EU Enlargement, Migration and the New Constitution

The paper deals with the effects of migration resulting fromEU Eastern enlargement on the welfare states of Western Europe.Although migration is good in principle, as it yields gainsfrom trade and specialization for all countries involved, itdoes so only if it meets with flexible labour markets and ifit is not artificially induced by gifts of the welfare state.This is not the present state of affairs in Western Europe.In addition to measures that make labour markets more flexible,the introduction of delayed integration of working migrantsand the home country principle for nonworking migrants is arational reaction of the state. The proposed new EU constitution,which contains far-reaching rules for a European social union,should be amended accordingly. (JEL E2, F2, H0, J3, J6)     

National Labor Market Institutions and the EU Integration Process

This paper outlines theoretical insights regarding the motivationand effects of labor market institutions, and reviews empiricalstudies of relevant evidence from European and other countries'historical experience. Institutional interference with laissezfaire labor market outcomes has both economic and distributionalimplications, which depend on the structure of markets and onthe details of policy implementation. The resulting conceptualframework is brought to bear on a discussion of possible reformsof European labor markets in the context of the Economic andMonetary Union process. (JEL F02, J00)     

Efficiency and Equality in the Labour Market

I review theoretical arguments suggesting that certain labourmarket institutions can be justified for economic efficiencyreasons. In models with intrinsic market failures, "rigidities"like employment protection legislation and institutional wagecompression may push the economy closer to the efficient frontier.I discuss recent empirical evidence on income inequality, povertyand income mobility in OECD countries, and I conclude that thewelfare states of Northern Europe score relatively well on allcounts. Finally, I discuss labour market reforms that may improveefficiency without violating European voters' preference forequality.(JEL H30, J30, J50)     

International factor mobility,informal interest rate and capital market imperfection: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper makes an attempt to provide a theory of determination of interest rate in the informal credit market in a less developed economy in terms of a three-sector static deterministic general equilibrium model. There are two informal sectors which obtain production loans from a monopolistic moneylender and employ labour from the informal labour market. On the other hand, the formal sector employs labour at an institutionally fixed wage rate and takes loans from the competitive formal credit market. We show that an inflow of foreign capital and/or an emigration of labour raises (lowers) the informal (formal) interest rate but lowers the competitive wage rate in the informal labour market when the informal manufacturing sector is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the informal agricultural sector. International factor mobility, therefore, raises the degrees of distortions in both the factor markets in this case.     

Harmonisation of Old-age Security Within the European Union

Not sufficiently harmonised national pension systems withinthe European Union distort the allocation of labour and endangerredistributive activities. This paper identifies the most decentralisedlevel of harmonisation which guarantees efficient allocationand enables redistribution. For this, we build on theoreticalresults from the literature to evaluate the realised distributionof the legal power between the European Union and the MemberStates and the resulting level of harmonisation. We find thatharmonisation is sub-optimally low. Binding rules guaranteedby the European Union are needed implying that the Member Stateshave to concede more fundamental responsibilities to the EuropeanUnion. (JEL F22, H55, K33, N34)     

Welfare Leakage and Immigration Policy

This paper analyzes the interaction between the welfare stateand immigration policy. We establish a negative relationshipbetween the number of dependents and the extent of the welfarestate due to the leakage of benefits. We also explain the determinationof immigration policy as the outcome of a lobbying game betweendomestic interest groups and the government. Our results indicatethat there is evidence for welfare leakage and for lobbyingas a determinant of immigration policy. In our baseline specification,a 10 percentage points increase in the share of dependents leadsto a 7–10 percentage point decrease in the labor tax rate.Furthermore, an increase by 10 percentage points in union densityleads to a decrease of one percentage point in the share ofimmigrants in the population. In the context of EU enlargementand the ensuing migration flows, our model predicts a reductionin the size of the welfare state in the old member countries.(JEL H5, J1, J61)     

Informality and mobility

Informality is a defining characteristic of labour markets in developing and transition countries. This paper analyzes patterns of mobility across different forms of formal and informal employment in Russia. Using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey household panel we estimate a dynamic multinomial logit model with individual heterogeneity and correct for the initial conditions problem. Simulations show that structural state dependence is weak and that transition rates from informal to formal employment are not lower than from non-employment. These results lend support to the integrated view of the labour market.     

