Export Flexibility And Currency Hedging*

This article studies the behavior of an export‐flexible firm under exchange rate uncertainty. We show that the separation theorem holds if selling exclusively in the domestic market is suboptimal even under the most unfavorable spot exchange rate. Otherwise, the firm's optimal output depends on its preferences and on the underlying uncertainty. We further show that the full‐hedging theorem holds only when the firm always finds it optimal to sell its entire output in the foreign market. Otherwise, export flexibility introduces a convexity into the firm's foreign exchange risk exposure, which calls for the use of currency options for hedging purposes.     

Currency Hedging For Export-Flexible Firms *

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of a competitive exporting firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The firm possesses export flexibility in that it can distribute its output to either the domestic market or a foreign market, after observing the true realization of the exchange rate. It is shown that the separation theorem does not hold under export flexibility, i.e., the firm's optimal output depends on the firm's preference and on the underlying exchange rate uncertainty. Furthermore, the export- flexible firm underhedges its exchange rate risk exposure in a currency forward market where in the forward exchange rate contains a non-positive risk premium. [D21, F31]     

Export-Flexible Firms and Forward Markets

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of an exporting firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The firm is export flexible in that it can distribute its output to either the domestic market or a foreign market, after observing the realized spot exchange rate. The firm is a monopoly in the domestic market but a price-taker in the foreign market. It is shown that the separation theorem holds if selling exclusively in the domestic market is suboptimal even under the most unfavorable sport exchange rate. Otherwise, the firm's optimal output depends on its preference and on the underlying exchange rate uncertainty. Furthermore, the export-flexible firm underhedges its exchange rate risk exposure in a currency forward market wherein the forward exchange rate contains a non-positive risk premium. [D21, F31]     

人民币实际有效汇率变动对我国进出口贸易影响的实证研究——基于1995-2011年数据

本文采用基于VAR的Johansen协整检验和向量误差修正（VEC）模型实证分析了人民币实际有效汇率变动对我国进出口贸易的长期静态影响及短期动态影响。结果发现,长期进出口贸易的汇率弹性均不显著,进口的汇率弹性较大,出口几乎无汇率弹性;长期进出口贸易的变化主要由国内外收入决定;短期内,进出口的汇率弹性同为负,即汇率贬值,进出口均增加,汇率升值降低出口的同时,进口也会下降且下降幅度大于出口的减少;而且向长期均衡调整的力度较小。因此说明单纯的汇率调整不能有效改善我国的贸易不平衡问题。     

The socially responsible choice in a duopolistic market: A dynamic model of “ethical product” differentiation

The increasing attention of profit maximizing corporations to corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a new stylized fact of the contemporary economic environment. In our theoretical analysis we model CSR adoption as the optimal response of a profit maximizing firm to the competition of a not for profit corporate pioneer in the presence of a continuum of consumers with heterogeneous preferences towards the social and environmental features of the final good. CSR adoption implies a trade-off since, on the one side, it raises production costs but, on the other side, it leads to accumulation of “ethical capital”. We investigate conditions under which the profit maximizing firm switches from price to price and CSR competition by comparing monopoly and duopoly equilibria and their consequences on aggregate social responsibility and consumer welfare. Our findings provide a theoretical background for competition between profit maximizing incumbents and not for profit entrants in markets such as fair trade, organic food, ethical banking and ethical finance.     

Operational and financial hedging for exporting firms

This paper examines the interaction between operational and financial hedging in the context of an internationally competitive but domestically monopolistic firm under exchange rate uncertainty. Operational hedging is modeled by letting the firm make its export decision after it has observed the true realization of the then prevailing spot exchange rate. Financial hedging, on the other hand, is modeled by allowing the firm to trade fairly priced exotic derivatives that are tailor-made for the firm's hedging need. We show that both operational and financial hedging unambiguously entice the firm into producing more. We further derive sufficient conditions under which operational hedging dominates (is dominated by) financial hedging in terms of promoting the firm's optimal output.     

Is Corporate Environmentalism Good for Domestic Welfare?

Many private firms voluntarily care about the environment and declare that their products and production processes are environmentally friendly. This paper shows that corporate environmentalism may reduce the effectiveness of government policies. A simple third‐market trade model with strategic environmental and trade policy is employed, in which an environmentally conscious domestic firm competes with a profit‐maximizing foreign firm. It is shown that even if emission taxes and export subsidies are both available, corporate environmentalism may reduce domestic welfare when pollution is transboundary. In the realistic situation where export subsidies are prohibited, welfare may fall even if pollution is local.     

