The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The world economy is just starting to emerge from the second trough of a "W-shaped" recession. Compared with the experience after the first oil shock, when industrial production fell by 12 per cent, bringing inflation quickly down from 14 per cent into single figures. the 1980 world recession was mild. Between the first and third quarters industrial output fell 5 per cent; it recovered in the fourth quarter and inflation stopped falling. As a result governments - and this is especially true of the United States - look "another bite at the cherry": monetary policy was tightened and interest rates rose. The effect over the last six months has been to produce a second dip in output. The renewed attack on inflation has, however, been successful and inflation is now well in single figures and falling. Consequently a general easing of policy is evident and a recovery of output in the second half of 1982 and into 1983 remains our forecast.     

Forecast Summary

The sluggish response of the current account to severe monetary tightening has put pressure on the exchange rate, which was instrumental in the decision to raise base rates to an eight-year high of 15 per cent. In so doing, the government has declared itself ready to risk recession to hold the pound - its main bulwark against rising inflation. Our forecast illustrates the risk. Compared with June, when we saw the economy avoiding a hard landing in the short term (at the cost of a protracted battle to reduce inflation over the medium term), the present forecast projects a sharp deceleration in output next year. Over the medium term output grows a disappointing 2 per centp.a., unemployment starts to rise and it is not until 1992 that retail price inflation is back below 5 per cent.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Last year saw the most coordinated cyclical upturn in the world economy since the early I970s, with OECD output rising 4per cent, industrial production and world trade even more rapidly. The boom in demand, which followed five years of continuous expansion, has outstripped supply and prices have begun to accelerate. To tackle inflation, the G7 monetary authorities have tightened policy over the last year, reversing the short-lived drop in interest rates necessitated by the stock market crash. This tightening may have to go further, especially in Germany and Japan where the effects of a rising oil price and higher indirect taxes are being exacerbated by currency depreciation. Although the rise in interest rates came too late to stop inflation rising, it has beet pursued with sufficient vigour to prevent inflation from seriously breaching the 5 per cent level. It is on these grounds that we forecast a relatively soft lending for the world economy on output, with growth continuing at 2.5–3per cent, accompanied by a limited reduction in inflation which stays in the 4–5per cent range. Progress on current account balances is also likely to be sluggish: in the absence of a serious attack on the budget deficit, the US deficit is likely to stay in the region of $140bn a year.     

Forecast Summary

In themselves the drop in interest rates and the fall in the exchange rate following the ERM débâcle of "Black Wednesday" will have an expansionary effect on demand in the UK economy. But because of the way in which the policy shift was handled, any positive impact is likely to be offset by lower business and consumer confidence with the result in our forecast that recession continues well into next year. It is another six months before output stops falling and a rise of as little as 0.9per cent is in prospect for 1993 as a whole. Such a weak recovery will, however, limit the inflationary impact of a lower pound and, helped by lower mortgage interest rates, retail price inflation is forecast to be almost unchanged over the next 12 months. In 1994 and beyond, the inflationary effects of devaluation are more evident and we assume that the Government will tighten its monetary stance, raising interest rates back above 10 per cent to stabilise the pound, possibly re-entering the ERM at a new central parity of DM2.40. On this policy stance, output rises 3 per cent in 1994 but slows thereafter and the peak in inflation is held to 6 per cent late in 1994. The J-curve effects of devaluation enlarge the current account deficit to f20bn next year- The weakness of output over the next 12 months is the main factor behind a rise in unemployment to 3.2 million and a steady increase in the PSBR, which reaches a high of f43bn in 1995-6, equivalent to 6per cent of nominal GDP.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The world recovery, now 18 months old, suffered two major setbacks in May: heightened political tension in the Middle East and a crisis in financial markets following a rise in US interest rates. On the assumption that oil supplies are not disrupted, we forecast that industrial production in the OECD area will rise by 7per cent in 1984 compared with 1983 and that total GNP will be 4 per cent higher. The Fed3 decision to tighten monetary policy, and run the risks of a US banking crisis, underline its determination to prevent the re-emergence of high inflation in the US. Higher interest rates are expected to produce a pause in the US recovery later this year, but, by reining back the economy and dampening down inflationary expectations, they should avert both a return to high inflation and the need for a more pronounced US recession at a later date. Compared with the January forecast, therefore, in which we assumed that, for political and debt-crisis reasons, the US authorities would avoid a rise in interest rates, the present forecast embodies higher interest rates and an earlier pause in the American recovery but, in the medium term, lower inflation and steadier growth of output. For the European and Japanese economies, where policy has remained more restrictive throughout, we have not changed our view that inflation will continue either to remain low (West Germany, Japan) or to moderate (France, Italy), thereby underpinning a sustainable medium-term recovery.     

