政府补贴、市场进入壁垒对民营企业绩效的影响——基于中国民营上市公司的实证研究

本文基于2013年中国民营上市公司的经验数据,实证检验了政府补贴、市场进入壁垒对民营企业绩效的影响。研究结果发现：①政府补贴对东部和北部地区民营企业绩效的积极影响最大,中部其次,东部最小,这说明政府补贴能够显著促进民营企业绩效增长,且呈现出显著的 区域差异性;②从全国来看,民营企业能否进入高壁垒行业对企业绩效的影响并不显著,但 民营企业进入高壁垒行业的程度却对企业绩效具有显著的积极影响;从分区域来看,东部和中部地区民营企业能否进入高壁垒行业对企业绩效产生显著的正向影响,而只在东部地区民营企业进入高壁垒行业的程度对企业绩效具有显著的积极影响,在西部地区却对企业绩效产 生显著的负面影响;③从总体上看,相对于市场进入壁垒而言,政府补贴对民营企业绩效的影响更大。因此,当民营企业进入高壁垒行业的成本过高时,政府给予民营企业的财政补贴可以弥补过高进入壁垒对企业绩效产生的负面影响。     

干中学与中国制造业的市场结构:内生性沉没成本的视角

本文首次将对我国干中学的研究从宏观层面拓展到微观层面,利用1999—2007年的大样本企业数据测算了我国465个四位码制造业的干中学学习率,并在Sutton(1991)内生性沉没成本理论的框架下检验了干中学对我国制造业市场结构的动态影响。研究发现,中国制造业现阶段干中学的学习率呈现整体较高、行业之间差异较大的特点;干中学作为一种内生性沉没成本确实具有进入阻止的作用,能够提高行业的市场集中度,减缓我国制造业在市场规模扩张过程中市场结构趋于分散的态势,而且,干中学对我国制造业市场结构的影响大于另两种典型的内生性沉没成本——研发和广告。为优化我国制造业的市场结构,政府应当下大力气保护企业投资内生性沉没成本的激励,对产业市场结构的干预应当充分考虑各个产业在干中学强度上的差异,并采取有效措施降低干中学对研发的挤出。     

改扩建项目中的沉没成本

利用改扩建项目的增量分析法来陈述沉没成本的存在情况及其处理办法。沉没成本有其“沉没”性，但通过再利用，仍可为企业带来效益。     

个人理性与沉没成本悖论

文章放松了新古典经济学条件下沉没成本决策无关性假设前提,进而从真实世界角度阐述沉没成本悖论存在的理性逻辑,从而表明人们很难忽略过去发生的沉没成本,它本身并不能被视为一种悖论或错误行为,甚至是非理性行为,同样也是在约束条件下一种广义理性行为。因此,需要承认沉没成本悖论存在的普遍性,而且还需要采取恰当的非正式和正式制度设计克服沉没成本悖论所带来的负面影响,并不是简单地警告我们不要考虑过去发生的沉没成本,＂让过去的事情过去吧＂的规范结论。因此,不仅需要提高决策者的认识能力,更多需要采取加强沉没成本与风险管理,创造一个良好的市场环境是最为根本的。     

关于油井单井临界产量决策方法的探讨

企业每一项经营决策都应该进行成本效益分析。对单井临界产量的决策应采用边际收益等于边际成本的方法，短期决策时应将固定成本视为沉没成本，在决策时不予考虑。     

对高成本说“不”

房价越来越贵,吃穿越来越贵,看病、上学、养老越来越贵,在这个什么都涨的年代,很多人都在大喊,高成本时代真的伤不起。面对着劳动力成本、财务成本、能源成本、节能减排成本、物流成本不断上升的高成本时代,化纤行业很多企业也都纷纷表示压力很大、难以吃得消。其实,该来的总会来,面对着已经到来的高成本时代,整个化纤行业和企业应该做的是,首先接受这个事实,然后微笑着、坚定地去面对、去努力,而不是消极地抵触和无所作为。     

2011’中国石油和化工行业4月报告

4月份,石油和化学工业经济运行总体保持良好态势。行业产值继续较快增长;市场供需总体平稳,价格震荡上扬;进出口贸易保持活跃势头,投资增速有所加快,行业经济增长的质量继续改善。但是,大宗商品价格继续攀升,企业经营成本居高不下,     

