Economic policy uncertainty and the credit channel: Aggregate and bank level U.S. evidence over several decades

Economic policy uncertainty affects decisions of households, businesses, policy makers and financial intermediaries. We first examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty on aggregate bank credit growth. Then we analyze commercial bank entity level data to gauge the effects of policy uncertainty on financial intermediaries’ lending. We exploit the cross-sectional heterogeneity to back out indirect evidence of its effects on businesses and households. We ask (i) whether, conditional on standard macroeconomic controls, economic policy uncertainty affected bank level credit growth, and (ii) whether there is variation in the impact related to banks’ balance sheet conditions; that is, whether the effects are attributable to loan demand or, if impact varies with bank level financial constraints, loan supply. We find that policy uncertainty has a significant negative effect on bank credit growth. Since this impact varies meaningfully with some bank characteristics – particularly the overall capital-to-assets ratio and bank asset liquidity-loan supply factors at least partially (and significantly) help determine the influence of policy uncertainty. Because other studies have found important macroeconomic effects of bank lending growth on the macroeconomy, our findings are consistent with the possibility that high economic policy uncertainty may have slowed the U.S. economic recovery from the Great Recession by restraining overall credit growth through the bank lending channel.     

货币政策和银行风险承担：一种非线性关系

宽松的货币政策会通过估值、收入和现金流机制,追逐收益机制以及中央银行沟通和反应机制等渠道增加银行风险承担,通过风险转移机制降低银行风险承担,从而导致货币政策与银行风险承担之间可能存在复杂的非线性关系。本文使用面板阈值模型,基于我国银行业数据研究了货币政策对银行风险承担的影响,发现我国货币政策对银行风险承担的影响存在门限效应,即货币政策对银行风险承担的影响取决于货币政策基准利率偏离泰勒规则利率的程度。当这种偏离小于门限值时,宽松货币政策会增加银行风险承担;当这种偏离大于门限值时,宽松货币政策会降低银行风险承担。本文研究对更好地理解我国货币政策对银行风险承担及金融稳定的影响有一定参考意义。     

Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions and Systemic Risk in the Banking Industry

This study examines the relation between earnings management through discretionary loan loss provisions (LLPs) and systemic risk in the U. S. banking sector using a large sample of commercial banks from 1996 to 2009. We find that earnings management increases a bank's contribution to systemic crash risk and systemic distress risk, consistent with the notion that earnings management increases information opacity, facilitates bad news hoarding, co‐moves with macroeconomic conditions, and exhibits cross‐sectional correlation and herding in earnings management. However, the effect of earnings management through discretionary LLPs on systemic risk disappears during the crisis period, consistent with weakened earnings management in crisis times. We also find that the same effect strengthens with bank uncertainty and homogenous loans, and weakens in the post‐SOX period, and when banks are audited by Big 4 auditors.     

Bank credit risk and macro-prudential policies: Role of counter-cyclical capital buffer

This paper investigates the impact of macro-prudential policy (proxied by the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB)) on bank credit risk during uncertain times, as banking sector stability is crucial in promoting financial intermediation. Using a unique daily data set consisting of 4939 credit default swaps (CDS) of 70 banks from 25 countries over the period 2010–2019, we find that CCyB tightening decreases bank-level CDS spreads, while CCyB loosening increases CDS spreads. This heterogeneous effect of CCyB arises due to its asymmetric effect on the capital ratio (i.e., the equity-to-total assets ratio) of banks. Tightening CCyB significantly increases capital, whereas loosening CCyB does not impact capital. Thus, the risks that emanate from the banking sector during periods of heightened uncertainty and financial distress can be significantly dampened when CCyB regulation is enabled. Consequently, macro-prudential policies for banks to hold higher levels of capital during good times are justified to contain financial market risks during downturns.     

Economic policy uncertainty and stock price crash risk

This paper studies the impact of economic policy uncertainty on stock price crash risk using data from China. We develop a new index to measure Chinese economic policy uncertainty and find that economic policy uncertainty has a remarkable positive effect on stock price crash risk. However, the effect reverses later. The results also indicate that the positive effect of economic policy uncertainty on stock price crash risk is more prominent for state‐owned enterprises. Moreover, this effect is more prominent for firms with higher information asymmetry and firms with greater disagreement among investors, indicating that economic policy uncertainty affects crash risk through two mechanisms: managers’ concealment of bad news and investors’ heterogeneous beliefs.     

