Why do (or did?) banks securitize their loans? Evidence from Italy

This paper investigates the ex ante determinants of bank loan securitization by using different econometric methods on Italian individual bank data from 2000 to 2006. Our results show that bank loan securitization is a composite decision. Banks that are less capitalized, less profitable, less liquid and burdened with troubled loans are more likely to perform securitization, for a larger amount and earlier.     

Product Market Imperfections and Loan Commitments

I show in a model of competitive banks that the characteristics of loan contracts are affected by product market imperfections in the borrower's industry. A bank loan commitment increases the value of a borrower firm operating in an imperfectly competitive industry and thus dominates a simple loan even in the absence of risk sharing considerations and informational asymmetries between the borrower and the bank. While it is individually rational for a firm to obtain a loan commitment, all the firms in that industry taken together are made worse off by the existence of loan commitments.     

Mutual guarantee institutions and small business finance

A large body of literature has shown that small firms experience difficulties in accessing the credit market due to informational asymmetries. Banks can overcome these asymmetries through relationship lending, or at least mitigate their effects by asking for collateral. Small firms, especially if they are young, have little collateral and short credit histories, and thus may find it difficult to raise funds from banks. In this paper, we show that even in this case, small firms may improve their borrowing capacity by joining Mutual Guarantee Institutions (MGI). Our empirical analysis shows that small firms affiliated to MGIs pay less for credit compared with similar firms. We obtain this result for interest rates charged on loan contracts which are not backed by mutual guarantees. We then argue that our findings are consistent with the view that MGIs are better at screening and monitoring opaque borrowers than banks are. Thus, banks benefit from the willingness of MGIs to post collateral since this implies that firms are better screened and monitored.     

Informational Barriers to Entry into Credit Markets*

Economic theory suggests that asymmetric information between incumbents and entrants can generate barriers to entry into credit markets. Incumbents have superior information about their own customers and the overall economic conditions of the local credit market. This implies that entrants are likely to experience higher loan default rates than the incumbents. We test these theoretical predictions using a unique database of 7,275 observations on 729 individual banks’ lending in 95 Italian local markets. We find that informational asymmetries play a significant role in explaining entrants’ loan default rates. The default rate is significantly higher for those banks that entered local markets without opening a branch, suggesting that having a branch on site may help to reduce the informational disadvantage. We also uncover a positive correlation between banks’ loan default rates in individual local markets and the number of banks lending in that market. We argue that these informational barriers can help to explain why entry into many local credit markets by domestic and foreign banks was slow, even after substantial deregulation. * The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not involve the responsibility of the Bank of Italy. The authors thank Franklin Allen, Dario Focarelli, Andrea Generale, Luigi Guiso, Francesca Lotti, Marco Pagano, Alberto Franco Pozzolo, Paola Sapienza, Alessandro Secchi, two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, the Federal Reserve of Chicago, the 2003 BIS Workshop on Applied Banking Research, the 2003 EARIE Conference, the First Banca d’Italia/CEPR Conference on Money, Banking and Finance, the 2004 FIRS Conference on Banking, Insurance and Intermediation and the 2004 EEA Meeting for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies to all of them.     

Derivatives usage,securitization, and the crash sensitivity of bank stocks

We show that the information on derivatives usage and securitization activities of U.S. banks as disclosed in their pre-crisis 10-K filings explains extreme equity returns of banks during the financial crisis. Stocks of banks that had previously disclosed a more extensive use of financial derivatives and loan securitization were more likely to experience extreme losses. Our findings are consistent with investors viewing banks that used derivatives for non-hedging purposes as highly vulnerable to the crisis. Moreover, banks which had significant securitization activities and were thus potentially exposed to under-capitalized risks from conduits possess a higher vulnerability of their equity to market downturns.     

Corporate Taxes and Securitization

Most banks pay corporate income taxes, but securitization vehicles do not. Our model shows that, when a bank faces strong loan demand but limited deposit market power, this tax asymmetry creates an incentive to sell loans despite less‐efficient screening and monitoring of sold loans. Moreover, loan‐selling increases as a bank's corporate income tax rate and capital requirement rise. Our empirical tests show that U.S. commercial banks sell more of their mortgages when they operate in states that impose higher corporate income taxes. A policy implication is that tax‐induced loan‐selling will rise if banks’ required equity capital increases.     

