On the nature of certainty equivalent functionals

We explore connections between the certainty equivalent return (CER) functional and the underlying utility function. Curvature properties of the functional depend upon how utility function attributes relate to hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) type utility functions. If the CER functional is concave, i.e., if risk tolerance is concave in wealth, then preferences are standard. The CER functional is linear in lotteries if utility is HARA and lottery payoffs are on a line in state space. Implications for the optimality of portfolio diversification are given. When utility is concave and non-increasing relative risk averse, then the CER functional is superadditive in lotteries. Depending upon the nature of association among lottery payoffs, CERs for constant absolute risk averse utility functions may be subadditive or superadditive in lotteries. Our approach lends itself to straightforward experiments to elicit higher order attributes on risk preferences.     

On the nature of certainty equivalent functionals

We explore connections between the certainty equivalent return (CER) functional and the underlying utility function. Curvature properties of the functional depend upon how utility function attributes relate to hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) type utility functions. If the CER functional is concave, i.e., if risk tolerance is concave in wealth, then preferences are standard. The CER functional is linear in lotteries if utility is HARA and lottery payoffs are on a line in state space. Implications for the optimality of portfolio diversification are given. When utility is concave and non-increasing relative risk averse, then the CER functional is superadditive in lotteries. Depending upon the nature of association among lottery payoffs, CERs for constant absolute risk averse utility functions may be subadditive or superadditive in lotteries. Our approach lends itself to straightforward experiments to elicit higher order attributes on risk preferences.     

Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions

We study Pareto efficiency in a setting that involves two kinds of uncertainty: Uncertainty over the possible outcomes is modeled using lotteries whereas uncertainty over the agents’ preferences over lotteries is modeled using sets of plausible utility functions. A lottery is universally Pareto undominated if there is no other lottery that Pareto dominates it for all plausible utility functions. We show that, under fairly general conditions, a lottery is universally Pareto undominated iff it is Pareto efficient for some vector of plausible utility functions, which in turn is equivalent to affine welfare maximization for this vector. In contrast to previous work on linear utility functions, we use the significantly more general framework of skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions as introduced by Fishburn (1982). Our main theorem generalizes a theorem by Carroll (2010) and implies the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem. We discuss three natural classes of plausible utility functions, which lead to three notions of ordinal efficiency, including stochastic dominance efficiency, and conclude with a detailed investigation of the geometric and computational properties of these notions.     

Optimism,pessimism and financial bubbles

This paper shows that it is possible to extend the scope of the existence of rational bubbles when uncertainty is introduced associated with rank-dependent expected utility. This RDU assumption can be viewed as a transformation of probabilities depending on the pessimism/optimism of the agent. The results show that pessimism favors the existence of deterministic bubbles, when optimism may promote the existence of stochastic bubbles. Moreover, under pessimism, the RDU assumption may generate multiple bubbly equilibria. The RDU assumption also leads to new conditions ensuring the (absence of) Pareto-optimality of the competitive equilibrium without bubbles. These conditions still govern the existence of bubbles.     

Competitive equilibrium cycles with endogenous labor

In this paper, we study a two-sector optimal growth model with elastic labor supply. We show that the modified golden rule is saddle-point stable when the investment good is capital intensive. To characterize stability with a capital intensive consumption good, we focus on either additively separable or homothetic preferences. In the first specification, we show that optimal oscillations require the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption to be high enough while the elasticity of labor needs to be low enough. At the same time, we prove that with a linear utility in leisure the modified golden rule is always saddle-point stable. In the second specification for preferences, we show that the local dynamic properties of the optimal path depend instead on the shares of consumption and leisure into total utility. We prove that endogenous fluctuations are even more likely with homothetic preferences.     

A simple mean–dispersion model of ambiguity attitudes

Several characterizations of ambiguity aversion decompose preferences into the expected utility of an act and an adjustment factor, an ambiguity index, or a dispersion function. In each of these cases, the adjustment factor has very little structure imposed on it, and thus these models provide little guidance as to which function to use from the infinite class of possible alternatives. In this paper, we provide a simple axiomatic characterization of mean–dispersion preferences which uniquely determines a subjective probability distribution over a set of possible priors and which uniquely identifies the dispersion function. We provide an algorithm for determining this subjective probability distribution and the coefficient in the dispersion function from experimental data. We also demonstrate that the model accommodates ambiguity aversion in the Ellsberg paradox.     

