Money as a Potential Anchor for the Price Level: a Critique of the P* Approach

A number of recent articles have attempted to restore the use of a simple measure of the money supply as an indicator of future price levels and to re-establish a causal link from money to prices. Most notably Hallman, Porter and Small (HPS) (1989a), (1989b) originated the approach using US data and Hannah and James(1989) have applied it to the UK The approach broadens the traditional idea of a constant velocity of money by introducing the notion of V* and Q*, the long-run value of velocity and income. These are then used to define P from the traditional quantity theory of money as the long-run equilibrium price level. The analysis then proceeds to estimate a standard Error Correction Model (ECM) for price determination with the levels effect given by (P-P*)t-1. The conclusion drawn is that 'a measure of money that determines the long-run future level of prices is useful in determining the proper monetary policy for attaining price stability. We have shown, through the construction of P*, that M2 can serve as this determinant for the price level' (Hallman, Porter and Small (1982a) p. 23).
We argue in this paper that the P* approach is flawed. It is certainly more complex than traditional monetarist approaches but the fundamental questions of causality are in no way either affected or resolved. The P* analysis is a variant on more conventional cointegration analysis (Engle and Granger (1987), Johansen (1988), Hall (1989)) and we argue that the Johansen framework allows us to address the question in a formal and more complete way. When this approach is applied to the US data used by HPS, we find that while the P* relationship does indeed represent a cointegrating one, it does not have a causal link with prices but rather the causality runs from prices to money - this result conforms well to the work of Hendry and Ericsson (1990) or Hall, Henry and Wilcox (1990), which use this form of relationship to model the demand for money.     

Dualism in Part-Time Employment

This paper draws on open-ended interviews of managers to characterize two distinct types of part-time employment in service industries. "Secondary" part-time employment displays the typical characteristics of a secondary labor market; "retention" part-time jobs are primary labor market jobs. Some predictions of this model are tested on Current Population Survey data.     

A Critical Look at SFAS 34: Capitalization of Interest Cost

In 1974, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) noted that an increasing number of companies were capitalizing interest costs, and that this practice was not being adequately disclosed (FASB, 1979, par. 26). In light of the alternative practices concerning the accounting for interest and lack of adequate disclosure by companies that were already capitalizing interest, the SEC recommended that the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) consider the issue of accounting for interest cost. As a result of the SEC's initiative, in 1979 the FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards [SFAS] No. 34, Capitalization of Interest Cost, which mandated uniform interest capitalization rules in accounting for interest costs associated with the acquisition of qualifying non-current assets. The purpose of this article is to examine SFAS 34 in terms of its financial statement impact, the congruence of its assumptions with economic behaviour, its effect on subsequent standards related to interest capitalization, and its implications on financial accounting standard setting. To explore these issues we first illustrate the extent to which interest capitalization affects financial statements. We then empirically analyse the measure employed in SFAS 34 for the capitalization of interest cost in cases where debt is not directly linked with the acquisition of qualifying non-current assets. In addition, we critically examine the treatment accorded interest cost in subsequent FASB standards. Our research suggests that SFAS 34′s rationale for interest capitalization is incompatible with firm behaviour, and that the rules for interest capitalization as reflected in various accounting standards are inconsistent. These findings suggest that in the case of interest capitalization the benefits of comparability in financial reporting are not realized. A policy recommendation is then offered to alleviate some of these difficulties. The recommendation is to disallow the capitalization of interest cost in the absence of a direct link between the debt and the acquisition of qualifying assets.     

Asset-pricing Puzzles and Incomplete Markets

The representative agent theory of asset pricing is modified to incorporate heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets. The model features two types of agents who differ up to a nontradable, idiosyncratic component in their endowment processes. Numerical solutions indicate that individuals are able to diversify a substantial portion of their idiosyncratic income risk through riskless borrowing and lending alone. Restrictions on the variability of intertemporal marginal rates of substitution ( Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) ) are used to argue that incomplete markets, as modeled here, cannot account for the properties of asset returns that are anomalous from the perspective of representative agent theory.     

Entry into Banking Markets and the Early-Mover Advantage

Using a sample for 1972–2002 with over 10,000 bank entries into local markets, we find a market share advantage for early entrants. In particular, the earlier a bank enters, the larger is its market share relative to other banks, controlling for firm, market, and time effects, with a market share advantage for early movers between 1 and 15 percentage points, depending on the order of entry. The strongest early-mover advantage is for banks that were in our sample in 1972 and survive into the 1990s. Moreover, early entrants appear to have such hold in the market by strategically investing in larger branch networks. Even controlling for the potential survivorship bias, we find that a bank's share decreases by 0.1 percentage points for a change in its order of entry from n th to ( n + 1)th. High growth markets show a smaller difference between late and early movers, consistent with a larger fraction of consumers yet to be locked in with a bank in these markets.