研发与市场结构:基于成本视角的分析

本文从成本入手，探讨了研发与市场结构的关系。通过对平均成本、固定成本及知识特性的综合分析，认为由于技术复杂度的不断提高及研发带来的规模经济，在多数产业研发会导致市场集中度逐渐提高。通过对研发沉没成本的分析表明，在专利保护与许可证制度下，当研发导致的沉没成本比较小时，厂商数量较多的竞争性市场的福利好于寡占或垄断市场，因为其研发速度更快；反之，寡占或垄断市场的福利更好，因为研发的沉没成本得到了节约。在理论分析的基础上，本文就如何通过优化市场结构，提升我国企业研发能力，应对经济全球化的挑战，提出了三点对策。     

“沉没成本”与企业决策

"沉没成本"亦称"旁置成本",是管理会计中的一个术语,主要用于项目的投资决策,与其对应的成本概念是"新增成本".在经济学和商业决策制定过程中经常会用到"沉没成本"的概念,代指由于过去的决策所引起,已经付出且不可收回的成本,因为现在和将来的决策中都不能改变这一已经实际支出的事实,所以在决策分析中通常不需要考虑这类成本.     

化纤业直面高成本

改革开放以来,"低成本竞争优势"一直是中国化纤行业快速发展的有力支撑,但在如今,劳动力、能源、物流等成本的不断上升,给化纤行业发展带来了巨大的挑战,同质化竞争愈加激烈,部分企业迫于库存压力和资金短缺,不得不低价竞争,甚至倒闭化纤行业正面临着高成本时代下的新考验。步入调整期近几年来,化纤企业切切实实地感受到了高成本时代的到来,以往的成本优势已经丧失。而下游的纺织行业面对国内外的严峻形势,对化纤产品的需求也表现出了谨慎的态度,纺织企业不     

Sunk Costs,Accommodation, and the Welfare Effects of Entry

Although economists usually support the unrestricted entry of firms into an industry, entry may lower social welfare if there are setup costs or if entrants have a cost disadvantage. We consider the welfare effects of entry within a standard Cournot model where some of an incumbent firm’s costs are sunk. We find that the range of parameter values over which entry can harm welfare declines monotonically in the fraction of cost that are sunk. Furthermore, the presence of even a small fraction of sunk costs often reverses an assessment that entry harms welfare.     

Mode of entry and ex-post performance

In this study I develop and empirically test hypotheses delineating how a set of industry- and firm-level factors are differentially associated with postentry performance of de novo and acquisitive entrants. First, I conceptualize structural entry barriers as sunk costs or irrecoverable investments that entrants must make in the entered industry to be competitive vis-à-vis incumbents. I then argue that de novo and acquisitive entrants differ in three important ways: (1) incremental vs. up-front sunk cost investments in overcoming impediments to entry; (2) increasing productive capacity vs. changing ownership in the entered industry; and (3) low vs. high costs of integration when realizing synergies with parent firms. I use the Trinet, FTC-ALB, and Compustat data bases to construct a sample comprising de novo and acquisitive entries made during the period 1980–82. Next, I evaluate postentry survival and growth between 1982 and 1986. Overall, empirical tests provided partial support for the hypotheses, and the explained variance in my models ranged from 17 percent to 37 percent. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sunk Costs,Market Contestability,and the Size Distribution of Firms

In this paper we offer a new economic explanation for the observed inter-industry differences in the size distribution of firms. Our empirical estimates based on three temporal (1982, 1987, and 1992) cross-sections of the four-digit US manufacturing industries indicate that increased market contestability, as signified by low sunk costs, tends to reduce the dispersion of firm sizes. These findings provide support for one of the key predictions of the theory of contestable markets: that market forces under contestability would tend to render any inefficient organization of the industry unsustainable and, consequently, tighten the distribution of firms around the optimum.     

