Immigration Policy,Self‐selection,and the Quality of Immigrants*

This paper investigates the effects of immigration quotas on the average quality of immigrants by developing a human capital migration model where efficiency in migration depends on skills and emigration rates are higher among skilled workers. Studying the joint determination of the domestic level of wages and immigrants' self‐selection, we find a negative relationship between the wage level and the percentage of educated workers among immigrants, which results in a nonstandard downward‐sloping labor supply. In our framework, a higher quota increases the skill mix of immigrants through its negative effect on wages and raises aggregate national income.     

Disentangling the migration-trade nexus: the pro-trade effects of immigrants and emigrants in the presence of vertical and horizontal product differentiation

This paper presents an exploration of the migration-trade nexus taking the case of Italy by crossing the two dimensions of migration (immigration and emigration) and the two dimensions of intra-industry trade (vertical and horizontal). This empirical strategy proves useful in refining interpretation of econometric results. In general, we find that both immigration and emigration are positively and significantly related to intra-industry trade. However, the magnitude and the statistical significance of the impact of migration on trade vary, depending on the type of trade flows considered (vertical or horizontal), the direction of migration (immigration or emigration) and the partner countries considered (OECD or non-OECD). In particular, we find that immigrants from non-OECD countries have a positive and significant impact on both ‘variety trade’ and ‘quality trade’, while immigrants from OECD countries significantly affect ‘variety trade’ only. Emigrants to non-OECD countries have positive effect only on ‘variety trade’. These findings are largely consistent with predictions deriving from theoretical models of intra-industry trade and from the literature on migration-trade nexus.     

Local labor markets and earnings of refugee immigrants

This paper estimates how local conditions at the time of immigration influence later outcomes for refugee immigrants to Norway, exploiting the quasi-experimental nature of the Norwegian system for settlement for “quota” or resettlement refugees. A unique administrative dataset with assigned settlement municipalities is used to identify the causal effect of initial location characteristics. Being placed in a labor market where other non-OECD immigrants do well increases own annual labor earnings up to 6 years after immigration. Extended models suggest that this effect is not driven by individual scarring effects: when controlling for the contemporaneous employment rate in the assigned region, effects of initial conditions disappear. Rather, the effects appear to be due to persistence in local labor market conditions combined with limited geographical mobility in response to adverse labor market conditions.     

The export effect of immigration into the USA

Much has been written on the connection between migration and international trade. Human history provides important examples of migrations leading to increased trade activity, with perhaps the most well-known example of the ‘Overseas Chinese’. This study investigates the trade-related importance of Chinese and other immigrants into the USA. Previous studies may have underestimated (or overestimated) the relationship between trade and migration with nations treated as featureless plains rather than as varied landscapes. This study contends that an understanding of the immigration–trade relationship can be improved upon by examining the specific pattern and destination of immigration into specific US states. Using state level export data to 28 immigrant source countries in 1993, a strong immigration–trade link is found, reinforcing conclusions made by previous research using country level data. The compelling connection between immigration and trade found in this study and others suggests that future changes to US immigration policies necessitate that their trade effects also be taken into account.     

Immigration,Conflict, and Redistribution

In this paper, we analyze how the possibility of conflict between natives and immigrants shapes income redistribution in developed democracies. This possibility can generate income redistribution towards immigrants even if they have no voting rights. We show that the threat of conflict between natives and immigrants lowers vertical income redistribution (from the rich to the poor) as the level of immigration increases. The opposite holds for horizontal income redistribution (from natives to immigrants), which increases with the level of immigration. Income inequality weakens the negative effect of immigration on vertical redistribution, but it also reduces horizontal redistribution. These theoretical predictions are consistent with the results of our empirical analysis on data from 29 European countries: larger immigrant populations are associated with more redistribution towards immigrants and lower vertical redistribution.     

A Model of Smuggling and Trafficking of Illegal Immigrants with a Host Country Policy

This paper deals with illegal immigration via two distinct activities—smuggling and trafficking of workers. A destination–source model determines economic pay‐offs and a standard labor market policy works as a deterrent. Tax paid by legal unskilled workers at the destination is determined endogenously and it finances inland monitoring against illegal immigration, holding the border patrol at a given level. The tax also finances unemployment benefit to legal workers at the destination. The number of immigrant smugglers and traffickers is also determined endogenously along with employer penalty and market wage for illegal immigrants. Higher unemployment benefits may reduce illegal wages, raise traffickers’ rent and reduce flow of illegal immigrants from the source countries.     

The effects of immigration restriction laws on immigrant segregation in the early twentieth century U.S.

