Brealey,Myers, and Allen on Real Options

Real options are valuable sources of flexibility that are either inherent in, or can be built into, corporate assets. The value of such options are generally not captured by the standard discounted cash flow (DCF) approach, but can be estimated using a variant of financial option pricing techniques. This article provides an overview of the basics of real option valuation by examining four important kinds of real options:

• 1 The option to make follow‐on investments. Companies often cite “strategic” value when taking on negative‐NPV projects. A close look at the payoffs from such projects reveals call options on follow‐on projects in addition to the immediate cash flows from the projects. Today's investments can generate tomorrow's opportunities.
• 2 The option to wait (and learn) before investing. This is equivalent to owning a call option on the investment project. The call is exercised when the firm commits to the project. But often it's better to defer a positive‐NPV project in order to keep the call alive. Deferral is most attractive when uncertainty is great and immediate project cash flows—which are lost or postponed by waiting—are small.
• 3 The option to abandon. The option to abandon a project provides partial insurance against failure. This is a put option; the put's exercise price is the value of the project's assets if sold or shifted to a more valuable use.
• 4 The option to vary the firm's output or its production methods. Companies often build flexibility into their production facilities so that they can use the cheapest raw materials or produce the most valuable set of outputs. In this case they effectively acquire the option to exchange one asset for another.

The authors also make the point that, in most applications, real‐option valuation methods are a complement to, not a substitute for, the DCF method. Indeed DCF, which is best suited to and usually sufficient for safe investments and “cash cow” assets, is typically the starting point for real‐option analyses. In such cases, DCF is used to generate the values of the “underlying assets”—that is, the projects when viewed without their options or sources of flexibility.     

Real Options: Meeting the Georgetown Challange

In response to the demand for a single, generally accepted real options methodology, this article proposes a four‐step process leading to a practical solution to most applications of real option analysis. The first step is familiar: calculate the standard net present value of the project assuming no managerial flexibility, which results in a value estimate (and a “branch” of a decision tree) for each year of the project's life. The second step estimates the volatility of the value of the project and produces a value tree designed to capture the main sources of uncertainty. Note that the authors focus on the uncertainty about overall project value, which is driven by uncertainty in revenue growth, operating margins, operating leverage, input costs, and technology. The key point here is that, in contrast to many real options approaches, none of these variables taken alone is assumed to be a reliable surrogate for the uncertainty of the project itself. For example, in assessing the option value of a proven oil reserve, the relevant measure of volatility is the volatility not of oil prices, but of the value of the operating entity—that is, the project value without leverage. The third step attempts to capture managerial flexibility using a decision “tree” that illustrates the decisions to be made, their possible outcomes, and their corresponding probabilities. The article illustrate various kinds of applications, including a phased investment in a chemical plant (which is treated as a compound option) and an investment in a peak‐load power plant (a switching option with changing variance, which precludes the use of constant risk‐neutral probabilities as in standard decision tree analysis). The fourth and final step uses a “no‐arbitrage” approach to form a replicating portfolio with the same payouts as the real option. For most corporate investment projects, it is impossible to locate a “twin security” that trades in the market. In the absence of such a security, the conventional NPV of a project (again, without flexibility) is the best candidate for a perfectly correlated underlying asset because it represents management's best estimate of value based on the expected cash flows of the project.     

Accounting for Sovereign Risk When Investing in Emerging Markets

In theory, political risk is project‐specific and should be accounted for in the estimation of the expected investment cash flows. But in practice, the political risk associated with this type of investment is typically accounted for implicitly by adjusting the investment's required rate of return or the discount rate. As the authors discuss in the article, this approach disguises the specific assumptions being made about the risk of expropriation and so makes it difficult to assess this risk properly. While defending some aspects of current practice, the authors argue that corporate executives should consider some changes. For example, although a project analysis that is shared with the host government could incorporate a risk adjustment to the discount rate, the authors suggest that more explicit analysis of the anticipated risk of expropriation should be incorporated into the analysis of expected project cash flows. This analysis could involve making specific assumptions about the “term structure” of expropriation risk over the life of the investment. Finally, the authors note that the political risk of making investments in emerging economies can be managed to some extent. Investments can be structured in ways that reduce political risk by structuring project cash flows in ways that better align the incentives of the project sponsor and the government of the host country.     

