Audit opinion improvement and the timing of disclosure

Companies have been found to report positive information more quickly than they report negative information (i.e., good news early, bad news late). This paper investigates the potential impact of audit opinion change on the timeliness of financial disclosures, with improvements in audit opinion considered to be “good news.” We take both the direction and the magnitude of audit opinion change into consideration, with magnitude measuring how far the opinion is from an unqualified opinion (i.e., an unqualified opinion with explanatory paragraph is closer to an unqualified opinion than a qualified opinion is). We find that firms experiencing an improvement in their audit opinions disclose their financial results earlier, while those with audit opinion deteriorations report their financial results later, and that these effects were related to the magnitude of the opinion change. What's more, there is an asymmetric response to good audit opinion news vs. bad audit opinion news, with bad audit opinion news having a larger effect on earnings timeliness than the effect on earnings timeliness of good audit opinion news. Overall, our results support the “good news early, bad news late” notion. Finally, we also find that overall earnings timeliness has improved in China since the enactment of new reporting regulations in 2006.     

Regulation Fair Disclosure and the timeliness of long-horizon management forecasts

We examine the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (hereafter Reg FD) on the timeliness of long-horizon management forecasts of annual earnings, especially those conveying bad news. We expect that managers are less timely in issuing bad news forecasts than good news forecasts prior to Reg FD when they can disclose bad news to selected analysts and institutional investors privately. As Reg FD prohibits private disclosures of material information, managers are expected to accelerate the issuance of long-horizon bad news forecasts after Reg FD due to concerns of litigation risk from institutional investors and loss of analyst coverage, leading to a decrease in timeliness asymmetry between bad news and good news forecasts. We also expect that the effect of Reg FD is stronger among firms with lower ex-ante litigation risk or higher information asymmetry as they are more likely to withhold bad news prior to Reg FD. In addition, we expect that investors and analysts react more to bad news forecasts than to good news forecasts prior to Reg FD, and this asymmetry decreases after Reg FD. Our results are consistent with our predictions and suggest that managers provide long-horizon forecasts conveying bad news more timely after Reg FD.     

Impact of earnings performance on price‐sensitive disclosures under the Australian continuous disclosure regime

This study examines the relation between accounting earnings and the frequency of price‐sensitive corporate disclosure under Australia's statutory continuous disclosure requirements. Despite low litigation threats and excepting loss‐making firms, results show that firms with earnings declines (bad news) are more likely to make continuous disclosure than firms with earnings increases (good news). This suggests that market forces and regulators’ scrutiny are sufficient to induce a ‘bad news’ disclosure bias. This study also examines the ‘materiality’ requirement under the continuous disclosure requirements and finds a positive relation between disclosure frequency and the magnitude of earnings news. The earnings–return correlation is positively associated with disclosure frequency for the financial services industry.     

The effect of board composition on the informativeness and quality of annual earnings: Empirical evidence from Greece

This study examines how the informational quality of annual accounting earnings, varies according to the size and composition of the board of directors of publicly listed firms within the Greek capital market. Data analysis over a period of five years (2000-2004) revealed that the informativeness of annual accounting earnings is positively related to the fraction of outside directors serving on the board, but it is not related to board size. Additionally, firms with a higher proportion of outside board members proved to be more conservative when reporting bad news but on the contrary they do not display greater timeliness on the recognition of good news. Finally, firms with a higher proportion of outside directors report earnings of higher quality compared to firms with a low proportion of outside directors. Our results are robust to several sensitivity tests controlling for endogeneity, firm's fixed effects and alternative models for the estimation of discretionary accruals.     

Peer performance and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings recognition

This paper investigates the impact of peer performance on the asymmetric timeliness of earnings recognition. We find a positive relationship between peers' weak performance and timely bad news disclosure. Our results are robust to a variety of tests, including instrument variable approach, difference-in-differences analysis, alternative measures and subsample analysis. Consistent with the notion that weak peer performance increases investors' demand for information, the relationship is more profound for firms suffering from high information externality, with weak governance and high information asymmetry. Furthermore, we find that the relationship is difficult to reconcile with the explanation of managers' herding behaviour. In addition, we show that conservative accounting information disclosure due to weak peer performance alleviates managerial bad news hoarding and information asymmetry for underperforming firms, but distorts investment decisions for outperforming firms. We highlight the spillover effect of peer performance on conservative accounting information and the related heterogeneous outcomes.     

