Tax Morale, Rule-Governed Behaviour and Trust

This paper outlines the relevance of rules to understand tax morale. It tries to find explanations why taxpayers obey, rather than simply evade taxes. The development of a typology of taxpayers shows that the same tax rules can have different compliance effects. Furthermore, the paper provides evidence with two data sets, the World Values Survey and the Taxpayers Opinion Survey that trust in public officials and the legal system have a significant positive effect on tax morale.     

GAMBLING WITH TAX DOLLARS

Municipalities often spend money in the hopes of generating new tax revenue. Because the estimated increase in tax revenues is uncertain, these policies are essentially gambles with tax dollars. This paper shows that it is possible for a welfare-maximizing government to exhibit risk-loving behavior even though individual taxpayers are risk-averse. This risk-loving behavior may occur when the government has the option to provide an indivisible public good, such as a park. Interestingly, the poorest and wealthiest municipalities do not find gambles optimal. For communities that find gambles optimal, both the provision of the public good and tax rates are affected.     

Tax Expenditures on Health in Australia: 1960–61 to 1988–89

Commonwealth government tax expenditures arise because departures from the tax structure produce favourable tax treatment of particular types of activities or taxpayers. Such tax concessions can be used in the same way as direct expenditures to give effect to government policies, and in fact are often used as substitutes for direct expenditures. Although estimates of tax expenditures on health in more recent times are readily available, this form of subsidisation of the health sector has not been used heavily since the introduction of Medicare in 1984. It is for the period spanning the 1960s and the 1970s, when tax expenditures were a much more important source of health care finance, that consistent estimates are lacking. This article presents estimates of the revenue cost of income tax concessions for health in Australia over the period 1960–61 to 1988–89 and integrates these estimates into the currently available health expenditure statistics. It is concluded that failure to allow for tax expenditures on health when analysing public expenditures on health in Australia can lead to misleading conclusions about the net fiscal impact of changes in the Commonwealth's health expenditure policy. In particular, the fiscal effect of introducing Medihank in 1975 is significantly lower if account is taken of changes to tax concessions on health occurring at the same time. Likewise, the net cost of the introduction of Medicare in 1984 is overstated by measures based on direct outlays alone.     

构建我国纳税人诉讼制度的理论基础

纳税人诉讼制度是公民财政监督权的具体体现,是实现财政民主与财政法治的重要途径。文章逐次分析了纳税人诉讼制度的政治学、经济学以及法学基础,指出“税收契约”、“税收价格”和“．税收债权债务理论’’都是纳税人诉讼赖以建立的理论基础,而宪法中关于人民主权、财产权、监督权的规定是纳税人诉讼得以建立的直接依据。     

Individual welfare,majority voting,and the properties of a linear income tax

A fundamental problem in public finance is the determination of parameters of income tax functions. This paper focuses on this problem in the context of a linear tax function whose parameters are chosen according to majority vote by the taxpayers. The possibility of conflict between high national income and distributional equity is explored and it is found that, even when the distribution of earning power is rightward skew, majority voting does not necessarily lead to the adoption of a tax function which has the average tax rate rising with income.     

Fiscal policies, environmental pollution and economic growth

This paper develops a model of endogenous economic growth with special consideration to the role of productive public expenditure and environmental pollution; and analyses the properties of optimal fiscal policy in the steady state growth equilibrium. We consider the level of consumption as the source of pollution. Government allocates its tax revenue between pollution abatement expenditure and productive public expenditure. Optimum ratio of productive public expenditure to national income is equal to the competitive output share of the public input, when productive public expenditure is depicted as tax revenue minus abatement expenditure. However, the proportional income tax rate exceeds the competitive output share of the public input. There is no conflict between the social welfare maximizing solution and the growth rate maximizing solution in the steady state growth equilibrium. The unique steady state growth equilibrium appears to be a saddle-point when the growth rate is above a critical level and the steady state equilibrium growth rate in the market economy is not necessarily lower than the socially efficient growth rate.     

