The Earned Income Tax Credit: Targeting the poor but crowding out wealth

This paper quantifies the individual, aggregate and welfare effects of the US Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). In particular, we analyze the labour supply and saving responses to changes in tax credit generosity and their implications for prices and welfare. Our results show that the EITC is a subsidy on labour income and a tax on savings. An increase in EITC generosity raises labour force participation, reduces savings for many and provides insurance to working poor households. The EITC reduces earnings inequality but increases the skill premium and wealth inequality. A 10% increase in tax credit generosity increases welfare by 0.31% and benefits the majority of the population.     

Estimating labour supply responses and welfare participation: Using a natural experiment to validate a structural labour supply model

We estimate an economic model of labour supply and welfare participation using data on single men from Quebec drawn from the 1986 Canadian Census. Detailed budget sets for each work‐welfare combination—accounting for income taxes, tax credits and welfare benefit rules—are derived using a micro‐simulation model. We show that predicted reactions to a welfare reform that took place in 1989 replicate actual changes in labour supply and welfare participation. We also illustrate the advantage of having estimated a structural model by showing how labour supply and welfare participation change when income taxes and benefit levels change.     

Evaluation of Policy Options to Encourage Welfare to Work

This article compares five alternative policy options with the January 2006 tax and social security system. Each option is designed to cost a similar amount of approximately $5 billion per year to the government at the observed level of labour supply. The five options include reducing the lowest income tax rate, increasing the tax‐free threshold, increasing the low income tax offset, decreasing all taper rates on own and partner's incomes for a number of allowances, and introducing an earned income tax credit. The criteria for comparison are the labour supply responses, the expected budgetary cost to the government after taking into account labour supply responses, the number of winners and losers from the policy change, the effects on the distribution of effective marginal tax rates, and the effects on the number of jobless households. From the results, it is clear that the option to reduce taper rates is dominated by the other options on all criteria. The other four options each have their advantages and disadvantages; no option scores best on all criteria.     

Tax Havens,Growth, and Welfare

This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring tax havens, and uses it to examine how the existence of tax havens affects the economic growth rate and social welfare in high‐tax countries. We show that the presence of tax havens generates two conflicting channels in determining the growth effect. First, the public investment effect states that tax havens may erode tax revenues and in turn decrease the government's infrastructure expenditure, thereby reducing growth. Second, the tax planning effect of tax havens reduces marginal cost of capital and hence encourages capital accumulation so as to spur economic growth. The overall growth effect is ambiguous and is determined by the extent of these two effects. The welfare analysis shows that tax havens are more likely to be welfare‐enhancing if the government expenditure share in production is low, or the initial income tax rate is high. Moreover, the welfare‐maximizing income tax rate is lower than the growth‐maximizing income tax rate if tax havens are present.     

Optimal Taxation with a Trade-off Between Income and Children

This paper explores the implications of endogenous fertility for optimal redistributive taxation in the presence of a trade-off between labour income and children. The labour supply is a decreasing function of the desired quantity and quality of children. Since children enter into the parent's budget constraint in a nonlinear form, their shadow prices are directly distorted by the income tax rate. It is shown that the substitution effects of the income tax rate on the quantity and quality of children cannot be signed uniquely although the effect on labour supply is negative. The aggregate substitution effect of the income tax rate on the quantity of children plays an important role in the determination of the signs of the income tax and child subsidy rates at a Rawlsian or Benthamite social welfare optimum.
JEL Classification Numbers: H21, J13, J22     

