Excess supply equilibria

This paper addresses a fundamental problem in economic theory: How can there be equilibria of the economic system where some commodity is in excess supply, yet that commodity's relative price shows no tendency to fall? Of course, the principal example of such a phenomenon is an economy experiencing a prolonged period of involuntary unemployment of the labor force during which there is no significant change in the real wage.In the following pages, I shall describe a two-commodity, general equilibrium model that has a continuum of unemployment equilibria, one for any given unemployment rate. The important feature of this model is that workers establish their wage rates in an attempt to maximize expected utility. The information upon which these wage setting decisions are based is provided by actual labor market transactions.Despite the voluntary nature of the wage setting decision, I shall argue that each equilibrium of this economy exhibits involuntary unemployment in the Keynesian sense. For there will always be another equilibrium with a lower real wage, a higher level of employment, and at which (at least when workers are risk neutral) each worker achieves a higher level of expected utility.     

自然失业率的机理与实证分析——基于资本构成理论的研究

依据马克思主义的资本构成、资本积累和资本循环理论,设计模型对自然失业率直接测量,从分析可知,自然失业率取决于人均资本量、资本构成、平均工资等变量。对我国1991～2009年自然失业率的实证分析显示,我国自然失业率稳定上升。提出应通过深化经济结构调整、调节收入分配两极分化等措施降低自然失业率。     

Black–white wage differentials: duration and probability unemployment effects in a multiple of sample selection bias model

The extent to which probability and duration of unemployment affect the black–white wage differentials is examined in this paper. The paper simultaneously incorporates in the wage equation the multiple sample selection bias that occurs as a result of individuals’ propensity to be in the labor force, and the firm’s hiring decisions. The results reveal a substantial contribution of the duration of unemployment variable to the black–white wage differential, but a small portion of the differential is explained by the probability of unemployment. The results also indicate a sizeable difference between the contribution of the duration of unemployment variable to the male’s wage differentials (26%) and to the female’s (35%). The study finds that an individual’s labor force decision as well as a firm’s hiring decision are important in the wage determination process and that failure to account for the sample selectivity bias due to these two decisions will result in either underestimating or overestimating the wage differentials between black and white workers. At the macro level, the results seem to suggest that promotion of racial wage equality should be associated with policies that will minimize blacks’ incidence of unemployment and duration of unemployment spells.     

Unemployment and the 'Labour-management Conspiracy'

We study a model in which management and a union bargain over a rule that will later determine the level of employment, and over a wage. The government then chooses an output or an employment subsidy. An exogenous natural turnover rate in the unionised sector creates unemployment whenever the union wage exceeds the competitive wage. Government intervention can increase both the equilibrium amount of unemployment and worsen the intersectoral allocation of labour, because of the induced change in the endogenous wage. Unemployment weakens but does not eliminate the possibility of a 'labour-management conspiracy'.     

Conflict in the labor market: Seniority rules and unemployment

This paper examines the macroeconomic implications of two labor-market institutions that play an important role in worker-management interactions: seniority-based layoffs and majority voting on wage proposals. Together, these make the median worker, rather than the marginal worker, the important decision maker for wage and employment outcomes. Since he is risk-averse, he will trade off higher wages for greater security of employment; therefore, the equilibrium level of unemployment will be much less than 50%, but higher than the conventional natural rate of unemployment. Median-worker behavior helps to explain both the greater frequency of excess supply than excess demand (59.4% versus 40.6% of the time since 1890) and the wage concessions of 1981–1983. A new Phillips curve is derived which incorporates systematic influences of the size of the labor force (to correct for the inappropriate measure of excess supply) and Tobin's “q” variable (to measure the risk of unemployment for the median worker). With U.S. data for 1957–1983, this new Phillips curve has a higher explanatory power than the traditional one. Additional forces that influence wages and employment in this setting are identified: firms have an incentive to bargain actively over wages rather than accept union demands passively and senior workers have a “social contract” with junior workers that reduces the extent to which the former exploit the latter.     

