DC) pension plans on an individual and aggregate basis, based on U.S. data. Our aim is to gain insight into the consequences of a DC pension scheme becoming the predominant pillar of retirement income for an entire society. Using the stochastic simulated output of a DC flexible age-of-retirement model, we first determine the optimal investment strategies. We then examine the demographic retirement dynamics of an entire population of DC pension plan participants.

We observe that even for the most risk-averse plan members there is a high level of uncertainty in an individual’s age at retirement. At the aggregate population level, we find that this uncertainty does not get dampened to any great extent by a diversification effect. Instead, the central role played by the market in determining retirement dates results in significant variation in the dependency ratio (the ratio of retirees to workers) over time. In addition, an attempt to ameliorate the outcome by introducing additional realistic features in the DC population modeling did little to dampen this volatility, which suggests that countries dominated by DC schemes of this type may, over time, be exposed to significant risk in the size of its labor force.     

Asset Allocation and the Liquidity Premium for Illiquid Annuities

Academics and practitioners alike have developed numerous techniques for benchmarking investment returns to properly adjust seemingly high numbers for excessive levels of risk. The same, however, cannot be said for liquidity, or the lack thereof. This article develops a model for analyzing the ex ante liquidity premium demanded by the holder of an illiquid annuity. The annuity is an insurance product that is akin to a pension savings account with both an accumulation and decumulation phase. We compute the yield (spread) needed to compensate for the utility welfare loss, which is induced by the inability to rebalance and maintain an optimal portfolio when holding an annuity. Our analysis goes beyond the current literature, by focusing on the interaction between time horizon (both deterministic and stochastic), risk aversion, and preexisting portfolio holdings. More specifically, we derive a negative relationship between a greater level of individual risk aversion and the demanded liquidity premium. We also confirm that, ceteris paribus, the required liquidity premium is an increasing function of the holding period restriction, the subjective return from the market, and is quite sensitive to the individual's endowed (preexisting) portfolio.     

公务员养老保险改革国际趋势及对中国启示

公务员养老保险制度是社会保障制度重要组成部分,公平与可持续的公务员养老保险制度关系着经济的持续发展与社会的长治久安。随着社会经济环境的变化,一些国家受人口、经济、政治、管理等因素影响,已经或正在进行公务员养老保险制度改革。改革主要趋势由"分立"转向"统一",由给付确定制(DB)转向缴费确定制(DC),改革主要措施包括引入积累制因素、建立自主缴费制度、制定科学的计发办法、逐步提高退休年龄等。我国自20世纪90年代开始实施养老金制度改革,但公务员养老保险一直延续着计划经济时代所确立的离退休制度,改革进程缓慢。随着市场经济的深入发展,机关和企业双轨制的养老保险制度的弊端日益显露,结合自身国情借鉴国际经验加速改革步伐势在必行。     

The Shift to Defined Contribution Pension Plans

Abstract

There has been a strong shift away from defined benefit (DB) pension plans toward defined contribution (DC) pension plans in the United States over the last 20 years. A variety of reasons for this shift have been proposed. In another paper in this issue, Krzysztof Ostaszewski presents a new hypothesis to explain the shift to DC plans in the United States. He argues that the decline in importance of DB plans is due to a shift in the way relative returns to macroeconomic factors of production, that is, capital and labor, are being rewarded in the national economy.

This paper attempts to test the Ostaszewski hypothesis using Canadian data. In Canada there has been only a slight decrease in DB plan coverage. It is shown that the Ostaszewski theory does not fit the Canadian experience well. Instead, it is argued that pension regulation and tax legislation play a crucial role in pension design and reform. It is also argued that the difference in pension regulation and taxation in Canada versus the United States has directly influenced plan sponsors in considering their pension objectives, costs, and risks. Differences in the proportion of the workforce that is unionized may also be important. The paper concludes that pension regulation and taxation are more important variables than are macroeconomic reward systems in the use of DB versus DC pension plans.     

金融危机对拉美国家私营养老金的影响及经验启示

2008年爆发的金融危机对全球经济产生了重要影响,也对拉美国家私营养老金制度的发展产生了巨大冲击。文章介绍了拉美国家私营养老金制度的改革路径和养老基金概况,从养老金资产价值、投资收益率、投资组合、雇员、制度覆盖面和缴费密度方面切入,分析了金融危机对拉美私营养老金制度的影响。在现状分析的基础上,得出了要保障私营养老金制度可持续运行的一些经验启示:构建多元化的混合型养老金体系,增强退休和养老金支付的灵活性,积极运用生命周期投资策略,实施多元化和分散化投资,以养老金长期收益作为投资目标,建立社会风险应急储备基金和政府担保机制,以及加强员工退休教育。     

The appropriateness of default investment options in defined contribution plans: Australian evidence

For participants in defined contribution (DC) plans who refrain from exercising investment choice, plan contributions are invested following the default investment option of their respective plans. Since default investment options of different plans vary widely in terms of their benchmark asset allocation, the most important determinant of investment performance, participants enrolled in these options face significantly different wealth outcomes at retirement. This paper simulates the terminal wealth outcomes under different static asset allocation strategies to evaluate their relative appeal as default investment choice in DC plans. We find that strategies with low or moderate allocation to stocks are consistently outperformed in terms of upside potential of exceeding the participant's wealth accumulation target at retirement as well as downside risk of falling below that target outcome by aggressive strategies whose allocation to stocks approach 100%. The risk of extremely adverse wealth outcomes for plan participants also does not appear to be very sensitive to asset allocation. Our evidence suggests the appropriateness of strategies heavily tilted towards stocks to be nominated as default investment options in DC plans unless plan providers emphasize predictability of wealth outcomes over adequacy of retirement wealth.     

延迟退休年龄、内生生育率与养老金

本文通过构建内生生育率的OLG模型,从微观视角考察了延迟退休年龄对生育率、养老金替代率及其个人养老金收入的影响。研究表明:(1)延迟退休年龄会提高均衡时的生育率水平,但提高幅度非常有限。(2)生育率的提高会增加未来劳动力供给,促进养老金替代率上升和养老金收入增加,而延迟退休年龄延长了养老保险缴费期限,也会促进养老金替代率上升和养老金收入增加;但同时,延迟退休年龄将使得预防性储蓄下降,资本积累降低,工资收入下降,养老金收入降低。因此,延迟退休年龄会使养老金替代率上升。当资本产出弹性大于或等于0.5时,延迟退休年龄会使得养老金收入降低;当资本产出弹性小于0.5时,在平均预期寿命较大或养老保险缴费比例较高的情形下,养老金收入会随着退休年龄的延迟而增加,反之,其会随着退休年龄的延迟而降低。进一步地,将模型拓展到包含人力资本的情形,延迟退休年龄仍会提高均衡时的生育率与养老金替代率。