无锡新区:跨国公司业务代表谈如何面对WTO

不久前,在无锡新区国际咨询顾问委员会召开的第三届年会上,不少委员(这些委员大都是已在无锡新区投资的跨国公司亚太区或中国区的高级行政管理人员和长期以来始终关注无锡新区发展的国外跨国公司和投资咨询机构的高级管理人员等)就中国加入WTO与无锡新区跨世纪发展等重大问题进行了广泛、深入地讨论与论证。这些意见可供有关部门参考。本刊择其部分发言摘要刊发于后,以飨读者。     

Strategic renewal for business units

Over the past decade, business units have increasingly taken the role of strategy formulation away from corporate headquarters. The change makes sense: business units are closer to customers, competitors, and costs. Nevertheless, business units can fail, just as headquarters once did, by losing their focus on the organization's priorities and capabilities. John Whitney--turnaround expert and professor of management at Columbia University--offers a method for refocusing companies that he calls the strategic-renewal process. The principles behind the process are straightforward, but its execution demands extensive data, rigorous analysis, and the judgment of key decision makers. However, when applied with diligence, it can produce a strategy that yields both growth and profit. To carry out the process, managers must analyze, one by one or in logical groupings, the company's customers, the products it sells, and the services it offers in light of three criteria: strategic importance, significance, and profitability. Does a given customer, product, or service mesh with the organization's goals? Is it significant in terms of current and future revenues? And is it truly profitable when all costs are care fully considered? Customers, products, and services that do not measure up, says the author, must be weeded out relentlessly. Although the process is a painstaking one, the article offers clear thinking on why-and how-to go about it. A series of exhibits takes managers through the questions they need to raise, and two matrices offer Whitney's concentrated wisdom on when to cultivate--and when to prune.     

The superefficient company

Most companies do a great job promoting efficiency within their own walls, streamlining internal processes wherever possible. But they have less success coordinating cross-company business interactions. When data pass between companies, inconsistencies, errors, and misunderstandings routinely arise, leading to wasted work--for instance, the same sales, order entry, and customer data may be entered repeatedly into different systems. Typically, scores of employees at each company manage these cumbersome interactions. The costs of such inefficiencies are very real and very large. In this article, Michael Hammer outlines the activities and goals used in streamlining cross-company processes. He breaks down the approach into four stages: scoping--identifying the business process for redesign and selecting a partner; organizing--establishing a joint committee to oversee the redesign and convening a design team to implement it; redesigning--taking apart and reassembling the process, with performance goals in mind; and implementing--rolling out the new process and communicating it across the collaborating companies. The author describes how several companies have streamlined their supply-chain and product development processes. Plastics compounder Geon integrated its forecasting and fulfillment processes with those of its main supplier after watching inventories, working capital, and shipping times creep up. General Mills coordinated the delivery of its yogurt with Land O'Lakes; butter and yogurt travel cost effectively in the same trucks to the same stores. Hammer says this new kind of collaboration promises to change the traditional vocabulary of corporate relationships. What if you and I sell different products to the same customer? We're not competitors, but what are we? In the past, we didn't care. Now, we should, the author says.     

How to kill creativity

In today's knowledge economy, creativity is more important than ever. But many companies unwittingly employ managerial practices that kill it. How? By crushing their employees' intrinsic motivation--the strong internal desire to do something based on interests and passions. Managers don't kill creativity on purpose. Yet in the pursuit of productivity, efficiency, and control--all worthy business imperatives--they undermine creativity. It doesn't have to be that way, says Teresa Amabile. Business imperatives can comfortably coexist with creativity. But managers will have to change their thinking first. Specifically, managers will need to understand that creativity has three parts: expertise, the ability to think flexibly and imaginatively, and motivation. Managers can influence the first two, but doing so is costly and slow. It would be far more effective to increase employees' intrinsic motivation. To that end, managers have five levers to pull: the amount of challenge they give employees, the degree of freedom they grant around process, the way they design work groups, the level of encouragement they give, and the nature of organizational support. Take challenge as an example. Intrinsic motivation is high when employees feel challenged but not overwhelmed by their work. The task for managers, therefore, becomes matching people to the right assignments. Consider also freedom. Intrinsic motivation--and thus creativity--soars when managers let people decide how to achieve goals, not what goals to achieve. Managers can make a difference when it comes to employee creativity. The result can be truly innovative companies in which creativity doesn't just survive but actually thrives.     