经济政策不确定性与企业贷款成本

基于大样本微观银行信贷数据,本文研究经济政策不确定性对企业的银行贷款成本的影响。研究发现,经济政策不确定性升高导致企业的银行贷款成本增加,且使得在中小型银行贷款的企业成本增加更多。异质性分析表明,经济政策不确定性升高对受政策因素影响较大的企业如小微企业、私营企业等的银行贷款成本的影响更为明显。进一步,对企业的银行贷款违约风险的研究发现,随着经济政策不确定性升高,企业的银行贷款违约风险反而降低。这表明,经济政策不确定性升高使得银行选择风险评级更低的贷款,符合谨慎性动机。本文研究结论表明,经济政策不确定性升高时,银行“自我保险”动机的增强使得企业的银行贷款成本增加,这在中小型银行中表现得更加明显,同时也更多地转嫁给中小企业。本文为经济政策不确定性对企业投资、宏观经济波动等的研究提供了微观解释机制,并揭示了政府经济政策的一致性、稳定性对维护金融稳定的重要作用。     

Audit opinion improvement and the timing of disclosure

Companies have been found to report positive information more quickly than they report negative information (i.e., good news early, bad news late). This paper investigates the potential impact of audit opinion change on the timeliness of financial disclosures, with improvements in audit opinion considered to be “good news.” We take both the direction and the magnitude of audit opinion change into consideration, with magnitude measuring how far the opinion is from an unqualified opinion (i.e., an unqualified opinion with explanatory paragraph is closer to an unqualified opinion than a qualified opinion is). We find that firms experiencing an improvement in their audit opinions disclose their financial results earlier, while those with audit opinion deteriorations report their financial results later, and that these effects were related to the magnitude of the opinion change. What's more, there is an asymmetric response to good audit opinion news vs. bad audit opinion news, with bad audit opinion news having a larger effect on earnings timeliness than the effect on earnings timeliness of good audit opinion news. Overall, our results support the “good news early, bad news late” notion. Finally, we also find that overall earnings timeliness has improved in China since the enactment of new reporting regulations in 2006.     

Bank risk in uncertain times: Do credit rationing and revenue diversification matter?

We show that bank risk rises, particularly for larger banks and those with greater interest-sensitive liabilities, during times of economic policy uncertainty through two economic channels: “credit rationing” and “revenue diversification.” The credit rationing channel shows that economic policy uncertainty increases aggregate loan spreads, exacerbating both adverse selection and moral hazard problems leading to higher bank risk. The revenue diversification channel suggests that as economic policy uncertainty reduces bank profits from traditional interest-based products, banks diversify into other non-traditional activities, thereby increasing their instability. Overall, our findings highlight the impact of economic policy uncertainty on exacerbating bank risk.     

The Effects of the Sharing Economy: How Does Internet Finance Influence Commercial Bank Risk Preferences?

In this article, we provide an evidence on the effects of the sharing economy by studying internet finance. It aims to explore how internet finance affects the relationship between commercial bank risk preferences and monetary policy, and discusses whether this impact varies across heterogeneous banks. The results suggest that having a loose monetary policy encourages a preference for risk. In addition, internet finance alters the sensitivity of bank risk behavior to monetary policy. Internet finance has a heterogeneous influence, depending on a bank’s ownership (i.e., state or private) and size. At privately owned banks, internet finance has only a moderate impact on the bank risk-taking transmission channel of monetary policy, unlike the subsample of large banks.     

Economic policy uncertainty,agency problem,and funding structure: Evidence from U.S. banking industry

We empirically examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on banks’ funding structure (FUD). Using an extensive dataset of U.S. bank holding companies, we find that high policy uncertainty strengthens banks’ FUD. For banks with a pre-existing low FUD, an increase in EPU raises FUD. However, for banks with a pre-existing high FUD, the relationship between EPU and FUD becomes negative and economically significant. Considering the lack of relevant studies, our paper contributes to the literature and provides implications for policymakers and practitioners in the banking industry.     

