Market power in Austrian food retailing: the case of milk products

An increasing market concentration in food retailing has generated concerns about the market power of retailers towards consumers and input suppliers. This is especially true for countries such as Austria, which has a CR-3 in food retailing greater than 75%. Based on a New Empirical Industrial Organization model we estimate the market power of food retailers towards consumers and input suppliers with respect to three groups of dairy products (drinking milk, cheese, butter including others). Our empirical results suggest that market power of retailing exists towards consumers (in particular in the case of drinking milk) and towards input suppliers (in particular in the case of butter and other milk products). Market power is more significant (in statistical terms) downstream than upstream. However, the impact of oligopsony power on input prices is stronger than the impact of oligopoly power on consumer prices.     

Effects of packers’ inventory and market power on price adjustments in the U.S. beef industry

This study examines effects of packers’ inventory and market power on their price adjustment behaviour in the U.S. beef industry. Econometric model used in the study allows inventory and market power variables to influence the speed-of-adjustment parameters in a three-regime threshold error-correction model. Results show that the two variables have a statistically significant impact on packers’ price adjustment behaviour when price decreases but not when price increases. When price decreases, inventory tends to accelerate the adjustment process whereas packers’ market power slows down the adjustment process. The hypothesis of symmetric adjustment towards long-run equilibrium during increasing and decreasing phases of price is not rejected when the effects of inventory and market power are considered in explaining packers’ price adjustment behaviour. However, when these two effects are ignored in the model specification, the hypothesis of symmetry is rejected such that the speed of adjustment in the increasing phase of price is faster than the adjustment speed in the decreasing phase of price, i.e. ‘rockets and feathers’ effect.     

Modelling upstream and downstream market power in bilateral oligopoly

This article develops a general model that estimates market power exertion in a bilateral market relationship for processors and retailers where each may also have market power in their primary input market and output markets, respectively. Monte Carlo experiments are used to generate industry data for market structures such as perfect competition, monopoly, monopsony, bilateral imperfect competition with an integrated processor/retailer, bilateral imperfect competition with separate processor and retailer, and bilateral imperfect competition with four adjacent upstream and downstream markets. Then, new empirical industrial organization models are estimated using the data with models that match the market structure under which the data were generated (true) and with models that reflect alternative market structures (alternative). The general model is derived using the production function approach without imposing the fixed proportion assumption. Monte Carlo simulation results indicate that the general model is preferred to alternative models that presume competitive behaviour by processors in primary input procurement and by retailers in the output market. Results indicate that less flexible models lead to biased market power estimates in the presence of market power in the corresponding input and output markets.     

Testing the ‘Quiet Life’ Hypothesis in the Italian Banking Industry

In this paper we test the so‐called ‘quiet life’ hypothesis (QLH), according to which firms with market power are less efficient. Using data on the Italian banking industry for the period 1992–2007, we apply a two‐step procedure. First we estimate bank‐level cost efficiency scores and Lerner indices. Then we use the estimated market power measures, as well as a vector of control variables, to explain cost efficiency. Our empirical evidence supports the QLH, although the impact of market power on efficiency is not particularly remarkable in magnitude.     

Differential efficiency,market structure and price

A persistent question in industrial economics is the underpinning of the link between market concentration and price. How much of the link can be attributed to market power and how much to market efficiency? This paper develops a theoretical model to address that question. Applied to the US portland cement industry, the model indicates that both impacts matter. In relative terms, however, the market power effect is twice as large as the efficiency effect. An implication for merger policy is that the beneficial efficiency effects of mergers may not be obtained without the detrimental market power effects as well.     

An analysis of bargaining power for milk cooperatives and milk processors in Florida

The Florida dairy market has a few fluid milk processors and many dairy farmers. The dairy farmers are represented in negotiation with the processors by a cooperative. This research builds a theoretical model of bargaining between the processors and a cooperative. The model is applied to the Florida dairy market to examine price negotiations between Florida milk processors and a dairy cooperative. An expectation maximization (EM) algorithm along with maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate the econometric disequilibrium model with time series data for the period of October 1998 to May 2009. The results show that the class I price set by the Federal Milk Marketing Order is the major factor influencing the cooperative’s supply reservation price. Negotiated quantity and production seasonality affect the processors’ demand reservation price. The processors appear to be more patient and have higher average bargaining power (0.8804) than the cooperative (0.1196). The highest (lowest) bargaining power for the cooperative (processors) occurred in 2008 and the lowest (highest) bargaining power for the cooperative (processors) occurred in 2001.     

