经济学角度看腐败

反腐倡廉建设是我国政府的一项艰巨的任务。腐败是政治问题,也是经济问题。在政治上对社会、政治安全与稳定造成严重威胁,在经济上带来了社会资源配置低效率。本文以官员与人民之间的委托代理关系以及博弈模型分析腐败的原因,进而提出了反腐的对策。     

社会化商务沟通如何提高B2B企业净推荐值？

文章聚焦于探讨和解释社会化商务沟通的核心特质及其对企业净推荐值影响。基于社会交换理论，研究一运用扎根理论发现社会化商务沟通具有广关联性、泛可见性与富载体性三个核心特质，同时提炼出净推荐值这一关系绩效的核心要素。研究二通过问卷调查进一步证实了社会化商务沟通的核心特征，并通过回归分析验证了社会化商务沟通通过关系强度影响净推荐值的作用机制，同时揭示了IT可供性感知在广关联性、泛可见性、富载体性与关系强度之间关系中发挥的负向调节作用以及合同详尽性在关系强度与净推荐值之间关系中发挥的负向调节作用。文章有助于深入认识社会化商务沟通对净推荐值的影响机制，并有效指导企业的关系绩效管理。     

企业知识管理过程对管理创新绩效的影响北大核心CSSCI

在知识经济环境下,知识管理对企业管理创新绩效的影响作用日益突出。本文通过构建理论研究模型探讨知识管理过程与管理创新绩效间的影响关系,并考察企业学习能力的调节作用。研究发现知识获取、转化、应用和保护过程积极影响市场绩效,知识保护过程对流程绩效影响不显著,企业学习能力在知识管理过程与管理创新绩效间能起到完全中介作用。     

网络位置、知识获取与中小企业绩效关系研究

基于知识基础观及社会网络理论,本文构建了"网络位置→知识获取→企业绩效"的概念模型,通过对广州市海味干果专业市场75家中小企业的问卷调查,收集到一个整体网络数据,运用社会网络分析方法及结构方程模型对概念模型进行实证研究。研究结果表明,占据网络中心和富含结构洞的网络位置对企业绩效有显著的正向影响,知识获取在企业网络位置与企业绩效关系间具有完全中介作用。     

集群式供应链企业间知识转移影响因素研究

基于文献研究和实际调研，本文建立了包含关系强度、供应链整合能力、知识获取能力以及知识转移绩效之间相互关系的结构方程模型。以供应链节点企业为调查对象搜集数据，对结构方程模型进行了实证检验，结果发现，供应链的知识整合能力与知识获取能力呈正向关系；知识获取能力与知识转移绩效呈正向关系；关系强度与供应链整合能力呈正向关系，但与知识获取能力相关性并不明显。     

策略性企业社会责任与企业财务绩效--一个两阶段分析模型

为了进一步论证企业社会责任（ CSR ）对企业发展的影响，本文采用策略性CSR 理论考察其与财务绩效的关系。通过构建一个两阶段分析模型，从投资者行为和策略性CSR经营效应两个方面进行演绎，最终得出两个重要结论：一是企业的财务绩效与企业用于CSR 的投入成正比，即CSR已成为企业不断提升其竞争能力的重要手段；二是策略性CSR的存在可以增加企业的市场价值，因而更多的企业将其从早期的无意识行为提升为主动行为。     

腐败、市场化与民生发展的积聚现状——基于空间计量的经验证据

本文基于中国地级行政区数据,采用了空间计量经济学的空间自相关模型,对腐败、市场化与民生发展三者的集聚现状,空间分布特征和外部性强度进行实证分析。研究发现,市场化聚集程度相近的地区容易趋向有相近的腐败聚集程度,此外,低民生发展聚集程度的省份总是倾向于具有较高的腐败聚集程度和较低的市场化聚集程度。据此结合当前我国现状,为了促进民生发展,并且将腐败控制在相对较低水平,本文认为要通过加大地区之间的合作力度和地方政府间的合作程度,从而放大地区间民生增长示范效应。     

现金股利、代理成本和企业绩效实证研究--基于农业上市公司数据

以沪深两市A股农业上市公司2010-2018年度现金股利发放为样本,构建多元线性回归模型,研究现金股利发放水平、两类代理成本和企业绩效三者之间的关系。研究表明,农业上市公司随着现金股利提高企业绩效显著上升;现金股利与第二类代理成本呈显著负相关关系;随着两类代理成本增加使企业绩效显著下降;第二类代理成本在现金股利与企业绩效中发挥部分中介效应。     