What working for a Japanese company taught me

In the late 1970s, John E. Rehfeld read everything he could on Japanese business. Most of the discussions focused on interest rates, the education system, and the culture--all very interesting but not very useful. What did these things have to do with day-to-day management? Since then, by working for Japanese companies, he has discovered more than ten Japanese management techniques that have everything to do with running a business. As vice president and general manager of Toshiba's U.S. computer business for nine years and president of Seiko Instruments USA for two, he has seen firsthand how the Japanese manage, and he has applied those techniques in the United States. Using six-month budget cycles, quantifying intangibles, and looking back to see what you could have done better are among the seemingly insignificant practices that combine to have big impact. For example, the author first saw budgeting for 6 months instead of 12 as twice as much work. But he came to appreciate the benefits: managers work harder because they have two deadlines a year, and planning and control improve because managers can adjust their targets to changing conditions more quickly. The author had another change of heart when he was asked to specify how many PCs would sell as the result of a demo program, a task he first thought ridiculous. Though he still thinks such numbers are shaky, he values the discipline of the thought process. These and other techniques, he says, explain much of Japanese companies' success and are tools that managers anywhere can use.     

外资保险公司在我国经营绩效分析

中国加入WTO后,对外资保险公司的限制逐渐取消,大量外资保险公司以独资、合资和战略投资等方式先后进入我国保险市场,对我国保险行业产生了深远的影响。其在中国的业务范围和经营区域不断地扩大,但经营近10年来,市场份额止步不前,经营也鲜有盈利。本文在对外资保险公司进入我国的经营基本状况及特点予以阐述的基础上,通过分析其在华经营的多项业绩指标,试图寻找其在华经营中存在的问题,进而提出提高外资保险公司经营绩效的发展策略。     

The hidden dragons

Most multinational corporations are fascinated with China. Carried away by the number of potential customers and the relatively cheap labor, firms seeking a presence in China have traditionally focused on selling products, setting up manufacturing facilities, or both. But they've ignored an important development: the emergence of Chinese firms as powerful rivals--in China and also in the global market. In this article, Ming Zeng and Peter Williamson describe how Chinese companies like Haier, Legend, and Pearl River Piano have quietly managed to grab market share from older, bigger, and financially stronger rivals in Asia, Europe, and the United States. Global managers tend to offer the usual explanations for why Chinese companies don't pose a threat: They aren't big enough or profitable enough to compete overseas, the managers say, and these primarily state-owned companies are ill-financed and ill-equipped for global competition. As the government's policies about the private ownership of companies changed from forbidding the practice to encouraging it, a new breed of Chinese companies evolved. The authors outline the four types of hybrid Chinese companies that are simultaneously tackling the global market. China's national champions are using their advantages as domestic leaders to build global brands. The dedicated exporters are entering foreign markets on the strength of their economies of scale. The competitive networks have taken on world markets by bringing together small, specialized companies that operate in close proximity. And the technology upstarts are using innovations developed by China's government-owned research institutes to enter emerging sectors such as biotechnology. Zeng and Williamson identify these budding multinationals, analyze their strategies, and evaluate their weaknesses.     

Six IT decisions your IT people shouldn't make

Senior managers often feel frustration--even exasperation--toward information technology and their IT departments. The managers complain that they don't see much business value from the high-priced systems they install, but they don't understand the technology well enough to manage it in detail. So they often leave IT people to make, by default, choices that affect the company's business strategy. The frequent result? Too many projects, a demoralized IT unit, and disappointing returns on IT investments. What distinguishes companies that generate substantial value from their IT investments from those that don't? The leadership of senior managers in making six key IT decisions. The first three relate to strategy: How much should we spend on IT? Which business processes should receive our IT dollars? Which IT capabilities need to be companywide? The second three relate to execution: How good do our IT services really need to be? Which security and privacy risks will we accept? Whom do we blame if an IT initiative fails? When senior managers aren't involved in these decisions, the results can be profound. For example, if they don't take the lead in deciding which IT initiatives to fund, they end up overloading the IT department with projects that may not further the company's strategy. And if they aren't assessing security and privacy risks, they are ignoring crucial business trade-offs. Smart companies are establishing IT governance structures that identify who should be responsible for critical IT decisions and ensure that such decisions further IT's strategic role in the organization.     