银行竞争提高了企业投资水平和资源配置效率吗？——基于分支机构空间分布的研究

银行贷款是我国企业融资的重要方式,在企业生产经营中发挥着举足轻重的作用。2006年和2009年,我国先后两次放松了商业银行分支机构市场准入规制,银行分支机构空间分布发生了较大变化,银行竞争水平和服务实体经济能力明显提升。本文利用2001-2012年国家统计局工业企业数据,以企业周边银行分支机构的数量衡量银行竞争水平,研究银行竞争对企业投资的影响。研究发现,银行分支机构数量的增加显著提高了企业投资水平和投资效率。进一步研究表明,银行分支机构数量增加对企业投资效率的提升作用主要表现在投资不足的企业和非国有企业中,企业融资约束降低和代理冲突减弱是银行竞争提高企业投资效率的主要原因。本研究拓展了银行竞争以及企业投资和资源配置效率的相关文献,对供给侧结构性改革和银行业高质量发展具有启示意义。     

Institutional investors and bank governance: An international analysis of bank earnings management

Despite the growing importance of institutional investors in global capital markets and the link between bank earnings management and financial crash risk, little is known about the role of institutional investors in mitigating bank earnings management. We conduct the first international analysis of this issue using a broad sample of banks and institutional investors. We find a negative relation between institutional ownership and bank earnings management, after controlling for the stringency of a country's bank regulations and other relevant bank and country characteristics. Additionally, institutional ownership is more negatively related to earnings management in countries with more-stringent bank disclosure requirements or when ownership is held by domestic rather than foreign institutional investors. Institutional ownership is also more negatively related to earnings management in countries in which insiders extract more private benefits or when ownership is held by institutional blockholders. Our findings have important policy implications regarding institutional investors' engagement with banks.     

Earnings and capital management and signaling: the use of loan-loss provisions by European banks

This paper investigates the relationship between loan-loss provisions (LLPs) and earnings management in the context of the capital adequacy of Euro Area (EA) banks versus non-EA credit institutions. This paper also examines whether LLPs signal managements’ expectations concerning future bank profits to investors. Additionally, this paper traces the role of bank regulations and creditor protection systems in explaining income smoothing. Evidence drawn from the 1996 to 2006 period indicates that LLPs do reflect changes in the expected quality of a bank's loan portfolio for both groups of banks, and that earnings management is an important determinant of LLPs for EA intermediaries, whereas non-EA credit institutions use LLPs to signal private information to outsiders. The paper also finds that higher protection of creditors’ rights significantly reduces the incentives to smooth earnings for EA banks. During the recent financial crisis, EA bank managers are much more concerned with their credit portfolio quality and do not use LLPs for discretionary purposes, whereas LLPs at non-EA banks are used to smooth income more than for the purposes of managing capital ratios or conveying private information about future performance to the market.     

Self-monitoring or reliance on media reporting: How do financial market participants process central bank news?

We study how financial market participants process news from four major central banks—the Bank of England (BoE), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Federal Reserve (Fed)—using a novel survey of 195 financial market participants from around the world. Our results indicate that, first, respondents rely more on media reports of central bank events than they do on self-monitoring. The only exceptions are interest rate decisions in the respondent’s home region. In general, the Fed is watched most closely, followed by the ECB, the BoJ, and the BoE. Second, ordered probit estimations reveal that the perceived reliability of media coverage is negatively associated with degree of self-monitoring and positively related to the probability of using media reports, particularly in the case of asset managers. The perceived importance of central bank events is positively related to the degree of self-monitoring in the case of traders. Finally, portfolio managers tend to self-monitor their home central bank significantly more often than other central banks.     

