近年来厄瓜多尔石油政策演变及风险服务合同要点

自2007年左翼政府上台执政以来,厄瓜多尔的石油资源国有化政策经过临时措施、法理准备和合同变更三个阶段,历时四年,现已完成服务合同谈判.厄政府通过颁布新宪法规定国家对石油等不可再生资源享有唯一管辖权,国家从这些资源的开发利用上获得的收益不能低于任何参与开发的合同者;通过修改石油法,规定风险服务合同为该国主要使用的石油合同模式,建立以每桶服务费率为基础的服务费支付机制,以法律条文形式规定原石油合同转换为服务合同的谈判截止日期;政府利用签订服务合同限定了承包商的收入,彻底消除油价上涨带给承包商的超额收入,同时要求承包商自担所有风险.综合考虑厄石油政策的变更规律,认为其石油政策环境进入一个相对稳定期.在厄发展的石油公司应在把握机会的同时,清醒认识和评估政策风险.     

Farmers’ preferences for supermarket contracts in Kenya

With the modernization of global agri-food systems, the role of contract farming increases. This also involves smallholder farmers in developing countries. While previous studies have looked at economic impacts of contract schemes on smallholder farmers, little is known about farmers’ preferences for contracting in general, and for specific contract design attributes in particular. Better understanding farmers’ preferences and constraints is important to make smallholder contract schemes more viable and beneficial. This article builds on a choice experiment to analyze farmers’ preferences and preference heterogeneity for contracts in Kenya. In the study region, supermarkets use contracts to source fresh vegetables directly from preferred suppliers. However, farmer dropout rates are high. Mixed logit models are estimated to examine farmers’ attitudes towards critical contract design attributes. Having to deliver their harvest to urban supermarkets is costly; hence farmers require a significant output price premium. Farmers also dislike delayed payments that are commonplace in contract schemes. The most problematic contract attribute is related to unpredictable product rejection rates, substantially adding to farmers’ risk. Designing contracts with lower transaction costs, more transparent quality grading, and fairer risk-sharing arrangements could enhance smallholder participation in supermarket procurement channels.     

The role of short-term contracts and subsidies in licensing

An innovator without production facilities owns a patented invention that lasts two periods, and looks for the best licensing arrangement with a producer that has private information about the market value of the invention. The license is either a single long-term contract in force over both periods or a series of short-term contracts, one per period. Under short-term contracts, the licensee can strategically signal the value of the invention with its level of production in the first period and thus influence the terms of the contract in the second period. We show that the licensor prefers successive short-term contracts rather than a single long-term contract for intermediate-level probabilities of dealing with an efficient licensee, while the first-period contract may optimally include a per-unit subsidy (a negative royalty rate) in order to correct signaling distortions in the licensee’s production for this period. We also show that prohibiting such subsidies can lead to welfare losses.     

Servicer Contracts and the Design of Mortgage‐Backed Security Pools

We develop a unified model of mortgage and servicer contracts. Renegotiating mortgage contracts following default is strictly Pareto improving, if the lender gathers updated information. An incentive compatible servicer contract requires the servicer to hold a risk position that has a value strictly greater than the cost of exerting effort. This risk position cannot in general be approximated with a horizontal “first‐loss” position. An alternative, forming a nondiversified pool, preserves pool‐wide information, avoids the cost of an incentive compatible servicer contract, and may increase MBS value.     

Infrastructure Contracts: Trust and Institutional Updating

This paper discusses trust and trust perceptions in infrastructure contracts and supporting institutions. We focus on perceptions of the trustworthiness of the government purchasers of infrastructure services by the supplying companies and by the governments themselves. In particular, we allow for trust updating and trust misalignments, which may give rise to ‘undertrusting’ and ‘overtrusting’. The core of the paper sets out a game theoretic model of contracts with dynamic adjustment of trust perceptions, which we use to explore the impact of trust misalignment both on economic efficiency (measured by expected welfare) and on investment levels. We explore flexible contracts with and without pre-payments, rigid contracts (which do not allow for post-investment renegotiation), and hybrid contracts. We then compare the efficiency of the flexible contracts to that of hybrid contracts using as a criterion the expected welfare implications of each contract. The model is used to shed light on current issues on the sustainability of private investment infrastructure contracts in developed and in developing countries, including the role of regulatory institutions.     

Partnering with Foreign Firms: How Do Chinese Managers View the Governance and Importance of Contracts?

It is a widespread perception that the role of contract in Chinese society is limited because obligations often derive from personal relationships. It is not clear how Chinese managers view the governance and importance of contracts when they deal with foreign counterparts in their joint ventures. To addresses this issue, this study proposes and verifies the governance structure and performance implications of interpartner contracts in a setting of international joint ventures (IJVs). Extant research on IJVs has extensively examined IJV performance but inadequately assessed how this performance is influenced by contractual design. Our analysis of 114 sample IJVs in China suggests that the governance structure of an IJV contract includes four dimensions, namely, issue inclusiveness, term specificity, contingency adaptability, and contractual obligatoriness. Each of these dimensions is validated to be important to IJV formation, interpartner cooperation, and process efficiency as perceived by Chinese managers working in IJVs.     

