Bank political connections and performance in China

We examine the effects of bank’s political connection on bank performance and risk in China. We use hand-collected information on CEOs’ professional background to identify their political affiliations, and find that banks whose CEOs have former government experiences have higher return on assets, lower default risk, and lower credit risk. Additionally, politically connected banks have disproportionally higher performance when the CEOs previous worked in the same city where the current bank’s headquarter locates, had past banking experiences, spend more on entertainment and travel costs, and have higher previous administrative rankings (e.g., at the provincial or state level). These results suggest that politically connected banks have better access to lending to politically connected firms, which are high yield assets and more likely to be bailed out when in distress. Our results offer a mechanism of political rent seeking, consistent with the institutional environment of China’s banking and political system.     

Auditors' Response to Political Connections and Cronyism in Malaysia

This paper extends the literature on the role of political economy in financial reporting and auditing by testing two hypotheses. The first hypothesis predicts that there will be a greater increase in audit effort and audit fees for Malaysian firms with political connections, as a result of the Asian financial crisis, than for non‐politically connected firms because these firms have a higher risk of financial misstatements. The second hypothesis predicts that the audit fees of politically connected firms will decline when capital controls are introduced by the government as a ploy to financially assist politically connected firms to rebound from the crisis, and thus reduces the risk of financial misstatements. The results show that there is a greater increase in audit fees for firms with political connections than for non‐politically connected firms as a result of the Asian financial crisis. However, there is a decline in audit fees for politically connected firms after the capital controls are implemented.     

Cash holdings of politically connected firms

Politically connected firms benefit from soft-budget constraints and are unlikely to suffer from liquidity constraints. This argument suggests that politically connected firms should hold less cash than non-connected peers. Another view posits that these firms exhibit acute corporate governance problems. In this setting, politically connected firms are more likely to hold more cash than non-connected firms. Using a sample of 50,119 firm-year observations from 31 countries, we find that politically connected firms hold more cash than their non-connected peers. We put forth two explanations for this result. Firstly, politicians use politically connected firms as “cash cows” to advance their political agendas. Secondly, political connections are conducive to agency problems. In additional analyses, we find that the positive relationship between political connections and cash holdings is stronger when corporate governance is weak.     

Politically Connected Private Equity and Employment

We investigate the employment consequences of private equity buyouts. We find evidence of higher job creation, on average, at the establishments operated by targets of politically connected private equity firms than at those operated by targets of nonconnected private equity firms. Consistent with an exchange of favors story, establishments operated by targets of politically connected private equity firms increase employment more during election years and in states with high levels of corruption. In additional analyses, we provide evidence of specific benefits experienced by target firms from their political connections. Our results are robust to tests designed to mitigate selection concerns.     

Political connections and debt restructurings

This paper presents evidence that distressed firms with politically connected executives and board members are more likely to reorganize outside of court than to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This relation is more evident for firms that have more political importance, such as major employers within a state, firms located in swing states, and in periods leading up to major election dates. The evidence suggests that the expected costs of financial distress are lower for politically connected firms which may partially explain the higher leverage ratios of politically connected firms documented in the extant literature.     

Are outside directors with greater board tenure valuable? Evidence from the last credit crisis

Analyses of bank performance around the 2007–2008 financial crisis indicate that outside directors with financial experience acquired through longer board service at their own banks are more effective than those with financial experience acquired elsewhere. Institutions with more long-tenured independent directors (i) earn higher Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the collapse of both Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, (ii) limit their risk exposure before the crisis, (iii) exhibit better stock return and accounting performance during the crisis, (iv) are less likely to be bailed out by the U.S. government’s Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), and (v) receive proportionally less financial assistance from TARP.     

Do Outside Directors with Government Experience Create Value?

We examine whether outside directors with government experience add value to their firms. We find that government directors are more likely to miss board meetings and that their appointment announcements are greeted more negatively. Firms with government directors also experience poorer operating performance and more negative merger announcement returns, although their mergers are less likely to be challenged by antitrust authorities. These adverse valuation effects are largely alleviated when firms have large government sales, when they operate in regulated industries, or when government directors are politically connected. Using close gubernatorial election outcomes as a natural experiment and an instrumental variables approach to control for endogeneity bias do not change the results.     

