Does corruption boost or harm firms’ performance in developing and emerging economies? A firm-level study

In the last decade, a growing number of studies have addressed the ongoing debate about whether corruption “sands” or “greases” the wheels of business at the firm level. This study revisits this debate and proposes a comprehensive theoretical framework to test whether corruption harms or boosts firm performance, as well as the extent to which this relationship is mediated by the countries’ institutional settings, the size and strategic behaviour of the firms, and market competition. Based on a sample of 21,250 firms located in 117 emerging and developing countries, and resorting to instrumental variable (IV) estimations, three main results were found: (a) regardless of the proxy used for corruption and firm performance, the former clearly harms the latter; (b) corruption “greases the wheels” of business for African firms but it “sands the wheels” for firms in Latin America, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southern Asia; and (c) the negative impact of corruption on performance is mitigated for larger and exporting firms.     

Corruption and Its Effects on FDI: Analysing the Interaction Between the Corruption Levels of the Home and Host Countries and Its Effects at the Decision-Making Level

This study furthers our understanding of how corruption affects the decision-making process of allocating foreign direct investment. Drawing on the responses of 28 managers in charge of establishing operations in a highly corrupt host country, we argue that those firms based in home countries with low levels of corruption are more proactive in preparing to face corruption abroad than those based in countries with high corruption levels. This means that firms from less corrupt home countries have strategies in place to deal with high corruption abroad. This finding is based on the fact that these firms have stronger pressures to not engage in corruption from their home stakeholders. Also, these firms might not have the experience of dealing with corruption at home, which hinders their potential to deal with corruption abroad. On the other hand, those firms based in highly corrupt home countries do not have clear strategies to deal with corruption abroad. This assertion is based on the fact that these firms might have familiarity in dealing with corruption and thus, might not see it as an obstacle to operating abroad.     

The Use and Abuse of Export Subsidies: Evidence from Colombia

(12033) Christian Helmers and Natalia Trofimenko We evaluate the impact of firm‐specific export subsidies on exports in Colombia. Using a two‐step selection model, we predict firm‐specific subsidy amounts that can be explained by the characteristics that determine firms’ eligibility for government support and its amount. Drawing on the accounts of the discretionary allocation of subsidies in developing countries, we interpret the discrepancy between the predicted and the observed subsidy amounts as a proxy for a firm's ties to government officials. Controlling for observable and unobservable firm characteristics as well as persistence in exporting, we find that although, in general, subsidies exhibit a positive impact on export volumes, this impact is diminishing in subsidy size and in the degree of a firm's connectedness.     

Overcoming the double hurdles to investing in technology

Technological activities of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have received considerable attention from researchers and policy makers since the mid-1980s. Small firms could nurture entrepreneurship and facilitate the creation and application of new ideas. In spite of their potential in generating innovations, it is also observed that SMEs shy away from formal R&D activities, and the firm size itself seems to be a barrier for R&D activities. SMEs operating in developing countries face extra hurdles to investing in R&D. Given the massive share of SMEs, it becomes crucial to realize their developmental potential in developing countries. In this paper, we study the drivers of R&D activities in SMEs in Turkish manufacturing industries by using panel data at the establishment level for the 1993–2001 period. Our findings suggest that SMEs are less likely to conduct R&D, but if they overcome the first obstacle of conducting R&D, they spend proportionally more on R&D than the LSEs do. R&D intensity is higher in small than in large firms. Moreover, public R&D encourages firms to intensify their R&D efforts. The impact of R&D support is stronger for small firms.     

Globalisation and Corruption,Revisited

This paper presents new empirical evidence on the determinants of corruption, focussing on the role of globalisation and inequality. The estimates for a panel of 102 countries over the period 1995–2005 point to three main results: (i) Detection technologies, reflected in a high level of development, human capital and political rights reduce corruption, whereas natural resource rents increase corruption; (ii) Globalisation (in terms of both trade and financial openness) has a negative effect on corruption, which is more pronounced in developing countries; (iii) Inequality increases corruption, and once the role of inequality is accounted for, the impact of globalisation on corruption is halved. In line with recent theory, this suggests that globalisation – besides reducing corruption through enhanced competition – affects corruption also by reducing inequality.     

Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The Role of Natural Resources,Market Size,Government Policy,Institutions and Political Instability

Data from several investor surveys suggest that macroeconomic instability, investment restrictions, corruption and political instability have a negative impact on foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa. However, the relationship between FDI and these country characteristics has not been studied. This paper uses panel data for 22 countries over the period 1984–2000 to examine the impact of natural resources, market size, government policies, political instability and the quality of the host country's institutions on FDI. It also analyses the importance of natural resources and market size vis‐à‐vis government policy and the host country's institutions in directing FDI flows. The main result is that natural resources and large markets promote FDI. However, lower inflation, good infrastructure, an educated population, openness to FDI, less corruption, political stability and a reliable legal system have a similar effect. A benchmark specification shows that a decline in the corruption from the level of Nigeria to that of South Africa has the same positive effect on FDI as increasing the share of fuels and minerals in total exports by about 35 per cent. These results suggest that countries that are small or lack natural resources can attract FDI by improving their institutions and policy environment.     

企业腐败动机与“最优”腐败程度实证研究

对于企业向官员行贿动机的解释主要有两种相反的观点,一是企业为了获取政府帮助而主动行贿,二是企业在威胁逼迫条件下的被动行贿。文章从企业在应对政府和应对市场两项事务间的权衡出发,构建企业绩效与腐败强度间的二项式回归模型,通过与传统线性回归模型的比较,发现企业腐败是一种主动行为,腐败的目的是为了构建政治关系以获取相应回报。运用世界银行企业调查数据,二次项回归模型显示出绩效与腐败强度间显著的倒U型曲线关系,文章得出了企业的“最优”腐败程度并对其政策含义进行了解释。     

Competition for firms in an oligopolistic industry: The impact of economic integration

We set up a model of generalised oligopoly where two countries of different size compete for an exogenous, but variable, number of identical firms. The model combines a desire by national governments to attract internationally mobile firms with the existence of location rents that arise even in a symmetric equilibrium where firms are dispersed. As economic integration proceeds, equilibrium taxes initially decline, but then rise again as trade costs fall even further. A range of trade costs is identified where economic integration raises the welfare of the small country, but lowers welfare in the large country.     

Resource-based FDI and expropriation in developing economies

Globally, foreign direct investment (FDI) assets are expropriated more in resource extraction industries compared to other sectors. Despite the higher apparent risk of expropriation in resources, countries more likely to expropriate also have a larger share of FDI in the resource sector. An incomplete markets model of FDI is developed to account for this puzzle. The type of government regime is stochastic, with low penalty regimes facing a relatively low, exogenous cost of expropriating FDI, and country risk is measured by the variation in these costs across different regimes. The key innovation of the model is that the government, before the regime type is known, is able to charge different prices to domestic and foreign investors for mineral rights. Granting cheap access increases FDI and reduces the country's share of resource rents, increasing the temptation to expropriate in a relatively low penalty regime. In very high-risk countries, subsidizing resource FDI increases the total value of output by raising investment, and the net gains from expropriating in a low penalty regime outweigh the rents foregone under a high penalty one. However, a stochastic resource output price results in relatively low-risk countries restricting FDI inflows to the resource sector instead — “windfall profits” in this sector raise incentives to expropriate when prices are high, yet minimization of the ex ante risk of expropriation is preferred owing to the relatively high penalty for expropriating. These results imply a higher average share of resource-based FDI in countries most likely to expropriate, while resources account for a high share of expropriated assets compared to the sector's global share of FDI. We show that the model is able to reconcile observed patterns of foreign investment and expropriation for a sample of 38 developing and emerging economies.     

Collectivism and Corruption in Commercial Loan Production: How to Break the Curse?

Recent research suggests that collectivism breeds corruption in bank lending. This finding, together with the stickiness of culture, poses a direct challenge to economic growth in collectivist societies. In this paper, we address this grim outlook by examining the types of firms that are susceptible to the detrimental effect of collectivism on lending integrity and the formal institutions that can help alleviate such effect. We find that the adverse effect of collectivism on bank corruption is more severe in small and medium-sized firms, privately owned firms, and non-exporting firms, while it is considerably weaker in countries with more effective private monitoring, a higher (lower) fraction of foreign-owned (government-owned) banks, a more competitive banking sector, better information sharing, and stronger legal and political institutions. Our findings are robust to using alternative measures of collectivism and alternative dependent variables. These results highlight how firm-level characteristics and formal institutions interact with collectivism in affecting firms’ access to bank credit.     