Nonrecursive separation of risk and time preferences

Recursive utility disentangles preferences with respect to time and risk by recursively building up a value function of local increments. This involves certainty equivalents of indirect utility. Instead we disentangle preferences with respect to time and risk by building up a value function as a non-linear aggregation of certainty equivalents of direct utility of consumption. This entails time-consistency issues which are dealt with by looking for an equilibrium control and an equilibrium value function rather than a classical optimal control and a classical optimal value function. We characterize the solution in a general diffusive incomplete market model and find that, in certain special cases of utmost interest, the characterization coincides with what would arise from a recursive utility approach. But also importantly, in other cases, it does not: The two approaches are fundamentally different but match, exclusively but importantly, in the mathematically special case of homogeneity of the value function.     

Quantification of preferences in markets

In this paper we quantify agent preferences in a market. In our framework every agent has a utility level associated with each transaction, and we assume that the probability of a feasible market transaction increases with an increase in total utility. It is surprising to observe that this simple behavioral principle induces a usually unique probability measure that can be constructed by a fast numerical algorithm. This unusual combination of a rigorous model and a fast numerical algorithm makes it possible to construct a well-defined set of preferences that implies a set of observed commodity prices.     

Optimal strategies for the immigration lottery

This paper considers the so-called OP-1 program in which certain foreign nationals can apply to a lottery for resident alien status in the United States. Based on the way the lottery will be administered, there are advantages for a candidate to submit multiple applications. We find the optimal number of applications for a candidate to submit in order to maximize his or her chances of winning. We also consider two extensions to a multiple year lottery. Current legislation has made no provision for repeating the lottery so these extensions would be relevant only if new legislation is passed.     

The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences

This paper replacesGibbard’s (Econometrica 45:665-681, 1977) assumption of strict ordinal preferences by themore natural assumption of cardinal preferences on the set pure social alternatives and we also admit indifferences among the alternatives. By following a similar line of reasoning to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theoremin the deterministic framework, we first show that if a decision scheme satisfies strategy proofness and unanimity, then there is an underlying probabilistic neutrality result which generates an additive coalitional power function. This result is then used to prove that a decision scheme which satisfies strategy proofness and unanimity can be represented as a weak random dictatorship. A weak random dictatorship assigns each individual a chance to be a weak dictator. An individual has weak dictatorial power if the support of the social choice lottery is always a subset of his/her maximal utility set. In contrast to Gibbard’s complete characterization of randomdictatorship, we also demonstrate with an example that strategy proofness and unanimity are sufficient but not necessary conditions for a weak random dictatorship.     

Stochastic utility theorem

This paper analyzes individual decision making. It is assumed that an individual does not have a preference relation on the set of lotteries. Instead, the primitive of choice is a choice probability that captures the likelihood of one lottery being chosen over the other. Choice probabilities have a stochastic utility representation if they can be written as a non-decreasing function of the difference in expected utilities of the lotteries. Choice probabilities admit a stochastic utility representation if and only if they are complete, strongly transitive, continuous, independent of common consequences and interchangeable. Axioms of stochastic utility are consistent with systematic violations of betweenness and a common ratio effect but not with a common consequence effect. Special cases of stochastic utility include the Fechner model of random errors, Luce choice model and a tremble model of [Harless, D., Camerer, C., 1994. The predictive utility of generalized expected utility theories. Econometrica 62, 1251–1289].     

On the computation of optimal monotone mean–variance portfolios via truncated quadratic utility

We report a surprising link between optimal portfolios generated by a special type of variational preferences called divergence preferences (see Maccheroni et al., 2006) and optimal portfolios generated by classical expected utility. As a special case, we connect optimization of truncated quadratic utility (see ?erný, 2003) to the optimal monotone mean–variance portfolios (see Maccheroni et al., 2009), thus simplifying the computation of the latter.     