Intergovernmental competition,voice and exit options and the design of fiscal structure

Taxpayers may reveal their assessment of policy through exercise of available voice and exit options within the fiscal constitution. The voice option is utilized when taxpayers remain within political boundaries and attempt to communicate their assessments regarding the institutionalstatus quo to policymakers. Exercise of the exit option occurs when taxpayers signal discontent with thestatus quo by purchasing from another government supplier. This paper discusses and contrasts theconventional andconstitutional economics views toward fiscal design and argues that a major difference exists regarding the issue of who should be awarded primary responsibility in the policy process: taxpayers or policymakers? Because voice and exit options determine the relative leverage of taxpayers and policymakers in the policy process, it is argued that the design of voice and exit options in the fiscal constitution exerts a predictable influence on policy. The paper concludes that one's view toward the design of voice and exit options is affected by one's perception of the appropriate size of government. Competitive fiscal structures tend to be advocated by those who believe that government tends to overexpand and monopolistic structures tend to be advocated by those who believe that government tends to be too small.     

The Time‐Consistent Public Goods Provision

In this study, we reconsider the optimal nonlinear tax problem with the public good from the perspective of the commitment issue and examine how it affects the condition of the public good provision. We show that the Samuelson rule should be modified when the government cannot commit and the skill types of taxpayers are revealed in the first period. This is true even if the preference of the taxpayers is separable and additive with respect to consumption and leisure. Our analysis also shows how the lack of commitment affects the formula of the marginal cost of public funds and the level of public good provision. Our findings imply that the level of the public good may be excessive in comparison to the case where the government can commit to its tax policy.     

THE OPTIMAL DIVISION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BETWEEN PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER PAYMENTS

This paper examines the optimal ratio of transfer payments to expenditure on public goods, for a given income tax rate. The transfer payment is then determined by the government's budget constraint. The optimal ratio of transfers to public good expenditure per person is expressed as a function of the ratio of the median to the arithmetic mean wage, and of the tax rate. Reductions in the skewness of the wage rate distribution are associated with reductions in transfer payments relative to public goods expenditure, at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, increases in the tax rate, from relatively low levels, are associated with increases in the relative importance of transfer payments. But beyond a certain level, further tax rate increases are associated with a lower ratio of transfers to public goods, because of adverse incentive effects.     

财产税、地方公共支出与房产价值的关联分析

基于财产税的受益税性质,财产税的资本化和房产价值负相关,地方公共支出和房产价值正相关.房产价值到底是降低、升高还是不变,则取决于财产税与地方公共支出的转换系数a及地方公共支出的效率系数b.从公共选择的视角看,人们会因为关心自身房产的价值而积极参与地方上的公共事务决策.基于以上,人们在选择居住社区时,将对地方公共服务带来的收益与税收负担成本进行权衡,并且会用"以脚投票"的方式来实现这一动态平衡过程.     

Do pensions foster education? An empirical perspective

The paper examines the effect of population ageing on public education spending. On the one hand, ageing is expected to have a negative effect on education, as an increasing number of retirees results in ‘intergenerational conflict’ and, hence, the condemnation of education expenditure. On the other hand, ageing, in combination with pay-as-you-go pension systems, offers incentives for the working-age generation to invest in the public education of the young in order to ‘reap’ the benefits (that is, higher income tax/contributions) of their greater future productivity. Empirical evidence derived from the application of a fixed effects approach to panel data for OECD countries shows that the increasing share of elderly people has a non-linear effect on education spending. This indicates a certain degree of intergenerational conflict. Nevertheless, we find that future population ageing, which reinforces the mechanism linking public education and pensions, reflects positively on education expenditure. Furthermore, by disaggregating total education expenditure by educational levels, we observe that this effect is led by levels of non-compulsory education, probably as a reflection of the direct connection to labor productivity.     

Imperfect Tax Compliance and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods

Our aim in this paper is to investigate whether the presence of imperfect income tax compliance affects the optimal provision of public goods within a framework in which public expenditure is financed by a general income tax that also accomplishes redistributive goals. We first derive the income tax structure, and then a generalized Samuelson rule. We argue that, under imperfect income tax compliance, it is desirable to distort public–good supply downwards, in the sense that the sum of marginal rates of substitution between public and private consumption must exceed their marginal rate of transformation.     

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION UNDER PARENTAL TEACHING*

This paper examines a simple overlapping generations model of human capital accumulation under both the public and private education regimes. Both young individuals and their parents allocate time to human capital accumulation. Under the public education regime, the government collects tax to finance expenditure for education resources. We show that there exists a level of tax which maximizes the speed of human capital accumulation because of parental teaching; and, if the government chooses tax rates adequately, human capital grows faster and welfare levels become higher under the public education regime than under the private.     

