WHAT DO CITIZENS THINK ABOUT PUBLIC ENTERPRISES? SUBJECTIVE SURVEY DATA ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF THE GERMAN PUBLIC SECTOR

We analyse the legitimacy of public enterprises that perform economic activities by focusing on the citizens’ subjective preferences, i.e. determining their political legitimacy. Using data from a representative survey conducted among 318 citizens of the German state of Rhineland‐Palatine, we explore determinants for the support of either privatisation efforts or the instrumental thesis, a widespread principle in German‐speaking countries, which considers public enterprises solely as instruments to fulfil economic policy objectives. Our results indicate that the respondents’ perception of the efficiency of public enterprises as well as their personal economic situation are important factors for the support of privatisation. The influential factors for the use of public enterprises as policy instruments are political ideology, the perception of a higher security of supplying goods and services as well as opinions regarding corporate social responsibility. The subjective preferences of a (democratic) country's citizens are thus an important reason why the public sector should or should not play an active part in providing goods and services. This can play an important role when decision makers from the public sector are keen to take into account the citizens’ approval or disapproval of privatisation measures.     

DOES THE MISSION OF PROVIDERS MATTER ON A QUASI‐MARKET? THE CASE OF THE BELGIAN ‘SERVICE VOUCHER’ SCHEME

ABSTRACT 1 : In 2001, the Belgian government introduced a ‘service voucher’ scheme in the field of domestic (housework) services, following a quasi‐market mechanism which fosters competition between providers of different types as regards sector (for‐profit, public, third sector) and mission (seeking profits, home care provision to vulnerable groups and work integration of the unemployed). Empirical evidence suggests that third sector organizations focusing on a social mission recognized by a tutelary regulation are the best performing with regards to the quality of jobs and service organization, leading to a better ‘triangulation’ of the service relationship. On the other hand, for‐profit providers, especially temporary work agencies, seem to favour their capacity of adaptation to the desiderata of their clients and costs’ minimization to the detriment of the quality of jobs which are made as flexible as possible.     

PRIVATIZATION OF WATER: EVALUATING ITS PERFORMANCE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Private‐sector provision of water has been promoted in developing countries since 1990 in order to expand water service coverage to low‐income households. Decades later, the consequences of privatizing water utilities are still disputed. Some scholars have found that areas with privatized water services see positive development effects, while others contend that the private‐sector supply of a social good will always lead to its under‐provision. However, does more privatization of water provision in developing countries actually bring about more access to water? This paper hypothesizes that more private participation in water provision will not ensure more access to water at the national level. The relationship is tested using data on weighted percentages of private ownership of water utilities, and access to improved water sources from 1990 to 2015 across 62 countries. Multivariate OLS results indicate a positive relationship but with no statistical significance. 2SLS results, on the other hand, indicate a positive, small and statistically significant effect of water privatization on water access. Nonetheless, the causal mechanism behind these results must be further explored, given that the measured effect could be capturing the result of an increase in investment that is associated with private ownership of water utilities.     

Political Participation of Mobile Citizens and the Size of the Welfare State

This paper deals with the implications of personal mobilityfor political participation of citizens and for the resultingsize of the welfare state. We show that mobility of citizensmay influence the individual decision to participate in thepolitical process and thereby may change policy outcomes. Ifcitizens who prefer a larger public sector are relatively immobile,the size of the welfare state may increase with mobility. (JELD72, J61)     

WHEN IS A SERVICE AN ESSENTIAL PUBLIC SERVICE?

ABSTRACT ** :  Citizens consider certain public (and private) services as essential services and therefore to be shielded from the full extent of market forces. Little is known about why some services are considered essential public services while other sometimes very similar services are not. In this article, we analyze public opinion using Eurobarometer data to test models exploring what factors determine whether citizens in 15 EU countries consider certain services as essential services and therefore to be provided to all. Despite the variety in public opinion, political orientations and geographic factors do little to explain why citizens have different opinions about the provision of public services. The article ends by outlining a research agenda for the further analysis of this underexplored research topic.     