Sunk costs and resource mobility: An empirical study

While the concept of sunk costs has become increasingly important in theoretical work, relatively few empirical studies have examined sunk costs. The present study focuses on the relationship between tangible sunk costs and entry. An estimate of industry specific capital, derived from engineering-statistical cost estimates, is employed as a proxy for tangible sunk costs. With this measure we can test directly the relationship between irreversible investments and entry in a sample consisting of 40 U.S. manufacturing industries. The primary finding is that tangible sunk costs have a deterrent effect on entry.     

Three problems in applying contestability to regulated markets

The theory of contestable markets emphasizes that the ease of entry rather than the number of existing firms forces incumbents to set prices at optimal levels. The policy implications of this work contrast sharply with past U.S. regulatory and antitrust policies, legitimizing increased industry concentration and decreased regulation. This paper explores three factors that influence the desirability of regulation or antitrust policy despite the apparent existence of a contestable market time lags, technological change, and cyclical macroeconomic fluctuations. Time lags enable incumbents to earnsupra-normal profits and take last-minute action to forestall entry. New technologies can create sunk costs that reduce the contestability of a market. Recessions can depress capital markets, raising the cost of exit, while expansion creates opportunities for entry without threatening monopolistic prices. These shortcomings limi the ability of contestability theory to provide guidelines for the regulation of actual industries.     

消费契约的双重特性与大企业危机

消费契约具有长期契约特征，不但企业对消费者的购买激励具备投资特征，消费者也会在购买过程中形成专用性资产。通过转移成本壁垒，企业和消费者被封闭在一种双边的长期契约关系当中，这种关系造成了消费契约的相对稳定性。但同时由于契约的不完全性，一旦消费者预期专用性资产变为沉没成本，潜在消费者将转投其他企业，造成企业的迅速倒闭。如果大企业不能采取有效措施，小的失误可能会演变成大的危机；由于大企业存在着危机的外部性．因此需要相应的公共政策。     

Spectrum limits and competition in mobile markets: the role of licence fees

The paper discusses the impact of scarcity of frequency spectrum on the performance of the mobile telecommunications industry. An oligopoly model with endogenous sunk costs illustrates the trade off between ex ante extraction of oligopoly rents and market entry of firms. The determination of the licence fee through an auction provides scope for setting market structure endogenously: the higher the licence fee, the lower the number of firms sustained by the market. High licence fees may be a signal for post-entry collusion. Differences across national regulatory frameworks with respect to the conditions for allocation of spectrum licenses may induce problems of fair competition in an integrated market.     

What Fraction of a Capital Investment is Sunk Costs?

To what extent are capital investments sunk costs? This question is addressed by examining the salvage values of discarded metalworking machinery. Even though such assets are expected to be non‐specific, many discarded assets are scrapped rather than sold on second‐hand markets. Econometric results suggest that firms can only expect to get back 20–50 percent of the initial price of a ‘new’ machine once it is installed. The results also indicate differences in value‐age profiles across firms, but provide only weak support for the hypothesis that salvage values are particularly low during recessions.     

Sunk Costs,Extensive R&D Subsidies and Permanent Inducement Effects

Using firm‐level data on Spanish manufacturing firms we estimate a model of the firm's optimal R&D decisions (whether to perform R&D and how much to invest). We quantify the fixed (proper fixed costs plus firms' outside option) and sunk costs of R&D and find the former to be substantially higher than the latter. While sunk costs act as a barrier to entry into R&D for some firms, fixed costs are the binding obstacle for many more firms. Simulation based on the estimated model reveals that one‐shot trigger subsidies cause a substantial increase in both the share of R&D firms and average R&D expenditures. This effect shows persistence over time, but totally fades away after seven years as firms are gradually hit by negative R&D profitability shocks.     

Employer discrimination and market structure: Does more concentration mean more discrimination?

We formalize Gary Becker’s dynamic conjecture that competitive forces drive discriminating employers from the market in the long run, using a dynamic model of a monopolistically competitive industry characterized by sunk costs and sequential entry. An advantage of this formalization is that it demonstrates the importance of the structure of production costs, as well as market power, in explaining the long-run survival of discriminatory firms. In addition, we show that, despite decades of empirical research on this connection, there is no consistent theoretical relationship between the degree of market concentration within an industry and the degree of discrimination. However, we do find an indirect link in which market liberalization has a more pronounced effect in reducing discrimination in more concentrated markets.