Several immigration restriction laws, passed in the background of anti-immigration populism in the early 1920s, put an end to the period of “open borders” in the U.S. In this paper, I use the linked county sample in the early twentieth century to examine how immigration restriction laws led to different trends in segregation across groups. Difference-in-difference estimations show that all immigrant groups followed similar trends in segregation before the passage of immigration laws; afterwards, segregation among immigrants from more restricted countries declined relative to segregation among immigrants from less restricted countries. I then construct linked census samples at the individual level, and study mechanisms behind de-segregation. I find two possible mechanisms: (a) limitations on new arrivals; (b) selection on return migration. Further analyses suggest that de-segregation might not benefit immigrants’ socioeconomic assimilation.     

Capital–skill complementarity and the immigration surplus

We build a neoclassical growth model with overlapping dynasties and capital–skill complementarities to evaluate changes in immigration policy. Calibrating the model using US data, we quantify the differential effects of skilled and unskilled immigration on factor returns and on the welfare of different sectors of the population. An influx of high-skilled immigrants lowers the wages of skilled workers, raises the wages of unskilled workers, and because of the relative complementarity between capital and skilled labor, substantially raises the rate of return to native-owned capital. By contrast, an influx of unskilled immigrants produces an opposite effect on wages, and has only a negligible effect on the return to capital. Because of capital–skill complementarity, an increase in the number of skilled immigrants generates an immigration surplus—the overall welfare benefit accruing to the native population—that is approximately ten times larger than the immigration surplus generated by an identical increase in the number of unskilled immigrants. This differential welfare effect is far higher than can be accounted for by the disparity between the productivities of each type of worker.     

SEGREGATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN LABOUR MARKET*

An important measure of the success of immigration is the assimilation of immigrants into the labour force of the host country. This criterion is important from both the perspective of immigrants themselves and that of the host country. Conversely, concentration of migrants in a few sectors is undesirable because of its adverse socio‐economic consequences. Since the pattern of distribution of migrant employment influences the structure and outcomes in the labour market in various ways, it attracts public, academic and policymakers’ attention. The present paper employs various numerical measures to estimate the degree of immigrant segregation across occupations and industries in Australia. The results indicate that the occupational distribution of immigrants is very similar to the proportion of native workers employed in the various occupations. This similarity also characterises the industrial distribution of immigrant employment. Thus, contrary to popular perception and findings for the United States, evidence from the Australian labour market does not indicate the existence of widespread immigrant segregation.     

Financing public goods and attitudes toward immigration

We study a model where individuals choose both the level of provision of a public good and the quota of low-skilled immigrants that are allowed into the country. Individuals can supplement the public good in the private market. Immigrants affect natives through three channels: (i) the labor market; (ii) tax collection; (iii) the quality of the public good. We find that the higher the political weight of the rich (highly skilled) is, the less tolerant the poor and the middle-class are toward immigration and the more demanding they are toward increasing public spending. The rich are the most favorable to immigration. As they have more weight, the political outcome is closer to their preferences and further from the preferences of the other groups. We use data from the European Social Survey to test the implications of our model.     

Promoting entry of high-quality workers through US immigration policy

We examine how US immigrants would be affected by applying a simple point system for admission, as Canada does. Since US immigration policy emphasizes family reunification, immigrants have lower education and earnings than natives, with unauthorized immigrants’ education below legal ones. Using American Community Survey data, and Center for Migration Studies data, which allows us to distinguish legal from unauthorized immigrants, we examine the effects of requiring immigrants to meet 2 of 3 conditions: (1) a high school or college degree, (2) being less than 40 years old and (3) working in a professional occupation, while admitting the same numbers of immigrants. This policy changes the source countries of immigrants and there are large positive effects on immigrant earnings. Immigrants’ use of government transfer programs is reduced to below natives and income inequality falls. Finally, with existing policy, immigrant earnings growth is not enough to overtake natives given immigrants’ entering earnings disadvantage. With this point system, immigrants start at a higher level and surpass natives relatively quickly.     

美国新移民法案人才政策及其对我国的潜在影响

2013年4月,美国参议院‘八人党"正式向国会提交《2013年边境安全、经济机遇及移民现代化法案》。目前该法案已在参议院获得通过,进入众议院审议阶段。该法案重点制定了一系列吸引高技术移民和创业人才的措施,内容涉及:取消对美急需人才移民签证的配额限制,增加高级人才在移民签证中的比例,设立创业移民签证,实施绩效评分的移民签证制度,大幅提高专业技能工作签证配额等。新法案一旦获得通过实施,会对美国带来积极影响,但对我国发展会造成潜在的负面影响,因此,我们应积极跟踪发达国家的人才政策,学习其先进经验和做法。     

Immigration and the Italian labour market: a contradiction

The role of immigration in the evolution of the labor force in Italy is analyzed. The author notes that not only is there a growing number of foreign immigrants, but return migration of natives to Italy is greater than Italian emigration. It is also noted that neither Italian migration policy nor the statistical system have evolved to cope with these new conditions. The high level of illegal immigration is also described, and the author concludes that such immigrants either find work in positions Italians no longer wish to fill, or in the black, or illegal, economy.     