Making business sense of the Internet

For managers in large, well-established businesses, the Internet is a tough nut to crack. It is very simple to set up a Web presence and very difficult to create a Web-based business model. Established businesses that over decades have carefully built brands and physical distribution relationships risk damaging all they have created when they pursue commerce through the Net. Still, managers can't avoid the impact of electronic commerce on their businesses. They need to understand the opportunities available to them and recognize how their companies may be vulnerable if rivals seize those opportunities first. Broadly speaking, the Internet presents four distinct types of opportunities. First, it links companies directly to customers, suppliers, and other interested parties. Second, it lets companies bypass other players in an industry's value chain. Third, it is a tool for developing and delivering new products and services to new customers. Fourth, it will enable certain companies to dominate the electronic channel of an entire industry or segment, control access to customers, and set business rules. As he elaborates on these four points, the author gives established companies a systematic way to sort through the risks and rewards of doing business in cyberspace.     

Foreign VCs and venture success: Evidence from China

This paper analyzes the role of foreign VCs in driving venture success in emerging markets. We analyze a comprehensive data set of 4753 portfolio companies from China. We test whether the presence of a foreign VC increases the likelihood that a portfolio company is successfully exited. We find that the presence of a foreign VC does not per se significantly increase the likelihood of a successful exit. However, the likelihood of a successful exit increases if the foreign VC collaborates with a joint venture (JV) partner. Further, the impact of foreign VC backing depends on the nature of the VC, with foreign VCs tending to perform better when investing in late-stage companies and when they are diversified across industries. If a foreign VC successfully exits an investment, then, compared with a domestic-VC, it prefers to exit via a M&A or secondary-buyout than via an IPO, reflecting the significant lock-up periods associated with VC-backed IPOs in China, the difficulty of achieving a foreign listing, and the difficulty listing a start-up on Chinese markets.     

To diversify or not to diversify

One of the most challenging decisions a company can confront is whether to diversify. The rewards and risks are extraordinary. Success stories such as General Electric, Disney, and 3M abound, but so do stories of failure-consider Quaker Oats' entry into the fruit juice business with Snapple. What makes diversification such an unpredictable, high-stakes game? First, companies usually face the decision in an atmosphere that is not conducive to thoughtful deliberation. For example, an attractive company comes into play, and a competitor is interested in buying it. Or the board of directors urges expanding into new markets. Suddenly, senior managers must synthesize mountains of data under intense time pressure. To complicate matters, diversification as a corporate strategy regularly goes in and out of vogue. In short, there is little conventional wisdom to guide managers as they consider a move that could greatly increase shareholder value or seriously damage it. But diversification doesn't need to be quite such a roll of the dice, argues the author. His research suggests that if managers consider six questions, they can reduce the gamble of diversification. Answering the questions will not lead to an easy go-no-go decision, but by helping managers weigh risks and opportunities, it can help them assess the likelihood of success. The issues that the questions raise, and the discussion they provoke, are meant to be coupled with the detailed financial analysis usually conducted before a diversification decision is made. Together, these tools can turn a complex and often pressured decision into a more structured and well-reasoned one.     

Selection bias and the perils of benchmarking

To find the secrets of business success, what could be more natural than studying successful businesses? In fact, nothing could be more dangerous, warns this Stanford professor. Generalizing from the examples of successful companies is like generalizing about New England weather from data taken only in the summer. That's essentially what businesspeople do when they learn from good examples and what consultants, authors, and researchers do when they study only existing companies or--worse yet--only high-performing companies. They reach conclusions from unrepresentative data samples, falling into the classic statistical trap of selection bias. Drawing on a wealth of case studies, for instance, one researcher concluded that great leaders share two key traits: They persist, often despite initial failures, and they are able to persuade others to join them. But those traits are also the hallmarks of spectacularly unsuccessful entrepreneurs, who must persist in the face of failure to incur large losses and must be able to persuade others to pour their money down the drain. To discover what makes a business successful, then, managers should look at both successes and failures. Otherwise, they will overvalue risky business practices, seeing only those companies that won big and not the ones that lost dismally. They will not be able to tell if their current good fortune stems from smart business practices or if they are actually coasting on past accomplishments or good luck. Fortunately, economists have developed relatively simple tools that can correct for selection bias even when data about failed companies are hard to come by. Success may be inspirational, but managers are more likely to find the secrets of high performance if they give the stories of their competitors'failures as full a hearing as they do the stories of dazzling successes.     