Public policy for reducing tax evasion: implications of the Yule–Simpson paradox

The current study exhibits a new implication of the Yule–Simpson paradox with public policy repercussions. We construct Laffer curves of local property tax collection based on aggregated data and group division to residential land uses in Jerusalem. Results indicate that based on aggregated (dis-aggregated) data, the location of owner-occupiers and renters who pay a relatively high rate tariff will be on the upward-sloping (downward-sloping) part of the Laffer curve. Consequently, statistical test outcomes support Laffer’s controversial claim that for the few upper-brackets taxpayers, an efficient collection is associated with tax reduction rather than tax increase.     

Are Tax Expenditures of Individuals Only a Tool of Tax Optimisation?

The paper focuses on tax expenditures of individuals, which are one of the fiscal tools of the state. In the Czech Republic they are primarily aimed at housing policy, pension policy, and philanthropy, and the question is the extent to which tax expenditures can influence the preferences of tax payers. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effect of tax expenditures of individuals in the form of tax deductions for social policy, housing support and retirement savings. We also evaluate whether these tax deductions fulfill the fiscal functions for which they were introduced and the extent to which taxpayers use them. Methodically, the research is based on the analysis of secondary statistical data of the Financial Administration of the Czech Republic and results from aggregated tax returns filed for the period 2005–2015. The effect of tax deductions was decreased by abolition of the progressive rate of personal income taxes and by introduction of a uniform tax rate of 15%. Tax deductions for retirement savings do not have a sufficiently strong motivational impact and do not affect taxpayers in the context of public policy. Deductions for mortgage interest can be regarded as a form of major housing support, but are related to taxpayer income and favor those with higher incomes.     

公共服务满意度、税制公平与纳税遵从——来自中国的证据

公共服务与税收公平是影响纳税遵从的重要因素。基于中国背景,将公共服务满意度、税制公平与纳税遵从纳入公平理论框架分析三者之间的作用机制后发现:公共服务满意度影响纳税人对税制公平的评价,无论是对政府部门的日常行政服务还是其他公共部门的基础公共服务而言,公共服务满意度越高,纳税人对税制公平的评价就越高;同时,税制公平对纳税遵从有正向影响,纳税人对税制公平的评价越高,其纳税遵从度就越高;税制公平评价在公共服务满意度与纳税遵从之间发挥着中介的作用。因此,现阶段提高我国公众纳税遵从度可以从改善公共服务和强化税制公平两个角度入手。     

Public policies,pressure groups,and dead weight costs

This paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence. Each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies, where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies. The dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model. An increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers, while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients. Various applications of the analysis are discussed.     

Assessing tax reforms through the elasticity of reported income: an empirical analysis for Spain

This paper demonstrates the usefulness of the elasticity of reported income to assess tax reforms from the perspectives of tax revenue and well-being. Employing different identification strategies, evidence is provided of the value of the elasticity of gross reported income in Spain and, based on this elasticity, a detailed assessment is made of the impact of the increase in marginal tax rates which the Spanish government approved in 2012. We use microdata from the Taxpayers Panel of the Institute for Fiscal Studies. The mean value of this elasticity for Spain is 0,363 with considerable heterogeneity depending on taxpayers’ characteristics.     

税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效

中国的财政分权改革激发了地方政府推进本地区经济发展的积极性,但不恰当的分权路径也加剧了地区间的税收竞争。本文运用空间滞后模型,对中国省际间的税收竞争与博弈行为进行检验。研究显示,省际间税收竞争反应函数斜率为负,这说明省际间在税收竞争中采取的是差异化竞争策略;同时也意味着地方政府目前对公共产品的偏好较低。而对省际间税收竞争增长绩效的格兰杰因果检验则显示,公共服务水平对地区经济增长率具有显著的促进作用,并且地方政府的征税努力与其财政充裕状况直接相关。为此,本文提出应加快地区基本公共服务的均等化和转移支付的法制化进程,努力打破数量型增长的政绩观,从制度层面营造地区间协调有序的竞争关系。     

Favouritism towards the poor and a discontinuous tax structure

This article aims to theoretically clarify two points. First, even though the government shows favouritism to the poor and wants to exempt low-income taxpayers and to secure the necessary income tax revenue by taxing only high-income taxpayers, the government nevertheless ends up taxing the poor. This is in opposition to favouritism and arises because of the government’s inability to observe the individual taxpayer’s income levels. Second, even without observing each taxpayer’s income level, if favouritism is sufficiently strong, then the government can discontinuously resolve such unintentional taxation.