An explicit solution to an optimal tax problem

Under specific but perhaps not over-restrictive assumptions on social welfare and consumer preferences, an explicit closed-form solution for an optimal linear income tax is derived. Specifically, given linear income supply functions and a rank-order social welfare function, the optimal tax rate and benefit level are characterized by four parameters: I, a measure of pre-tax inequality in the ability (wage) distribution; r, the fraction of potential total income required for (non-redistributed) government revenue; σ, the fraction of potential total income required for consumer subsistence expenditures; and a disincentive parameter, δ, the marginal propensity to spend on leisure or the amount by which earned income is reduced in response to a unit increase in unearned benefit. Defining , the ratio I/(1 - σ - r), the optimal tax rate τ is given by: The formula is used to fully characterize τ in terms of the parameters. Results include the following: τ = 0 if I = 0; τ = 1 if δ = 0; τ is increasing in I, σ and r; τ may be increasing or decreasing in δ depending on the value of ; when disincentive effects are large, τ becomes close to so that, in such economies, if σ and r are small, the optimal tax rate is equal to the measure of pre-tax inequality. Formulae for the deadweight loss associated with the tax are derived and some observations are offered on the empirical issues associated with the model.     

Does labour supply respond to a flat tax?

We exploit the exogenous change in marginal tax rates created by the Russian flat tax reform of 2001 to identify the effect of taxes on the labour supply of men and women. We apply a weighted difference‐in‐difference regression approach and instrumental variables to estimate labour supply functions using a panel dataset. The mean regression results indicate that the tax reform led to a statistically significant increase in hours of work for men but had no effect on work hours for women. However, we find a positive response to tax changes in both tails of the female work hour distribution. We also find that the reform increased the probability of finding a job among both men and women. Despite significant variation in individual responses, the aggregate labour supply elasticities are trivial. This suggests that reform‐induced changes in labour supply are an unlikely explanation for the amplified personal income tax revenues that followed the reform.     

The Household, Time Use and Tax Policy

This paper is concerned with modelling household decisions andthe welfare effects of tax policy. It seeks to emphasise theimportance of a model that incorporates household productionand can take account of the evident female labour supply heterogeneityacross two-parent families. If, after having children, someproportion of households substitute domestic for market laboursupply, the income and consumption variables used as the taxbase in most countries may be poorly correlated with livingstandards. Taxes and welfare programs based on these variablesmay increase inequality by shifting the overall tax burden tolow and middle wage families with both partners in work, awayfrom families with much higher wages and in which only one memberworks to earn the same joint market income. The paper combinesdata on time use, income, taxes and benefits to show how theytrack female labour supply over the life cycle, resulting inmuch higher tax burdens on two-earner households. (JEL D13,D91, H31, J22)     

Household Transport Demand in a CGE-framework

The main objective of this study is to improve the modelling of household demand for transport services in a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. The new extended model is then used for numerical calculations to test how the Swedish economy reacts to a carbon target. Special attention will be given to distributional effects and the connection between labour supply and work journeys in a sparsely populated country like Sweden. A differentiation between trip purposes and trip length, a complementary relationship between work journeys and labour supply, and a subdivision of households by density of population and income influence the numerical results. Our main conclusions from the analysis of a carbon target are that if the carbon tax revenue is recycled by decreasing the employers’ social contribution fee, welfare costs are lower than with lump-sum replacements of tax revenue to households. The welfare cost may be reduced even further if work journeys are not additionally taxed as compared to the base year. However, the lower total welfare cost is obtained at the expense of making society more unequal, since both labour tax recycling (cuts in employers’ social contributions) and exempting tax on work journeys will make low income groups carry a higher burden. An increased carbon dioxide tax is also shown to increase welfare differences between sparsely populated areas and city regions in Sweden.      

Housing Subsidies and Work Incentives in Great Britain

The relationship between housing costs, wages and transfer programmes is complex yet helps determine the incentive to work for individuals in low income or high housing cost households. We estimate a static discrete choice labour supply model that allows for housing benefit programme participation, using samples of married women and unmarried women drawn from Great Britain Family Resources Surveys 1994/5–97/8. We find women are quite responsive to labour supply incentives and that housing benefit income has similar incentive effects to earned income which suggests any 'stigma' is small. Our analysis is complemented by simulating housing benefit and direct rent subsidy reforms.     