Impact of host‐country corruption on U.S. and Chinese cross‐border acquisitions

Does corruption in a target country create a similar effect on cross‐border acquisitions (CBAs) by firms from a developed and a developing country? This article empirically examines the relationship between corruption and CBAs by firms from China and the United States. Based on a combined sample of 10,236 completed acquisitions over the period of 1990–2006, the authors find that both Chinese and U.S. firms make a significantly greater number of acquisitions in less corrupt countries. However, unlike the U.S. CBAs, we find a significantly positive relationship between the transaction value of Chinese CBAs and the level of perceived corruption in the target country. It is suggested that having been schooled in weaker institutions themselves, Chinese firms may find it easier to deal with corrupt conditions in target countries, giving them an advantage over firms from less corrupt countries. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Regulating Supply Side Corruption

Abstract

Doing corruption-free business in developing countries is not easy. Government officials and politicians in developing countries demand monetary gains from multinational companies interested in seeking business deals in their nations. Multinational firms are willing to oblige them since they need the business in developing countries. Such unsavory business practices are extremely difficult to change. However, today more and more countries are concerned about corruption and are trying to combat it. Sociologists, political scientists, and economists have advanced various methods to combat corruption. Mainly, these methods are geared toward reducing the demand for corrupt practices. This paper using the case of the Republic of Kazakhstan suggests controlling the supply of corruption.     

The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy and the Brazil–Canada Export Subsidies Saga

In this paper we study the on‐going trade dispute between Canada and Brazil on export subsidies in the aircraft industry and the reasons for its escalation. This is a peculiar case of strategic trade policy insofar as the good, i.e. regional jets, is heavily dependent on sub‐systems that are imported in the two countries. The hypothesis that the dispute solely derives from the search for rents and externalities is therefore incomplete. Without downplaying the role of interest politics, we argue that in both countries ideas about the goals of trade policy have an important place in explaining why this dispute drags on. For Canada, the belief in a rules‐based trading regime has led it to strongly oppose violations, while insecurity about its competitiveness has led to a variety of government schemes to support firms in advanced sectors like aerospace. For Brazil, its place as a leader of the developing world acted as a rallying point for government and firms alike. The research also argues that the WTO process has actually made a resolution of the dispute more difficult by making it too costly for firms and countries to comply with the costs of losing.     

Who creates jobs in developing countries?

This paper investigates the contribution of small firms to employment, job creation, and growth in developing countries. While small firms (<20 employees) have the smallest share of aggregate employment, the small and medium enterprise sector’s (<100 employees) contribution is comparable to that of large firms. Small firms have the largest shares of job creation, and highest sales growth and employment growth, even after controlling for firm age. Large firms, however, have higher productivity growth. Conditional on size, young firms are the fastest growing and large mature firms have the largest employment shares but small young firms have higher job creation rates.     

Areas of Corruption in the Distribution of Foreign-Made Goods Where a Firm's Size and Origin Play a Role: The Russian Experience

Drawing on interview evidence, this article explores areas whereby business corruption in Russia affects distributors of foreign goods with both local and foreign ownership and whether its effects on distributors of small and large sizes vary. The findings reveal the areas of corruption wherein distributors of foreign goods in Russia are most likely to be affected and suggest that, though widespread in Russia, corruption may have far greater effect on smaller distributors as compared to large firms. Large distributing firms can avoid involvement in corruption in some of the areas explored. This in turn may limit small-sized foreign manufacturers' capability to compete in this market, as they are most likely to be able to contract only to small-sized distributors. The study presents findings that are based on interviews with the distributors of foreign-made goods operating in Russia. The findings of the study can help to explain activities of corruption as related to the size of business firms involved in distribution of foreign products in Russia. Hence, its value to firms contemplating export to Russia. The research can also be considered a valuable platform for further research in this field.     