Currency Options and Export-Flexible Firms

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of a globally competitive firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The firm is risk averse and possesses export flexibility in that it can distribute its output to either the domestic market or a foreign market after observing the realized spot exchange rate. To hedge against its exchange rate risk exposure, the firm can trade fairly priced currency call options of an arbitrary strike price. We show that both the separation and the full‐hedging results hold if the strike price of the currency call options is set equal to the ratio of the domestic and foreign selling prices. Otherwise, neither result holds. Specifically, we show that the optimal level of output is always less than that of an otherwise identical firm that is risk neutral. Furthermore, an under‐hedge (over‐hedge) is optimal whenever the strike price of the currency call options is below (above) the ratio of the domestic and foreign selling prices.     

TIMING OF LUMPY INVESTMENT,PRICING AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS

In equipment‐intensive sectors – such as water utilities, power generation, and gas – billions of dollars are spent in capital equipment. The nature of the investment is often lumpy: at some point a plant has to be replaced and a large investment is required. We characterize the dynamic optimal investment policy of profit‐maximizing and welfare‐maximizing firms. We first show that, when there is no technical progress, the duration of the plant is longer for a profit‐maximizing firm. We then consider technical progress leading to either capacity expansion or to operating costs reduction. We show that duration tends to increase when the installed capacity increases over time, while it tends to decrease when technical progress reduces operating costs, both for profit‐maximizing and welfare‐maximizing firms. Under some conditions, when capacity expands over time the duration of the plant is longer for a profit‐maximizing firm than for a welfare‐maximizing firm.     

LOBBYING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

We analyze an informational theory of lobbying in the context of strategic trade policy. A home firm competes with a foreign firm to export to a third country. The home policy-maker aims to improve the home firm's profit using an export subsidy. The optimal export subsidy depends on the demand conditions in the third country, which are unknown to the policy-maker. The home firm can convey this information to the policy-maker via costly lobbying. Surprisingly, the presence of lobbying costs can be advantageous for both: it makes the home firm's lobby effort credible and eases the policy-maker's information problem. We identify the conditions under which lobbying is beneficial on balance and the conditions under which it is harmful.     

进出口产品质量测度方法的比较与中国事实——基于微观产品和企业数据的实证分析

如何科学合理地测算贸易产品质量是研究企业产品质量异质性的一个关键问题,但目前仍缺乏一个被广泛认可的方法,也没有相关研究对不同方法的结果进行比较和检验.文章基于国家层面的进口质量、企业层面的出口质量和企业层面的进口质量三个视角,将已有研究方法进行归类,并利用中国数据进行测算和检验,力求找到不同视角下最符合中国现实的测算方法.研究表明:(1)国家层面的进口质量测算使用KHW方法,而企业层面的出口质量测算则使用SHIBZ方法更加符合中国现实;(2)对于企业层面的进口质量测算,通过引入运输成本和汇率作为产品价格的工具变量对现有方法加以改进,可以克服其存在的样本选择偏差等问题;(3)对贸易产品质量测算方法在国家层面与企业层面、进口方面和出口方面进行划分,其测算结果能够合理地解释我国近年来的进出口产品质量变动趋势,且国家层面与企业层面的一般贸易进口产品质量的变动趋势一致.文章不仅为今后研究中国进出口产品质量问题提供了测算依据,而且有助于我们廓清我国进出口产品质量的现实情况及其变动趋势.     

The Impact of Regret on Exports

We examine optimal production and export decisions of a firm facing exchange rate uncertainty, where the firm's management is not only risk averse but also regret averse, i.e., is characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex post suboptimal alternatives. Experimental and empirical results support the view that managers tend to be regret averse. Under regret aversion a negative risk premium need not preclude the firm from exporting which would be the case if the firm were only risk averse. Exporting creates an implicit hedge against the possibility of regret when the realized spot exchange rate turns out to be high. The regret‐averse firm as such has a greater ex ante incentive to export than the purely risk averse firm. Finally, we use a two‐state example to illustrate that the firm optimally exports more (less) to the foreign country than in the case of pure risk aversion if the low (high) spot exchange rate is more likely to prevail. Regret aversion as such plays a crucial role in determining the firm's optimal allocation between domestic sales and foreign exports.     

STRATEGIC LOBBYING BY POTENTIAL INDUSTRY ENTRANTS*

A firm which lobbies government for a change in policy, say an import tariff, can increase its profits in two ways. First, the policy can increase the profits of all firms in the industry. This effect therefore involves a free-rider problem. Second, a firm's lobbying expenditures may signal other firms about its costs and interests. For example, a firm with low marginal costs may profit much from an import ban. Other firms which see that this firm expects to profit much from the ban may decide not to enter the industry. This may further increase the low-cost firm's profits.     