Adam Smith and the division of labour: is there a difference between organisation and market?

The paper claims that, in The Wealth of Nations, the divisionof labour refers simultaneously to two different things: a socialdivision of labour and an organisational division of labour.The central point is that the organisation of work (the organisationaldivision of labour) in the firm is the logical counterpart ofthe social division of labour, and that these reflect two inseparableaspects of the process of the division of labour. Smith is thusconcerned with organisations as well as with markets, each functioningaccording to the same principle. Hence, Smith does not believethat the organisational and the social divisions of labour arefundamentally different, although he does recognise some variationbetween them and describes different states of the divisionof labour within the firm, liberal and capitalist.     

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LABOUR MARKET IMPERFECTION

This paper will set up a general equilibrium model with a distorted labour market to explore the effects of an environmental tax and union bargaining power on formal employment and the informal competitive wage. We find that when the government raises the environmental tax, both formal employment and informal competitive wage would fall. In addition, we confirm that a policy of labour market reform would increase both formal employment and the informal competitive wage.     

A Note on Changes in the Earnings and Unemployment Structures in Spain Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study

This note tests whether the extraordinary rise in Spanish unemploymentin the 1980s can be traced back to rigidities in the earningsstructure in the face of relative net demand shocks againstthe unskilled (this claim is also known as the "Krugman hypothesis").I can establish that youth joblessness is key to the Spanishunemployment problem, but sampling procedures in the data setmake it impossible to track the youth unemployment problem acrosstime in a satisfactory way. Even though high youth unemploymentis consistent with the Krugman hypothesis, substantial skillupgrading of the Spanish labour force in the 1980s explainswhy the low education groups did not experience an increasein relative unemployment. (JEL J21, J31, J64)     

Interaction of formal and informal financial markets in quasi-emerging market economies

The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the interaction of formal and informal financial markets and their impact on economic activity in quasi-emerging market economies. Using a four-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with asymmetric information in the formal financial sector, we come up with three fundamental findings. First, we demonstrate that formal and informal financial sector loans are complementary in the aggregate, suggesting that an increase in the use of formal financial sector credit creates additional productive capacity that requires more informal financial sector credit to maintain equilibrium. Second, it is shown that interest rates in the formal and informal financial sectors do not always change together in the same direction. We demonstrate that in some instances, interest rates in the two sectors change in diametrically opposed directions with the implication that the informal financial sector may frustrate monetary policy, the extent of which depends on the size of the informal financial sector. Thus, the larger the size of the informal financial sector the lower the likely impact of monetary policy on economic activity. Third, the model shows that the risk factor (probability of success) for both high and low risk borrowers plays an important role in determining the magnitude by which macroeconomic indicators respond to shocks.     

Labor Market Institutions, Wages, and Investment: Review and Implications

Labor market institutions, via their effect on the wage structure,affect the investment decisions of firms in labor markets withfrictions. This observation helps explain rising wage inequalityin the US, but a relatively stable wage structure in Europein the 1980s. These different trends are the result of differentinvestment decisions by firms for the jobs typically held byless skilled workers. Firms in Europe have more incentives toinvest in less skilled workers, because minimum wages or unioncontracts mandate that relatively high wages have to be paidto these workers. I report some empirical evidence for investmentsin training and physical capital across the Atlantic, whichis roughly in line with this theoretical reasoning. (JEL E22,E24, J23, J24, J31)     

Regulation of entry, labor market institutions and the informal sector

This paper develops a two-sector matching model that incorporates the main features of Latin American labor markets. It has an innovation in its matching structure that makes it more consistent with some key stylized facts of the informal sector in these countries. The model is numerically solved using Brazilian data and several policy simulations are performed. Reducing formal sector's entry cost significantly reduces the size of the informal sector and improves overall labor market performance. Increasing enforcement significantly reduces informality but has strong adverse effects on unemployment and welfare. Thus, the results indicate that the tradeoff between lower informal employment and higher unemployment rates is not present when one looks at policies that aim at reducing the costs of being formal, as opposed to policies that simply increase the costs of being informal.     