Institutional ownership composition and accounting conservatism

This study empirically investigates the association between institutional ownership composition and accounting conservatism. Transient (dedicated) institutional investors, holding diversified (concentrated) portfolios with high (low) portfolio turnover, focus on portfolio firms’ short-term (long-term) perspectives and trade heavily (generally do not trade) on current earnings news. Thus, I predict that as transient (dedicated) institutional ownership increases, firms will exhibit a lower (higher) degree of accounting conservatism. Consistent with my predictions, in the context of asymmetric timeliness of earnings, I document that as the level of transient (dedicated) institutional ownership increases, earnings become less (more) asymmetrically timely in recognizing bad news.     

The Effect of Regulation FD on Transient Institutional Investors' Trading Behavior

We assess the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) on the trading behavior of transient institutional investors in the quarter prior to a bad news break in a string of consecutive earnings increases. Bad news breaks are defined as breaks that are by growth firms, preceded by longer strings of consecutive earnings increases, followed by longer strings of consecutive earnings decreases, and associated with larger declines in earnings. Pre–Reg FD transient institutions have abnormal selling of stocks in the quarter immediately preceding a bad news break. This abnormal selling is confined to firms that hold conference calls in the pre–Reg FD period. However, in the post–Reg FD period transient institutions do not exhibit similar abnormal selling of stocks in the quarter before a bad news break. Furthermore, after Reg FD transient institutions allocate less of their stock portfolios to conference call firms relative to non–conference call firms in the quarters prior to a bad news break. These results demonstrate that Reg FD has had an impact on management's selective disclosure behavior and significantly changed the trading behavior of transient institutions.     

Economic policy uncertainty and bank earnings opacity

Using a sample of U.S. banks and an index for economic policy uncertainty developed by Baker et al. (2016), we investigate whether economic policy uncertainty is systematically related to bank earnings opacity. When economic policy is relatively uncertain, it is easier for bank managers to distort financial information, as unpredictable economic policy changes make assessing the existence and impact of hidden “adverse news” more difficult for investors and creditors. Economic policy uncertainty also increases the fluctuation in banks’ earnings and cash flows, thus providing additional incentives and opportunities for bank managers to engage in earnings management. Our results show that uncertainty in economic policy is positively related to earnings opacity, proxied by the magnitude of discretionary loan loss provisions and the likelihood of just meeting or beating the prior year’s earnings, and negatively related to the level of accounting conservatism (i.e., the timeliness of recognition of bad news relative to good news). Collectively, our results suggest that economic policy uncertainty leads to greater earnings opacity. We also find that the impact of economic policy uncertainty on financial reporting distortion is less pronounced for stronger banks (i.e., banks with high capital ratios).     

Trading volume in options and common stock around quarterly earnings announcements

This study examines trading in call and put options around quarterly earnings announcements and investigates whether the existence of these options affects the common stock trading volume response to these announcements. We find that the options trading volume reaction to earnings announcements is larger than the corresponding reaction in common stock. Consistent with the idea that options provide an alternative vehicle for trading on information, the existence of these options lowers the level of trading in common stock. Options also appear to offer investors an alternative method of taking short positions, as shown by the symmetric stock market trading volume reaction to good versus bad news for firms with listed options. In contrast, firms without listed options exhibit a larger trading volume response to good news than to bad news of similar magnitude.     

How do the content,format, and tone of Twitter-based corporate disclosure vary depending on earnings performance?

Using 86,891 tweets, from the official corporate Twitter accounts of 715 unique firms, this study examines whether and how managers strategically attract and distract investors’ attention from corporate news through Twitter. We find that firms with good earnings news use Twitter to post more earnings-related information directly, whereas firms with bad earnings news post more non-earnings-related information on Twitter. We further find that depending on earnings performance firms strategically choose the format of tweets (qualitative or quantitative) and the tone of earnings tweets (positive or negative) to attract investors’ attention to good news or distract investors’ attention from bad news. Our results are robust to difference-in-differences (DID), alternative sample periods, and different variable specifications. Our findings provide empirical evidence for investors and regulators regarding current practices in corporate information on Twitter.     