Outcome-based contracts as new business model: The role of partnership and value-driven relational assets

This paper investigates the new business model of outcome-based contracts where the firm is tasked to achieve outcomes of equipment as a service contract instead of the traditional maintenance, repair and overhaul activities (e.g., power-by-the-hour® engine service contract). Through a qualitative study of two outcome-based contracts between BAE Systems, MBDA and the UK Ministry of Defence, we derive three value drivers of information, material and people transformation. Mapping it with transaction cost literature we propose five relational assets based on the value drivers; three value-driven alignments and two partnership inputs. We then study the relationships between the relational assets and contract performance through a quantitative survey by applying the partial least square (PLS) method. Our study shows that behavioral and information alignments are important to achieve outcomes. However, material and equipment alignment (i.e., joint supply chain) does not have a significant effect on contract performance. In addition, perceived control and empowerment mediated the relationship between partnership inputs and value-driven alignments. Our study provides a more integrated view of how various theoretical management domains overlap in the understanding of business models, and contribute to the understanding of value drivers and partnership factors in achieving performance in outcome-based contracts.     

基于合约化质量管理框架下的质量创新模式研究

本文首先从现代合约理论出发，对传统质量概念中的合约化内涵进行发掘和深化，并进一步对质量合约的风险特征及原理进行讨论。在此基础上，进行质量创新理论的探析，研究表明：绝对质量价值管理、相对质量价值管理和证券化质量价值管理都是基于合约化质量理念下的质量创新的新模式——质量价值管理的三种形态，是在不同的竞争环境、不同的发展时期、具有不同质量风险特征的企业的不同选择而已。但从质量风险收益来看，证券化质量价值管理代表着质量创新模式的发展方向。     

Research notes and communications factors in the instability of international joint ventures: An event history analysis

This study uses Event History methodology to examine factors that may contribute to the instability of joint ventures between U.S. multinationals and foreign companies. Using joint venture contract renegotiation as a proxy for instability, it finds statistically significant support for hypotheses that joint ventures are more unstable when partners start out with uneven shares of equity and when the contracts have been renegotiated before. Contract renegotiation is also more likely in relatively open economies than in countries that impose restrictions on direct investment.     

基于市场契约城市社区物业纠纷的经济学解释及其预防机制构建

城市社区物业纠纷严重影响社会和谐与稳定。物业公司与业主之间市场交换活动,实质是一种市场契约的缔结、达成过程,二者是基于经济利益的市场契约关系。城市社区物业纠纷的经济学解释是,物业公司与业主市场契约缔结、达成过程中,双方实际市场地位不对等,物业公司强势垄断,业主缺乏投票选择权,政府隐形价格规制与物业公司形成利益同盟,业主集体维权遭遇＂搭便车＂。构建城市社区物业纠纷预防机制,从源头上防范物业纠纷发生,必须通过立法赋予业主更多权利,健全物业公司退出机制,建立业主集体维权激励机制,完善市场契约治理机制有效运行的制度基础,才能实现城市社区和谐、稳定。     

Prepayment Penalty as a Screening Mechanism for Default and Prepayment Risks

The objective of this article is to offer a theoretical model of asymmetric information to analyze the screening role of prepayment penalty. We consider both default risk and prepayment risk. What makes the role of prepayment penalty interesting and more complicated is that a borrower's contract choice could send conflicting signals to the lender about that borrower's default and prepayment risk type. This is different from earlier theoretical models of mortgage choice under asymmetric information where a certain aspect of the contract (e.g., discount points or loan‐to‐value ratio) is explored as a screening mechanism for a single risk dimension (default risk or prepayment risk) of the borrower type. We show the existence of separating equilibria where different default and prepayment risk types choose contracts with different combinations of prepayment penalty and interest rate. For certain parameter combinations, the model also generates a pooling equilibrium where all borrower types obtain the same contract. Our analysis could offer a partial explanation for the observation that contracts with prepayment penalties are a lot less prevalent than contracts with points.     

Coordinating a channel with asymmetric cost information and the manufacturer's optimality

In a manufacturer-retailer system with private retail cost information, we find that a set of incentive-compatible contracts consisting of wholesale and buyback prices can coordinate the channel for any retail cost. We then design two wholesale-buyback contracts by imposing a cutoff point on the retail cost. The first contract maximizes the manufacturer's expected profit while ensuring the channel is coordinated. The second contract assumes the same contractual structure without considering the effect on the channel. Both contracts are exactly solved. We find from numerical study that the manufacturer in the first contract can perform closely to the second one in many cases, and cases exist where both the manufacturer and the channel can do better in the first contract versus the second one.     