Countervailing Duties, Foreign Export Subsidies and Import Tariffs

Given that countervailing duties and import tariffs are set in different ways and for different purposes, I re-examine the relationship between countervailing duties, foreign export subsidies and import tariffs under imperfect competition. I find that (i) the optimal countervailing duty depends on the existing import tariff level; (ii) the optimal import tariff is so high that the optimal countervailing duty is zero and hence foreign export subsidization occurs; and (iii) it is more likely for countervailing duties to be imposed on a foreign firm whose government takes no action when other foreign countries reduce or eliminate their subsidies on exports.     

Export rivalry,vertically-related markets,and optimal public ownership policy

This paper considers the optimal public ownership policy of an upstream firm which competes with a foreign private rival. Both firms supply a produced input to the domestic and foreign downstream firms that compete in an export market. The paper shows that complete privatization of the domestic upstream firm is never optimal. It will likely be fully nationalized if its market share is high, the domestic downstream firms' market share is low, and the total number of firms in the downstream is large. Simulation results reveal that the public firm's optimal profit margin may be negative and that the government ownership level may exhibit a reswitching phenomenon as the number of domestic downstream firms keeps growing. The paper sheds light on the possibility of using government ownership policy as a pseudo-trade and industrial policy.     

WAGE‐RISE CONTRACT AND QUANTITY COMPETITION WITH PROFIT‐MAXIMIZING AND LABOUR‐MANAGED FIRMS

This paper examines the behaviours of a profit‐maximizing firm and a labour‐managed profit‐per‐worker‐maximizing firm in a two‐stage quantity‐setting model with a wage‐rise contract as a strategic commitment. The paper then shows that there exists a unique equilibrium that coincides with the Stackelberg solution where the profit‐maximizing firm is the leader and the labour‐managed firm is the follower.     

Are Public Firms Always Less Innovative than Private Firms?

The effect of information spillovers is analysed in a mixed duopoly where a profit‐maximizing private firm and a market‐share‐maximizing public firm decide whether to invest in a process innovation. It is shown that, when the spillover effect is rather strong, the public firm innovates in order to acquire a larger market share, while the private firm prefers that its rival invests in the new technology and reaps the benefits of technological leakages if investment costs are moderate. Thus, when information spillovers are taken into account, the public firm sometimes behaves more innovatively than the private firm, which is contrary to the well‐known results. Furthermore, in a mixed duopoly where only the public firm invests, its average cost exceeds that of its competitor, but investment remains an efficient strategy compared with non‐investment.     

人民币升值能解决美国对华贸易赤字吗?——基于1994～2005年间月度数据的贸易弹性分析

文章以1994年1月到2005年3月的月度数据为样本,用ARDL框架下的协整方法,对中美贸易的收入弹性和实际汇率弹性进行了经验分析。分析后发现:第一,我国对美进出口的收入弹性都是显著的,并且我国对美国出口的收入弹性约为我国从美进口的收入弹性的6倍,但是我国对美进口和出口的实际汇率弹性都是不显著的。因此,文章认为人民币汇率对中美贸易没有显著影响,人民币汇率升值将无法改善美国的对华贸易收支。     

Protection and Exchange Rates in a Small Open Economy

In a small‐open‐economy model with two tradables and one nontradable, if a price index of these three goods is stabilized and the exchange rate is flexible, conditions are obtained in the cases of two and of three or more factors for an export subsidy or an import tariff to result in currency appreciation. In the case of three or more factors, conditions are obtained under which either an export‐subsidy or an import‐tariff policy (or a combination) can take the place of a flexible exchange rate in accommodating the necessary resource allocation to an exogenous capital outflow, generalizing Keynes’s 1931 proposition.     

Exchange Rate Passthrough to Export Prices: Assessing Cross‐Country Evidence*

A growing empirical literature reports evidence of a decline in exchange rate passthrough to import prices in a number of industrial countries. Our paper complements this literature by examining passthrough from the other side of the transaction; that is, we assess the exchange rate sensitivity of export prices (denominated in the exporter's currency). We find that the prices charged on exports to the United States are more responsive to the exchange rate than are export prices to other destinations, which is consistent with results in the literature that import price passthrough in the US market is relatively low. In addition, the exchange rate sensitivity of export prices over time has been significantly affected by country‐ and region‐specific factors, including the Asian financial crisis (for emerging Asia), deepening integration with the United States (for Canada), and the effects of the 1992 ERM crisis (for the United Kingdom).