Investment Decisions of Nonprofit Firms: Evidence from Hospitals

This paper examines investment choices of nonprofit hospitals. It tests how shocks to cash flows caused by the performance of the hospitals’ financial assets affect hospital expenditures. Capital expenditures increase, on average, by 10 to 28 cents for every dollar received from financial assets. The sensitivity is similar to that found earlier for shareholder‐owned corporations. Executive compensation, other salaries, and perks do not respond significantly to cash flow shocks. Hospitals with an apparent tendency to overspend on medical procedures do not exhibit higher investment‐cash flow sensitivities. The sensitivities are higher for hospitals that appear financially constrained.     

CEO Inside Debt Incentives and Corporate Tax Sheltering

This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax sheltering. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside creditors. As such, theory (Jensen and Meckling [1976]) suggests that inside debt holdings negatively impact CEO risk‐appetite. To the extent that corporate tax shelters are likely to result in high cash flow volatility in the future, we expect that inside debt holdings will curb CEOs from engaging in tax shelter transactions. Consistent with the prediction, we document a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and tax sheltering. Additional analyses suggest that the effect of inside debt on tax sheltering is more (less) pronounced in the presence of high default risk and liquidity threats (cash‐out options in pension packages). Overall, our results highlight the importance of investigating the implication of CEO debt‐like compensation for corporate tax policies.     

Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang

We characterize optimal taxation of foreign capital and optimal sovereign debt policy in a small open economy where the government cannot commit to policy, seeks to insure a risk-averse domestic constituency, and is more impatient than the market. Optimal policy generates long-run cycles in both sovereign debt and foreign direct investment in an environment in which the first best capital stock is a constant. The expected tax on capital endogenously varies with the state of the economy, and investment is distorted by more in recessions than in booms, amplifying the effect of shocks. The government's lack of commitment induces a negative correlation between investment and the stock of government debt, a "debt overhang" effect. Debt relief is never Pareto improving and cannot affect the long-run level of investment. Furthermore, restricting the government to a balanced budget can eliminate the cyclical distortion of investment.     

Harmful Procompetitive Effects of Trade in Presence of Credit Market Frictions

We explore the consequences of international trade in an economy that encompasses technology choice and an endogenous distribution of mark-ups due to credit market frictions. We show that in such an environment a gradual opening of trade may—but not necessarily must—have a negative impact on productivity and overall output. The reason is that the procompetitive effects of trade reduce mark-ups and hence make access to credit more difficult for smaller firms. As a result, smaller firms—while not driven out of the market—may be forced to switch to less productive technologies.     

NUMERICAL SIMULATION OF NONOPTIMAL DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM MODELS

In this article, we propose a recursive equilibrium algorithm for the numerical simulation of nonoptimal dynamic economies. This algorithm builds upon a convergent operator over an expanded set of state variables. The fixed point of this operator defines the set of all Markovian equilibria. We study approximation properties of the operator. We also apply our recursive equilibrium algorithm to various models with heterogeneous agents, incomplete financial markets, endogenous and exogenous borrowing constraints, taxes, and money.     

Competition from Specialized Firms and the Diversification–Performance Linkage

In this study, we show that the effect of diversification on performance is not homogeneous across industries and explore analytically and empirically the implications of this finding for the diversification literature. Diversified firms perform better in industries with a small number of nondiversified competitors or, equivalently, when specialized firms have a small combined market share, but worse as the presence of specialized firms increases in the industries in which they compete. The results are robust to the use of methods that alleviate the self‐selection problem and call for a reassessment of the diversification–performance relationship.