Ökonomische Aspekte der Entlohnung und Regulierung unabhängiger Versicherungsvermittler

The compensation and regulation of independent intermediaries is an important issue in insurance markets. With this respect, the profitability and importance of fee-for-service and commission compensation of intermediaries is lively discussed in academia and in the insurance industry. This paper summarizes economic rationales why and in which lines of business insurance companies sell their products via independent intermediaries. With this respect, it is analyzed how different forms of compensation affect important market functions of independent intermediaries. Finally, the economic impact of certain regulatory interventions, like a mandatory disclosure or a general ban of any commissions and the German ban for intermediaries to share commission with policyholders, on market efficiency is discussed.     

Insurance intermediation — Theoretical analysis and practical issues in the european market

This paper studies intermediation between consumers and providers of insurance. Different types of intermediaries are distinguished and investigated in the light of recent market dynamics in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, in particular concentration and the trend towards one-stop finance. Intermediaries’, the insurance providers’ and the consumers’ strategic options are evaluated with a focus on the incentive problems caused by an intermediaries double principal-agent relationship with insurance providers and consumers. Criteria for an intermediary’s independence, which is often aggressively advertised without transparent justification, are developed. It is argued that performance and stability of the market could be improved by well-specified levels of independence in insurance intermediation which are to be verified by regulation authorities and / or private rating agencies.     

The Economics of Insurance Intermediaries

This article analyzes the economic functions of independent insurance intermediaries (brokers and independent agents), focusing on the commercial property–casualty insurance market. The article investigates the functions performed by intermediaries, the competitiveness of the market, the compensation arrangements for intermediaries, and the process by which policies are placed with insurers. Insurance intermediaries are essentially market makers who match the insurance needs of policyholders with insurers who have the capability of meeting those needs. Intermediary compensation comprises premium‐based commissions, expressed as a percentage of the premium paid, and contingent commissions based on the profitability, persistency, and/or volume of the business placed with the insurer. Empirical evidence is provided that premium‐based and contingent commissions are passed on to policyholders in the premium. However, contingent commissions can enhance competitive bidding by aligning the insurer's and the intermediary's interests. This alignment of interests gives insurers more confidence in the selection of risks and thus helps to break the “winner's curse” and encourages insurers to bid more aggressively. Independent intermediaries also help markets operate more efficiently by reducing the information asymmetries between insurers and buyers that can cause adverse selection.     

On the Positive Role of Financial Intermediation in Allocation of Venture Capital in a Market with Imperfect Information

This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation that highlights the contribution of intermediaries as informed agents in a market with imperfect information. We consider a venture capital market where the entrepreneurs select the qualities of projects and their perquisite consumptions, about which the investors are imperfectly informed. It is shown that when all investors have positive search costs, the entrepreneurs are induced to offer the unacceptable inferior projects (“lemons” only), and the investors will not enter the venture capital market, but put their funds in other low return investments–an undesirable allocation of resources. Beginning with an initial undesirable situation, the financial intermediaries may evolve as informed agents that induce a Pareto-preferred allocation, leading the investors to a higher welfare state. We focus our analysis on the existence of intermediation equilibra when the market for intermediation services is competitive. The distribution of returns on projects, the fees charged by intermediaries, and the fraction of institutional holdings are all endogenous in equilibrium. It is shown that (i) there cannot be a competitive intermediation equilibrium with very high institutional holdings, and (ii) in other cases multiple equilibra may exist, but the one with the highest institutional holdings dominates the others in a Pareto sense.     

Europäische Richtlinie über Versicherungsvermittlung und VVG-Reform

The directive on insurance mediation, proposed by the European Commission, is supposed to secure a minimum standard of professional competence for intermediaries to protect customers as well as to ascertain the intermediaries’ freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services in the internal market. Pursuant to the directive, only an intermediary who is registered in his / her home country’s intermediary register will be allowed to mediate insurances. The intermediary has to comply with professional requirements set by the directive in order to be registered. Yet, part-time intermediaries can be exempted from those requirements by the member states. Additionally, the intermediaries are burdened with certain information and documentation duties towards their customers, a breach of which will cause personal liability. Only these contractual duties are to be implemented in the WG (German Insurance Act), which is soon to be basically reformed.     