Financing constraints, cash-flow risk, and corporate investment

Using an analytically tractable two-period model of a financially constrained firm, we derive an investment threshold that is U-shaped in cash holdings. We show analytically the relevant trade-offs leading to the U-shape: the firm balances financing costs for present and future investment, respectively. Our main argument is that financing costs today are more important than the risk of future financing costs. The empirically testable implications are that low-cash firms facing financing costs today are more reluctant to invest if they have less cash, or if their future cash flows are more risky. On the other hand, cash-rich firms facing no financing costs today invest in less favorable projects (i.e., forgo their real option to wait) if they have less cash, or if their future cash flows are more risky. The magnitude of these effects is amplified by the degree of market frictions that the firms are facing.     

Corporate decision making in the presence of political uncertainty: The case of corporate cash holdings

Using a quarterly panel of U.S. corporations over the period 1985–2014, we show that corporate managers respond to political uncertainty and economic policy uncertainty shocks in different ways. We proxy for political uncertainty using the Partisan Conflict Index and employ a prevalent empirical macroeconomic methodology to construct structural shocks that are orthogonal to shocks captured by the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index. Following a political uncertainty shock, corporations increase cash but do not adjust investment. Alternatively, following an economic policy uncertainty shock, firms appear to draw on cash and reduce capital spending to increase research and development spending.     

The evolution of financial constraints

We demonstrate that the severity of financial constraints has declined over time for two reasons: (i) improved access to external funds as evidenced by a decreased reliance on internal cash flows, and (ii) an inward shifting investment frontier with reduced investment opportunities. The decline in financial constraints coincides with the documented diminishing sensitivity of investment to cash flows, yet we show that cash flows remain a determining factor in helping constrained firms overcome restricted access to external capital. There is a flight-to-quality during economic shocks, where the adverse effects following periods of tightened credit are particularly pronounced for smaller firms, with larger firms appearing largely unaffected.     

Real Options: Experimental Evidence

Empirical testing of the real options theory has been very limited. This is primarily due to various inherent problems with obtaining field data for many components of real options theory. This paper utilizes experimental methodology to generate the data. The advantage of the experimental approach is that it enables the investigator to generate reliable and replicable data in a controlled environment. The results of the experiment indicate that fundamental insights of real options theory are not evident to individual investors. The majority invested too early and thus failed to recognize the benefit of the option to wait. However, when the investors had to compete with others for the right to invest, their bids generally reflected the value of the embedded option. Furthermore, as predicted by the theory, their bids increased with greater uncertainty about future cash flows from the investment.     

Implementing Fischer Black's Simple Discounting Rule

Corporate managers typically estimate the value of capital projects by discounting the project's expected future net cash flows at the cost of capital. The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is generally used to estimate that cost. But, as anyone who has worked on the finance or business development staff of a public company can attest, there are major challenges in applying the CAPM, including largely unresolved questions about what constitutes the “market portfolio,” how to estimate market risk premiums, and how to estimate the betas of projects. In a short article published in Financial Management in 1988, Fischer Black proposed a valuation “discounting rule” that avoids all these problems—one that involves discounting a relatively certain (as opposed to an expected or average) level of operating cash flows at the risk-free rate. But Black's article does not address the question of how to calculate these “certainty equivalent” or “conditional” cash flows. In this article, the authors propose a way of implementing Black's rule that involves estimating the “conditional” cash flows in a three-step procedure:

• • Find a benchmark security that correlates with the project's cash flows;
• • Estimate the percentiles of the distribution in which the benchmark return equals the risk-free rate over different investment horizons;
• • Use information from corporate managers to assess the cash flows that define the same percentiles in the cash flow distributions.

As the authors point out, the virtue of Black's rule is that it shifts the focus of the analyst away from the assessment of discount factors and puts it squarely on the more challenging, and arguably more relevant, problem of estimating the project's cash flows.     

On the investment–uncertainty relationship: A game theoretic real option approach

This paper examines the effect of uncertainty on investment timing in a game theoretic real option model. We extend the settings of the related recent literature on investment timing under uncertainty by a more general assumption, i.e. the investment is also influenced by the actions of a second player. The results show that a U-shaped investment–uncertainty relationship generally sustains even for infinite-lived investment projects and proper defined cash flows. However, timing of an investment occurs inefficiently late. Moreover, we show that the influence of uncertainty on the associated first-mover advantage becomes ambiguous, too.     