Measuring market power in multi-product oligopolies: the US meat industry

This paper develops and estimates an economic model for measuring market power in a quantity-setting oligopoly engaged in the joint production of demand-related goods. The model, which allows for firms' conjectures about both same and cross-market responses to own output variation, is applied to the US meat (beef and pork) industry. He hypothesis that the industry's equilibrium reflects price taking behaviour is rejected. The hypothesis of no cross effects cannot be rejected. Roughly, half of the farm-to-retail price spreads for beef and pork appear to be attributable to market power.     

Measuring the degree of competition in Pakistan’s banking industry: an empirical analysis

Pakistan’s banking industry has gone through significant transformation from being in a heavily state regulated and controlled environment to a more liberalized market structure in recent years. This liberalization of banking industry in Pakistan has raised concerns over the dominant banks’ exercise of market power on account of increase in market concentration due to mergers and acquisitions, high profitability in banking sector and increasing interest rate spread. Present study therefore explicitly tests the market conduct of banks using quarterly panel data of 30 banks from 2004 to 2012 and employing Panzar–Rosse, Bresnahan–Lau, Hall–Roeger and Boone’s approaches to study market power. Our findings suggest that Pakistan’s banking industry is working in a competitive environment and we find little evidence for the exercise of market power by the dominant banks. Our results remain robust across all these approaches to measure market power. These findings indicate that the liberalization and deregulation of Pakistan’s banking industry has been successful in improving the competitive conditions in the market.     

Retailer power: recent developments and policy implications

It is common, but incorrect, to view retailing as a highly competitive activity. Unlike manufacturing, retailing has displayed a trend towards much higher concentration, reinforced by actions of retailers themselves, such as emphasis on own-label brands. This may introduce distortions arising from exercise of market power or may create countervailing power to that already enjoyed by manufacturers. Acknowledging increased market power within retailing raises new issues for competition authorities. We develop a consistent framework of analysis and use it to examine two issues: attitudes to retail mergers and exclusivity arrangements between retailers and their suppliers.     

Local monopsony and free riders

In an industry with upstream economies of scale in the distribution of differentiated products to retailers which have monopoly power within separate local market areas, the retailers have an incentive to exert monopsony power due to the divergence between average and marginal costs in the distribution of those inputs. The retailers increase their ability to exert monopsony power by forming coalitions (that is, chains) across local markets. Sufficiently large retail chains may force input price below the seller's average cost, thus ‘free riding’ on the level of product variety supported by other retailers. Vertical integration, cartels, or other cooperative behavior, however, can be means to control the level of product variety, and may increase both industry profits and economic welfare. Policy applications to the cable television, motion picture, and pharmaceutical industries are discussed.     

Assessing the role of futures position substitutability in a monthly slaughtered pork factor demand by US processors: a cointegrated VAR model approach

This article combines cointegrated VAR modelling with basic neoclassical production microeconomics in a new way that tests for, and illuminates the empirical nature of, the monthly US pork processing sector’s factor demand for slaughtered pork. Statistical evidence strongly suggests that the US pork processing sector has a Hicksian Cobb–Douglas slaughtered pork demand that arises from applying Shephard’s lemma to the sector’s cost function and that US pork processors treat slaughtered pork and related futures positions as close factor substitutes. In the wake of major and ongoing futures market events and trends, this study establishes and statistically tests a theoretical link between futures price movements and impacts on the underlying slaughtered pork market through monthly formation of US pork processors’ factor demand for slaughtered pork. Evidence suggests that demand agents shift between demands for the two substitutes based on movements in the slaughter/futures price ratio that results in a market-stabilizing cushion against sharp pork price movements such as those observed in the late-1990s. Statistical and diagnostic evidence suggests that our modelled non-experimental data and estimated Hicksian demand that arose from the cointegrated VAR model’s cointegration space met Haavelmo’s setting of passive variables and associated ceteris paribus conditions.     

Market power in input purchase and trade

Market power in the input purchase is becoming increasingly common because of growing consolidation and mergers and also due to multinational firms establishing a stronghold in buying inputs in the developing countries. In this study, we formulate a general equilibrium model consisting of a competitive sector and an oligopsony sector which exercises market power over inputs. Our results indicate that if the oligopsony sector incurs a higher marginal factor cost for the intensive factor, basic results of the standard two-sector model continue to hold. But if the marginal factor cost is higher for the non-intensive factor, then factor intensities in the physical and value sense differ and traditional trade propositions such as the Stolper–Samuelson theorem do not hold.     

Vertical separation with location–price competition

While the literature has generally found that vertical separation helps buffer competition and harm consumers in a duopolistic market, we find the exact opposite. To induce the retailers to locate closer to consumers and earn a larger market share, the manufacturers set wholesale prices below marginal cost. This market share effect dominates the previously focused coordination effect under which a higher wholesale price helps coordinate the retailers’ pricing decisions. For each manufacturer, vertical separation is a dominant strategy so the endogenous determination of vertical separation versus vertical integration is a prisoner’s dilemma game.     