THE RE-MONETARIZATION OF WELFARE BENEFITS: Entitlements, liabilities and transaction costs in the relationship between citizens and public agencies: the US EBT system and the outlook for European citizen cards

ABSTRACT*: The revolution in transaction costs brought about by new technology can make it economically efficient to restore purchasing power to citizens in the case of in-kind benefits. Analysis of the economic and institutional evolution of the US electronic benefit transfer (EBT) experience shows that a system of welfare payments can evolve either towards monopolistic (or semi-monopolistic) solutions promoted by government or towards competitive, open-market solutions. The EBT system has addressed the diseconomies created by the high proportion of unbanked citizens among welfare recipients by creating electronic pseudoaccounts for the unbanked piggybacked on the commercial payments infrastructure. The EBT card is the first obligatory payment card to be issued by a government, albeit through the intermediary of a government-designated issuer (GDI). Moving to chip cards, the problems posed by setting up a large-scale network of terminals and the fact that 'universal' welfare cards are born as 'natural' government monopolies may lead banks, governments and central banks to consider the great economies of scale and of critical mass for migration that can be offered by combining various functions in a single, universally distributed 'citizen card'. Starting with health care, European citizen cards could gradually take over functions such as the transfer of benefits to specific groups of citizens, payment for other public services, payment of national and local taxes, and payment for utilities. This would make explicit the level of subsidization now implicit in the provision of benefits in kind. The clear indication of deductions, reimbursements and subsidies in the context of payment would mark a considerable advance in the transparency of the welfare market.     

The political agenda effect and state centralization

We provide a potential explanation, based on the “political agenda effect”, for the absence of, and unwillingness to create, centralized power in the hands of a national state. State centralization induces citizens of different backgrounds, interests, regions or ethnicities to coordinate their demands in the direction of more general-interest public goods, and away from parochial transfers. This political agenda effect raises the effectiveness of citizen demands and induces them to increase their investments in conflict capacity. In the absence of state centralization, citizens do not necessarily band together because of another force, the escalation effect, which refers to the fact that elites from different regions will join forces in response to the citizens doing so. Such escalation might hurt the citizen groups that have already solved their collective action problem (though it will benefit others). Anticipating the interplay of the political agenda and escalation effects, under some parameter configurations, political elites strategically opt for a non-centralized state. We show how the model generates non-monotonic comparative statics in response to the increase in the value or effectiveness of public goods (so that centralized states and public good provision may be absent precisely when they are more beneficial for society). We also suggest how the formation of a social democratic party may sometimes induce state centralization (by removing the commitment value of a non-centralized state), and how elites may sometimes prefer partial state centralization.     

转型期中国县级政府的客观治理绩效与政治信任——从“经济增长合法性”到“公共产品合法性”

善治是中国政府的执政要务,政治信任反映着公民对政府治理的认可和支持。文章利用2008年中国公民意识调查及政府统计数据,实证分析了政府治理绩效的主观和客观维度对政治信任的影响。研究发现,公民对政府在经济增长、民生福利、纯公共产品领域治理绩效的回顾性和前瞻性积极评价都正相关于政治信任;纯公共产品提供的主观评价对政治信任的影响大于经济增长和民生福利。县级政府的客观治理绩效对政治信任有重要影响,在高人均福利支出、低基尼系数和低失业率的县级单位,政治信任更高,而人均GDP反而微弱地负作用于政治信任。因此,尽管经济增长仍然是政治信任的重要来源,但民生福利和纯公共产品正赶上并超越经济增长,成为公民提供政治信任的新源泉。     

Nonprofit organizations, privatization and the mixed economy: A managerial economics perspective

This paper is divided into two parts. The first illustrates the present characteristics and future prospects for the development of the third sector in Italy. It then examines the social context in which the third sector develops not only in Italy but also in the rest of Europe. The theoretical perspective that seems to be the most appropriate to the dimensions the third sector has taken on in most Western countries is that of dynamic complementarity between state agencies, for-profit organizations and nonprofit organizations. In order to foster economic and social innovation, there is a need for collaboration and complementarity of roles among organizations of different types. An economic policy implemented on a rational basis should select its own intervention instruments after building a set of strategic and organizational alternatives, avoiding the exclusive adoption of only one of these, as happened at the time of the almost unlimited provision of state aid to enterprises and with the unproductive rescues of ailing public enterprises.     