Forecast Summary

A pause in world activity held back UK industry in the first quarter of the year and, even though we expect faster growth from now on, we forecast total output growth of only 2 per cent this year. But next year a stronger world economy and pre-election tax cuts lift growth to 3 1/4per cent. Lower oil prices and falling interest rates help keep inflation at its current level both this year and, as long as wages respond, next. In the medium term we expect the growth rate to fall back but, assuming that a fairly tight fiscal policy is pursued by whichever government is in power, we predict that inflation stays below 3 per cent     

WORLD OUTLOOK

World output, which was strengthening immediately prior to last October, appears to have barely suffered in the short term from the stock market crash. Apart from an early reaction by US consumers - since reversed - demand is proving robust and in early 1988 OECD industrial production is, we estimate, 6 per cent up on year-earlier levels, with GNP more than 4 per cent higher. Indeed such is the strength of activity that the present balance of risk is not that recession is imminent but that inflation may pick up again. In the United States, where activity rates are at their highest level for eight years and unemployment is at a fourteen-year low, monetary policy has been tightened and interest rates are moving higher. The Bundesbank is keen to follow suit and the BoJ is keeping the situation under review. Nevertheless, with wages in most countries still adjusting to the low inflation rates of the last two years, there is little evidence yet that prices are accelerating.
We expect to see world interest rates edging higher in the second half of the year as recorded inflation picks lip. But we believe that underlying inflation remains low and that, even on the assumption that oil prices return to 18 a barrel, OECD consumer price inflation will peak early next year at a little over 4 per cent. Tighter monetary policy is also expected to hold back demand over the next 12 months. Consequently, we expect some weak- ness in output in the first half of next year but discount the possibility of a severe recession. GNP growth in the OECD area is forecast to decline from the 3 per cent rate of 1987–8 to a little over 2 per cent next year and to a sustainable 2½ per cent p.a. over the medium term.     

The London Business School With Gower Publishing: FIGHTING YESTERDAY'S BATTLES

With still no firm evidence at home of a recovery in non-oil GDP, the government's main worries centre on the path of output ahead of the General Election. In a forecast, which relies heavily on exports to stimulate demand in 1992, the Treasury cannot regard the rising probability of renewed recession in the US or the very sharp slowdown currently taking place in Europe as the post-unification German boom runs out of steam with equanimity. The fear mist remain in Conservative politicians' minds that there will be no meaningful recovery within an electorally significant timescale. We sketch out this background, but our focus here is not on the prospects for recovery; rather we ask whether the recession has achieved its objectives. The recession was, it should be remembered, the direct product of government policy - interest rates were raised to 15per cent ahead of ERM membership - aimed at reversing the excesses of the late 198Os'boom and in particular at bringing inflation quickly down to acceptable European levels and reducing the deficit on the current account, which at its peak in 1989 amounted to 4 per cent of GDP. Our answer is that, over the last year of recession, considerable progress has been made: the rate of inflation is now in line with that in Germany and the current account deficit has fallen to under 1 per cent of GDP. But, on the government's own forecasts contained in the Autumn Statement, there will be some slippage on both counts in 1992. It is this worrying feature that we consider here. Our overall conclusion is that the recession has not completely delivered its objectives and that, even as the politicians turn their attention to recovery, we still have to fight yesterday's battles.     

THE AUTUMN STATEMENT

The short-term prospects for output are weaker than our October forecast suggested - manufacturing output fell 1.8per cent in the third quarter and the CBI survey indicates a sharp decline in business confidence. This is reflected in the Treasury's Autumn Statement forecast of GDP growth this year of only 1 per cent followed by 0.5per cent in 1991. With inflation now passing its peak, there would be a case for lowering interest rates but this is not possible with the pound below DM2.90 - the ill-judged reduction in base rates on ERM entry combined with the challenge to Mrs. Thatcher's leadership has pushed sterling deep into its lower ERM band. The principal unknown in the Autumn Statement forecast is the level of interest rates which, in the Treasury's judgement, will be necessary to keep sterling at or close to DM2.95. The Treasury may envisage only a very modest decline in base rates to 13 per cent next year. This could explain why their forecast is relatively gloomier than ours; alternatively the Treasury's underlying view could simply be more pessimistic. Nevertheless we show that the gap between the two forecasts can be eliminated if we change a limited number of assumptions - notably on interest rates, North Sea oil output, general government consumption and stock-building.     