基于平衡计分卡的领导干部绩效和政府战略性绩效关系研究

本文首先介绍了平衡计分卡理论的来源及影响,重点阐述了以政府为代表的公共部门的平衡计分卡与冰山素质模型之间的关系,阐明了领导干部能力素质模型是平衡计分卡学习与成长层面的重要组成部分。文章也阐述了以县级政府为代表的地方政府绩效管理的战略地位,重点分析了政府战略性绩效与领导干部绩效的关系,构建了基于平衡计分卡的地方政府战略性绩效与领导干部绩效的关系模型,并分别从平衡计分卡角度和冰山模型角度对领导干部的绩效考评要素赋予了新的内涵。希望以此明晰领导干部绩效与政府绩效的关系,深入挖掘平衡计分卡在学习与成长层面更深层次的内涵,为地方政府及领导干部绩效考评提升提供新的思路。     

股权集中度、股权制衡度与公司绩效的实证研究——以辽宁省上市公司为例

近60年来,国内外著名学者关于上市公司股权结构问题展开深入而广泛的实证研究。研究结果表明股权结构的合理配置,对公司治理结构有着至关重要的作用,同时可以提高上市公司的经营绩效。在企业现代管理制度中,股权集中度、股权制衡度作为公司治理的关键因素,对企业的生产经营效率与公司业绩起着关键作用。文章聚焦于辽宁省上市公司股权结构层面,系统分析了股权集中度、股权制衡度与公司绩效间的关系,并以2008—2015年相关数据为样本构建回归模型进行实证研究,以期引导辽宁省上市公司实现公司绩效的提升。根据文章的实证数据显示,上市公司股权集中度与企业绩效呈现倒"U"形曲线,股权制衡度与上市公司绩效呈现一定程度的负相关关系。最后结合实证研究结论,对优化辽宁省上市公司股权结构、提升治理效率,进而提高公司整体经营绩效,提出对策建议。     

Government Intervention,Perceived Benefit,and Bribery of Firms in Transitional China

This article examines whether (1) government intervention causes bribery (or corruption) as rent-seeking theory suggested; (2) a firm’s perceived benefit partially mediates the relationship between government intervention and its bribing behavior, as rational choice/behavior theory suggested; and (3) other firms’ bribing behavior moderates the relationship between government intervention and a firm’s perceived benefit. Our study shows that government intervention causes bribery/corruption indeed, but it exerts its effect on bribery/corruption through the firm’s perceived benefit. In other words, a firm’s perceived benefit fully mediates the relationship between government intervention and its bribing behavior. We also find that other firms’ bribery positively moderates the relationship between government intervention and a given firm’s bribery. This study partly proves that firms are rational actors. Potential benefit encourages them to practice bribery. Besides, this research also supports the rent-seeking view of bribery/corruption, which argues that government intervention is a source of bribery/corruption. However, we have also identified that only those government interventions that will create “rent” can cause bribery/corruption.     

Recognizing and Justifying Private Corruption

While public (or government) corruption has attracted a lot of attention, private (or business) corruption has been relatively under-addressed. A specific form of corruption, namely, paying a bribe to a public official, is easily identifiable as unethical and possibly illegal, but this is not clear in a private business context. Yet private bribery also has serious organizational consequences. This exploratory study suggests that individuals have difficulty in recognizing the ethical connotations of potential bribery, and draws attention to the need to build skills in this regard. C. Gopinath is a professor in the Management Department, Sawyer Business School, Suffolk University and is a visiting professor at the Institut D’Administration des Entreprises, Aix en Provence. His research, teaching and consulting interests span strategic management and international business. His current work is titled ‹Globalization: A multidisciplinary system’ (Sage, forthcoming).     

Corruption and private participation infrastructure projects: The influence of vicarious experience and national animosity

This paper investigates the influence of vicarious experience and national animosity on the relationship between corruption and the performance of private participation infrastructure projects. Our analysis of 27,264 projects in 114 countries from 1997 to 2013 shows that higher levels of corruption are associated with higher risk of project failure. We also find that this effect is weakened by the presence of other firms from the same industry, as firms may learn from other companies how to deal with corruption. In contrast, we find the effect is strengthened by the presence of other firms from different industries. This result is due to a lower applicability of knowledge and to an increase in national animosity and discrimination from local stakeholders.     

Corruption in international business: A review and research agenda

We systematically reviewed the literature on corruption in international business (137 articles) for the last 17 years between 1992 and 2019. Additionally, we identified seven research streams in this growing literature: (1) the legislation against corruption, (2) the determinants of corruption, (3) combating corruption, 4) the effect of corruption on firms, (5) the political environment and corruption, (6) corruption as a challenge to existing theories of management, and (7) the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment and trade. Based on this review, we recommend that strong international laws are needed to minimize the negative impact of corruption on international business. Firms must also consider corruption when formulating strategies to increase operational efficiency and performance. Finally, corruption challenges some key assumptions of existing theories of management. Scholars need to test and expand these existing theories by considering corruption as an important issue in international business.     