中国的国际贸易与外商投资(英文)

随着中国经济的发展,越来越多的外商决定来中国投资。通过使用波特的钻石理论来分析中国的市场,我们可以清楚的看到,中国的国际贸易与外商投资情况发展的很好。     

Six dangerous myths about pay

Every day, executives make decisions about pay, and they do so in a landscape that's shifting. As more and more companies base less of their compensation on straight salary and look to other financial options, managers are bombarded with advice about the best approaches to take. Unfortunately, much of that advice is wrong. Indeed, much of the conventional wisdom and public discussion about pay today is misleading, incorrect, or both. The result is that business people are adopting wrongheaded notions about how to pay people and why. In particular, they are subscribing to six dangerous myths about pay. Myth #1: labor rates are the same as labor costs. Myth #2: cutting labor rates will lower labor costs. Myth #3: labor costs represent a large portion of a company's total costs. Myth #4: keeping labor costs low creates a potent and sustainable competitive edge. Myth #5: individual incentive pay improves performance. Myth #6: people work primarily for the money. The author explains why these myths are so pervasive, shows where they go wrong, and suggests how leaders might think more productively about compensation. With increasing frequency, the author says, he sees managers harming their organizations by buying into--and acting on--these myths. Those that do, he warns, are probably doomed to endless tinkering with pay that at the end of the day will accomplish little but cost a lot.     

What's wrong with strategy?

Why is it that successful strategies are rarely developed as a result of formal planning processes? What is wrong with the way most companies go about developing strategy? Andrew Campbell and Marcus Alexander take a common sense look at why the planning frameworks managers use so often yield disappointing results. Companies often fail to distinguish between purpose (what an organization exists to do) and constraints (what an organization must do in order to survive), the authors say. Many executives mistakenly believe, for example, that satisfying stakeholders is an objective that drives thinking about strategy. In fact, it's a constraint, not an objective. Companies that don't win the loyalty of stakeholders will go out of business. Strategy is not about plans but about insights, the authors add. Strategy development is the process of discovering and understanding insights and should not be confused with planning, which is about turning insights into action. Furthermore, because executives develop most of their insights while actually doing the real work of running a business, it is important for companies not to separate strategy development from implementation. Is there a better way? The answer is not new planning processes or more effort. Instead, managers must understand two fundamental points: the benefit of having a well-articulated, stable purpose and the importance of discovering, understanding, documenting, and exploiting insights about how to create value.     

Strategy as revolution

How often does the strategic-planning process start with senior executives asking what the rest of the organization can teach them about the future? Not often enough, argues Gary Hamel. In many companies, strategy making is an elitist procedure and ?strategy? consists of nothing more than following the industry's rules. But more and more companies, intent on overturning the industrial order, are rewriting those rules. What can industry incumbents do? Either surrender the future to revolutionary challengers or revolutionize the way their companies create strategy. What is needed is not a tweak to the traditional strategic-planning process, Hamel says, but a new philosophical foundation: strategy is revolution. Hamel offers ten principles to help a company think about the challenge of creating truly revolutionary strategies. Perhaps the most fundamental principle is that so-called strategic planning doesn't produce true strategic innovation. The traditional planning process is little more than a rote procedure in which deeply held assumptions and industry conventions are reinforced rather than challenged. Such a process harnesses only a tiny proportion of an organization's creative potential. If there is to be any hope of industry revolution, senior managers must give up their monopoly on the creation of strategy. They must embrace a truly democratic process that can give voice to the revolutionaries that exist in every company. If senior managers are unwilling to do this, employees must become strategy activists. The opportunities for industry revolution are mostly unexplored. One thing is certain: if you don't let the revolutionaries challenge you from within, they will eventually challenge you from without--in the marketplace.     

Putting the enterprise into the enterprise system

Enterprise systems present a new model of corporate computing. They allow companies to replace their existing information systems, which are often incompatible with one another, with a single, integrated system. By streamlining data flows throughout an organization, these commercial software packages, offered by vendors like SAP, promise dramatic gains in a company's efficiency and bottom line. It's no wonder that businesses are rushing to jump on the ES bandwagon. But while these systems offer tremendous rewards, the risks they carry are equally great. Not only are the systems expensive and difficult to implement, they can also tie the hands of managers. Unlike computer systems of the past, which were typically developed in-house with a company's specific requirements in mind, enterprise systems are off-the-shelf solutions. They impose their own logic on a company's strategy, culture, and organization, often forcing companies to change the way they do business. Managers would do well to heed the horror stories of failed implementations. FoxMeyer Drug, for example, claims that its system helped drive it into bankruptcy. Drawing on examples of both successful and unsuccessful ES projects, the author discusses the pros and cons of implementing an enterprise system, showing how a system can produce unintended and highly disruptive consequences. Because of an ES's profound business implications, he cautions against shifting responsibility for its adoption to technologists. Only a general manager will be able to mediate between the imperatives of the system and the imperatives of the business.     

