Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-geometric Discounting

We consider a representative-agent equilibrium model where the consumer has quasi-geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions. We restrict attention to a parametric class for preferences and technology and solve for time-consistent competitive equilibria globally and explicitly. We then characterize the welfare properties of competitive equilibria and compare them to that of a planning problem. The planner is a consumer representative who, without commitment but in a time-consistent way, maximizes his or her present-value utility subject to resource constraints. The competitive equilibrium results in strictly higher welfare than the planning problem whenever the discounting is not geometric. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E21, E61, E91.     

Variance and lower partial moment betas as bases for costing equity capital among regulated utilities

An important question in the setting of public utility rates is, ‘What constitutes a fair rate of return or cost of equity capital for a regulated utility?’ Recent debates over this issue have centred on the CAPM's ability to produce realistic equity cost figures for use in the rate-setting process. Several researchers recommend modified or expanded versions of the market model as a means of improving its predictive capabilities. One such approach is the lower partial moment model. The purpose of the present paper is to assess the robustness of the lower partial moment model relative to the conventional CAPM as a basis for estimating the cost of a utility company's equity capital. The hypothesis that empirical estimates of the LPM beta tend to overestimate the true systematic risk of utility companies was corroborated by our test results.     

JOINT BIDDING,GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT COSTS:A CASE OF ROAD PROJECTS*

ABSTRACT *** : To utilize public resources efficiently, it is important to take advantage of competition in public procurement auctions to the maximum extent. Joint bidding is a common practice that potentially facilitates competition. By pooling financial and experiential resources, more firms are expected to enter the market, but it will also directly reduce competition if more than one bidder who is solely qualified makes a coalition. In theory joint bidding may or may not be beneficial to auctioneers, depending on the model. The paper empirically examines the impacts of joint bidding on firms' entry as well as bidding behaviour, using data on public road projects in developing countries. It shows that coalitional bids, in particular by local firms, would be competitive, but foreign joint ventures would undermine competition. It is also found that good governance can encourage firms' entry into the tendering and facilitate joint bidding practices.     

Right-Wing Populism and Neoliberalism in Germany: The AfD’s Embrace of Ordoliberalism

This article analyses the ambiguous relation between right-wing populism and neoliberalism in Germany. It concentrates on the connections between and convergence of right-wing populism and ordoliberalism, a specific type of neoliberalism that was developed by the Freiburg School since the late 1920s and which the new right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD) explicitly focuses on in its economic programme. In its attempt to analyse the affinity of the AfD to ordoliberalism, this study relies on Michel Foucault’s account of ordoliberalism in his book The Birth of Biopolitics and his concept of governmentality. It was found that the AfD wants to bring ordoliberalism into service of an authoritarian project in Germany and beyond. This economic approach combines neoliberalism with authoritarian forms of government through the governmentalisation of the state. Ordoliberals prescribe a regulatory framework for the economy which is centred on the creation of a competitive order. It is meant to produce and justify social differences. Right-wing populists connect the economic differentiation system provided by ordoliberalism with the differentiation systems of nation, race, religion and culture. Thus, the neoliberal principle of competition is used not only to justify inequality among German citizens but also among European countries.     

Did the global financial crisis alter the competitive conditions in the Indian banking industry?

This article addresses a pertinent research question: Did the global financial crisis alter the competitive conditions in the Indian banking industry? In order to find the answer of this research question, we applied a dynamic version of the non-structural Panzar-Rosse model on a unique unbalanced panel dataset of Indian banks spanning over the period from 1998/99 to 2015/16. The robust estimates of H-statistic computed on the basis of the generalized method of moments estimates of the elasticities of input prices show that (i) Indian banks earned their interest and total revenue under monopolistic competition throughout the whole of the sample period and (ii) the global financial crisis altered the competitive conditions in the banking industry, and market moved closer to perfect competition following the financial crisis, especially when interest-bearing activities were in focus.     

Competition among banks and the pass-through of monetary policy

This paper introduces monopolistically competitive financial intermediaries into the New Keynesian DSGE setting. Modelling bank market power explicitly contributes to understanding two empirical facts: (i) The short-run transmission of changes in money market rates to bank retail rates is far from complete and heterogeneous. (ii) Stiffer competition among commercial banks implies that loan rates correlate more tightly with the policy rate. In my model, the degree of monopolistic competition in the banking sector has a sizeable impact on the pass-through of changes in the policy rate. In particular, a more competitive market for bank credit amplifies the efficiency of monetary policy.     

Middle Class,Government Effectiveness and Poverty in the EU: A Dynamic Multilevel Analysis

Using the 2008-2011 EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions data, we implement a dynamic three-level model to analyze poverty persistence in 26 EU countries. We isolate true state dependence phenomena by disentangling the effects of observed and unobserved heterogeneity at country level and employ cofactors not previously considered by the literature. Estimates show that unobserved heterogeneity across individuals remains large, even after explicitly controlling for the observable components of individual characteristics. The initial value of poverty has large effects on current poverty status but this effect is not uniform across countries. The risk of poverty is negatively related to the size of the structural middle class and to the level of structural social expenditure but it increases when lagged total public expenditure increases (with respect to the structural value). There is strong evidence of true state dependence.     