Unemployment, Real Wages and the Money Supply in Australia*

Many observers have attributed the high unemployment experienced in Australia in the 1970s to the rises in real wages which have occurred in the decade. An alternative or additional hypothesis is that unemployment has resulted from policy directed at controlling inflation and that this has been exacerbated by the occurrence of adverse external factors, particularly bul not solely the oil price shocks, which have made inflation more difficult than otherwise to control .
The results of econometric tests suggest that a significant portion of fluctuations in the unemployment rate can be explained by real wage movements, and as well monetary policy through its effects on the real money supply also seems to affect unemployment. Both real wage rises and monetary restrictions appear to have contributed to the jump in unemployment in 1974–75, and since then the continuing high and rising unemployment rate is closely associated with the low growth rate of the real money supply .     

Minimum wages and youth unemployment

This paper constructs a labor search model to explore the effects of minimum wages on youth unemployment. To capture the gradual decline in unemployment for young workers as they age, the standard search model is extended so that workers gain experience when employed. Experienced workers have higher average productivity and lower job finding and separation rates that match wage and worker flow data. In this environment, minimum wages can have large effects on unemployment because they interact with a worker's ability to gain job experience. The increase in minimum wages between 2007 and 2009 can account for a 0.8 percentage point increase in the steady state unemployment rate and a 2.8 percentage point increase in unemployment for 15–24 year old workers in the model parameterized to simulate outcomes of high school educated workers. Minimum wages can also help explain the high rates of youth unemployment in France compared to the United States.     

How is the worker’s weekly hour related to wage over the life cycle? The U.S. evidence

The current study estimates the relationship between weekly hours and weekly wage over the life cycle of a representative sample of workers. Recognizing the endogeneity of these two variables, the study estimates both equations in a simultaneous equations framework and demonstrates that the relationship between weekly hours and weekly wage is not uniform over the worker’s life cycle. These two variables are negatively related when the workers are young and have a positive relationship when they are matured adults. This conclusion remains valid for both men and women. Our robustness check further confirms that workers respond to wage increases differently at different stages of their working career. This has interesting policy implications. Any policy to influence the worker’s hours decision through wage incentive must consider the stage of his/her working career.     

Classical and Keynesian unemployment in Austria

The labor market in a macroeconometric model of Austria is used to determine the natural unemployment rate, full-employment (F.E.) output, and the F.E. real wage for 1966–92. Gaps between actual and F.E. variables are examined analytically and historically. Observed unemployment is decomposed into natural, hidden, classical, and Keynesian components. Classical unemployment is associated with the real wage gap, while Keynesian unemployment depends on the output gap. A rise in the natural rate is found to account for almost all of the increase in unemployment between 1966–74 and 1975–81, but an increase in Keynesian unemployment is the major factor in the rise of unemployment between 1975–81 and 1982–92. A fiscal shock to the complete model is found to increase real GDP for a year or two, reducing Keynesian unemployment without an appreciable rise in classical unemployment; the wage gap is eventually increased, however, producing a modest rise in classical unemployment.A lengthier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association, Graz, April 14–16, 1993. The generous finacial support of the Jubiläumsfonds of the Austrian National Bank for the research of which this paper is a part is gratefully acknowledged.     

Involuntary unemployment,macroeconomic policy,and a behavioral model of the firm: Why high real wages need not cause high unemployment

The perspective of modern macroeconomic theory, be it new classical or old and new Keynesian, is that unemployment can be reduced only if real wages are cut. The modern Keynesians, basing themselves upon the microfoundations of efficiency wage theory, argue that real wages cannot and will not be cut by firms for efficiency wage reasons. This generates involuntary unemployment based on a market coordination problem. A behavioral model that contrasts with efficiency wage theory is presented here which suggests that reducing real wages need not affect the marginal cost of labor and, therefore, the number of individuals employed. In the behavioral model, wherein there exists some linearity in the relationship between real wages and working conditions and labor productivity, a lower real wage rate is not a necessary condition for reducing the unemployment rate nor is a higher real wage an obstacle to reducing it. In this scenario, unemployment, to the extent that it is demand-side induced, is not related to movements in real wages. Therefore, restoring full employment after a negative demand shock becomes a matter for demand management, not demand management that must be coordinated with measures designed to reduce real wages.     

Robust central banking under wage bargaining: Is monetary policy transparency beneficial?