Visible Reserves in Banks – Determinants of Initial Creation,Usage and Contribution to Bank Stability

The opportunity of building up visible “Reserves for General Banking Risks” by the bank management represents a peculiarity in the German financial accounting framework for banks. We investigate German banks' motives for the creation and usage of these reserves and assess their role in financial stability. We find that banks primarily create and use GBR reserves to build up Tier 1 capital for regulatory capital management and earnings management purposes. Most importantly, however, we also reveal that banks using these reserves are less likely to experience a future distress or a bank default event. We therefore conclude that the existence of GBR reserves within the financial accounting framework represents both a convenient capital and earnings management tool for bank managers and a beneficial regulatory instrument to enhance bank stability.     

The effect of economic policy uncertainty on investor information asymmetry and management disclosures

Investor uncertainty about firm value drives investors’ information collection and trading activities, as well as managers’ disclosure choices. This study examines an important source of uncertainty that likely cannot be influenced by most managers and investors: uncertainty about government economic policy. We find that this uncertainty is associated with increased bid-ask spreads and decreased stock price reactions to earnings surprises. Managers respond to this uncertainty by increasing their voluntary disclosures, but these disclosures only partly mitigate the bid-ask spread increase. We conclude that government economic policy uncertainty is an important component of firms’ information environments and managers’ voluntary disclosure decisions.     

The effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on bank loan contracting

Although firm-initiated clawbacks reduce accounting manipulation, they also induce managers to engage in suboptimal activities (e.g., reduce research and development (R&D) expenses) to achieve earnings targets. To assess the effectiveness of clawback provisions, we examine their impact from debtholders' point of view. We find that banks use more financial covenants and performance pricing provisions in the loan contracts and decrease interest rates after firms initiate clawbacks. Moreover, we also find that loan maturity increases and loan collateral decreases subsequent to clawback adoption. Taken together, our findings indicate that firm-initiated clawback provisions enhance financial reporting quality, thereby reducing the information uncertainty that financing providers face.     

Policy uncertainty and bank’s funding costs: The effects of the financial crisis,Covid-19 pandemic,and market discipline

This paper examines the impacts of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on bank funding costs using the 2001–2021 data of US banks. We document consistent evidence of a negative relationship between EPU and bank funding costs, implying lower bank funding costs during a time of high EPU, consistent with the hypothesis that economic agents tend to reallocate their assets into safer investments, such as bank deposits during high uncertainty. Large banks are likely to benefit most during high EPU when experiencing lower costs of funds compared with other banks, suggesting the “too-big-to-fail” perception of depositors. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that depositors require safer banks to pay lower rates, indicating the existence of market discipline. The cost-decreasing effects of policy uncertainty are less pronounced during the global financial crisis than the Covid-19 crisis.     

商业银行效率及其影响因素实证研究

以我国14家商业银行2000～2009年的面板数据为分析依据,采用随机前沿分析(SFA)方法对商业银行效率进行计量,并从公司治理、市场结构、宏观经济政策、金融业结构和经营能力等方面分析商业银行效率的影响因素。结果表明:市场集中度和银行个体市场份额与银行效率反向变动;投资和货币供给对银行效率影响较大;经济周期、通货膨胀和存贷利差对银行效率影响较小;存款准备金率对银行效率影响最小。可以认为,在当前形势下,存款准备金率的调控作用只是暂时的,无法从根本上抑制货币的流动性;存贷利差对银行效率影响不大。因此,为控制通货膨胀实施不对称加息政策,不会对商业银行系统产生较大影响;从银行经营能力考察,传统的存贷业务已不能独立支持商业银行的进一步发展,应大力提倡金融创新,寻求新的业务增长点。     

Manager wealth concentration,ownership structure,and risk in commercial banks

Of key importance in the governance structure of firms is the role of financial incentives for each major player. The main contribution of this article is an analysis of how an insider's concentration of wealth in his or her bank investment affects incentives to take risk. Major empirical findings are that, first, bank earnings variation falls when bank managers have more of their wealth concentrated in their banks; second, hired-manager banks become less risky when a person who has significant motivation to monitor bank management has his or her wealth highly concentrated in the bank; and third, stock ownership by hired managers can increase total risk of a bank. Further analysis suggests that community banks in our sample control earnings variation by manipulating idiosyncratic risk, credit risk, and leverage but not systematic risk or the loan-to-asset ratio.