Political connections and the cost of equity capital

Motivated by recent research on the costs and benefits of political connection, we examine the cost of equity capital of politically connected firms. Using propensity score matching models, we find that politically connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital than their non-connected peers. We find further that political connections are more valuable for firms with stronger ties to political power. In additional analyses, we find that the effect of political connection on firms' equity financing costs is influenced by the prevailing country-level institutional and political environment, and by firm characteristics. Taken together, our findings provide strong evidence that investors require a lower cost of capital for politically connected firms, which suggests that politically connected firms are generally considered less risky than non-connected firms.     

Modeling approaches for the design of resilient supply networks under disruptions

This paper studies various modeling approaches to design resilient supply networks (SN) for the location-transportation problem under uncertainty. The future environment of the SN is shaped by random demands, and by disruptions perturbing depots capacity and ship-to-point demand processes. The paper proposes several stochastic programming models incorporating alternative resilience seeking formulations. A generic approach to model SN disruptions, and to elaborate and evaluate SN designs is also proposed. Experiments are made to compare the SN design models formulated, and recommendations are drawn on the approach to use to design effective and robust supply networks.     

Cash holdings of politically connected firms

Politically connected firms benefit from soft-budget constraints and are unlikely to suffer from liquidity constraints. This argument suggests that politically connected firms should hold less cash than non-connected peers. Another view posits that these firms exhibit acute corporate governance problems. In this setting, politically connected firms are more likely to hold more cash than non-connected firms. Using a sample of 50,119 firm-year observations from 31 countries, we find that politically connected firms hold more cash than their non-connected peers. We put forth two explanations for this result. Firstly, politicians use politically connected firms as “cash cows” to advance their political agendas. Secondly, political connections are conducive to agency problems. In additional analyses, we find that the positive relationship between political connections and cash holdings is stronger when corporate governance is weak.     

美国房市2011年难复苏

2007年以来,笔者经常就美国房地产市场发表评论,说的最多的是在自己的博客,以及一本叫做《市场评论》的季刊上,几乎每每中的。随着2011年到来,购房人税务减免、创纪录的超低按揭利率、止赎事件(指业主失去赎回其抵押房产的权力)频发,及由于各种原因急于出手房产者,对房地产市场造成的冲击依然猛烈,致使房价下跌到2002年前的水平甚至更低。     

Financial structure and the heterogeneous impact of monetary policy across industries

The two general channels by which monetary policy impacts output are the neo-classical cost of capital channel and the credit channel. This paper decomposes the output response to a change in the stance of monetary policy to each of these channels. We use a unique industry level data set that measures the financial characteristics of firms operating at the industry level through time. We bring these financial characteristics formally into the regression analysis, thus allowing for a more precise identification of the two channels. The evidence indicates that both channels are active in the Canadian economy.     

A UK Test of an Inflation‐Adjusted Ohlson Model

Abstract:   This paper conducts a UK test of a version of the Ohlson (1995) model. We should only expect abnormal earnings to revert to zero if the book value of assets is economically meaningful. In this paper we make use of the property revaluations common in UK accounts, but estimate other asset values and earnings in inflation‐adjusted terms. This, we argue, gives rise to estimates of abnormal earnings that can reasonably be expected to revert to zero. We then test this modified model on UK data using the Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999) method. In line with the predictions of the Ohlson model, we find that these modified abnormal earnings appear to mean revert, and that a first order autoregressive process is sufficient to capture the persistence of UK real abnormal earnings. The modified abnormal earnings model in general predicts one year ahead earnings more successfully than an unmodified model. Furthermore, for much of the sample period, one year ahead predictions of abnormal earnings are better for the real model during periods of higher inflation. The undervaluation problem found in prior studies appears to be replaced with an overvaluation problem in the real model which is more acute during periods of high inflation. Last, we show that an estimate of the model based upon an industry level specification appears to perform no better than a market‐wide specification of the model.     

Political connections of newly privatized firms

We investigate the extent of political connections in newly privatized firms. Using a sample of 245 privatized firms headquartered in 27 developing and 14 developed countries over the period 1980 to 2002, we find that 87 firms have a politician or an ex-politician on their board of directors. Politically-connected firms are generally incorporated in major cities, are highly leveraged, and operate in regulated sectors. The likelihood of observing political connections in these firms is positively related to government residual ownership, and negatively related to foreign ownership. Political fractionalization and tenure, as well as judicial independence are also key explanatory variables. Finally, politically-connected firms exhibit a poor accounting performance compared to their non-connected counterparts.     

Near and dear? The role of location in CSR engagement

Research summary : Building on economic geography and institutional theory, we develop and test theory relating geographic variables to the strength of corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement and the cost of equity capital. For a large sample of U.S. firms over the period 1998–2009, we find strong and robust evidence that firms located in areas characterized by high levels of local CSR density score higher in CSR engagement. In addition, firms located close to major cities and financial centers exhibit higher CSR engagement compared to firms located in more remote areas. Moreover, the effect of CSR engagement on reducing equity financing costs is even greater for firms in high CSR density areas than for firms in low CSR density areas. Managerial summary : Does the location of CSR engagement by firms affect the strength of CSR engagement by their neighbors? Does the geography of engagement have an impact on financial performance? Our findings show that a firm's CSR engagement increases in areas where there is dense CSR engagement and when it is located near large cities. In these areas, norms, values, and knowledge related to CSR are transmitted to firms through face‐to‐face meetings and frequent social interactions with groups such as peers, labor unions, news media, universities, and community organizations, which tend to be concentrated in large cities. Our findings further highlight that CSR engagement reduces equity financing costs for firms in areas where CSR is widely practiced. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.