The Role of Real Options in Capital Budgeting: Theory and Practice1

Most discussions of capital budgeting take for granted that discounted cash flow (DCF) and real options valuation (ROV) are very different methods that are meant to be applied in different circumstances. Such discussions also typically assume that DCF is “easy” and ROV is “hard”—or at least dauntingly unfamiliar—and that, mainly for this reason, managers often use DCF and rarely ROV. This paper argues that all three assumptions are wrong or at least seriously misleading. DCF and ROV both assign a present value to risky future cash flows. DCF entails discounting expected future cash flows at the expected return on an asset of comparable risk. ROV uses “risk‐neutral” valuation, which means computing expected cash flows based on “risk‐neutral” probabilities and discounting these flows at the risk‐free rate. Using a series of single‐period examples, the author demonstrates that both methods, when done correctly, should provide the same answer. Moreover, in most ROV applications—those where there is no forward price or “replicating portfolio” of traded assets—a “preliminary” DCF valuation is required to perform the risk‐neutral valuation. So why use ROV at all? In cases where project risk and the discount rates are expected to change over time, the risk‐neutral ROV approach will be easier to implement than DCF (since adjusting cash flow probabilities is more straightforward than adjusting discount rates). The author uses multi‐period examples to illustrate further both the simplicity of ROV and the strong assumptions required for a typical DCF valuation. But the simplicity that results from discounting with risk‐free rates is not the only benefit of using ROV instead of—or together with—traditional DCF. The use of formal ROV techniques may also encourage managers to think more broadly about the flexibility that is (or can be) built into future business decisions, and thus to choose from a different set of possible investments. To the extent that managers who use ROV have effectively adopted a different business model, there is a real and important difference between the two valuation techniques. Consistent with this possibility, much of the evidence from both surveys and academic studies of managerial behavior and market pricing suggests that managers and investors implicitly take account of real options when making investment decisions.     

Valuation of Corporate Innovation and the Pricing of Risk in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Case of Gilead

Much of a firm's market value derives from expected future growth value rather than from the value of current operations or assets in place. Pharmaceutical companies are good examples of firms where much market value comes from expectations about drugs still in the development “pipeline.” Using a new osteoporosis drug being developed by Gilead Sciences, Inc., the author combines discounted cash flow methods values and real option models to value it. Alone, discounted cash flow (DCF) calculations are vulnerable to the assumptions of growth, cost of capital, and cash flows. But by integrating the real options approach with the DCF technique, one can value a new product in the highly regulated, risky and research‐intensive Biopharmaceutical industry. This article shows how to value a Biopharmaceutical product, tracked from discovery to market launch in a step‐by‐step manner. Improving over early real option models, this framework explicitly captures competition, speed of innovation, risk, financing need, the size of the market potential in valuing corporate innovation using a firm‐specific measure of risk and the industry‐wide value of growth operating cash flows. This framework shows how the risk of corporate innovation, which is not fully captured by the standard valuation models, is priced into the value of a firm's growth opportunity. The DCF approach permits top‐down estimation of the size of the industry‐wide growth opportunity that competing firms must race to capture, while the contingency‐claims technique allows bottom‐up incorporation of the firm's successful R&D investment and the timing of introduction of the new product to market. It also specifically prices the risk of innovation by modeling its two components: the consumer validation of technology and the expert validation of technology. Overall, it estimates the value contribution per share of a new product for the firm.     

OPTION EXERCISE GAMES: THE INTERSECTION OF REAL OPTIONS AND GAME THEORY

While the real options approach has proven useful in providing an analytical framework for analyzing the timing of investment decisions, a notable failure of the approach has been an almost complete lack of strategic considerations. In standard real options models, invest-ment (and exercise) strategies are for-mulated in isolation, without considering the potential impact of other firms' exercise strategies. This paper illustrates how the intersection of real options and game theory provides powerful new insights into the behavior of economic agents under uncertainty.
Introducing strategic considerations into the real options framework can lead to a rethinking of standard real option analysis. For example, one of-ten cited conclusion of the real options literature is the overturning of the standard capital budgeting rule of in-vesting immediately in any project with a positive NPV. Because the fu-ture value of the asset is uncertain, there may be significant benefits to deferring the investment until condi-tions prove even more favorable. But this result clearly depends on the lack of competitive access to the project. If firms fear preemption, then the option to wait becomes less valuable. For example, while the standard real op-tions models suggest that a real estate developer should wait until the devel-opment option is considerably "in the money," competition and the fear of preemption will likely force develop-ers to build much earlier.     

Cash Flow Immediacy and the Value of Investment Timing

In a model with stochastic interest rates, irreversible investment, and two investment dates, the value of investment delay has two components: the expected gain from committing now to investment at a future date and the potential gain from the ability to reverse this commitment. Holding net present value constant, we show that the values of both these components are increasing in the proportion of project cash flows that accrue in the more distant future. Our results emphasize the importance of the interaction between cash flow immediacy and interest rate uncertainty for the optimal investment policy.     