PARTICIPATION IN THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: Experience from Greek utilities

ABSTRACT * : This paper attempts to evaluate employee and social-group participation in the management of public sector enterprises, using evidence from a scheme introduced in seven public utilities in Greece, 1983-8. It describes the institutional background and the formal directives through which this participation scheme was implemented and assesses its effects. Difficulties arising from the wider political and administrative environment are discussed. Reasons for the observed disfunctioning of the scheme are given. These refer to the structure of the scheme itself, negligence of existing experience and tradition within the enterprises, and failure to associate participation with modernization. Suggestions are provided for the implementation of more effective participative management in future .     

欧洲福利国家危机的政治经济学分析

20世纪70年代以来,福利国家的危机日益加剧,凯恩斯主义在欧洲各国不同程度地被新自由主义所取代.新自由主义从意识形态、全球化与竞争力、不平等、经济与社会政策、公共财政等方面对福利国家发起了攻击,其目的 不是取消福利国家,而是改变福利国家的内涵,使之服务于新自由主义,其核心利益关切点不再是社会大众,而是金融资本.在这一背...     

REGULATION STRATEGIES FOR THE PROVISION OF PATERNALISTIC GOODS

In this study, we analyze the regulation of markets for the provision of services whose costs are subsidized for paternalistic reasons. We model the choice of a benevolent regulator who wants to maximize consumer welfare in a setting where quality cannot be verified and the good provided is fully subsidized. The choice is thus made between two types of providers (profit maximizers and altruistic providers) and two frameworks (monopoly franchise and quality competition). Our analysis shows that in this environment the performance of mixed markets is always dominated by pure forms. Moreover, although making efficient providers compete for the market minimizes cost, the choice of quality competition with altruistic providers may be preferable from a welfare point of view whenever service quality is relevant and the productivity differential is not substantial.     

PUBLIC SERVICES IN THE AREA OF THE SOCIAL ECONOMY IN ARGENTINA

ABSTRACT*: The author describes the development of the public sector of the social economy in the last few years. The state-owned companies with significant participation in the economic activity of the country were privatized within the so-called State Reform Scheme (Law 23696), beginning in 1990. Privatizations are still being carried out, but the main activities that were formerly in the hands of the state (electricity, transport, public service) are now in the hands of the lucrative private sector (corporations, mainly of foreign origin). The policy regarding the transfer of these companies has not favoured the social economy sector.     

Price Discrimination in Public Healthcare

Could a public healthcare system use price discrimination—paying medical service providers different fees, depending on the service provider's quality—lead to improvements in social welfare? We show that differentiating medical fees by quality increases social welfare relative to uniform pricing (i.e. quality‐invariant fee schedules) whenever hospitals and doctors have private information about their own ability. We also show that by moving from uniform to differentiated medical fees, the public healthcare system can effectively incentivise good doctors and hospitals (i.e. low‐cost‐types) to provide even higher levels of quality than they would under complete information. In the socially optimal quality‐differentiated medical fee system, low‐cost‐type medical‐service providers enjoy a rent due to their informational advantage. Informational rent is socially beneficial because it gives service providers a strong incentive to invest in the extra training required to deliver high‐quality services at low cost, providing yet another efficiency gain from quality‐differentiated medical fees.     

A comparison of citizen and “expert” preferences using an attribute-based approach to choice

This paper explores whether expert judgements can be taken as a proxy for citizen preferences for determining investment strategies for public goods. As an illustration, we focus on the provision of Public Rights Of Way (PROW) by Local Government Authorities in England. These provide rights of passage over property to those other than the owners, and little information is available on the welfare effects of changes in the provision and use of PROW. Given limited funds, reliance on expert judgement could be a cost effective alternative for decision-making compared with stated preference surveys of citizens. Two methods are compared. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is used to elicit expert judgement to proxy citizen preferences for different attributes of PROW. The Choice Experiment (CE) technique is then used to derive preferences directly through personal interviews with citizens. Overall it was found that judicious use of AHP by experts can, in this instance, be used to represent citizen views. However, this result may not be easily generalisable to other settings.     