The competitive conditions in the OECD manufacturing industry

The goal of this study was to assess the intensity of competition in the OECD manufacturing industry by using the Panzar and Rosse index over the period 1970–2011. For this purpose, we use the fully modified OLS method and second-generation unit root analysis to investigate the level of competition across two-digit manufacturing sectors. The results are robust and consistent with similar studies, leading to the rejection of perfect collusion and perfect competition, while providing evidence in favour of monopolistic competition. Similarly to other empirical studies, H-statistics are shown to be heterogeneous across manufacturing sectors. We argue that more concentrated sectors such as food and beverages, motor vehicles and furniture have low levels of H-statistic being thus less competitive than other industries (i.e. computers transportation equipment, printing and chemicals), where the H-statistic is closer to unity. Lastly, our analysis will be a useful policy tool to achieve structural micro-economic goals.     

On the level of optimal capital import in a decentralized competitive economy

In a competitive economy, capital import will affect the distribution of income among domestic economic units. Our main aim is to determine the optimal level of capital import, given that the distribution of income among people is accounted for. In order to consider explicitly the effect of capital import on saving behavior, we shall adopt a simple, two-period life cycle growth model. It will be shown that in order to know if the government can increase everybody's long-run utility, the criterion of the golden rule is important.     

Pricing Discretion and Price Regulation in Competitive Industries

Price capped firms enjoy a large degree of pricing discretion, which may harm customers and competition. We study two alternative regulatory regimes to limit it: the first regime (Absolute) places a fixed upper limit to the prices charged in captive markets, while the other regime (Relative) constrains the captive prices relatively to the competitive ones. Under the Relative regime, captive prices are only weakly lower and competitive prices are always higher than under the Absolute regime. However, the number of competitors and/or their output may be higher under the Relative regime. While the effects on aggregate welfare are ambiguous, there is some evidence that the Relative regime is more likely to increase consumers’ surplus and social welfare the more efficient are the competitors.     

Credit rationing as a (temporary) suboptimal equilibrium with imperfect information

Jaffee and Russell (1976) characterized partial rationing as a contract rate and contract size below those of the no-rationing equilibrium. Their non-price rationing here obtains as a suboptimal equilibrium for a risk-averse rate-setting intermediary with marginal increasing cost and a monopolistically competitive loan demand. The temporary (dis)equilibrium corresponds to a dominated strategy, and the wider class of models of which J-R's solution is but a singular case is touched upon.     

Municipal aggregation and retail competition in the Ohio energy sector

Ohio allows communities to vote to aggregate the loads of individual consumers (unless they opt out) in order to seek a competitive energy supplier. Over 200 communities have voted to do this for electricity. By 2004 residential switching reached 69% in Cleveland territory (95% from municipal aggregation) but by 2006 had fallen to 8%. Savings are now small, but customer acquisition costs are low and the cost to consumers is negligible. Aggregation and retail competition have been thwarted by Rate Stabilization Plans holding incumbent utility prices below cost since 2006. In the Ohio gas sector, rate regulation has not discouraged aggregation and competition, but market prices falling below municipally negotiated rates can be politically embarrassing. Municipal aggregation thus works when conditions allow it, and enhances competition. How it would fare against individual choice in a market conducive to retail competition remains an open question.      

Competition Among National Football Leagues. Does It Exist? Should We Regulate?

It is often supposed that the stakeholders of a national football league draw more satisfaction from their sport if the league is balanced, that is, if a large number of clubs have a reasonable chance of winning. This is the so‐called Competitive balance hypothesis. This hypothesis can be challenged, however, in the context of international competition like the European champions league. It could be that the utility of national leagues' stakeholders would be higher if the probability of victory for their nation's club at the international level were higher. If this were the case, a league's governing body intending to maximize the quality of the national league by making use of redistributive schemes would face a trade‐off between national competitive balance and international performance of the national representative club. We propose a simple microeconomic framework to model this trade‐off. If a non‐cooperative game exists among the national league governing bodies, whether it is a Nash or a Stackelberg one, this game would result in inefficient redistributive policies. We find ‘soft’ empirical evidence of such a competition among the big 5 football leagues in Europe. This result supports the idea of the creation of an international regulatory body. We derive the conditions under which the international regulatory body should ensure that the leagues' governing bodies implement redistributive schemes guaranteeing the respect of the national competitive balance. We also emphasize the risk of experiencing a drop in the quality of leagues if one of them becomes too big relatively to the others, what we call the tragedy of the wealthy.     