Political connections,financial constraints,and corporate investment

This study investigates whether firms politically connected to the ruling party can mitigate financial constraints and increase their investments. Data on Taiwan-listed companies from 1991 to 2010 are used to answer the preceding issue. Results indicate that firms connected to the ruling party that transitioned into power can mitigate financial constraints, but results do not hold for firms connected to the opposition party that transitioned out of power. Firms connected to both parties have similar results with those connected to the ruling party, but the diminishing effect is weaker than those connected to the ruling party. Results further indicate that financially constrained firms can increase their investment when they have political connections to the ruling party. Finally, firms with strong connections can reduce financial constraints more effectively.     

Political considerations in the decision of Chinese SOEs to list in Hong Kong

This paper investigates why Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with strong political connections (i.e., politically connected firms) are more likely to list overseas than non-politically connected firms. We find that connected firms' post-overseas listing performance is worse than that of non-connected firms. This evidence suggests that connected firms' managers list their firms overseas for private (political) benefits. Consistent with this private benefits explanation, we further find that connected firms' managers are more likely to receive political media coverage or a promotion to a senior government position subsequent to overseas listing than domestic listing.     

Political embeddedness and firms’ choices of earnings management strategies in China

We examine whether and how political embeddedness influences financial reporting quality in China by investigating how government ownership and political connections affect Chinese listed firms’ choices of earnings management strategies. The results show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and in particular, central SOEs, are more likely to substitute accrual-based earnings management strategies with costlier but less detectable real earnings management strategies than non-SOEs. The results also indicate that politically connected enterprises (PCEs) are more likely to employ less detectable real earnings management strategies than non-PCEs, so much so that PCEs’ total earnings management level is higher than that of non-PCEs.     

Differences between Politically Connected and Nonconnected Firms: A Cross-Country Analysis

Evidence from firms in 47 countries shows that companies with political connections have higher leverage and higher market shares, but they underperform compared to nonconnected companies on an accounting basis. Differences between connected and unconnected firms are more pronounced when political links are stronger. Differences also vary depending on the level of corruption and the degree of economic development in individual countries.     

Politically connected CEOs,corporate governance,and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms

Almost 27% of the CEOs in a sample of 790 newly partially privatized firms in China are former or current government bureaucrats. Firms with politically connected CEOs underperform those without politically connected CEOs by almost 18% based on three-year post-IPO stock returns and have poorer three-year post-IPO earnings growth, sales growth, and change in returns on sales. The negative effect of the CEO's political ties also show up in the first-day stock return. Finally, firms led by politically connected CEOs are more likely to appoint other bureaucrats to the board of directors rather than directors with relevant professional backgrounds.     

The politics of government investment

This paper investigates the relation between corporate political connections and government investment. We study various forms of political influence, ranging from passive connections between firms and politicians, such as those based on politicians’ voting districts, to active forms, such as lobbying, campaign contributions, and employment of connected directors. Using hand-collected data on firm applications for capital under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), we find that politically connected firms are more likely to be funded, controlling for other characteristics. Yet investments in politically connected firms underperform those in unconnected firms. Overall, we show that connections between firms and regulators are associated with distortions in investment efficiency.     

Do Political Connections Affect Firm Performance? Evidence from a Developing Country

We investigate how politicians serving on the boards of directors influence firm performance. The results show a negative relationship between political connections and firm performance. Specifically, politically connected firms underperform nonconnected firms directors by almost 17 percent and 15 percent based on return on assets and return on equity, respectively. By stratifying the sample duration into two periods based on the political environment, we find that this effect is more pronounced in autocratic as opposed to democratic regimes. Finally, our results also suggest that the performance of connected firms with more growth opportunities is not affected by political connections.     