Forecast Summary

Nearly two years after the I990peak in output, the economy continues to 'bump along the bottom' of an L-shaped recession, which has turned into as severe a downturn as its predecessors in 1974-5 and 1980-1. The origins of the recession lie in the weakness of domestic demand, which has failed to respond to the 4.5per cent cut in interest rates that has taken place since we joined the ERM. It is now the turn of fiscalpolicy: public spending was raised in the Autumn Statement and, as the General Election approaches, the odds are on tax cuts in next month's Budget. This relaxation of monetary and fiscal policy should produce recovery and we see output moving ahead from the second quarter onwards. Nevertheless, the outlook for I992 is weaker than before: we forecast a rise in GDP of a little over I per cent, rather less for manufacturing industry. In 1993 and beyond n growth rate of around 2112per cent should be possible but it is the second half of next year before output passes its previous peak. This suggests that unemployment will rise for at least another year - to a peak in the summer of I993 of 2.8 million. The combination of a stable exchange rate inside the ERM and protracted recession has produced a rapid reduction in inflation and the current account deficit. As long as the pound maintains its present parity, inflation should moderate further, to the 3–4 per cent range by the end of the year and beyond. On the trade side, in contrast, imports have already bottomed out and exports are struggling in a weak world economy. This suggests that, as the recovery gets under way, the deficit on current account will widen from last year's £6bn to £8bn this year and £10bn by I995.     

Government Popularity and the Economic Cycle

In June 1987 the Conservatives under Mrs. Thatcher were re-elected with a majority of over 100 seats against Labour. They received 42.3 per cent of the total vote, the size of the majority owing much to the significant number of votes received by third parties. But it is also believed that the Conservatives' share of the vote, unchanged from 1983, reflected the performance of the macro economy. In the four years of Mrs. Thatcher's second term, output rose more than 3 per cent a year and by the time of the election inflation was below 1 per cent, interest rates were under 10 per cent, and unemployment had come back below 3 million. If Mrs. Thatcher and her Cabinet colleagues had planned an economic strategy for the next four (or five) years in order to be in a strong position to win a fourth term of office, it might have included the following factors: output growth of 2–3 per cent a year; inflation staying around 1 per cent; interest rates of 10 per cent or thereabouts; unemployment down further from the near-3 million mark of June 1987. On our current forecast, that is, with the exception of output, the economic record of the Conservatives' third (Thatcher/Major) term. Yet the Conservatives have been running neck and neck with Labour in tile opinion polls and, barring unforeseen developments, the coming election will be extremely close, with the possibility still of either a small Conservative majority or a small Labour majority or even a hung Parliament. Why is it that, against the background of a similar economic performance in aggregate, the Conservatives have lost popularity? The arguments are complex and a full explanation would include the introduction of the community charge arid the fall of Mrs. Thatcher herself. But the economy is part of the explanation. The economic literature on Government popularity examines the state of a number of economic variables at the time of the election. At its most extreme, some believe that all a Government has to do to be re-elected is deliver a low mortgage rate in time for the election. Other analysts have explained Government popularity in a simple regression framework, with a lagged dependent variable to capture sluggish adjustment. A weakness of this research is that it implicitly believes all the Government has to do is to ‘get it right on the night’. As long as the economy falls into place by the time of the election, re-election is certain. This implies that the electorate both forgets and forgives, and is indifferent to the course of the economy in the previous three or four years. But it cannot be the case that the electorate evaluates only the average performance of the economy over the lifetime of a Parliament or even the most recent developments. As in any simple utility maximisation problem, it is not just the mean of the distribution that counts but also its variance. In other words the combination of late 1980s' boom and early 1990s' recession counts against the Government in a way that four or five years of steady progress would not have done. If this is correct, it may not be sufficient for the Government to deliver low inflation and interest rates and some recovery in output in time for the election; it may simply be that the electorate remains unforgiving of a five-year track record of boom and bust.     