Loan Market Competition and Bank Risk-Taking

Recent literature (Boyd and De Nicoló, J Finance 60:1329–1343, 2005) has argued that competition in the loan market lowers bank risk by reducing the risk-taking incentives of borrowers. Using a model where competition arises from falling switching costs for entrepreneurs, we show that the impact of loan market competition on banks is reversed if banks can adjust their loan portfolios. The reason is that when borrowers become safer, banks want to offset the effect on their balance sheet and switch to higher-risk lending. They even overcompensate the effect of safer borrowers because loan market competition erodes their franchise values and thus increases their risk-taking incentives.     

The role of securitization in bank liquidity and funding management

This paper studies the role of securitization in bank management. I propose a new index of “bank loan portfolio liquidity” which can be thought of as a weighted average of the potential to securitize loans of a given type, where the weights reflect the composition of a bank loan portfolio. I use this new index to show that by allowing banks to convert illiquid loans into liquid funds, securitization reduces banks' holdings of liquid securities and increases their lending ability. Furthermore, securitization provides banks with an additional source of funding and makes bank lending less sensitive to cost of funds shocks. By extension, the securitization weakens the ability of the monetary authority to affect banks' lending activity but makes banks more susceptible to liquidity and funding crisis when the securitization market is shut down.     

Financial distress,information asymmetry,and syndicate structure: Evidence from Japanese borrowers

This paper examines how borrower firm characteristics affect syndicate size structure in the Japanese loan market for the 1999–2003 period when the banking system is undergoing a major consolidation. We find that syndicates are smaller when borrowers have higher credit risk and when borrowers present larger information asymmetries to the lending group. Interestingly, however, these results are primarily driven by keiretsu (business group) firms. This suggests that the benefits of enhanced monitoring and superior renegotiation prospects are especially useful for banks participating in syndicated loans to Keiretsu firms in Japan rather than informationally opaque, independent firms.     

Did the securitization market freeze affect bank lending during the financial crisis? Evidence from a credit register

Using data from the Italian Credit Register we identify the adverse effect of the freeze of the securitization market on bank lending during the crisis of 2007–2008. Applying a differences-in-differences estimation to data on firms that borrow from multiple banks, we single out credit supply by including firm fixed effects. Our results show that the degree to which banks tightened credit supply to nonfinancial firms is positively related to the share of loans they securitized before the crisis. The tightening translated into lower credit growth, higher interest rates, lower probability of accepting loan applications and higher probability of relationship termination. Firms were unable to fully compensate the negative credit supply shock, which suggests that the securitization freeze played a role in reducing aggregate credit availability.     

BANK LOAN SALES: A NEW LOOK AT THE MOTIVATIONS FOR SECONDARY MARKET ACTIVITY

Bank lending traditionally involves the extension of credit that is held by the originating bank until maturity. Loan sales allow banks to deviate from this pattern by transferring loans in part or in their entirety from their own books to those of another institution. I use a new methodology to test the validity of two hypotheses regarding banks' motivations for selling and buying loans: (1) the comparative advantage hypothesis, that banks with a comparative advantage in originating loans sell and those with a comparative advantage in funding loans buy; and (2) the diversification hypothesis, that banks lacking the ability to diversify internally use loan sales and purchases to achieve diversification. I also address the possibility that information asymmetries may increase the cost of participating in secondary markets. Particular attention is paid to the importance of affiliate relationships in overcoming informational barriers to participation. The empirical evidence presented here helps clarify the benefits of an active secondary loan market and generates predictions regarding the future of that market in a world of rapid consolidation and disappearing barriers to geographical expansion.     

Enhancing Loan Quality Through Transparency: Evidence from the European Central Bank Loan Level Reporting Initiative

We explore whether transparency in banks’ securitization activities enhances loan quality. We take advantage of a novel disclosure initiative introduced by the European Central Bank, which requires, as of January 2013, banks that use their asset‐backed securities as collateral for repo financing to report securitized loan characteristics and performance in a standardized format. We find that securitized loans originated under the transparency regime are of better quality with a lower default probability, a lower delinquent amount, fewer days in delinquency, and lower losses upon default. Additionally, banks with more intensive loan level information collection and those operating under stronger market discipline experience greater improvement in their loan quality under the new reporting standards. Overall, we demonstrate that greater transparency has real effects by incentivizing banks to improve their credit practices.     

Bank risk and real estate: An asset pricing perspective

While a number of papers have investigated the time-series behavior ofex post bank stock returns and real estate returns, no study has comprehensively studied the relationship betweenex ante risk premiums on both assetsand the time-varying nature of such premiums in relationship to economic and real estate market conditions. In this study, we investigate how the changing nature of bank risk taking, especially in the real estate market, has affected theex ante pricing of risk in the market for bank stocks. We find that the time variation in bank risk premiums are partly determined by interest rate and real estate market conditions. We also discover that the real estate factor has been important for banks in the 1980s.     