We study the role of transparency in an environment of robust monetary policy under wage bargaining. The standard view from the game-theoretical literature is that, with unionised labour markets, monetary policy transparency is unambiguously “bad” (it induces increases in wage and price inflation, unemployment and may lead to higher inflation uncertainty). The empirical literature is instead ambiguous about the macroeconomic effects of transparency. By recasting the earlier theory into a robust monetary policy environment, and focusing transparency on the uncertainty about the preference for price stability, we show that the macroeconomic effects of transparency are more favourable than normally found. The impact on nominal wages, inflation and real variables (real wages and unemployment) is not parameter-free but depends on the public's informedness about this coefficient. The impact on real variables is found to disappear in case unions do not internalise the effect of wage decisions on the economy (i.e. in the case of atomistic unions). Finally, we find that the effect of transparency on inflation uncertainty is more complex than in the standard approach. We show that transparency may have the beneficial effect of reducing inflation variability not only when monetary uncertainty is low (as previously reported), but also when monetary uncertainty exceeds an upper threshold.     

The impact of minimum wages and foreign domestic workers in Taiwan

The purpose of setting the minimum wage is mainly to protect the rights and interests of vulnerable workers and to enhance productivity of labour. In this paper, an attempt has been made to explore the effect of the upwards adjustment of the minimum wage in Taiwan on the inflation rate, the unemployment rate, labour productivity, economic growth and other macroeconomic variables by means of an analysis of empirical data using a structural vector auto‐regressive model. The findings of the paper show that upwards adjustment of the minimum wage in Taiwan will not intensify the unemployment rate. On the contrary, it will help to promote labour productivity to an extent that will have a positive effect on the economic growth rate. In addition, this paper investigates, long‐term care system should incorporate the foreign domestic worker labour pool, which could provide the additional personnel necessary for the nation's long‐term care. Minimum wage should apply to foreign domestic workers, and foreign domestic workers should not be treated as a separate group of workers in minimum wage policy.     

Economic migration and business cycles in a small open economy with matching frictions

With the free movement of labour in Europe, economic migration has become an important determinant of labour supply. Cyclical migration exceeds one percent of the population in many countries and affects (un)employment and wage setting. The main contribution of this paper is that it models migration as an endogenous decision in a search-and-matching framework, where labour market institutions play an important role. It shows that, contrary to typical beliefs, migration can amplify business cycles. After a positive shock to the economy, immigration increases the labour force and initially unemployment. The latter reduces a worker's outside option in wage negotiations, resulting in a lower wage increase than when there is no migration. With cheaper labour firms post more job vacancies, which increases the probability that unemployed workers find jobs and attracts new workers to immigrate. Attenuated response of wages and the stronger response of employment to shocks result in a flatter Phillips curve.     

The NAIRU reconsidered: why labour market deregulation may raise unemployment

According to the mainstream theory of equilibrium unemployment, persistent unemployment is caused mainly by ‘excessive’ labour market regulation, whereas aggregate demand, capital accumulation and technological progress have no lasting effect on unemployment. We show that the mainstream non‐accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) model is a special case of a general model of equilibrium unemployment, in which aggregate demand, investment and endogenous technological progress do have long‐term effects. It follows that labour market deregulation does not necessarily reduce steady‐inflation unemployment. Theoretically, if the decline in real wage growth claims owing to deregulation is smaller than the ensuing decline in labour productivity growth and in the warranted real wage growth, then in that case steady‐inflation unemployment may increase. Empirical evidence for 20 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (1984–1997) indicates that the impact of labour market deregulation on OECD unemployment is zero, and possibly negative (causing a higher rate of unemployment).     

Flexible and Committed Profit Sharing with Wage Bargaining: Implications for Equilibrium Unemployment

We analyze the relationship between profit sharing, employee effort, wage formation and unemployment under different relative timings of the wage and profit sharing decisions. The optimal profit share under commitment exceeds that under flexibility, because through a profit share commitment the firm can induce wage moderation. The negotiated profit sharing depends positively on the bargaining power of trade union and it has both effort-enhancing and wage-moderating effects. Higher profit sharing is shown to reduce equilibrium unemployment under ``sufficiently rigid' labor market institutions, but it can harm employment when labor market ``rigidities' are ``small enough'.     

Worker displacement during the transition: Experience from Slovenia1

The Slovenian transition created labor displacements that were bigger than those experienced in North America in the 1980s. In Slovenia, probability of both layoffs and quits fell with worker tenure, firm profitability and expected severance costs. Individuals facing a higher probability of displacement accepted slower wage growth than otherwise comparable workers. The incentives to avoid displacement were strong – workers that actually were displaced faced a slow process of transiting out of unemployment with only one‐third finding re‐employment. Correcting for selection, real wage losses for displaced workers are comparable to those reported for displaced workers in North America.     