Forecast Summary

The economy is in the throes of its biggest downturn in ten years. Output has been falling and unemployment rising for nearly a year and business confidence indicators suggest no early letup. In the last 12 months total output has fallen 2 per cent with manufacturing 5 per cent lower. This, we believe, is the trough of the recession and we expect signs of recovery to be evident in the late spring. Even so, output is likely to fall by nearly 1 per cent this year and unemployment should rise well above 2 million. The benefits of recession have been slow to appear, though the trade gap is narrowing sharply. The downward pressure on prices from falling demand is balanced by rising costs as industry struggles to pass on high unit labour and interest costs. Helped by some reduction in mortgage rates and a severe squeeze on profits, we expect retail price inflation to fall to Sper cent by the end of the year and to 3–4 per cent over the medium term.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The Government has recognised that the balance of risks has shifted in the last six months. Even though the pound has been devalued by around 15 per cent and suspended from the ERM, the probability of a significant pick-up in inflation over the next 12 months is low: the more serious risk is that the recession, which showed signs of deepening in the third quarter, turns into a slump. It is for this reason that the Autumn Statement announced measures, both monetary and fiscal, to increase demand and more particularly to try to rebuild confidence which has taken a battering over more than two years of recession, most notably in the housing market, where in the immediate aftermath of the ERM diédâle prices continued their sharp fall. On the fiscal side the measures were constrained by a seriously adverse trend in the PSBR, with some imaginative use of ‘time-limited’ measures which will boost demand in the short run without adding to government borrowing in the medium term. On the monetary side the Chancellor sanctioned the third 1 percent reduction in interest rates since the pound has been in free float. He was responding partly to criticism that the earlier two cuts had achieved rather little, though Mi. Lamont might have been advised that steering the economy by monetary policy is akin to steering an oil tanker: it takes a considerable time to respond. The danger, especially if rates come down to 6 per cent before the end of the year or even, as some are urging, to Sper cent, is that rates will have to rise sharply again before the end of next year to head off a renewed bout of inflation. This may seem a remote possibility at the present time but, as Milton Friedman taught us long ago, the lags in monetary policy are long and variable: it is nonsense to imagine that the cuts in rates that we have seen in the last two months could have yet had any impact on the economy. The worry is that, with the pound I5 per cent down on ERM levels, they will have an adverse effect on inflation in, 1994-5.     

Forecast Summary

Backed by the lowest interest rates in fifteen years and a competitive exchange rate, we see the economy moving off the corrugated bottom of last year and recovery gathering pace as this year progresses. We expect output to rise 1.4 per cent this year, 0.5 per cent more than we forecast in October when we were expecting a far more cautious approach on interest rates, and 3 per cent in 1994. Here we have factored in another 1 per cent cut in base rates to coincide with the Budget on 16 March but this may prove to be the floor, especially if, as is rumoured, the Prime Minister has vetoed tax increases in the Budget for fear of derailing a fragile recovery. By the end of the year, however, we expect the trend in interest rates to be upwards to halt a sliding exchange rate and to cap the devaluation-induced price increases that will be feeding into domestic prices by then. On this basis we believe that inflation can be contained at 4 per cent underlying this year, 5 per cent in 1994 - outside the Chancellor's target range. While we are more sanguine than before on the outlook for output and inflation, major problems remain on the PSBR and the balance of payments. Beginning in the December Budget, the Government will have to raise taxes to avoid a debt spiral on the budget deficit and channel resources into net exports. Even on the basis of a £4bn tax hike in the first of the unified Budgets, we expect the PSBR to run along close to £50bn and the current account deficit in the £15bn-20bn range.     

The Dollar, the Oil Price and Policy Divergence

There is currently a clear divergence of policy between the United States, Japan and Germany. With the US in recession and concern growing over the severity of the slump, interest rates have been cut in a move to revive the economy. In contrast Japan and Germany are both experiencing strong growth and monetary policy remains tight to combat inflation. This divergence was seen most clearly when the Federal Reserve Board lowered its discount rate to 6 per cent on 1 February, the day after the Bundesbank had raised its Lombard rate to 9 per cent. With G7 increasingly concerned about domestic factors, less emphasis is placed upon stable exchange rates and as a result the dollar is at an all-time low. The last two G7 communiqués have stressed ‘stability oriented monetary policies’, an ambiguous phrase which fails to define ‘stability’ either in terms of exchange rates, inflation or growth. Thus both the German and Japanese policy of high interest rates to reduce inflation and low US interest rates aimed at stimulating the economy can be termed as ‘stability oriented’. This analysis focuses on these divergent policy responses in two alternative scenarios to the world forecast we presented last month. The first scenario considers what might happen if the Federal Reserve Board were to stimulate the US economy by further cuts in interest rates, whilst Japanese and German rates were unchanged in the face of inflationary pressures. This case may be relevant if the recent US loosening of monetary policy is not sufficient to encourage growth because of a ‘credit crunch’, so that a more expansionary policy is required by the Fed. As a consequence, policy diverges further and the dollar weakens. The second scenario focuses upon a reduction in inflationary pressures in Japan and Germany brought about by an oil price fall. In this case we assume that US policy is already loose enough to avoid a prolonged recession, but that German and Japanese monetary policy is relaxed as inflationary forces recede. In this case policies converge. Each scenario thus concentrates on one of !he two features which are causing the policy divergence amongst G3 countries: recession in the US, inflation in Germany and Japan.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The recent weakness of the world economy does not undermine the relatively optimistic forecast for 1987 which we presented in May. At that time we suggested that activity would be sluggish for most of this year as a result of the impact effect of the OPEC III oil price collapse. But we also argued that by the end of the year there would be clear signs of a consumer-led recovery as the personal sector adjusted to the real income gains and lower inflation benefits of the lower oil price and the reduction in nominal interest rates which followed. There is mounting evidence of rising consumer spending, particularly in Europe and it is something of a puzzle that output has not risen to meet this demand. The explanation is partly that producer confidence has lagged behind that of consumers, so that demand has been met from stock, and partly that spending has been supplied from countries outside the OECD, especially the NICs in the Far East. Nevertheless, we are convinced that our earlier view of OECD output prospects next year remains the most likely though, in recognition of the growing importance of non-OECD competition, we have adjusted the output forecast down slightly. OECD GNP is expected to rise 2.6 per cent this year, with an acceleration to over 4 per cent in 1987 arid 1988. Moreover, we believe this can be achieved without a rebound in inflation, which is forecast to be stable at about its present level of 2 1/2 per cent.     