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION FINANCED BY INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESOURCES, IN FRANCE AND ITALY (1959, 1965, 1969)

In this article the authors anticipate some results of a study carried out in France and in Italy, in the framework of a wider research project aiming at analysing in some depth and at comparing the recent trends and patterns of total household consumption in some capitalist and socialist countries. ¹
The accounting scheme used to arrive at a comprehensive definition of household consumption, inclusive of the "non-market" divisible services produced by public administrations, and to identify the share of this new aggregate which is financed by collective resources, isoutlined in the first section. In the second section, the article shows the growing relative importance of publicly-supported consumption, but it also shows that during the sixties, the overall cost of divisible public services and of social benefits provided in kind or in cash was, in both countries, almost entirely auto-financed by the household sector, via social security contributions and taxes levied on that sector's income and consumption. In the third section, comparative analysis of the recent structural evolution of the "market" and the "non-market" shares of total household consumption points out the similarities and dissimilarities between the patterns and forms of private and public spending in the two countries.
The results of this analysis seem to support the thesis that unless a better integration of social policies with economic growth policies is achieved, it will not be possible to implement rational choices between the "market" and the "non-market" ways of satisfying specific population needs. The authors' conclusion is that under present circumstances, public civil expenditures will continue to rise, both in France and in Italy, more rapidly than total national resources and it will become difficult to balance total receipts and total outlays of the public sector.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND ANALYSIS OF THEIR SOCIAL VALUE*

ABSTRACT: This article applies political economy theory to public‐private partnerships (PPPs). First, we propose that social welfare is the appropriate normative evaluation criterion to evaluate the social value of PPPs. Second, we specify the goals of PPP participants, including private‐sector partners and governments. Third, we review the observed outcomes of PPPs and analyze them from both a political economy perspective and a social welfare perspective. Fourth, based on a comparison of the actual outcomes of PPPs to normatively desirable social welfare outcomes, we propose some ‘rules for governments’ concerning the design of government PPP institutions and the management of PPPs. We argue that if governments were to adopt these rules there would be fewer PPPs in total, they would be more like traditional government contracts and there would be a greater likelihood of improved social welfare. However, political economy theory also explains why implementation of any reform will be difficult.     

Political,Institutional, and Economic Factors Underlying Deficit Volatility

It is well known that fiscal policy can counter‐cyclically smooth out the effect of unexpected shocks and public deficit volatility may reflect the (optimal) policy response to them. However, the welfare losses associated to fiscal instability are also an important challenge for many countries, as it typically implies an inefficient allocation of resources, higher sovereign risk premium and an inadequate provision of public services. In this paper, we empirically analyze the political, institutional, and economic sources of public deficit volatility. Using the system‐generalized method‐of‐moments (GMM) estimator for linear dynamic panel data models and a sample of 125 countries analyzed from 1980 to 2006, we show that higher public deficit volatility is typically associated with higher levels of political instability and less democracy. In addition, public deficit volatility tends to be magnified for small countries, in the outcome of hyper‐inflation episodes and for countries with a high degree of openness.     

The quality of government

We investigate empirically the determinants of the quality ofgovernments in a large cross-section of countries. We assessgovernment performance using measures of government intervention,public sector efficiency, public good provision, size of government,and political freedom. We find that countries that are poor,close to the equator, ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, useFrench or socialist laws, or have high proportions of Catholicsof Muslims exhibit inferior government performance. We alsofind that the larger governments tend to be the better performingones. The importance of (reasonably) exogenous historical factorsin explaining the variation in government performance acrosscountries sheds light on the economic, political, and culturaltheories of institutions.