Lending Booms and Lending Standards

We examine how the informational structure of loan markets interacts with banks' strategic behavior in determining lending standards, lending volume, and the aggregate allocation of credit. We show that, as banks obtain private information about borrowers and information asymmetries across banks decrease, banks may loosen their lending standards, leading to an equilibrium with deteriorated bank portfolios, lower profits, and expanded aggregate credit. These lower standards are associated with greater aggregate surplus and greater risk of financial instability. We therefore provide an explanation for the sequence of financial liberalization, lending booms, and banking crises observed in many emerging markets.     

The Real Effects of FAS 166/167 on Banks’ Mortgage Approval and Sale Decisions

We examine the real effects of FAS 166 and FAS 167 on banks’ loan‐level mortgage approval and sale decisions. Effective in 2010, these standards tightened the accounting for securitizations and consolidation of securitization entities, respectively, causing banks to recognize an estimated $811 billion of securitized assets on balance sheet. We find that banks that recognize more securitized assets exhibit larger decreases in mortgage approval rates and larger increases in mortgage sale rates. These effects significantly exceed those of banks’ off–balance sheet securitized assets, consistent with our results being driven by the consolidation of securitization entities rather than by securitization per se. We conduct tests that help rule out the financial crisis as an alternative explanation for our results. Further analyses suggest that mechanisms underlying the results include consolidating banks’ reduced regulatory capital adequacy, increased market discipline, and consequent desire not to recognize high‐risk mortgages on balance sheet.     

Fairly priced deposit insurance,incentive compatible regulations,and bank asset choices

This article provides incentive compatible regulations that support fairly priced deposit insurance in a competitive banking industry. If informational asymmetry exists between the regulator and banks regarding loan quality, but the regulator can observe actual loan rates charged, then imposing a capital requirement schedule that leads market loan rates to decrease in loan quality is shown to be incentive compatible. Competition in the loan market induces banks to be indifferent to all loans that satisfy a minimum acceptable quality and reject all riskier loans. The regulator could reduce the banking industry's riskiness by imposing stricter capital requirements that increase this minimum quality.     

Credit risk transfer in U.S. commercial banks: What changed during the 2007–2009 crisis?

Following the debate on the role of credit risk transfer (CRT) in exacerbating the 2007–2009 crisis, this paper investigates the usage and effects of loan sales, securitization, and credit derivatives in U.S. commercial banks over the last decade, with special emphasis on the financial crisis. We find that in times of severe funding constraints, the need to raise financial resources becomes the principal incentive behind CRT. We document some beneficial effects of CRT on the economy, since the funds released through CRT are subsequently invested by banks to sustain credit supply, also in recession. However, we report higher overall riskiness in banks that engage intensively in loans sales and securitization, which translates into higher default rates during the crisis. Interestingly, the benefits and drawbacks of CRT are much stronger for loan sales and securitization than for credit derivatives.     

Short-term safety or long-term failure? Empirical evidence of the impact of securitization on bank risk

Based on a sample of U.S. commercial banks from 2002 to 2012, this paper shows that bank loan securitization has a significant and positive impact on both Z-scores and the likelihood of bank failure, indicating a short-term risk reduction and a long-term risk increase effect. We also find disparate impacts between mortgage and non-mortgage securitization. Loan sale activities are found to have a similar impact to securitization.     

Securitization and systemic risk: An empirical investigation on Italian banks over the financial crisis

This research examines the effects of securitization on the bank's risk exposure both in terms of individual expected shortfall and marginal expected shortfall as a measure of systemic risk. The relationship between securitization activity and tail risks is especially relevant in light of the consequences for financial stability, both for the individual securitizing banks and for the market as a whole, as the financial crisis 2007–2008 reveals. By using a sample of Italian listed banks over the period 2000–2009, we find that securitizing banks have, on average, higher expected losses in case of extreme events. This adds new evidence on the main findings in the literature that focused on the evidence that risk transfer through securitization is relatively insignificant compared to the risk retained by the originating bank. We show that this risk retention is in terms of an increase of tail risk. We also find that securitization increases the probability of banks to become “systemically” riskier, but we find no difference when comparing the pre-crisis with the post-crisis period. This suggests that the systemic exposures of Italian banks are still as high as before the crisis with severe implications for financial stability.