Workforce or workfare? The optimal use of work requirements when labour is supplied along the extensive margin

This paper explores the use of workfare as part of a tax mix when labour supply responses are along the extensive margin. In an economy where the government has a priori chosen any tax‐and‐benefit schedule, we show that, despite their common goal of providing additional incentives for individuals to enter the labour force, workfare and an earned income tax credit are at odds with each other. We also show that, in the presence of an optimal nonlinear income tax, introducing unproductive workfare is always suboptimal when individuals face the same disutility of being on workfare. When this disutility is heterogeneous, unproductive workfare may be a useful policy tool.     

A COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTIONS OF ANNUAL AND LIFETIME INCOME: SWEDEN AROUND 1970.

The concern with income distribution has always mainly existed because of a concern with individuals' economic welfare. In recent years, the question has arisen whether the distribution of annual income—the distribution most often studied—is the best proxy for the distribution of economic welfare. Other measures, such as lifetime income, have been proposed instead.
The paper starts with a discussion of how to define and measure the distribution of lifetime income. By using a simulation model, which partly consists of estimated functions and partly of tax functions taken directly from tax laws, distributions of lifetime income, variously defined, are then constructed. These distributions are compared with each other, and with distributions of annual income. The simulations indicate that the distribution of lifetime income is considerably less unequal than the distribution of annual income. Whether inheritances are included or not seems to be of no importance for the inequality of lifetime income. If, on the other hand, we include the value of leisure time in lifetime income, inequality increases by about 10–15 percent. Distributions of income after tax have Gini coefficients which are approximately 25 percent less than the Ginis for the before-tax distributions. We thus find that the picture of inequality we get is very much dependent on which income concept we use.     

The composition effects of tax-based consolidation on income inequality

Many advanced economies have recently embarked on fiscal austerity. As this has come at a time of high and rising income disparities, policy-makers have fretted about the inequality effects of fiscal consolidations. We shed new light on this issue by empirically investigating the (composition) effects of tax-based consolidations on income inequality, output and labour market conditions for a sample of 16 OECD countries over the period 1978–2012. We find that tax-based consolidations reduce income inequality, but at the cost of weaker economic activity. However, tax composition does matter. Indirect taxes reduce income inequality by more than direct taxes, possibly due to the operation of a positive labour supply channel. Higher indirect taxes increase the price of the consumption basket and create incentives for agents to increase their labour supply. We find this effect to be stronger for middle-aged women. Looking at specific instruments, general consumption taxes and personal taxes are the most suited to reduce inequality while at the same time minimizing the equity-efficiency trade-off.     

MACROECONOMIC AND REDISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF CONSUMPTION TAXES IN THE USA*

This paper studies the effect of an increase in consumption taxes using a dynamic general equilibrium model of overlapping generations calibrated to the US economy. When the proceeds are used to reduce income taxes, the reform raises the aggregate capital and labour supply in the long run. Workers increase labour supply immediately in response to the reform, while consumption rises only gradually. The tax reform also transfers wealth from old consumers to young consumers. As a result, while future generations experience significant welfare gains, current generations, particularly old consumers, tend to experience sizable welfare losses. When the proceeds are used for a lump‐sum transfer, the aggregate capital and labour both decrease in the long run. This reform is welfare‐improving for the current low‐income households.     

Higher Tax for Top Earners

The literature can justify both increasing and decreasing marginal taxes (IMT & DMT) on top incomes under different welfare objectives and income distributions. Even when DMT are theoretically optimal, they are often politically infeasible. Then a flat tax seems to be a constrained optimal solution. We show however that, given any flat tax we can increase the total utility of a poor majority by raising the top income tax rate under a simple condition, which can be checked with empirical data. We further generalize our main results allowing different welfare weights, declining elasticity of labor supply and more tax bands.     