Dynamic and contemporaneous causality in a supply chain: an application of the US beef industry

Causal relationships are used to investigate information flows and directions of control in a decentralized multi-echelon supply chain where no central authority has system level control over optimizing decisions. We use secondary time-series data representing the US beef industry to investigate dynamic and contemporaneous causality based on out-of-sample Granger causality and Direct Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). Results indicate: (i) the US beef supply chain experienced a significant structural change in late 1996 and early 1997 that may be attributed to a weather induced production shock and an apparent turnaround of the cattle cycle; (ii) contemporaneous causalities appear to be stronger and dynamic causalities appear to be weaker after the structural change, suggesting faster and more effective information transmission along the supply chain after the structural change; (iii) contemporaneous information appears to flow from upstream to downstream tiers in the supply chain before the structural break, which reverses after the structural break, suggesting a shift in control from upstream to downstream firms; and (iv) co-use of spot market and contracts to procure strategic inputs by processors appears to allow processors some control of spot price through contract purchases in the post-break period. Our approach could be readily used to investigate other multi-echelon systems.     

中国证券公司市场结构与绩效的实证分析

笔者利用2006年～2009年的面板数据,对传统的SCP假说、相对市场力量假说和效率结构假说进行了检验。研究发现,我国证券市场支持传统的SCP假说:市场集中度与证券公司绩效显著正相关,市场份额、效率与证券公司绩效之间的关系不显著,并且,效率与市场份额不相关。     

Exchange rate pass-through,price discrimination,and US meat export prices

Exports are becoming increasingly important for US livestock and poultry producers. Consequently, meat industry participants are concerned about the potential impacts of variations in relative currency values. These effects are considered by quantifying the impacts of relative exchange rates on US beef, pork and poultry export prices. In addition, the impacts of GATT and NAFTA agreements on exchange rate pass-through are considered. The results indicate incomplete exchange rate pass-through occurs for several countries. Trade liberalization under GATT has positively influenced US beef and poultry export prices.     

Price response,information, and asymmetry of price dispersion

In this study, we examine how differently gasoline prices in 25 regions of Seoul, Korea respond to asymmetric information between retailers and consumers. We estimate the region-specific likelihood that retailers engage in price undercutting under asymmetric information and investigate inter-regional differences. We find that in response to increases in wholesale price, regions with a high likelihood of price undercutting experience intensified gas station price competition while dispersions of price and markups tend to decrease more in response to cost shocks. Understanding the geographical dispersion of retailers’ price responses to information frictions and search intensity is crucial to lowering information barriers across regions and redistributing profit among market participants.     

Vertical Relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data

In this paper, different models of vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers in the supermarket industry are compared. Demand estimates are used to compute price-cost margins for retailers and manufacturers under different supply models when wholesale prices are not observed. The purpose is to identify the set of margins compatible with the margins obtained from estimates of cost and to select the model most consistent with the data among non-nested competing models. The models considered are (1) a simple linear pricing model; (2) a vertically integrated model; and (3) a variety of alternative (strategic) supply scenarios that allow for collusion, non-linear pricing, and strategic behaviour with respect to private label products. Using data on yogurt sold in several stores in a large urban area of the U.S. the results imply that wholesale prices are close to marginal cost and that retailers have pricing power in the vertical chain. This is consistent with non-linear pricing by the manufacturers or high bargaining power of the retailers.     

Asymmetric farm–retail price transmission and market power: a new test

A finite mixture model is used to estimate farm–retail price transmission in the US fresh strawberry market. Results suggest two distinct pricing regimes associated with off- and peak-harvesting seasons. The market power parameter is significant in the peak-harvest regime, but not in the off-peak regime. Moreover, price changes are transmitted completely throughout the marketing channel in the off-peak regime when the market power parameter is zero, but not in the peak-harvest regime when the market power parameter is positive. This suggests that produce buyers are more apt to exercise market power when farm supplies are abundant than when they are scarce, and that the exercise of such power causes the farm–retail price linkage to become asymmetric.     

Oligopsonistic Intermediate Input and Patterns of Trade *

We examine the validities of traditional trade theorems and patterns of trade for an economy with an oligopsonistic intermediate input. Specifically, the model consists of two final goods. one intermediate good, and two primary factors. One final good and the intermediate good are produced using primary factors, capital and labor. The second final good is produced using the intermediate good and labor. All markets operate under perfect competition except the intermediate good market, which is oligopsonistic. This model reflects the real world phenomena of oligopsony power excerted by some industries (e.g., the food processing industry) in the intermediate good purchases. Our analysis shows that some of the traditional trade theorems and H.O trade pattern may be overturned if the factor intensity of the competitive sector lies between those of oligopsony and intermediate good sectors. [F12]