Job search and mobility in developing countries. Theory and policy implications

A labor market model is developed in which the formal sector is characterized by search frictions whereas the informal sector is competitive. We show that there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium in this dual economy. We then consider different policies financed by a tax on firms' profits. We find that reducing the unemployment benefit or the firms' entry cost in the formal sector induces higher job creation and formal employment, reduces the size of the informal sector but has an ambiguous effect on wages. We also find that an employment/wage subsidy policy and a hiring subsidy policy have different implications. In particular, the former increases the size of the informal sector while the latter decreases it.     

International Trade,Migration and Unemployment – The Role of Informal Sector

This paper provides an elaborate general equilibrium framework by including informal economic activities in a model of trade, migration and unemployment. Existence of informal activities is critical in generating positive employment effects of liberal trade policies. Following a tariff cut informal wage increases and rate of unemployment goes down under reasonable conditions. Next we generalize the benchmark model to capture the phenomenon of sequential migration: from agriculture to urban informal sector, and then to urban formal sector. Positive employment effect of reformatory trade policy partly owes to the fact that the presence of informal sector directly reduces the cost of migration and, hence, further induces the process of outmigration from agricultural sector. The paper also extends the benchmark model to include both informal intermediate and final good.     

Informality,public employment and employment protection in developing countries

This paper proposes an equilibrium matching model for developing countries’ labor markets where the interaction between public, formal private and informal private sectors are taken into account. Theoretical analysis shows that gains from reforms aiming at liberalizing formal labor markets can be annulled by shifts in the public sector employment and wage policies. Since the public sector accounts for a substantial share of employment in developing countries, this approach is crucial to understand the main labor market outcomes of such economies. Wages offered by the public sector increase the outside option value of the workers during the bargaining processes in the formal and informal sectors. It becomes more profitable for workers to search on-the-job, in order to move to these more attractive and more stable types of jobs. The public sector therefore acts as an additional tax for the formal private firms. Using data on workers’ flows from Egypt, we show empirically and theoretically that the liberalization of labor markets plays against informal employment by increasing the profitability, and hence job creations, of formal jobs. The latter effect is however dampened or even sometimes nullified by the increase of the offered wages in the public sector observed at the same time.     

Job creation and job destruction in the presence of informal markets

In developing economies, the fraction of informal workers can be as high as 70% of total employment. For economies with significant informal sectors, business cycle fluctuations and labor market policy interventions can have important effects not only on the unemployment rate, but also on the allocation of workers across regulated and unregulated jobs. In this paper, using worker flows data from Brazil, we build, calibrate, and simulate a two-sector search and matching labor market model, in which firms have the choice of hiring workers formally or informally. We show that our model can explain well the main cyclical patterns that lead to those cyclical reallocations. We also show how the effect of government interventions in the labor market depend on the magnitude of the reallocation of labor across regulated and unregulated sectors. For our calibration, policies that decrease the cost of formal jobs, or increase the cost of informality, raise the share of formal employment while reducing unemployment.     

The labor market effects of introducing unemployment benefits in an economy with high informality

Unemployment benefit systems are nonexistent in many developing economies. Introducing such systems poses many challenges which are partly due to the high level of informality in the labor markets of these economies. This paper studies the consequences on the labor market of implementing an unemployment benefit system in economies with large informal sectors and high flows of workers between formality and informality. We build a search and matching model with endogenous destruction, on-the-job search, and intersectoral flows, where agents in the economy decide optimally whether or not to formalize jobs. We calibrate the model for Mexico, and show that the introduction of an unemployment benefit system, where workers contribute when employed in the formal market and collect benefits when they lose their jobs, even if they obtain informal jobs, can lead to an increase in formality in the economy, while also producing small increases in unemployment. The exact impact of incorporating such benefits depends on the relative strength of two opposing effects: the generosity of the benefits and the level of the contributions that finance those benefits. We also show important policy complementarities with other interventions in the labor market. In particular, combining the unemployment benefit program with policies that reduce the cost of formality, such as lower employment taxes and firing costs, can produce greater decreases in informality and lower impacts on unemployment than when the program is applied in isolation.     

Labor markets and productivity in developing countries

In middle-income countries, the informal sector often accounts for a substantial fraction of the urban labor force. We develop a general equilibrium model with matching frictions in the urban labor market, the possibility of self-employment in the informal sector, and scope for rural–urban migration. We investigate the effects of labor market institutions, different types of growth, and company taxes on labor market outcomes and aggregate productivity. We quantify these effects by calibrating the model to data for Mexico, and show that matching frictions can lead to a large informal sector when formal sector workers have substantial bargaining power.     