Do analysts affect bad news timeliness?

I investigate the effect of analysts on the speed with which bad news is reflected in earnings. Intuitively, the more analysts that cover a firm, the more costly it will be for the firm to keep bad news suppressed. Thus, analyst coverage should positively affect bad news timeliness (BNT) (but not necessarily the differential timeliness of bad news over good news, or conditional conservatism). Using brokerage house mergers as a natural experiment with a difference-in-differences design, I find that an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage decreases BNT; that is, analysts positively affect BNT. The decrease in BNT is robust to controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity, using a propensity score matched sample, persists for up to three years after the brokerage house merger, and is stronger for firms with relatively low analyst coverage before the merger. The result improves our understanding of how analysts affect a firm's information environment.     

An Empirical Analysis of Qualitative Management Earnings Forecasts

Despite efforts by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to encourage corporate disclosure of quantitative management earnings projections, only a small fraction of firms voluntarily do so. Instead of quantitative estimates, a large number of firms choose to disclose qualitative (verbal) assessments of their earnings prospects. This paper is a study of the information characteristics and the usefulness of this alternative form of forecast disclosure to investors. The study examines a sample of qualitative forecast statements from the 1979–1985 period and finds associations between these forecasts and percentage changes in realized earnings per share, the direction of financial analysts' forecast revisions following the disclosure of these forecasts, and abnormal stock returns on the date of their disclosure. These associations are, however, shown to be more significant for negative (bad news) than for positive (good news) forecasts.     

Can Stock Recommendations Predict Earnings Management and Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors?

In this article we present evidence that a firm's stock price sensitivity to earnings news, as measured by outstanding stock recommendation, affects its incentives to manage earnings and, in turn, affects analysts' ex post forecast errors. In particular, we find a tendency for firms rated a Sell (Buy) to engage more (less) frequently in extreme, income–decreasing earnings management, indicating that they have relatively stronger (weaker) incentives to create accounting reserves especially in the form of earnings baths than other firms. In contrast, firms rated a Buy (Sell) are more (less) likely to engage in earnings management that leaves reported earnings equal to or slightly higher than analysts' forecasts. Our empirical results provide direct evidence of purported, but heretofore, weakly documented equity market incentives for firms to manage earnings. They are also consistent with a growing body of literature that finds analysts either cannot anticipate or are not motivated to anticipate completely in their forecasts firms' efforts to manage earnings.     

Asymmetric Trading Costs Prior to Earnings Announcements: Implications for Price Discovery and Returns

We show that the cost of trading on negative news, relative to positive news, increases before earnings announcements. Our evidence suggests that this asymmetry is due to financial intermediaries reducing their exposure to announcement risks by providing liquidity asymmetrically. This asymmetry creates a predictable upward bias in prices that increases preannouncement, and subsequently reverses, confounding short‐window announcement returns as measures of earnings news and risk premia. These findings provide an alternative explanation for asymmetric return reactions to firms' earnings news, and help explain puzzling prior evidence that announcement risk premia precede the actual announcements. Our study informs methods for research centering on earnings announcements and offers a possible explanation for patterns in returns around anticipated periods of heightened inventory risks, including alternative firm‐level, industry‐level, and macroeconomic information events.     

Managerial incentives for discretionary disclosure: evidence from management leveraged buyouts

Managers in management leveraged buyout (MBO) firms prefer to purchase their firms at a low offer price. This motive gives them a clear incentive to make pessimistic discretionary disclosures. Using a sample of press releases, I find that managers involved in their firms’ MBO selectively release negative disclosures to denigrate their firm just before the MBO transaction when compared with prior period: they issue more bad news disclosures and more pessimistic quotes. Additionally, they issue less optimistic quotes, fewer good news disclosures, less positive earnings forecasts, and they manage earnings downwards. I control for factors that may not be caused by managers’ purchase motives by comparing the MBO sample with a third-party leveraged buyout sample where management is not involved in the buyout and with a performance-matched control sample. I find that the disclosure of MBO firms becomes significantly more pessimistic than the leveraged buyout firms where management is not involved in the transaction and significantly more pessimistic than the performance-matched control sample.     

