生育政策调整、退休年龄延迟与城镇职工基本养老保险最优缴费率

文章基于“十三五”规划建议提出适当降低社会保险费率的现实背景,从社会福利最大化视角,运用一般均衡模型对五种生育情景下不同退休年龄的城镇职工基本养老保险最优社会统筹缴费率进行测算,并分析降低社会统筹缴费率的经济效应。研究表明：（1）最优社会统筹缴费率随退休年龄的延长而下降,随人口增长率的上升而提高。0％－100％符合全面二孩政策规定的妇女生育二孩,使退休年龄为60岁时的最优社会统筹缴费率降到191．8％－196．3％,使退休年龄为65岁时的最优缴费率降到107．7％－116．4％。（2）除了受生育政策和退休年龄影响外,最优社会统筹缴费率对物质资本产出弹性、个人主观效用贴现因子和社会贴现因子的敏感性也较强。（3）降低社会统筹缴费率具有积极的经济效应,不仅能促进经济增长和增进社会福利,而且有助于完善我国多层次养老保险体系。因此,文章为降低城镇职工基本养老保险社会统筹缴费率的改革提供了依据。     

Public Pension Benefits Claiming Behaviour: new Evidence from the Japanese Study on Ageing and Retirement

The present study explores public pension claiming behaviour among the Japanese elderly. First, we perform financial simulations, estimate expected utility and depict the typical patterns of pension benefits over a lifecycle. We show that a beneficiary's optimal retirement age depends on that beneficiary's mortality risk, discount rate, initial wealth and risk attitude. Second, we use individual‐level data from the Japanese Study on Aging and Retirement (JSTAR) to empirically examine the determinants of claim timing. We find evidence that most of the factors examined in the simulation are, indeed, significantly associated with early claiming among wage earners of pension benefits.     

The Effect of Benefit Reductions on the Retirement Age: The Heterogeneous Response of Manual and Non‐Manual Workers

I estimate the effect of benefit reductions on the timing of retirement. The introduction of actuarial adjustments in the German public pension system serves as a source of exogenous variation to estimate discrete time transition rates into retirement for individuals of age 60–66. Responses to benefit reductions are elaborated separately for manual and non‐manual workers. On average, individuals postpone retirement by 13.2 months if pension benefits are reduced by 3.6 percent for each year of early retirement. This result is in line with the previous quasi‐experimental literature and suggests that people respond to the incentive of reducing the implicit tax on further periods of work. However, among men the response is about 50 percent lower for manual workers compared to non‐manual workers. Surprisingly, this does not necessarily indicate that retirement incomes of manual workers deteriorate. The explanation is that disability pensions are available at age 63—without benefit reductions.     

Age-specific entrepreneurship and PAYG: Public pensions in Germany

We present new empirical evidence on the distribution of earnings, income and wealth among entrepreneurs in Germany. We document that both earnings and income are more concentrated among entrepreneurs than among workers and describe a large-scale overlapping-generations model that replicates the age-earnings profiles of these two household types. As an application, we compute the equilibrium effects of a reform of the German pay-as-you-go pension system in which entrepreneurs must also contribute and receive a pension. We show that in the presence of mobility between workers and entrepreneurs, the expected lifetime utility of all newborn households unanimously declines due to the general equilibrium effects of lower aggregate savings, and welfare losses amount to approximately 0.7% of total consumption. In addition, the integration of self-employed workers into the social security system in Germany does not help to improve its fiscal sustainability, and only an increase in the retirement age to 70 years will help to finance pensions at the present level beyond the year 2050.     

Endogenous retirement and public pension system reform in Spain

Population aging has spurred developed countries around the world to reform their PAYG pension systems. In particular, delaying legal retirement ages and reducing the generosity of pension benefits have been widely implemented changes. This paper assesses the potential success of these policies in the case of the Spanish economy, and compares them with the results obtained by the (rather modest) reforms already implemented in 1997 and 2001. This evaluation is accomplished in a heterogeneous-agent dynamic general equilibrium model where individuals can adjust their retirement ages in response to changes to the pension rules. We check the ability of the model to reproduce the basic stylized facts of retirement behavior (particularly the pattern of early retirement induced by minimum pensions). The model is then used to explore the impact of pension reforms. We find that already implemented changes actually increase the implicit liabilities of the system. In contrast, delaying the legal retirement age and extending the averaging period in the pension formula to cover most of the individual's life-cycle can reduce the implicit liabilities substantially. These findings reveal the failure of the Spanish political system to distribute the costs of population aging more evenly across the generations.     