Corruption and industrial dualism in less developed countries

This paper provides an explanation for the observation that developing countries tend to have a higher degree of dualism in the size distribution of firms and a relatively smaller proportion of large firms than do developed countries. This paper builds a model where large 'formal' firms attract rent seeking activities from the government while small firms do not. In the model, there exists a 'competitive fringe' of small firms and a formal market consisting of Cournot competitors. The number of formal firms is made endogenous and is a function of the degree to which the government can extract rents. This ability to extract rents is itself posited as a function of the degree of corruption in a country's government. Thus, it is the high degree of corruption in developing country governments that contributes to the dual nature of their industrial structure. The model predicts that the higher the degree of corruption, the fewer (and larger) are the formal firms, the lower is social welfare and the greater is dead-weight loss, and the higher are government rents. An examination of the size distribution of 16 countries and their degree of corruption shows that the degree of corruption is a good predictor of the percentage of large firms in an economy.     

Corruption and Development: New Initiatives in Economic Openness and Strengthened Rule of Law

Corruption is a major problem in many of the world’s developing economies today. World Bank studies put bribery at over $1 trillion per year accounting for up to 12 of the GDP of nations like Nigeria, Kenya and Venezuela. Though largely ignored for many years, interest in world wide corruption has been rekindled by recent corporate scandals in the US and Europe. Corruption in the developing nations is said to result from a number of factors. Mass poverty has been cited as a facilitating condition for corruption just as an inability to manage a sudden upsurge in mineral revenues has been credited with breeding corruption and adventurous government procurement among public officials in countries like Nigeria and Venezuela. Virtually all developing nations that have serious corruption problems also have very limited economic freedom and a very weak enforcement of the rule of law. In such nations, corruption represents a regressive taxation that bears hard on the poor. It has a dampening effect on development and it could result in the production of inferior goods as companies find ways to accommodate under-the-table payments. Finally, corruption is a dangerous threat to the legitimacy of the governments of some of the developing nations themselves. It is suggested that new urgent initiatives are needed to deal with the dangers posed by corruption in the developing economies. They include making the economies of these nations more open by the withdrawal of the government from the productive sector and by the abolition of unnecessarily stringent restrictions on business conduct. The rule of law needs to be strengthened in these nations and those countries like Nigeria and Venezuela should ignore scruples over sovereignty and seek foreign assistance in the management of their oil wealth. Finally, multinationals should be made to disclose all the payments they make in developing nations to such organizations like International Chamber of Commerce or Transparency International where they can be reviewed by anyone interested.     

Corruption and business in present day Venezuela

Venezuelan media present corruption as a major problem of the country and a research conducted by the author shows managers perceive it as business ethics' main issue. The corruption type addressed to in this article is the collusion between public officials and private managers for illegal or undue profits. Corruption in this form is related to the long-standing policy of State intervention and overregulation of the economy in order to industrialize the country. The issue analyzed is the perception of corruption as a major political and social problem. Corruption is pervasive in many societies but it is not perceived as a central problem. The explanation for this perception in Venezuela is the increased impoverishment of people as a consequence of present economic crisis (the corrupt person is perceived as taking from my pocket) and the openness and pluralistic character of the political system. Moral indignation and scandal is the result of this new feature of Venezuelan society. Changes in the economic policies and the awareness of corruption seem to establish the basis to overcome the perception of corruption as the paramount problem it is now.Rogelio Perez Perdomo is Professor at IESA, Caracas. He is trained in law, philosophy and sociology. He was called to create the Sanchez chair of business ethics at IESA. He has taught in Europe, United States and Latin America and has published extensively mostly on sociology of law.This study arose as part of the preparations for setting up a chair of business ethics in IESA. I would like to thank M. Naim and R. Piñango for our conversations which guided me in my work. Thanks to J. Malavé for his help in designing the questionnaire and for his careful comments on the first draft. H. Gómez, E. Granell, A. Francés and E. Pacheco also read the first draft and made some useful comments. C. Portela and A. Ruiz helped in the data processing. H. Njaim and E. Blankenburg gave me the chance of discussing their own studies on corruption. But first of all I should have thanked all those involved in corruption scandals who have made me think constantly on this theme, which is a real challenge for a researcher.     

Corruption in international business

I analyze corruption in international business, presenting a critical assessment of the topic and providing suggestions for future research. I argue that corruption creates a laboratory for expanding international business studies because its illegal nature, the differences in perception about illegality, and the variation in the enforcement of laws against bribery across countries challenge some of the assumptions upon which arguments have been built, i.e., that managers can choose appropriate actions without major legal implications. Hence, I first provide suggestion for how to analyze the topic of corruption in future studies by analyzing the types, measures, causes, consequences, and controls of corruption. I then provide suggestions for how to extend leading theories of the firm by using corruption as a laboratory that challenges some of the assumptions of these theories: extending agency theory by analyzing the existence of unethical agency relationships; extending transaction cost economics by analyzing illegal transaction costs minimization; extending the resource-based view by studying corporate social irresponsibility capability; extending resource dependency by analyzing the ethical power escape; and extending neo-institutional theory by studying illegal legitimacy.