创业板上市公司董事会规模、稳定性与公司绩效关系研究

董事会作为现在公司法人治理的核心,其专有特征会影响到其职能的发挥,进而影响公司的绩效。文章根据创业板上市公司的特点,利用创业板上市公司2009-2012年的最新数据,研究其董事会规模与稳定性对公司绩效的影响。研究发现,当以每股收益来衡量公司绩效时,董事会规模与公司绩效之间并不存在显著的相关关系;当以净资产收益率来衡量公司绩效时,董事会规模与公司绩效存在着显著的倒“U”型关系,并证实了董事会稳定性与公司以前年度的绩效具有显著的正相关关系,以及以前年度董事会稳定性低的公司在后续年度内其绩效会越来越差。为此建议公司在选择合适的董事会规模的同时要尽量保持董事会的稳定性。     

创业板公司董事会特征与公司绩效的实证研究

董事会作为代表公司行使其法人财产权的会议机关,是公司内部治理结构的核心。规范和经验分析共同表明,董事会特征会对其职能的行使发挥作用,进而对公司绩效产生影响。本文基于创业板上市公司两年的面板数据,采用多元回归方法,对创业板上市公司董事会特征与公司绩效的关系进行了实证研究,找出专属于我国创业板公司的规律。实证结果显示,董事会两职合一有利于提高公司绩效,独立董事比例与公司绩效呈倒U型关系,第一大股东持股比例与公司绩效呈显著负相关关系,最优董事会规模未得到验证。     

董事会特征和公司绩效的实证研究——基于中小企业上市公司的经验分析

本文选取2004—2005年上市的50家中小企业为样本,研究了董事会的主要特征对公司绩效的影响,实证结果显示：董事会规模、独立董事比例对公司绩效的提高有一定的作用,但不显著;董事长与总经理两职分离对公司绩效的提升有显著的影响。总体来说,中小企业的董事会结构还有待进一步优化。     

我国房地产上市公司董事会特征与公司绩效研究

本文整理了2013—201566家A股上市房地产公司数据,分析房地产上市公司董事会的特征.具体研究董事会人数、独立董事占比、董事长总经理是否二职合一、董事会持股比例、董事会薪酬、独立董事薪酬、董事会会议次数与公司绩效的关系.     

高校上市公司公司治理结构与经营绩效关系研究

本文以高校上市公司2005-2009年的面板数据为基础进行实证分析,以探讨高校上市公司公司治理三个主要方面即董事会特征、股权结构及管理层薪酬与其经营绩效之间的关系,并探究影响我国高校上市公司绩效的重要公司治理成分。研究发现：董事会规模与公司绩效（ROE,EPS）呈负相关关系;独立董事比例与公司绩效（Tob in＇s Q）呈正相关关系;两职合一对公司绩效（EPS）有正面作用;Z指数和公司绩效（ROE）呈正相关关系;高校持股比例与公司绩效（Tob in＇s Q）呈负相关关系;高管薪酬与公司绩效（Tob in＇s Q）呈显著的正相关关系,与公司绩效（EPS）呈显著的负相关关系。     

董事会特征和公司绩效的实证研究——基于中小企业上市公司的经验分析

本文选取2004-2005年上市的50家中小企业为样本,研究了董事会的主要特征对公司绩效的影响,实证结果显示:董事会规模、独立董事比例对公司绩效的提高有一定的作用,但不显著;董事长与总经理两职分离对公司绩效的提升有显著的影响.总体来说,中小企业的董事会结构还有待进一步优化.     

青海省上市公司公司治理结构与财务绩效

上市公司的公司治理结构与财务绩效一直是证券市场的热点讨论话题。许多国内学者的相关理论研究,对公司治理结构,财务绩效评价,及公司治理结构与财务绩效相关关系分别进行研究。对很多学者研究的股权结构、董事会规模、董事长与总经理兼任、董事持股比例、独立董事比例、机构投资者比例、高管持股比例、高管薪酬因素等公司治理变量对企业绩效的影响进行分析研究,以及将公司治理的诸多影响因素整合成一个综合指数来代表公司治理水平进行的研究进行分析等。本文围绕青海省上市公司的公司治理结构对财务绩效的影响的实证结果,从制度和理论的视角解释,提出优化上市公司治理结构,提高上市公司财务绩效的建议措施。     

不同产业属类董事会治理结构与公司绩效的相关性——基于A股上市公司的实证分析

随着经济全球化发展,司治理已经成为现代企业提升企业核心竞争力的关键因素,而建立一个规范、独立、结构合理、富有效率的董事会是完善公司治理结构、提高公司绩效的重要内容.本文对2003年至2005年三年间深市333家上市公司共计982个有效数据进行描述分析并做出研究假设,利用SPSS软件进行描述性统计分析,并建立多元回归分析模型,通过实证研究分析上市公司董事会治理结构特征与公司绩效的相关性,为公司绩效的改善提供参考.     