A text book treatment of calculating returns on non-traditional portfolios

This paper addresses a gap in traditional portfolio literature by providing techniques for identifying returns on non-traditional portfolios.Futures contracts require daily cash flows over the holding period; these cash flows determine the rate of return. The security deposit represents a tied investment since the funds are not available for other uses and do not earn a risk adjusted return. To initiate a short option or a short stock position also requires a cash outflow. The cash outflow or equity deposit effectively constitutes an investment since the trader postpones consumption in a risky medium that does not guarantee the return of the funds.By identifying the amount of the investment and rates of returns, it is possible to extend normative investment analysis to non-traditional portfolio holdings. This paper introduces four propositions to aid in this process.     

Optimal subsidies and guarantees in public–private partnerships

In this paper, we analyse how certain subsidies and guarantees given to private firms in public–private partnerships should be optimally arranged to promote immediate investment in a real options framework. We show how an investment subsidy, a revenue subsidy, a minimum demand guarantee, and a rescue option could be optimally arranged to induce immediate investment, compensating for the value of the option to defer. These four types of incentives produce significantly different results when we compare the value of the project after the incentive structure is devised and also when we compare the timing of the resulting cash flows.     

Economic uncertainty and the influence of monetary policy

This paper explores if economic uncertainty alters the macroeconomic influence of monetary policy. We use several measures of U.S. economic uncertainty, and estimate their interaction with monetary policy shocks as identified through structural vector autoregressions. We find that U.S. monetary policy shocks affect economic activity less when uncertainty is high, in line with “real-option” effects from theory. Holding uncertainty constant, the effect on investment is approximately halved when uncertainty is in its top instead of its bottom decile.     

Real Asset Valuation: A Back‐to‐basics Approach

Different valuation methods can lead to different corporate investment decisions, and the conventional “static, single discount rate” DCF approach in particular is biased against many of the kinds of decisions that corporate managers tend to view as “strategic.” Reducing the bias from valuations involves two main tasks: treating risk in a way that is consistent with observed market pricing, and accounting for the ability of companies to make decisions “dynamically” over time. The authors propose two separate tools, market‐based valuation and complete decision tree analysis, for accomplishing these two improvements in valuation. The authors also suggest working with the full distribution of future cash flows, one possible realization at a time, rather than working with the aggregate measure of expected cash flow. From a technical perspective, it is necessary to work with the full distribution to value real options properly. Valuing the cash flows one realization at a time also leads to a much better understanding of the interaction between economy‐level, systematic risks and local asset‐level, technical risks. Just as important, the proposed approaches support an effective division of labor between local asset managers, who are better positioned to model technical considerations and other asset specifics, and the central finance staff, who can ensure the consistent treatment of economy‐wide risk and to create the rules of engagement for evaluating opportunities. After presenting an overview of both the valuation and the organizational issues, the authors present a case involving a corporate investment in carbon capture and storage that illustrates both the application of the proposed methods and the various sources of bias in the typical DCF analysis.     

Investment Decisions of Nonprofit Firms: Evidence from Hospitals

This paper examines investment choices of nonprofit hospitals. It tests how shocks to cash flows caused by the performance of the hospitals’ financial assets affect hospital expenditures. Capital expenditures increase, on average, by 10 to 28 cents for every dollar received from financial assets. The sensitivity is similar to that found earlier for shareholder‐owned corporations. Executive compensation, other salaries, and perks do not respond significantly to cash flow shocks. Hospitals with an apparent tendency to overspend on medical procedures do not exhibit higher investment‐cash flow sensitivities. The sensitivities are higher for hospitals that appear financially constrained.     

A theory of corporate financial decisions with liquidity and solvency concerns

This paper studies the impact of both liquidity and solvency concerns on corporate finance. I present a tractable model of a firm that optimally chooses capital structure, cash holdings, dividends, and default while facing cash flows with long-term uncertainty and short-term liquidity shocks. The model explains how changes in solvency affect liquidity and also how liquidity concerns affect solvency via capital structure choice. These interactions result in a dynamic cash policy in which cash reserves increase in profitability and are positively correlated with cash flows. The optimal dividend distributions implied by the model are smoothed relative to cash flows. I also find that liquidity concerns lead to a decrease of dispersion of credit spreads.     

Tax Rate Uncertainty, Investment Decisions, and Tax Neutrality

This article deals with the effects of tax rate uncertainty (TRU) on individual investment behavior. We show that under risk neutrality as well as under risk aversion, increased TRU has an ambiguous impact on investment, depending on the investment project's structure of cash flows and depreciation deductions. Although the investment effects are small the popular view that tax policy uncertainty depresses real investment is rejected. Further, tax neutrality in the light of tax policy uncertainty is defined more precisely. Neutrality results for the Johansson-Samuelson tax and the cash flow tax that are known from certainty are confirmed under TRU.