延迟退休年龄与养老保险收支余额:作用机制及政策效应

文章通过连续时间养老金收支模型分析认为延迟退休年龄对养老保险计划收支余额的影响来自四个方面的效应,即缴费年限效应、领取年限效应、替代率效应和差异效应。改革的最终效果是上述四种效应共同作用的结果。短期看,前两种效应占据主导;长期看,后两种效应也具有显著影响。延迟退休年龄的政策效果和工资增长率、养老金增长率、改革速度以及未来参保人口结构有关。理论分析和实证检验结果表明,无论从改革过程还是从对养老保险计划收支余额的影响看,延迟退休年龄都是一个复杂而渐进的过程,延迟退休年龄必将减轻政府在养老保险方面负担的传统说法并不全面。     

Taxation of early retirement windows and delaying retirement: The French experience

This paper investigates the effect of the 2003 French pension reform on hiring, firing and employment rates among older workers. This reform increased the mandatory retirement age and simultaneously it set a tax levied on early retirement windows paid by firms to their older workers, to encourage them to leave their job early. We use a matching model with endogenous job destruction extended to account for a mandatory retirement age and we calibrate the model with data drawn from the French Labor Force Surveys for the years 2002 and 2003. We show that in the case of a high tax rate, delaying retirement raises job separation rates, which partially offsets its positive effect on job finding rates. Consequently, the combination of an increase in the retirement age and a taxation on early retirement windows may have negative effects on the employment rate among older workers.     

Pension expectations,reforms and macroeconomic downturn in Italy. What can microdata tell us?

We use different years of the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) to explore how Italian workers’ expectations regarding their future level of pension benefits and retirement age changed from 2000 to 2014. Comparing expected and statutory values for future pension benefits and retirement ages, we find that knowledge of the pension system and its rules are not evenly distributed among workers. Some sections of the population, in particular, younger workers, women and the self-employed, are less precise in estimating their future pension benefits. As for retirement age, a large share of the working population still has not completely assimilated the implications of the linkage with the evolution of lifetime expectations at 65. Expectations in the final part of the period observed are dominated by increasing pessimism, which may be related to the macroeconomic crisis of the Italian economy and to the approval of a severe pension reform in 2011. Checking whether a household’s total wealth is consistent with lifetime consumption, we find that households where the head overestimates the future value of the pension benefit accumulate fewer resources than the remaining part of the population.     

OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS, WAGES, AND JOB MOBILITY IN GERMANY

Pension‐covered workers in Germany are three times less likely to change jobs than workers not covered by an occupational pension scheme. This paper examines the effects of occupational pension coverage and pension portability loss on voluntary job changes using a sample selection model with endogenous switching. The model estimates, derived from western German panel data for 1985–1998, indicate that occupational pension coverage reduces worker mobility by imposing a capital loss on those leaving their job before retirement age. Moreover, pension‐covered workers receive a higher compensation, which discourages mobility. Making pensions portable increases mobility, but from a low initial level.     

Social security and retirement incentives in Austria

This paper provides an overview of the interaction between social security and retirement behavior in Austria in the decades up to the on-going reform process. The key question is, how much of the retirement behavior can be attributed to incentive effects of the pension system. We describe the labor market and retirement behavior of the elderly in Austria, survey the key features of the public pension system and finally present the results of a series of simulations aimed at assessing the retirement incentives generated by the pension system. We compute levels and accrual rates of social security wealth and implicit tax rates on continued work according to the method portrayed in Gruber and Wise [Gruber J, Wise D (1999) Social security and retirement around the world. University of Chicago Press, Chicago London]. To some extent, the sharp drop in labor force participation among the elderly must be attributed to major disincentives of the Austrian pension system; the system turns out to provide significant incentives to retire early. Past reforms have reduced the disincentives. Our results, however, show the need to further reform the public pension scheme and to reorient it stronger towards the principle of actuarial fairness.     

Do retirement planning strategies alter the effect of time preference on retirement wealth?

An individual’s willingness to accumulate retirement wealth is influenced by their preference for intertemporal consumption. People with a strong preference for current consumption (high personal discount rate) may choose to save less and face the risk of decreased retirement preparedness. A negative relation between a high personal discount rate and retirement wealth may be reduced when individuals engage in some form of retirement planning. Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we provide evidence that respondents with a high personal discount rate accumulated 37% less retirement wealth, on average, between 2004 and 2008, when compared with respondents with a low personal discount rate. However, when retirement planning strategies were included in the model, there was no statistical difference in retirement wealth between people with high and low personal discount rates. The retirement planning strategies included calculating a retirement income need, hiring a financial planner for retirement or engaging in both of these activities.     

Pension Reform, Capital Markets and the Rate of Return

Abstract. This paper discusses the consequences of population aging and a fundamental pension reform – that is, a shift towards more pre‐funding – for capital markets in Germany. We use a stylized closed‐economy, overlapping‐generations model to compare the effects of the recent German pension reform with those of a more decisive reform that would freeze the current pay‐as‐you‐go contribution rate and thus result in a larger funded component of the pension system. We predict rates of return to capital under both reform scenarios over a long horizon, taking demographic projections as given. Our main finding is that the future decrease in the rate of return is much smaller than often claimed in the public debate. Our simulations show that the capital stock will decrease once the baby‐boom generations enter retirement, even if there were no fundamental pension reform. The corresponding decrease in the rate of return, the direct effect of population aging, is around 0.7 percentage points. While the capital market effects of the recent German pension reform are marginal, the rate of return to capital would decrease by an additional 0.5 percentage points under the more decisive reform proposal.     