董事会特征与公司绩效的研究综述

董事会作为联结股东与经理层的纽带,是公司治理机制的重要组成部分,其治理效率直接关系到公司业绩和股东利益.董事会独立性较低、董事会职能不清以及董事会作用微弱是我国许多公司存在的问题.文章梳理了董事会特征与公司绩效方面的文献,希望为后续学者的研究提供阅读思路.     

公司绩效、公司治理与管理者报酬实证研究

本文以中国深、沪两市在2004年上市公司样本作为公司绩效、公司治理与管理者报酬研究对象,从公司绩效、股权结构的安排以及董事会治理三个方面,通过构建最小二乘模型进行多元线性回归,来研究公司内部治理机制对公司管理层报酬的影响。研究结果表明:公司绩效、国有股比例、董事会规模、两职兼任均对管理者报酬产生显著的影响。     

改制模式影响董事会特征吗?

本文考察了不同改制模式对于董事会特征的影响。通过分析1997—2000年我国285个国有企业首次公开发行后三年的数据,我们发现控股股东控制上市公司和董事会的动机及监管层政策规定是影响董事会领导层两职状态的重要原因。非完整改造公司中,控股股东更容易违反监管层的有关规定,委派本公司人员在上市公司同时兼任董事长和总经理职位。同时,非完整改造公司董事会的规模较大,董事会的活动强度较低,其激励程度也较低。     

Board 3.0: What the Private‐Equity Governance Model Can Offer Public Companies∗

The authors view board structures as an adaptive institution that responds to the key challenges faced by public companies: helping management solve the problems of production and organization of large‐scale enterprise; limiting managerial agency costs; serving as a delegated monitor of the firm's compliance obligations; and responding to the governance environment of changing shareholder ownership patterns. U.S. company board structures are shown to have evolved over time, often through discontinuous lurches, as particular functions have waxed and waned in importance. This article is part of a larger project that traces two iterations of the public company board, what the authors call Board 1.0 (the “advisory board”) and Board 2.0 (the “monitoring board”). The authors argue in particular that Board 2.0, as embedded in both current practice and regulation, now fails the functional fit test for many companies. First, it does not scale to match the dramatic increase in the size and complexity of many modern public corporations. Second, at a time of reconcentrated ownership achieved through institutional investors and increased activism, it does not have the expertise and commitment needed to resolve the tension between managerial or market myopia, or “short‐termism,” and managerial “hyperopia.” This article holds out an optional alternative, Board 3.0, which would bring to the public company board some strategies used by private equity firms for their portfolio company boards. Such “Portco” boards consist of directors who are “thickly informed,” “heavily resourced,” and “intensely interested.” Bringing such “empowered directors” to public company boards could facilitate evolution of the public company board model in response to dramatic changes in the corporate business environment. The authors also suggest possible routes for implementing Board 3.0, including the enlisting of PE firms as “relational investors” that would have both capacity and incentives to engineer changes in board structure.     

公司治理结构特征与困境公司恢复——基于中国上市公司的实证研究

目前学者们对公司财务困境的研究主要集中在事前的困境预测上,而对公司陷入财务困境后如何恢复研究较少。本文选取2005—2009年国内被ST的上市公司为研究样本,将研究样本分为逐渐走出财务困境的公司（一类公司）和一直处于财务困境中的公司（二类公司）,从董事会特征、股权结构以及管理层持股这三个方面来比较分析这两类公司在陷入财务困境之后的公司治理结构差异对困境恢复的影响。研究结果表明,公司处于不同的财务情况下,大股东们对公司绩效的影响是不一样的。当公司逐渐陷入财务困境的过程中,大股东们对公司绩效没有显著性的影响;而在公司逐渐摆脱财务的过程中,大股东们对公司绩效有显著的正面影响,此时的公司治理关键在于股权集中度,大股东在公司摆脱财务困境中起到了重要作用。     