Are income and consumption taxes ever really equivalent? Evidence from a real-effort experiment with real goods

The public finance literature demonstrates the equivalence between consumption and labor-income (wage) taxes. We introduce an experimental paradigm in which individuals make real labor-leisure choices and spend their earned income on real goods. We use this paradigm to test whether a labor-income tax and an equivalent consumption tax lead to identical labor-leisure allocations. Despite controlling for subjects' work ability and inherent labor-leisure preferences and disallowing saving, subjects reduce their labor supply significantly more in response to an income tax than to an equivalent consumption tax. We discuss the economic implications of a policy shift to a consumption tax.     

The Cost of Public Funds in Australia*

A model of labour supply is used to calculate Australia's marginal cost of public funds, which is the appropriate cut-off benefit/ cost ratio for an additional public project. The labour supply model incorporates effective average and marginal tax rates faced by the representative household in each gross income decile. These rates are estimated from the ABS 1988–89 Household Expenditure Survey. A simulation analysis is performed to calculate the effect on labour supply of a 1 per cent increase in marginal tax rates. The estimated changes in tax revenues and deadweight loss in each decile are used to estimate the marginal cost of public funds.     

Fiscal policy reforms in general equilibrium: The case of Greece

This paper quantifies the macroeconomic and welfare implications of (i) changes in the tax-spending mix and (ii) debt consolidation policies. The setup is a neoclassical growth model augmented with a relatively rich public sector. The model is calibrated to the Greek economy. The results suggest that, if the goal of fiscal policy is to stimulate the economy and increase welfare by changing the tax mix, then it should decrease the tax rate on labour income and increase the consumption tax rate. While higher public investment spending is good for the economy, it is lower public consumption spending that is found to be expansionary. The results also suggest that both tax- and expenditure-based debt consolidation policies lead to worse economic activity in the short run, but they have strong beneficial effects in the medium and long run when the consolidation period finishes.     

我国两税合并的社会经济福利效应分析

2007年年初国务院批准了合并内、外资企业的所得税,税率为25%,并从2008年1月1日起实施。外资企业在经历了20年的税收优惠政策之后,开始承担与国内企业相同的所得税税率。统一企业所得税率在自由竞争的经济环境中有增加社会福利的效应。但由于我国仍处在经济转型过程中,内资企业和外资企业在管理体制和运行机制上有很大的不同。因此,统一税率对我国总的社会福利的影响可能与西方发达国家的影响有所不同。文章通过对我国内外资企业生产方程的不同设定来反映内外资企业的不同特点并考察统一税率对我国劳动力配置、资本需求及社会整体福利可能带来的影响。用2004-2006年的统计数据进行了模拟计算,结果表明,两税合并短期内使我国社会整体福利略有下降,在考虑国有企业冗员的情况下,两税合并使社会福利在三种情形下分别下降0.18%、0.17%和0.13%;而考虑国有企业经理负责制时,两税合并使社会福利分别下降0.25%、0.21%和0.15%。但从长期看,两税合并最终会使我国的社会福利有所增加。     

Government financing in an endogenous growth model with financial market restrictions

Summary. In this paper, we develop an endogenous growth model with market regulations on explicitly modeled financial intermediaries to examine the effects of alternative government financing schemes on growth, inflation, and welfare. In the presence of binding regulation, there is always a unique equilibrium. We perform four alternative policy experiments; a change in the seigniorage tax rate, a change in the seigniorage tax base, a change in the income tax and a change in the fiscal-monetary policy mix. We find that in the presence of binding legal reserve requirements, a marginal increase in government spending need not result in a reduction in the rate of economic growth if it is financed with an increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Raising the seigniorage tax base by means of an increase in the reserve requirement retards growth and it has an ambiguous effect on inflation. An increase in income tax financed government spending also suppresses growth and raises inflation although not to the extent that the required seigniorage tax rate alternative would. Switching from seigniorage to income taxation as a source of government finance is growth reducing but deflationary. From a welfare perspective, the least distortionary way of financing an increase in the government spending requirements is by means of a marginal increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Under the specification of logarithmic preferences, the optimal tax structure is indeterminate. Received: March 20, 2000; revised version: June 26, 2001