The London Business School with Gover Publishing

The world economy is in poor shape. OECD industrial production fell 0.5per cent in both 1991 and 1992 arid though it may now have stopped falling it is still, on our estimates, below year-earlier levels. The US recovery continues to disappoint; recession persists in Japan and Europe; inflationary pressures, already weak, are waning. Next month's UK forecast would normally be based on the world forecast published in June's International Economic Outlook, when we were looking for G7 output to rise 1.2 per cent this year, 2.5 per cent next. But this now looks on the high side and although a detailed revision to the world forecast mist wait until the December IEO, as at1 input to the UK forecast we are shading our G7 growth forecasts - to I per cent this year and 2.25 per cent in 1994. Similar downward revisions are also in train at the OECD arid IMF, according to recent press reports. The more sluggish output performance is already having mi impact on the oil price, which has fallen below £16 a barrel. Together, these developments imply lower world inflation and, particularly in post-ERM Europe, a faster easing of monetary policy than we had allowed for in June.     

Forecast Summary

The recovery that we forecast in February remains intact, though its composition is shifting between external and domestic demand. As we reported in International Economic Outlook earlier this month, the recession in Europe is intensifying so that, even with the devaluation-induced improvement in competitiveness, exports are being held back The weaker world outlook is the main factor behind a lower growth forecast next year. For 1993, however, we are continuing to forecast growth of 11/2 per cent, principally on the basis of more buoyant consumer spending. But the boost from consumption, while welcome in the first stage of recovery, is short-lived since the higher taxes already announced for next year hold back the growth of disposable incomes. Again this is desirable for the share of consumption, private and public, in GDP has been rising steadily and needs to be reversed in order to devote resources to reducing the two deficits: the PSBR and the trade gap. Over the forecast as a whole it is exports and investment which drive demand, not consumption. Underlying inflation has fallen below 3 per cent for the first time in twenty years, but it is now at its cyclical low point. We expect some increase in inflation from now on, though the Government's 1–4 per cent target is not likely to be breached this year. Next year and beyond, however, without more action on the budget deficit or a sharper increase in interest rates than we are assuming, inflation is forecast to settle in the 4–5 per cent range. Unemployment has fallen in recent months but the underlying trend remains upwards. We expect the three million level to be reached in the second half of the year.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The strength of US domestic demand is exerting a very strong pull on the world economy. Japan in particular is benefiting from soaring export demand, but the effects on European exports have been offset by weak domestic demand and, in the case of West Germany and the UK, by damaging industrial disputes which have interrupted supply. Over the next 12 months we expect the US economy to slow down under the weight of the financial and external balance pressures, which two years of very rapid but unbalanced growth have built up. For the world economy, however, we expect the slowdown in the US to be counterbalanced by expanding domestic demand in Europe and Japan, especially if a lower dollar permits reductions in interest rates. We forecast world output growth of about 3 per cent next year, well below the near-5 per cent projected for 1984 - the cyclical peak. By the second half of 1985 the world recovery will be three years old and we expect a pause in the growth of output. Against a background of stable monetary growth we expect world inflation in the 5–6 per cent range over the medium term. This is consistent with some increase in US inflation, low and stable inflation in Japan and West Germany and further progress in reducing inflation in countries such as France and Italy. Our forecast is based on the assumption that the dollar falls next year. If it does not fail we believe there is a significant risk of slower growth.