保险人与保险中介人之间的信息不对称问题研究

保险人与保险中介人之间由于期望效用不一致、信息资源不充分等原因导致了信息不对称,对保险人造成负面影响的是代理人隐瞒行为型信息不对称。要解决保险人与保险中介人之间的信息不对称,一方面应加强保险人与保险中介人自身的内部约束,另一方面应建立利益趋同机制和保险信用评级制度。     

对我国保险专业中介发展问题的思考

更高的效率与更低的成本,产业链各主体利益共赢的生存法则,是保险行业良性生态的基础。资金、人才、技术,成为制约保险专业中介做大做强的主要瓶颈。在规模化及技术进步的效率提高基础上深化与保险公司利益一致的战略合作,是其新时期发展的现实选择。以创新提升保险专业中介有效供给能力是现阶段最主要的任务。竞争发展,须由商业模式确定的战略定位及战略规划获得制高点。从专业型走向综合型,是企业组织管控能力与市场能力匹配的结果,是企业决策者基于现实资源能力深思熟虑市场战略的结果。     

Die Deckungsvorsorge der Versicherungsvermittler nach der EU-Versicherungsvermittlungs-Richtlinie

Insurance intermediaries being obliged to be registrated in Germany due to the directive have to comply with severe provisions concerning cover provisions (i. e. Deckungsvorsorge). A third-party liability insurance is virtually compulsory for insurance brokers and insurance agents charged by several insurance companies (i. e. Mehrfach-Agent), other kinds of equal alternatives for them do not exist practically. Concerning exclusively charged insurance agents (i. e. Ausschließlichkeits-Agenten), as well as in a side job, an indemnity clause of their insurance company giving the third party full rights may be a an alternative complying with the directive. The minimum covering funds being prescribed by the directive of € 1 million per event of damage and the minimum annual covering sum of € 1.5 million are appropriate to third party liability risks of an average insurance broker on the German market, for almost all of the insurance agents on this market without a permitted covering provisions, with regard to their very little third party liability risks, they are too high. Nevertheless, the German legislator is not entitled to deviate from them to lower sums for lack of an authorization rule in the directive. German legislator should transform the rules of the directive into national ones as soon as possible in favour of the interests of the consumers worthy of protection, using the existing national regulations on lawyers, notary publics, tax consultants and accountants concerning minimum contents of compulsory cover provisions and agreed exclusive clauses.     

Das Recht der Versicherungsvermittlung

The European single market and its legal harmonization and integration are important for the law of insurance and particularly for the process of mediation and of the intermediaries. Especially the EU Insurance Mediation Directive (IMD 1) from 2002 stated all essential principles and rules for insurance mediators. This European directive lead to a more convergent and consistent level of regulation in the whole EU. Therefore it was interesting to analyze in a comparative session on Turkish and German law if there has been any influence of the EU regulation on insurance mediation on Turkish law. The following article gives an overview both of the similarities and differences of the Turkish and the German codifications on the law of insurance intermediaries. More than one would expect the essentials are still similar in a wide range.     

What Do We Know About Market Discipline in Insurance?

The aim of this article is to summarize the knowledge on market discipline in insurance and other financial service sectors. Market discipline can be defined as the ability of customers, investors, intermediaries (agents, brokers), and evaluators (analysts, auditors, rating agencies) to monitor and influence a company's management. Looking at banking is especially interesting, since market discipline in this field has been studied extensively. Based on existing knowledge, we develop a framework for researching market discipline in insurance that includes its most important drivers and impediments. The results highlight a significant need for continuing research. The findings are of relevance not only for European insurers and regulators, but for institutions outside Europe.     

Versicherungszyklen in der deutschen KFZ-Versicherung

In this paper we analyze underwriting cycles in the German motor insurance industries for the last 50 years. A special emphasis is laid on the so-called aggregation bias that arises when data from different lines of business is merged in a total market statistic. In literature, underwriting cycles were found for many international markets and for numerous lines of business. We find underwriting cycles for the German motor insurance with lengths between six and ten years, which have been increasing for the last years. Our empirical evidence on cycle lengths in German motor insurance fits well into the context of international comparative studies on underwriting cycles.     

ERODING MARKET IMPERFECTIONS,REINTERMEDIATION, AND DISINTERMEDIATION

In this paper a search model of a financial market, generalized to include costly contracting, is employed to demonstrate that: (i) relative cost efficiency for an intermediary is not sufficient to explain a role for intermediation services, and (ii) eroding market imperfections do not produce hypothesized effects on “reintermediation” from traditional depository-type intermediaries to brokerage-type intermediaries and on “disintermediation” from indirect financing to direct financing under a set of justifiable assumptions.     

Neuausrichtung des Hypothekenkreditgeschäfts in der Lebensversicherung durch Kreditverkäufe

Loan portfolio sales represent a valid option to restructure the life insurer’s real estate loan business. Latest market experience gained by vendors from the German banking industry is positive as there has grown a liquid and professional market in Germany over the last few years. Some German life insurers have already utilised this market to sell loan portfolios and restructure their real estate loan business accordingly. Potential vendors from the insurance industry can rely on the given market experience and professional assistance to design the transaction process and the restructuring result efficiently.     