连锁董事怎样影响会计师事务所的选择

利用我国上市公司的数据,在控制了会计师事务所选择的经济决定因素和传统的董事会特征变量之后,结果发现,会计师事务所的选择显著受到了连锁董事的影响,并且连锁董事的解释力远远超过了传统董事会特征的解释力。具体而言,如果某公司与选择了高质量会计师事务所的公司相联结,该公司就越可能选择聘请高质量的会计师事务所;在公司董事会中,连锁董事比例和连锁独立董事比例越高,公司就越不可能选择聘请高质量的会计师事务所。     

董事会隐性层级、公司投资行为及效率——基于我国A股上市公司的实证检验

董事会内部非正式的隐性特征如董事们的才能、地位、影响力等在群体决策过程中发挥无形的作用.以董事会内部非正式的隐性层级为出发点,研究它与公司投资行为及投资效率的关系.研究结果表明:董事会隐性层级分化程度越高,公司投资规模越大;相对于非国有上市公司,国有上市公司中董事会隐性层级分化度对投资规模的影响显著变小;董事会隐性层级分化度越大,公司投资效率越低,出现投资过度或投资不足可能性越大.     

Attendance of board meetings and company performance: Evidence from Taiwan

This paper empirically investigates board meeting attendance and its effects on the performance of Taiwanese listed corporations. Directors with higher qualifications attend board meetings more often by themselves. The ownership of the largest shareholder of a company also has a positive effect on director’s own meeting attendance. High meeting attendance by directors themselves can enhance a firm’s performance but high attendance by their representatives has an adverse effect. Independence of directors or a board is also positively associated with firm performance. These results largely hold even when the sample is decomposed to count for different ownership structures and director types.     

An analysis of majority owner‐managed companies in the UK

This paper investigates the characteristics of 73 UK companies in which managers have an ownership stake of greater than 50 per cent. We find that majority owner‐managed companies make less use of alternative corporate control systems and are less likely to remove their chief executive officer or other board members following poor performance. However, our sample firms actually outperform diffusely held companies of similar size in the same industry. The determinants of majority control appear more closely related to the characteristics of the controlling shareholders rather than the firm's operating environment. Changes in the ownership structure of our sample companies owe more to changes in owner‐specific characteristics and security issuance than they are related to changes in the company's operating environment or company performance. We conclude that despite the obvious agency costs of managerial entrenchment for closely held companies, for the present sample at least the incentive alignment benefits of large director shareholdings are beneficial to outside shareholders.     

Strategic Governance and Management Accounting: Evidence From a Case Study

This paper seeks to establish if top management (the board) of a firm should extend its overview of the governance process to the execution of strategy (i.e., strategic governance) and, if so, does the management accounting information system (MAIS) have a role in facilitating this strategy execution process. This study investigated the role of the board and MAIS in strategic governance by examining a company with a public record of both successful governance and integrated strategic management accounting processes in a high‐risk industry. The analysis demonstrates that boards should go beyond the minimum conformance (compliance) requirements of the governance‐regulatory legislation and assume ultimate responsibility for strategy execution and enterprise performance. However, while management accounting techniques, processes and reports were found to be used extensively in strategic governance to integrate the policy‐management interface in numerous conformance–performance domains, the traditional role of the management accountant was found to be limited in terms of their role in such governance. The study demonstrates that a more strategic governance role offers the management accountant a way back into senior management by using the routines of management accounting to socialize the board and curb any opportunism that may arise.     

Est in aqua dulci non invidiosa voluptas In pure water there is a pleasure begrudged by none: on ownership,accountability and control in a privatized utility

We explore the proposition that the unitary board structure is defective, as a mechanism of effective corporate governance, in its application in the post-privatization British water industry. Specifically we explore the case of Yorkshire Water plc and a serious crisis that it faced as a result of a severe drought in the summer of 1995. Our contention is that whilst the water company continued to meet its commitment to raising shareholder value, it failed to meet the needs of other stakeholders, and not least its customers. Our analysis of this case is grounded in a discussion of the political-economy and critical accounting literatures relating to private versus public provision and privatization. Following this we outline the nature of governance by unitary board and then turn to Yorkshire Water’s crisis, its failure in service provision and its performance. Based upon this we then lay out the precursors to the crisis and review the role that the unitary board model played in its development. We conclude by proposing that the dual board model may be better suited to the management of the production of essential “public" goods, in order to protect the interests of all stakeholders.