Bank Loan Supply in the Financial Crisis: Evidence from the Role of Political Connection

We investigate the changes in bank loan supply during the 2007–2008 financial crisis, with particular focus on the influence of political connections. We demonstrate that although political connections can help firms obtain lower loan rates during the precrisis period, such benefits disappear in the postcrisis period. Moreover, the loan acceptance ratio for politically connected firms is enhanced in the postcrisis period, especially for the politically connected firms with high risks. Evidence reveals that the focus of the benefits for politically connected firms is more likely to shift from the loan rate to the loan acceptance ratio during the postcrisis period.     

Characteristics of non-audit services and financial restatements in Malaysia

Various types of purchased non-audit services (NAS) and their recurring nature affect the likelihood of financial statement restatements in Malaysia. Based on 953 firm-year observations during the period 2007–2009, evidence of a negative relationship between non-audit fees and financial statement restatements is provided. The purchase of both tax-related and audit-related NAS decreases the likelihood of restatements. Recurring (as opposed to non-recurring) tax-related and audit-related NAS are negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of restatements. These findings support our hypothesis that both types of NAS and their recurrence provide knowledge spillover, which enhances audit and financial reporting quality. When considering institutional settings, we find that politically connected firms are more likely to require financial restatements than non-politically connected firms, while audit committee independence and the purchase of tax-related, recurring tax-related and other NAS decrease this likelihood. The purchase of audit-related and recurring audit-related NAS and non-recurring other NAS decreases the likelihood of restatements for non-politically connected firms.     

Does political connection distort competition and encourage corporate risk taking? International evidence

We investigate the impact of political connection on corporate risk-taking by connected firms, their industry counterparts, as well as non-rival firms from 48 countries. We find that political connection induces higher risk taking by connected firms. By contrast, we do not find evidence that political connection, with the attendant potential competitive distortions in the industry, induces higher risk taking by competitors. We focus on non-financial industries. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the inability to avail themselves of political rents compels the non-connected rivals to adopt more conservative strategies. However, large rival firms, generally considered to be too-important-to-fail, exhibit evidence of higher risk taking. The top size quartile industry rivals take as much risk as the politically connected firms. The higher risk exhibited by large rivals of politically connected firms suggests that our baseline regression results of lower risk-taking among rivals of politically connected firms are biased upward by firms that would be considered too-big-to-fail. This finding also suggests that the too-big-to fail phenomenon is not unique to banks. Our results are robust to the use of alternative measures of risk, to the exclusion of privatized and state-owned firms, and to controlling for the effects of financial crisis.     

The effects of corporate bailout on firm performance: International evidence

Not all corporate bailouts are the same. We study corporate bailouts from around the world during 1987–2005. Among these bailed-out firms, some firms are economically distressed while others are financially distressed. Some firms are bailed out with cash (either as equity or as loans) while others are bailed out with debt relief. Some firms are bailed out by the government while others are bailed out by other stakeholders. We examine these firms’ operating performance before and after their bailouts, but specifically across different bailout types, and we also measure their stock returns surrounding their bailout announcements.     

Earnings credibility in politically connected family firms

We investigate whether politically connected family firms provide the market with more or less credible earnings compared with unconnected family firms. Our results evidence that politically connected family firms show higher earnings informativeness than unconnected family firms. Our findings are consistent with the market perceiving that, in the presence of political ties, family firms are more likely to reduce information asymmetries by signalling their superior earnings quality.     

Financial Crisis,Politically Connected CEOs,and the Performance of State-Owned Enterprises: Evidence from Korea

This study examines under specific situations the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from two points of view—business performance and public performance. We find that SOEs with a politically connected CEO perform well even during a financial crisis as the SOEs are able to obtain more favorable treatment. However, the results imply that politically connected CEOs perform poorly when government subsidies are excluded as they may lack the skills for successful management. The results also confirm that SOEs encourage more corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities during a financial crisis in an effort to gain legitimacy by demonstrating that they are committed to social responsibility. However, politically connected CEOs have a negative effect on CSR performance during a financial crisis.