现代金融中介理论视角下的我国金融体系模式选择

现代金融中介理论表明,商业银行等金融中介与经济增长之间存在密切的相关性。金融中介在促进经济增长的同时,也面临着许多复杂问题。本文从现代金融中介理论的视角出发,对银行导向型金融体系与市场导向型金融体系进行了国际比较,并从融资关系、风险管理、信息生产、公司治理等角度进行对比分析,得出在中国现实的环境下中介与市场发挥着不同作用,但金融中介的优势明显。因此,我国应选择以金融中介为主、资本市场为辅的金融体系,并加紧推出金融机构的混业经营模式。     

Empirische Analyse des Einflusses der Überschussbeteiligung auf Neugeschäft und Storno

Recently, German insurers are becoming increasingly interested in assessing and modelling risks related to new business and lapses. The final report of a DAV (German actuarial association) working party on stochastic models for German life insurance companies, released end of 2005, includes some basic approaches for this purpose. However, so far no systematic empirical research has been carried out which provides evidence for an appropriate calibration of such models. This article contributes to closing the gap. It presents the main results of an empirical analysis on the influence of policyholders’ profit participation on new business and lapses based on data about 87 German life insurance companies from 1995—2004. Analyses of regression and correlation were performed for various definitions of the explanatory variable ?profit participation“ (more precisely: the spread to some average value) and with diverse reference parameters for new business and lapses, also considering different types of life insurance. Ultimately, the exploration scarcely yielded evidence for a significant general correlation between policyholders’ profit participation and new business or lapses. However, because of the individuality of life insurance business such an evaluation of historical data can certainly only be regarded as a building block for the overall picture, as is also explained in the paper in some more detail.     

Zunehmende Unsicherheit als Risiko für die Versicherung: Risikotransfer zwischen Unternehmen,Banken, Versicherungen und Märkten

The increase in natural and human catastrophes is well documented. For risk averse private customers this increase in risks implies an increase in the willingness to pay for insurance which in turn increases the business possibilities for insurers. However, this argumentation can not be transferred to firm insurance, as, following the work by Modigliani and Miller, companies are in general not to be regarded as being risk averse. In this article we discuss with the example of the demand for reinsurance why firms might want to shift risk to other firms. An empirical study for the German market for reinsurance is presented. The results are then used to discuss whether an increase in risk might lead to an increase in risk transfers between firms and insurers.     

Does Surplus Participation Reflect Market Discipline? An Analysis of the German Life Insurance Market

The aim of this paper is to analyze whether the level of surplus participation affects customer demand. We use multivariate linear regression models and data on surplus participation, new business, and lapse for the German life insurance market from 1998 to 2008. We find a significant positive dependence between surplus participation and new business growth as well as a significant negative dependence between surplus participation and growth of lapse volume. Overall, these findings indicate that customers do react to changes in product characteristics, which might be seen as indicative of market discipline. Our results are important for insurance company managers, regulators, and boards of insurance associations.     

Understanding price competition in the German motor insurance market

This paper analyzes price competition in the German motor insurance market since 1994 and looks for evidence to back up a claim frequently found in the trade literature—that there have been two recent price wars in this industry, the first in 1996–1999, the second in 2005–2006. In a first step, we analyze the development of the German motor insurance market and compare it to that of other property-liability lines of business. In a second step the applicability of price war definitions found in the marketing literature to the German motor insurance market is checked. In a third step, a comparison to reference cases from other industries, where price wars have been subject to academic analysis, is conducted to complement the analysis. We conclude that, contrary to reports in the trade literature, the periods of 1996–1999 and 2005–2006 should be considered as times of intense competition in the motor insurance industry, not as times of price war.     

Die Risikoübernahme von Versicherungsunternehmen: Eine empirische Analyse für Deutschland und Großbritannien

In this paper we analyze the risk resulting from an insurer’s investment policy. For this a hypothetical asset return rate is defined, based on which the German and British insurance market is analyzed. The study design allows an investigation of the investment risk in different countries or for different lines of business. The aim of the analysis is to detect general market trends in the investment policy and an analysis of effects of important changes over time on the investment risk of insurers. The questions analyzed in this paper are also of particular relevance beyond the background of current reform proposal for insurance regulation in Europe in the field of risk management and capital adequacy (Solvency II).     

The theory of financial intermediation

Traditional theories of intermediation are based on transaction costs and asymmetric information. They are designed to account for institutions which take deposits or issue insurance policies and channel funds to firms. However, in recent decades there have been significant changes. Although transaction costs and asymmetric information have declined, intermediation has increased. New markets for financial futures and options are mainly markets for intermediaries rather than individuals or firms. These changes are difficult to reconcile with the traditional theories. We discuss the role of intermediation in this new context stressing risk trading and participation costs.