THE TIMELINESS OF HALF YEARLY EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS AND STOCK RETURNS

This paper examines the association between the timeliness of the half-yearly report for Australian firms and the abnormal stock price behaviour around the time of the announcement. The results support the overseas evidence that reports containing ‘good’ news are released earlier than reports containing ‘bad’ news. The abnormal returns are consistent with the direction and magnitude of the earnings and dividend information. We find no evidence to support the Kross and Schroeder [1984] conclusion that timeliness per se is associated with abnormal returns once appropriate control is made for earnings/dividend information.     

Corporate goodness and profit warnings

Is a firm that is known for positively engaging stakeholders expected to voluntarily disclose bad financial news? If it makes the announcement, does its corporate goodness help to mitigate the stock price reaction? We examine these issues using a sample of profit warnings, and a sample of firms with negative earnings surprises that did not warn. Firms that have positive corporate social responsibility ratings are more likely to provide earnings warnings than other firms. When they do provide a profit warning, the event negative abnormal returns are of significantly smaller magnitude than the returns of other firms providing warnings. This effect does not occur for social firms that decide not to warn. They suffer the same negative stock price impact on the earnings announcement day as other firms.     

The spillover effect of shareholder activism: Evidence on firm reporting

This study examines the spillover effect of shareholder activism against target firms on financial reporting by non-target firms in portfolios held by the same activist shareholders. We find that firms that are not the target of institutional shareholders’ activism campaigns report more positive abnormal accruals. Cross-sectional tests indicate that the effect is more pronounced i) for firms that have more opportunities to engage in upward earnings management, or for firms with less effective alternative monitoring forces, and ii) when investors are more sensitive to good news. We also find that the effect is stronger when activist shareholders are more experienced, are waging more confrontational campaigns against target firms, and have larger holdings in non-target firms. We further find that non-target firms tend to report lower magnitude of asset write-downs, are more likely to restate financial statements and meet or beat earnings benchmarks, and exhibit a more optimistic tone in their 10-K/10-Q filings. Overall, our findings suggest that firms tend to window-dress their mandatory reporting to preempt possible shareholder activism against them.     

Earnings conservatism: panel data evidence from the European Union and the United States

This paper focuses on earnings conservatism, and provides new evidence based on procedures that account for variability at the firm level, drawing a comparison between the European Union and the United States. A key finding is that the estimated responsiveness of earnings to bad news is substantially higher when unobserved firm-specific effects are modelled. Furthermore, it is shown that accounting has become more conservative not only in the U.S. but also in the EU when taken as a whole, and there is little evidence of marked differences in the asymmetric timeliness of earnings between the two. Indeed, any changes in this property of earnings are likely to be attributable to a common factor that influences firms similarly in both locations, and not necessarily to the process of economic convergence that has taken place in the EU.     

A Temporal Analysis of Earnings Surprises: Profits versus Losses

I show that median earnings surprise has shifted rightward from small negative (miss analyst estimates by a small amount) to zero (meet analyst estimates exactly) to small positive (beat analyst estimates by a small amount) during the 16 years, 1984 to 1999. I show that a rightward temporal shift in median surprise from negative to positive describes earnings, but neither profits nor losses. Median profit surprise shifts within the positive quadrant, from zero to one cent per share. Median loss surprise shifts within the negative quadrant from extreme negative (about -33 cents per share) to zero. I show that the median surprise for profits exceeds that for losses in every year. I document significant positive temporal trends in both meet and beat analyst estimates for both profits and losses, but I find a greater frequency of profits that either meet or beat analyst estimates in every year. I find a significant positive temporal trend in positive profits that are "a little bit of good news," and a significant negative temporal trend in managers who report losses that are an "extreme amount of bad news." My results are robust to the four internal validity threats I consider—namely temporal changes in: (1) analyst forecast accuracy, (2) the mix of earnings of one sign preceded by earnings of another sign four quarters ago, (3) the timeliness of the most recent analyst forecast, and (4) the I/B/E/S definition of actual earnings. I find that managers of growth firms are relatively more likely than managers of value firms to report good news profits. I show that when they do report positive profit surprises, managers of growth firms are more likely to report "a little bit of good news" in every year.