Effect of labor market policies on unemployment when firms adapt their recruitment strategy

Firms conduct interviews to select who to hire. Their recruitment strategies affect not only the hiring rate but also job destruction rate as more interviews increase the chances of finding the right worker for the job; a link mostly overlooked in the literature. I model this recruitment behavior and investigate the effects of labor market policies on unemployment. These policies change the value of hiring the right worker, altering firms' incentives to conduct interviews. Policies further affect job creation and destruction when firms adapt their recruitment strategies. Net effect of a policy on unemployment depends on the magnitude of change in job creation versus destruction. Qualitative analysis reveals that the effect of a policy on unemployment is mostly weakened with the introduction of firms' recruitment behavior to the model. Firing taxes still increase unemployment, albeit at a lower rate. The effect of hiring subsidies on unemployment is even reversed: Unemployment increases with hiring subsidies if firms adapt. Minimum wage and unemployment insurance policies are also analyzed.     

Labour market institutions and wage setting: evidence for OECD countries

The main channel through which labour market institutions are supposed to work in affecting unemployment is through their effects on the key parameters of the wage curve. In particular, labour market institutions may have both a direct wage push (or level) effect, i.e. change the level of the real wage for any given level of the unemployment rate and productivity, and an indirect slope effect, i.e. change the responsiveness of the real wage to the unemployment rate. The question this article addresses is whether there is any evidence that these transmission mechanisms were at work in a group of 20 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries over the period 1960 to 1999. The analysis is accomplished in two steps. Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimates of a wage equation including unemployment, productivity and a set of wage push institutions are first obtained, allowing only a subset of institutional coefficient to be homogeneous, while leaving the unemployment and other coefficients free to differ across countries. The country specific estimates of the unemployment coefficients are then used to investigate whether and to what extent cross-country heterogeneity in the estimated wage response to unemployment is related to institutional differences. The results support the existence of significant wage push effects of union density and benefit replacement rates, and of significant slope effects of benefit replacement rates, benefit duration and employment protection. A more generous unemployment benefit structure is found to lower the wage responsiveness to unemployment, while higher employment protection, contrary to what one expects, is found to enhance it. No significant level and slope effects are found for the tax wedge and bargaining coordination.     

Exploring different measures of wage flexibility in a developing economy context: the case for Turkey

In this paper we use Turkish household labor force data to address a number of conceptual issues pertaining to the wage curve, an empirically derived negative relationship between the real wage level and the local unemployment rate. First, we show that in developing economies where labor markets are prone to high degree of segmentation by skill level, local unemployment rates disaggregated by education provide more accurate measures of the degree of group-specific wage competition and hence yield more robust results of the wage curve analyses. Second, we estimate the wage curve using various definitions of the unemployment rate, including discouraged and marginally attached workers, and the long-term unemployment rate to explore the most relevant measure of local labor market tension in the wage setting process. We find that broader definitions of unemployment serve as a more effective reference point in measuring wage flexibility for women, whose attachment to the labor market is substantially weak in the Turkish context; while for men the official and long-term unemployment rates perform well. Finally, using quantile regression we show that wage responsiveness to unemployment cannot be assumed to be constant along the wage distribution. In the Turkish case, we find a higher unemployment elasticity of wages around the median segment of wage distribution. This effect is more pronounced for women.     

Employment cycles and minimum wages. A macro view

We start from the hypothesis that Goodwin’s (1967) distributive cycle does not represent a process of social reproduction that can be considered as adequate and sustainable in the long-run, due to the degradation of a part of the workforce it implies during periods of mass unemployment. Against this background, the paper then formulates an unemployment benefit system and a minimum (and maximum) wage rule for the employed where this form of economic reproduction of capitalism is overcome, at least to a certain extent. There is perfect mobility on the labor market (concerning ‘hiring’ and ‘firing’), with fluctuations of the employment rate made socially acceptable by guaranteeing minimum levels of income to all members of the workforce. We can show in this framework that minimum (and maximum) real wages provide increased stability to the economy by reducing the amount of overshooting in income distribution as well as the employment rate.