Economic reform and informal wage—a general equilibrium analysis

We attempt to trace the consequences of liberal economic policies on informal wage in a general equilibrium model with formal informal labor markets, wage-differential, vertical linkage and restricted capital movement. In particular, we show that the informal wage, representing income for a vast segment of unskilled labor may actually increase even if more people are employed in the informal segment. This also confirms that a contraction in the formal sector employment and the consequent expansion in the informal segment do not necessarily imply impoverishment of the existing set of informal workers.     

Rural-urban migration,informal sector and development policies: a theoretical analysis

"A theoretical model of rural-urban migration has been developed with special reference to the informal sector. The wage rate and employment in the informal sector are determined endogenously. The paper shows the simultaneous existence of open unemployment and informal sector in the urban area in migration equilibrium. The effects of alternative subsidy policies on unemployment and welfare of the workers are studied." The model is intended primarily for use in analyzing trends and policies in developing countries.     

Employment effects of stabilization policies

This paper studies the effects of a stabilization program based on a reduction in the devaluation rate in an optimizing model with capital controls, minimum wages for unskilled labor, an informal sector, and public production of intermediate inputs. Perfect mobility across sectors of the unskilled labor force prevents the emergence of unemployment for that category of labor, but skilled unemployment prevails in equilibrium. The analysis highlights the role of endogenous labor market segmentation in assessing the wage and employment effects of stabilization policies.     

Job-search and foreign capital inflow — A three-sector general equilibrium analysis

The purpose of this paper is to extend the Fields' (1989) multi-sector job-search model in a three-sector general equilibrium framework by introducing international trade and capital as input. The three sectors are the rural sector, the urban informal sector and the urban formal sector. The rural sector and the urban informal sector use one type of mobile capital while the urban formal sector uses a sector-specific capital. We find that the effects of an inflow of foreign capital in the urban formal sector on unemployment and social welfare crucially hinge on the relative factor intensities of the rural sector and the urban informal sector. We show that there is a possibility of trade-off between the government's twin objectives of improvement in social welfare and mitigation of the urban unemployment problem. These results are extremely crucial from the view point of policymaking in an unemployment plagued, low-income developing economy.     

Fiscal adjustment and labor market dynamics in an open economy

This paper studies the labor market effects of fiscal adjustment in a two-sector, three-good intertemporal framework. Key features of the model are an informal sector, minimum wages, unionized labor in the formal economy, imperfect labor mobility, and public production of intermediate inputs. “Luxury” and wait unemployment prevail in equilibrium. It is shown that if unions care sufficiently about employment, and if the degree of openness is high, an increase in the price of government services may reduce unemployment in the steady state. A similar result would hold in an efficiency-wage setting if the “disciplinary effect” of unemployment is sufficiently strong.     

A general equilibrium analysis of production subsidy in a Harris-Todaro developing economy: an application to India

Since 1950s India has advocated import substituting industrialization policies to promote its manufacturing sector. The end result was creation of a dual economy: highly favored manufacturing sector with high and rigid wages and neglected agricultural sector with low wages and poverty. Because of the higher wages in the manufacturing sector, the rural laborers migrate to the urban sector, a typical characteristic of the Harris-Todaro developing economy. Realizing this crisis, the Indian government recently initiated policies to boost agricultural production to curb the labor migration and improve the welfare of the rural population. In this study, we develop a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for India by incorporating Harris-Todaro economic characteristics of unemployment, labor migration, farm dependant population, and labor-intensive agriculture. We use the model to analyze the effects of agricultural production subsidy policies on employment, factor price, output price, output levels, and welfare in agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Our findings show that agricultural production subsidy increases agricultural production, reduces unemployment, raises the wage rate in the agriculture sector, augments the consumption among the rural and urban households, and increases the rental rate for capital in agricultural sector.     

Informal employment in developing countries : Opportunity or last resort?

There is an ongoing debate among researchers and policy makers, whether informal sector employment is a result of competitive market forces or labor market segmentation. More recently it has been argued that none of the two theories sufficiently explains informal employment, but that the informal sector shows a heterogenous structure. For some workers the informal sector is an attractive employment opportunity, whereas for others - rationed out of the formal sector - the informal sector is a strategy of last resort. To test the empirical relevance of this hypothesis we formulate an econometric model which allows for several unobserved segments within the informal sector and apply it to the urban labor market in Côte d'Ivoire.     