Use of the written contract in long-lasting business relationships

While contracts are signed in most business dealings, they are seldom used. These contracts are drawn up for different purposes: as a communication tool, to reduce uncertainty, or simply because it is customary. This study investigates how contracts are used in long-lasting business relationships and what factors influence the use of contracts. A number of studies claim that the negotiation process and the relationships developed during that process influence the subsequent use of contracts. In many cases, parties conduct business without contracts as they develop trust-based relationships. A conceptual framework is developed, which is then used to analyze three in-depth case studies. Findings show that the contract itself, rather than the negotiation process, has the greatest influence on how the contract is used.     

Non-Exclusive Dealing with Retailer Differentiation and Market Penetration

Retailer differentiation exists in most industries and gives manufacturers an incentive to contract with different retailers to penetrate a market. This paper analyzes the impact of this penetration effect on vertical contract exclusivity in an oligopolistic model with differentiated retailers. In the model, manufacturers endogenously choose contract types and negotiate with retailers on wholesale prices. We show that, when the penetration effect is sufficiently strong, non-exclusive contracts lead to higher profits for the manufacturers and retailers. The model is applied to an example with logit demand, which shows that both manufacturers choosing the non-exclusive contracts is a dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium even though they may both be better off under exclusive contracts when the products have high quality or low costs.     

The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales

In England and Wales, wholesale electricity is sold in a spot market partly covered by long-term contracts which hedge the spot price. Two dominant conventional generators can raise spot prices well above marginal costs, and this is profitable in the absence of contracts. If fully hedged, however, the generators lose their incentive to raise prices above marginal costs. Competition in the contract market could lead the generators to sell contracts for much of their output. Since privatisation the generators have indeed covered most of their sales in the contract market.     

Safeguarding or coordinating? Unfolding the dual-function of contracts in manufacturer-distributor relationships

By unfolding the simultaneous presence of the safeguarding function (i.e., contract monitoring) and coordinating function (i.e., joint action) of contracts, the current research operationalizes the dual-function of contracts and ascertains their effects on stimulating interfirm relationships. Analyzing the data collected from 512 manufacturers, we find that, first, contract specificity is positively associated with contract monitoring and joint action. Second, contract monitoring mediates the negative relationship between contract specificity and distributors' opportunistic behavior, while joint action mediates the positive relationship between contract specificity and channel cooperative performance. Third, while joint action directly improves channel performance, contract monitoring does not directly influence channel performance; rather, it promotes channel performance through inhibiting distributors' opportunism. In addition, contract monitoring and joint action substitute for each other in their influence on distributors' opportunism. Overall, we enrich and add insights into the literature on contractual governance by operationalizing the dual-function of contracts and investigating the underlying mechanisms of the dual-function in their influence over different channel outcomes     

国内外服务外包政策研究及应用启示——兼对天津等3示范城市服务外包政策的对比

服务外包是我国转变经济发展方式、推进产业结构调整的重要途径,国家为此专门编制“十二五”中国国际服务外包产业发展规划,积极营造服务外包产业发展的良好政策环境。基于此,对国内外服务外包政策的研究进行了综述分析,同时对天津、大连、济南3个服务外包示范城市当前的服务外包政策进行了分析,在理论与实践对比的基础上,提出应用性对策建议。     

伊拉克国际油气合作法律法规及应对策略

伊拉克现行石油法律法规体系可分为宪法、石油法、石油行业法规和石油合同四个层次。其中,伊拉克宪法对各级政府权力分配不明晰,伊石油天然气法草案目前尚未获国会批准,石油行业法规急需建立,伊对外石油合同采用服务合同模式。本文还介绍了与外国石油公司相关的税务规定、反贿赂和反腐败规定、外汇兑换及管制、石油投资保护以及环境保护法等。建议中国石油企业在伊拉克运营项目时,密切关注伊石油天然气法草案的进程,关注伊国家石油公司法进程和伊国家石油公司成立进展,跟踪伊拉克税务法律变动,加强石油投资保护研究,同时加强油田区块地质资料研究,建立反贿赂和反腐败计划并加强环保工作。     

Privatizing Highways in the United States

We review the experience of both private toll-roads built in the United States during the 1990s, and argue that the problems they encountered could have been avoided if the length of the franchise contract would adapt to demand realizations. We also argue in favor of adjudicating private toll-roads via BOT-type contracts in competitive (Demsetz) auctions. The lessons of this paper are relevant since growing congestion and troubled government finances have made private toll-roads increasingly attractive in the United States.     

Contract costing in outsourcing enterprises: Exploring the benefits of discrete-event simulation

Outsourcing is a business strategy that has received much attention. An increase in outsourcing has a direct influence on the complexity of supply chain networks and on the number of contracts required to manage a supply chain. Outsourcing contracts may be entered into relatively quickly without a full understanding of the true cost implications. The research described here aims to develop tools based on discrete-event simulation to aid outsourcing companies when costing contracts. Currently available software for this type of application is reviewed. A field study is presented from the electronics sector, describing companies’ needs with respect to contract costing and how simulation could be used in the contract costing process. Simulation approaches are described for different contract costing scenarios. The paper concludes with a case study of a preliminary simulation model that has been developed to test the concept with a specific outsourcing scenario.