Foreign Ownership and the Extensive Margins of Exports: Evidence for Manufacturing Enterprises in Germany

We examine how foreign ownership of a firm affects the variety of goods that the firm exports and the number of countries it trades with. We construct a simple theoretical model of how foreign ownership may affect these extensive margins of exports and take this model to data from Germany, one of the leading actors on the world market for goods. In line with theoretical predictions we find that foreign‐owned firms do export more goods to more countries after controlling for firm size, productivity and industry affiliation. These differences between foreign‐owned firms and domestically controlled firms are highly statistically significant, and they are large from an economic point of view, with foreign‐owned firms exporting up to 39 per cent more goods to up to 31 per cent more countries.     

Organizational Isomorphism and Corruption in Financial Institutions: Empirical Research in Emerging Countries

The globalizations of capital markets in the last 20 years has led to a historic degree of financial integration in the world. It is clear, however, that globalization is not conducive to a complete homogeneity of financial markets and institutions. Among others, one element of diversity is the importance of the impact of corruption in emerging countries. Corruption decreases the credibility of financial institutions and markets. Scandals and unethical behavior in financial institutions erode confidence in such firms. Relying on neoinstitutional literature, this article focuses on the link between corruption and organizational isomorphism in financial institutions in emerging countries. Therefore, our aim is to examine the institutional reasons for corruption in financial institutions in emerging countries. Our structural equation model is based on empirical research in financial institutions in emerging countries. A questionnaire was administrated to 70 top executives of financial institutions in 18 different emerging countries.     

Recent Trends in the Size Structure of Italian Manufacturing Firms

This paper analyses the re-emergence of small-scale production which has characterised the more recent phase of industrial development in Western countries, providing updated evidence about the phenomenon and focussing in particular the attention on Italy, where it has been assuming peculiar relevance.Data show that in the course of the '80s the main industrial European countries – with the notable exception of Germany – have experienced a further reduction in the average size of manufacturing firms, which was declining since the mid-'70s. Yet, in all of the countries concerned the increase of the relative "weight" in the employment shares of small enterprises is associated to an overall decline of employment levels in absolute numbers (smaller firm do not succeed in making up for the whole amount of job losses in the industrial sector).These trends appear particularly strong in the Italian manufacturing sector. In particular, a transition matrix drawn from a data-base of over 200,000 firms and data relative to birth and exit rates show that the rising importance of small firms in terms of employment (in particular within the range between 10 and 50 employees) has been linked to higher rates of growth with respect both to large enterprises and very small ones, as well as to a relatively higher "inertia" of their entry rates with respect to the latter. More specifically, data highlight a peculiarly low frequency of growing firms in the range including very small units (less than 5 employees); at the same time, such firms' exit rates do not show any tendency to be especially affected by the slowing down of economic activity in the late '80s.     

发达国家和发展中国家企业对外直接投资动机--基于文献综述的比较研究

在全球经济一体化背景下,企业对外直接投资行为的兴起激发了国内外学术界对其动机的研究。发展中国家和发达国家由于市场发展程度存在较大的差别,企业对外直接投资动机也大相径庭。通过对比归纳发现,发达国家企业对外直接投资动机较为集中,受东道国因素影响较多并大多有市场推动;而发展中国家企业对外直接投资动机较复杂多样,主要受母国因素影响且政府政策推动具有较大作用。这一比较研究也表明,在我国针对企业对外直接投资经济影响的研究中,应先考虑并区分不同动机企业对外直接投资产生的差异化结果。     

Future rent-seeking and current public savings

The conventional wisdom is that politicians' rent-seeking motives increase public debt and deficits. This is because myopic politicians face political risk and prefer to extract political rents as early as possible. In this paper we study the determination of government debt and deficits in a dynamic political economy model. We show that this conventional wisdom relies on economic volatility being low relative to political uncertainty. If economic volatility is high relative to political uncertainty, then a rent-seeking government actually over-saves and over-taxes along the equilibrium path relative to a benevolent government. This result emerges because of the option value of rent-seeking: a rent-seeking government over-values future funds because of the possibility of using them for future rents instead of cutting taxes in the event of a future boom (when marginal utility of private consumption is low). This over-saving bias is temporary since, in the long run, the rent-seeking government over-borrows relative to the benevolent government as it eventually squanders the funds it has accumulated. We find that both the under-saving and over-saving bias of the government can be solved by a rule of capping deficits.