Demand forecasting for new media services with consideration of competitive relationships using the competitive Bass model and the theory of the niche

New broadcasting services such as Internet protocol TV (IPTV) have been totally revolutionizing the broadcasting industry; thus, the prediction of the degree of diffusion of new media services is a major topic of interest for both governments and providers. This paper proposes a new approach towards demand forecasting for new services with no data and with consideration of competitive relationships with existing services. The underlying model of the proposed approach is the competitive Bass model, which is the most widely used competitive diffusion model. The competition coefficients of the model are estimated by introducing the theory of the niche. The theory of the niche, which originates from ecology, has often been used as a framework for examining competition patterns in the media industry. This study develops a new integrated measure, competitive superiority, by modifying and combining the two conventional measures of the theory of the niche, viz., niche overlap and niche superiority. The competition coefficients are then obtained by adjusting the values of competitive superiority to be incorporated in the model based on the relationship between competition and imitation effects. A case of Korean digital broadcasting services is presented to illustrate the proposed approach.     

Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes: The Private Ownership of Monopoly in General Equilibrium

Employing a general equilibrium framework, Blackorby and Murty prove that, with a monopoly and under 100% profit taxation and uniform lump‐sum transfers, the utility possibility sets of economies with unit and ad valorem taxes are identical. This welfare equivalence is in contrast to most previous studies, which demonstrate the superiority of the ad valorem tax in a partial equilibrium framework. In this paper, we relax the assumption of 100% profit taxation and allow the consumers to receive profit incomes from ownership of shares in the monopoly firm. We find that, under certain regularity conditions, for any fixed vector of profit shares, the utility possibility sets of economies with unit and ad valorem taxes are not generally identical. But it does not imply that one completely dominates the other. Rather, the two utility possibility frontiers cross each other. Additionally, employing a standard partial equilibrium welfare analysis, we show that the Marshallian social surpluses resulting from the two tax structures are identical when the government can implement unrestricted transfers.     

Some Implications of Imperfect Competition For Recent Trade Theory*

This paper argues that in a general-equilibrium context, it is not sensible for oligopolistic (and mono-polistically competitive) firms to maximize profit, because the outcome would be sensitive to the choice of the numeraire. the natural objective of these firms would be to maximize the utility of the shareholders if the shareholders are identical. I show that even if each firm takes the representative individual's marginal utility of income as given, the outcome of the utility maximization objective is Pareto optimal, and in equilibrium, each firm equates price with marginal cost.     

Reconsidering the Impact of the Environment on Long-run Growth when Pollution Influences Health and Agents have a Finite-lifetime

Using an overlapping generation model à la Blanchard (1985, J Polit Econ 93:223–247) with human capital accumulation, we demonstrate that the influence of the environment on optimal growth in the long-run may be explained by the detrimental effect of pollution on life expectancy. We also show that, in such a case, greener preferences are growth- and welfare-improving in the long-run even if the ability of the agents to learn is independent of pollution and utility is additively separable. Finally, we establish that a minimum environmental policy is required to obtain a sustainable equilibrium in the market economy and that it is possible to implement a win–win environmental policy.     

Scarcity and appropriative competition

This paper formalizes the commonsensical hypothesis that resource scarcity causes a large allocation of time and effort to appropriative competition. Our main innovation is to model explicitly the positive intertemporal effect of consumption on the probability of survival. The critical assumption is that this effect becomes stronger as resources become scarcer. We also show that anticipated future resource abundance increases the incremental value of survival and, consequently, amplifies the current allocation of time and effort to appropriative competition. Interestingly, if resources are currently scarce, then larger anticipated future abundance can cause a big enough increase in the time and effort allocated to appropriative competition to result in a decrease in the sum of current and expected future utility, a “paradox of anticipated abundance”.     

JOINT VENTURES, POLLUTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

We examine the impact of emission taxes on the pollution level in a duopoly framework with endogenous market structure. We demonstrate that an increase in emission taxes could trigger a regime switch from joint ventures to Cournot competition, causing the pollution level to increase. Such a phenomenon is likely to happen when the concerned industry is reasonably profitable, and the synergistic gain between joint venture partners is not too strong. Moreover, emission taxes can implement the first best outcome if and only if the industry is not too polluting. In case it is, the second best level of taxes may or may not equal the optimal tax under either joint venture or Cournot competition.     

Analysis of the Lotka-Volterra competition equations as a technological substitution model

This paper provides insight into the dynamics of the Lotka-Volterra competition (LVC) equations, a much used competition model, and compares the dynamics of LVC competitive substitution to that of several well-known substitution models. The behavior of the LVC equations is analyzed for the special case of a dominant competitor at equilibrium being replaced after the introduction of a small population of an invading competitor with a competitive advantage. Expressions are derived that describe the growth of the invading competitor and that growth is shown to be of four classes: left asymmetric, logistic, right asymmetric with 1−ε₂ asymptote and right asymmetric with γ asymptote. It is shown that the LVC model reverts to logistic substitution in a market of fixed size, a result with important implications. The LVC equations are fitted to the Gompertz, Bass, Non-Symmetrical Responding Logistic (NSRL) and Sharif-Kabir substitution models and compared using a novel graphical technique. The LVC equations can reasonably mimic the full range of curve shapes exhibited by each of these models.