A welfare economic analysis of labor market policies in the Harris–Todaro model

This paper presents a welfare economic analysis of the benefits of various labor market policies in the Harris–Todaro labor market model. The policies considered are a policy of modern sector job creation, which I call modern sector enlargement (MSENL); a policy of rural development, which I call traditional sector enrichment (TSENR); and a policy of wage limitation in the urban economy, which I call modern sector wage restraint (MSWR). First, I analyze the inequality effects of these policies. I then perform two welfare economic analyses, the first based on summary measures of labor market conditions (total labor earnings, unemployment, inequality of labor incomes, and poverty rates) and the second based on dominance analysis in the labor market, in both cases assuming that the costs are borne elsewhere. The results of the welfare analyses are compared, and it is shown that TSENR unambiguously increases welfare in the labor market using both approaches, the other policies yield ambiguous results, and no policy is unambiguously welfare-decreasing.     

SEEKING RENT IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR

Rent seeking within the vast informal segment of the developing world is a relatively under‐explored topic in the interface of labor market policies and public economics. Moreover, how rent seeking and corruption within the informal segment gets affected by economic reforms targeted for the formal sector is rarely discussed in the literature. This paper fills the gap. We identify conditions under which economic reform in the formal segment will increase the rate of corruption or rent seeking in the informal sector and raise the pay‐off for those involved in rent‐seeking activities. When the formal sector contracts due to reforms, rent seeking in the informal sector may increase and lower the level of welfare unconditionally. Economic reforms may increase corruption instead of reducing it, unlike standard conjectures.     

Urban unemployment, informal sector and development policies

We analyze the effects of wage subsidy policies on unemployment and welfare in the model that is characterized by the existence of both open unemployment and the informal sector that producesfinal goods. Our main findings are as follows. Wage subsidies to the agricultural and informal sectors increase welfare and decrease urban unemployment. The effects of a wage subsidy to manufacturing sector on welfare and unemployment are conditional. We identify some sufficient conditions for the definite results and interpret them.     

Informal pay gaps in good and bad times: Evidence from Russia

Informal work is traditionally large in Russia and has further increased in the recent years. We explore the implications of this shift in terms of wage dynamics. Our characterization is based on the estimation of informal pay gaps at the mean and along the wage distribution, relying on the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey for 2003–2017. Our approach comprises three original features: we rely on unconditional quantile effects of informality, we incorporate quantile-specific fixed effects using a tractable approach, and we suggest a treatment of the incidental parameter bias. Over the whole period, informal wage penalties are relatively small and do not suggest heavily segmented labor markets, even at low wage levels. Yet, in the past decade, a substantial negative selection into informal employment and self-employment has taken place, on average and especially at low earnings. Economic downturns and labor market policies have likely contributed to the shakeout of less productive workers in the formal sector, making the low-tier informal sector more of a last resort.     

Tax Reform,Structural Unemployment and the Environment

The effects of environmental tax reform, i.e., using the proceeds of a higher energy tax rate to lower the labour tax rate, on wage formation, employment and environmental quality are analysed in the context of a small open economy with structural unemployment caused by hiring costs. We find that such a reform may boost employment if it shifts the tax burden away from workers towards those without employment in the formal sector. Environmental tax reform succeeds in shifting the tax burden away from workers in the formal sector if higher energy taxes reduce earnings in the informal sector by reducing labour productivity.     

Labor Informality: Choice or Sign of Segmentation? A Quantile Regression Approach at the Regional Level for Colombia

The labor market in developing countries is remarkably heterogeneous, with a small productive formal sector characterized by high wages and attractive employment conditions, and a large informal sector characterized by low productivity and volatile wages. The informal sector is particularly diverse. In this paper, we examine the heterogeneity of the informal sector at the regional level in Colombia. In general, our findings suggest that both voluntary and involuntary informal employment co‐exist by choice and as a consequence of labor market segmentation. We also find that there are striking differences in labor market characteristics across cities, particularly with respect to informal employment.     

Under-reporting of Income and Labor Market Performance

To examine the effects on labor market performance of government tax and enforcement policies, this paper develops an equilibrium model featuring tax evasion, matching frictions, and worker–firm wage bargains. In the wage bargains, workers and firms can agree on the amount of remuneration that should not be reported to the tax authorities. We find that increased taxation actually reduces unemployment, whereas more zealous enforcement has the opposite effect.