Opening the Pandora's box? Trade openness and informal sector growth

This article constructs a labour transition model combining the features of job loss and job creation in the formal sector of an economy. The theoretical model examines the impact of trade liberalization on net job transition from formal to informal sector. In the light of our model we establish certain pre-conditions based on simulations under which trade liberalization is accompanied by rising informal sector. The model outcome conforms to the empirical evidence of rising informality with openness which we find in 18 Central Eastern European and Former Soviet Union countries.     

Not just a work permit: EU citizenship and the consumption behaviour of documented and undocumented immigrants

This paper explores the impact of the 2007 European Union enlargement on the consumption behaviour of immigrant households. Using data from a unique Italian survey and a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the enlargement induced a significant consumption increase for the immigrant households from new member states both in the short and in the medium run. This enlargement effect cannot be attributed to the mere legalization as it concerns both undocumented and documented immigrants, albeit through different channels. Detailed information on immigrants’ legal status (undocumented/documented) and sector of employment (informal/formal) allows us to shed light on the exact mechanisms. Following the enlargement, previously undocumented immigrants experienced an increase in the labour income by moving from the informal towards the formal economy, whereas immigrants who were already working legally in Italy benefited from the increased probability of getting a permanent contract. Enhanced employment stability in turn reduced the uncertainty about future labour income leading to an increase in documented immigrants’ consumption expenditure.     

Informal work networks

Abstract We present a model of time allocation between formal and informal labour supply, where workers learn of informal job opportunities from their peers. In addition to formal income taxation and enforcement, individuals’ labour supply decisions depend on the number of their peers with informal jobs and the strength of social ties. Workers allocate more time to informal activities when tax enforcement is lax and job information transmission is good. More connected social networks (e.g., wheel, complete) feature lower average income but higher average utility than poorly connected social networks (e.g., star, empty). Average income may be non‐monotonic in tax enforcement.     

Corruption in a model of vertical linkage between formal and informal credit sources and credit subsidy policy

The present note develops a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets highlighting the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing dominant moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move sequentially. The existing moneylender acts as a Stackelberg leader and unilaterally decides on the informal interest rate. We show that there may arise a case where an increase in the supply of formal credit results in an increase in the informal interest rate under reasonable parametric restrictions. This shows that apart from (i) asymmetric information on the part of informal sector lenders (Bose, 1998), (ii) an increase in the probability of default of all informal sector lenders (Hoff and Stiglitz 1997), and the (iii) possibility of informal lenders to collude (Floro and Ray 1997), the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit might be another factor responsible for the policy of vertical linkage to break down.     

Fiscal Stabilisation and EMU

This paper builds on the papers published by HM Treasury in2003 alongside the UK Government's assessment of the case forEMU entry. The paper considers the potential for fiscal policyto play a greater role in stabilisation policy if the UK wereinside EMU. The paper considers: the scope for strengtheningthe automatic stabilisers and the possible trade-offs; how institutionalchanges could increase the effectiveness of discretionary fiscalpolicy; which fiscal instruments might be most effective; andto what extent stabilisation might be promoted in other ways,such as through enhanced risk sharing by financial markets.(JEL E62, E63)     

Commentary. 'Work first': workfare and the regulation of contingent labour markets

The paper presents a critical review of UK and US welfare-to-workstrategies, stressing their implications for changing formsof labour regulation. The favoured policy orientation - 'workfirst' - forcefully redistributes the risks and burdens of job-marketinstability from the state to unemployed individuals, the solutionto whose 'welfare dependency' is presented in terms of a one-waytransition into (low) waged work. At a systemic level, the analysissuggests that a regressive regulatory accommodation may be emergingbetween mandatory welfare-to-work programming on the one handand the lowest reaches of deregulated, 'flexible' labour marketson the other, as the destabilisation of welfare via work-activationmeasures creates a forced labour supply for contingent jobs.     

Structural differences across macroregions: an empirical investigation

Using a macro–micro econometric framework that allows studying the labour market dynamics, this paper offers an in-depth investigation of the structures of both national and macro regional labour markets in Italy. The simulation results reveal structural differences between regions in the short as well as the long run. Regional gaps represent one of the main components of the natural unemployment rate in Italy. The results may help regional and national policy makers in the European Union to formulate strategies tailored to the specific needs of regional labour markets.