Selling the brand inside

When you think of marketing, chances are your mind goes right to your customers--how can you persuade more people to buy whatever it is you sell? But there's another "market" that's equally important: your employees. Author Colin Mitchell argues that executives by and large ignore this critical internal audience when developing and executing branding campaigns. As a result, employees end up undermining the expectations set by the company's advertising--either because they don't understand what the ads have promised or because they don't believe in the brand and feel disengaged or, worse, hostile toward the company. Mitchell offers three principles for executing internal branding campaigns--techniques executives can use to make sure employees understand, embrace, and "live" the brand vision companies are selling to the public. First, he says, companies need to market to employees at times when the company is experiencing a fundamental challenge or change, times when employees are seeking direction and are relatively receptive to new initiatives. Second, companies must link their internal and external marketing campaigns; employees should hear the same messages that are being sent to the market-place. And third, internal branding campaigns should bring the brand alive for employees, creating an emotional connection to the company that transcends any one experience. Internal campaigns should introduce and explain the brand messages in new and attention-grabbing ways and then reinforce those messages by weaving them into the fabric of the company. It is a fact of business, writes Mitchell, that if employees do not care about or understand their company's brands, they will ultimately weaken their organizations. It's up to top executives, he says, to give them a reason to care.     

The four things a service business must get right

Many of the management tools and techniques used in service businesses were designed to tackle the challenges of product companies. Although they are valuable to service managers, they aren't sufficient for success. In this article, Harvard Business School's Frei explains why and urges companies to add some new ones to the mix. After years of extensive research and analysis, she offers an approach for crafting a profitable service business based on four critical elements: the design of the offering, employee management, customer management, and the funding mechanism. Just like a product that's going to market, a service needs to be compellingly designed, and management must field a workforce capable of producing it at an attractive price. Additionally, however, service firms must manage their customers, who do not simply use the service but also can be integral to its production: Because customers' involvement as producers can wreak havoc on costs, companies must also develop creative ways to fund their distinctive offerings, by providing a self-service alternative, for example, or by offsetting expenses with operational savings. A close look at successful service businesses--Wal-Mart, Commerce Bank, the Cleveland Clinic, and others--reveals that effective integration of the four elements is key. There is no "right" way to combine them; the appropriate design of one depends upon the other three. If managers don't get all four pulling together, they risk pulling the enterprise apart. Incumbents can fend off attacks from highly focused upstarts by becoming multifocused--that is, by pursuing multiple niches through optimized service models rather than trying to cover the entire waterfront with one model. Shared services within a firm (functions such as HR and finance) can help, since they will enable it to generate economies of scale and experience across models.     

How we built a strong company in a weak industry

When Roger Brown and Linda Mason decided to start a child care and early-education company 15 years ago, they knew about the challenges inherent in the industry: no barriers to entry, low margins, few economies of scale, heavy regulatory oversight--to name just a few. But that didn't stop them. They eventually built Bright Horizons Family Solutions, a company that now has more than 340 high-quality child care centers, serving 40,000 children and employing 12,000 people. How did they do it? Sheer determination helped. But even more important, they developed a business model that took advantage of industry weaknesses. When the couple sat down to hash out a plan for the company, they realized that the key to achieving profitability and creating barriers to entry was to partner with companies. They could achieve higher returns by having those companies build and outfit the centers and, at the same time, boost customer loyalty. Indeed, Bright Horizon's corporate clients came to see the state-of-the-art centers as a way to distinguish themselves in the eyes of current and prospective employees. The high-quality child care attracted the best employees and raised retention rates. Brown's first-person account describes the difficulties the couple and their company faced along the way, including the struggle for funding and a board that questioned Bright Horizons' business model and basic philosophy of good child care. But, Brown says, the commitment to a singular business model and the determination to make strengths out of weaknesses made the impossible possible.