Homesickness and repeated migration

This paper presents a dynamic structural model of migration that is designed to help explain the migration behaviour of undocumented Mexican immigrants in the US. Its key feature – which I call ‘homesickness’ – is a duration-dependent disutility from living abroad that keeps increasing while a migrant stays abroad and can be reset to zero only by returning to their home country. I estimate the model using data primarily from the Mexican Migration Project Survey and find that the model is capable of explaining, among other things, the fact that: (i) a non-negligible number of Mexican immigrants in the US return home after earning very little; (ii) these ‘unsuccessful’ immigrants are more likely to re-enter the US at a later date; and (iii) such ‘unsuccessful’ returns are more prevalent among immigrants who left their wives behind in Mexico. These facts are not easily reconciled with existing models of migration that do not feature homesickness.     

Immigration and the Trade of Provinces

A link between immigration, imports, and exports has been found by a number of papers that have used the gravity equation to analyze bilateral trade patterns. We discuss what this research implies about the mechanisms through which immigrants expand trade and identify strengths and weakness of the various approaches. This paper also contributes to this literature by estimating immigrant effects for Canada using cross‐province variation in international trade and immigration patterns. We derive an alternative functional form capturing the relationship between immigration and trade based on the proposition that immigrants use their connections and superior 'market intelligence' to exploit trade opportunities that non‐immigrants do not access. We find that the average new immigrant expands exports to his/her native country by $312 and expands imports by $944.     

Solving the Misesian migration conundrum

This paper reviews Ludwig Von Mises’ concerns surrounding unrestricted immigration and relates them to the current debate surrounding immigrants’ impact on destination countries’ institutions. It then outlines a policy of generally unrestricted immigration with selective restrictions that addresses Mises’ concerns and concerns about destination country institutions, while still achieving the majority of the economic gains that unrestricted immigration is forecast to achieve.

     

The political economy of naturalization

This paper presents a political economy model in which self‐interested natives decide when citizenship and/or voting rights should be granted to foreign‐born workers. Native voters know that immigrants hold different ‘political’ preferences and would thus tend to postpone their enfranchisement as much as possible. They also consider, however, that a more restrictive naturalization policy may reduce the gains from immigration. We find that the optimal timing of naturalization depends on the quantity, quality (productivity), and preferences of potential immigrants, the political composition and the age structure of the native population, as well as the sensitivity of migration choices to the citizenship issue.     

Deeds or words? The local influence of anti-immigrant parties on foreigners’ flows

We investigate the influence of anti-immigrant parties on foreigners' location choices. Considering Italian municipal elections from 2000 to 2018, we create a comprehensive database that includes a classification of the anti-/pro-immigration axis of leading political parties based on specialists' assessments. Adopting a bias-corrected regression discontinuity design, we find that the election of a mayor supported by an anti-immigrant coalition significantly affects immigrants' location choices only when considering the most recent years. This finding is not driven by the enactment of policies against immigrants but by an ‘inhospitality effect’, which has become stronger over time due to the exacerbation of political propaganda. Therefore, foreigners' flows are influenced by the local political environment only when immigration is central to the political debate.     

The dynamic impact of immigration on natives' labor market outcomes: Evidence from Israel

This paper studies the short and medium run impact of highly skilled immigrants from the Former Soviet Union to Israel on natives' wages and employment. If immigrants are relatively good substitutes for native workers, the impact of immigration will be largest immediately upon the immigrants' arrival, and may become smaller as the labor market adjusts to the supply shock. Conversely, if immigrants upon arrival are poor substitutes for natives, the initial effect of immigration is small, and increases over time as immigrants acquire local labor market skills and compete with native workers. We empirically examine these alternative hypotheses using data from Israel between 1989 and 1999.We find that wages of both men and women are negatively correlated with the fraction of immigrants with little local experience in a labor market segment. A 10 percent increase in the share of immigrants lowers natives' wages in the short run by 1–3 percent, but this effect dissolves after 4–7 years. This result is robust to a variety of different segmentations of the labor market, to the inclusion of cohort effects, and to different dynamic structures in the residual term of the wage equation. On the other hand, we do not find any effect of immigration on employment, neither in the short nor in the medium run.     

A theory of permissible illegal immigration

In many countries laws are not enforced against visibly present illegal immigrants. The visibly present illegal immigrants also tend to be concentrated in particular sectors. We explain such permissible illegal immigration in an endogenous-policy model where selective sector-specific illegality transforms illegal immigrants from non-sectorally specialized to sector-specific factors of production. Under initial conditions where no immigrants are present, the median voter opposes immigration. When, however, a population of illegal immigrants has accumulated, ongoing illegal immigration becomes an endogenous equilibrium policy, at the same time that a majority of voters opposes legal immigration and opposes amnesty that would legalize the immigrants' presence. We also establish a basis for domestic voters preferring that illegal immigrants be employed in service rather than traded-goods sectors.