A Model Under Siege: A Case Study of the German Retirement Insurance System

This study evaluates the positive and negative features of the German public pension system and discusses three reasons for its increasing perceived and real difficulties: maturation, negative incentive effects, and the problems of demographic change. The German system in its current form may be able to limp through the coming decades but will cease to be the exemplary Bismarckian machine that has created generous retirement incomes at reasonable tax rates. Current policy proposals are insufficient and a few but incisive design changes and some degree of prefunding could rescue the many positive aspects of the German retirement insurance system.     

The effects of recent Spanish pension reforms on sustainability and pension adequacy

The Spanish pension system has been recently reformed as a response to the demographic challenge and with the objective of ensuring the sustainability of the pension system in the long-term. The overall reforms include changes in the majority of the system parameters, a new indexation rule and a sustainability factor that links life expectancy and the first pension amount. The aim of this work is to analyse how these reforms affect two important features of a pension system: fiscal sustainability and adequacy. For this purpose, the real internal rate of return (IRR) of the lifetime contributions and benefits and the prospective gross theoretical replacement rate (TRR), both before and after the reforms, have been computed. The calculations are case-study based, for a few hypothetical workers who are sufficiently representative of the earnings and retirement patterns in Spain. The results show that the real IRR is 0.7 p.p. lower and the prospective gross TRR is 18 p.p. lower after the reform process for the base case of a man with an uninterrupted career of 40 years with average earnings and a retirement age of 65. In addition, pension reform process in Spain has different effects among the individuals depending on the gender, level of earnings, retirement age and career length.     

An increase in the retirement age in China: the regional economic effects

China’s pension system is in need of comprehensive reform. One measure on which we focus is to increase the retirement age. It is likely that a change in retirement age will have significantly different effects across China’s regions. Interregional disparities are already very substantial in China and it will be important to know how changes in pension arrangements will affect disparities. We consider four policies to increase the retirement age from 60 to 61. They differ according the use made of the extra revenue generated by the policy. All four policies increase welfare and reduce the interregional welfare gap.     

Myopia, redistribution and pensions

This paper reviews a number of recent contributions that study pension design with myopic individuals. Its objective is to explore how the presence of more or less myopic individuals affects pension design when individuals differ also in productivity. This double heterogeneity gives rise to an interesting interplay between paternalistic and redistributive considerations, which is at the heart of most of the results that are presented. The main part of the paper is devoted to the issue of pension design when myopic individual do not save “enough” for their retirement because their “myopic self” (with a high discount rate) emerges when labor supply and savings decisions are made. Some extensions and variations are considered in the second part. In particular we deal with situations where labor disutility or preferences for consumption are subject to “habit formation” and where sin goods have a detrimental effect on second period health. Myopic individuals tend to underestimate the effects of both habit formation and sinful consumption, which complicates public policy.     

Optimal Social Insurance and Health Inequality

This paper integrates into public economics a biologically founded, stochastic process of individual aging. The novel approach enables us to quantitatively characterize the optimal joint design of health and retirement policy behind the veil of ignorance for today and in response to future medical progress. Calibrating our model to Germany, our analysis suggests that the current social insurance policy instruments are set close to the (constrained) socially optimal levels, given proportional contribution rates for health and pension finance, the equivalence principle in the pension system, and a common statutory retirement age. Future progress in medical technology calls for a potentially drastic increase in health spending and a higher retirement age without lowering the pension contribution rate. Interestingly, from an ex ante point of view, medical progress and higher health spending are in conflict with the goal to reduce health inequality.     

退休年龄与社会养老金的定量关系研究

我国现行的社会保障政策与法定退休年龄使得个人养老金收支盈亏及领取水平有很大的差异,并导致高龄退休人员相对贫困化。经计量,现行的社会保障政策才是导致这些不良结果的主要因素。适当降低退休时养老金替代率,提高养老金的年增长率是目前合理的政策调整取向。     

人口预期寿命与退休年龄

人口寿命的不断延长给中国养老事业带来越来越大的压力.文章在两期交叠世代模型的基础上引入退休,在市场完全竞争、充分就业和政府能够控制退休年龄的假设前提下,在个人、企业和政府的行为以及资本市场均衡的层面构建了一般均衡的模型框架,从社会计划者的角度发现福利最大化下的人口预期寿命变化和退休年龄是正相关的,并呈现出负反比例的函数形式.文章还基于参数估计和赋值模拟的方法,求解出了人口预期寿命与退休年龄的调整算法,并以此给出了两者间的调整对照表.根据计算的结果和预期的寿命,建议2030年前逐步将退休年龄延长至65岁.最后通过检验发现,如果不存在人口预期寿命和退休年龄之间的调整机制,在保持养老金收支平衡的前提下,预期寿命的延长将减少养老金的发放,并可能带来社会福利的损失.因此,在中国人口预期寿命不断延长的背景下,建议政府考虑建立人口预期寿命和退休年龄的调整机制.