Optimal full-hedging under state-dependent preferences

This paper examines the hedging behavior of a risk-averse individual who faces uncertainty in spot-market prices and has a state-dependent utility function. The model demonstrates how risk aversion, state-dependency of preferences, and dependence structure of spot-market prices and states of nature jointly determine the individual’s optimal hedge position. We stipulate two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions, one on the utility function and the other on the dependence structure of spot-market prices and states of nature, which yield the celebrated full-hedging theorem originally derived under state-independent preferences.     

Risk aversion for variational and multiple-prior preferences

The objective of this paper is to identify variational preferences and multiple-prior (maxmin) expected utility functions that exhibit aversion to risk under some probability measure from among the priors. Risk aversion has profound implications on agents’ choices and on market prices and allocations. Our approach to risk aversion relies on the theory of mean-independent risk of Werner (2009). We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for risk aversion of convex variational preferences and concave multiple-prior expected utilities. The conditions are stability of the cost function and of the set of probability priors, respectively, with respect to a probability measure. The two stability properties are new concepts. We show that cost functions defined by the relative entropy distance or other divergence distances have that property. Set of priors defined as cores of convex distortions of probability measures or neighborhoods in divergence distances have that property, too.     

Intergenerational justice when future worlds are uncertain

Let there be a positive (exogenous) probability that, at each date, the human species will disappear. We postulate an Ethical Observer (EO) who maximizes intertemporal welfare under this uncertainty, with expected-utility preferences. Various social welfare criteria entail alternative von Neumann Morgenstern utility functions for the EO: utilitarian, Rawlsian, and an extension of the latter that corrects for the size of population. Our analysis covers, first, a cake-eating economy (without production), where the utilitarian and Rawlsian recommend the same allocation. Second, a productive economy with education and capital, where it turns out that the recommendations of the two EOs are in general different. But when the utilitarian program diverges, then we prove it is optimal for the extended Rawlsian to ignore the uncertainty concerning the possible disappearance of the human species in the future. We conclude by discussing the implications for intergenerational welfare maximization in the presence of global warming.     

Consumption paths under prospect utility in an optimal growth model

This paper studies the Cass-Koopmans-Ramsey model of optimal economic growth in the presence of loss aversion and habit formation. The representative agent's preferences for consumption can be gradually varied between the standard constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES) case and Kahneman and Tversky's prospect utility. We find that the transitional dynamics of optimal consumption paths differ distinctly from the standard model, in particular consumption smoothing is more pronounced. We also show that prospect utility can cause the economy to remain in a steady state with low consumption and low capital.     

Evolutionary stability of prospect theory preferences

We demonstrate that in simple 2×2 games (cumulative) prospect theory preferences can be (semi-)evolutionarily stable, in particular, a population of players with prospect theory preferences is stable against more rational players, i.e. players with a smaller degree of probability weighting. We also show that in a typical game with infinitely many strategies, the “war of attrition”, probability weighting is (semi-)evolutionarily stable. Finally, we generalize to other notions of stability. Our results may help to explain why probability weighting is generally observed in humans, although it is not optimal in usual decision problems.     

An analytical solution for the robust investment-reinsurance strategy with general utilities

In financial markets, different investors have different attitudes or preferences on the investment policies and reinsurance problems. For investors with different investment utilities, how to provide an optimal investment strategy is not only a very hard problem, but also an urgent problem to be solved. In this paper, we derive an analytical solution for the optimal allocation problem of investment-reinsurance with general-form utility function. The general utility function allows for varying relative risk aversion coefficient, which is an important feature in finance theory. However, obtaining analytical solutions for general utility function has been difficult or impossible. The solution presented in this paper is constructed through the homotopy analysis method (HAM) and written in the form of a Taylor series expansion. The fully nonlinear Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation is decomposed into an infinite series of linear PDEs, which can be solved analytically. In the end, three examples are presented to illustrate the convergence and accuracy of the method, it also demonstrates that different risk reference investors have different investment-reinsurance strategies.     

Utility Theory and reciprocal pairwise comparisons: The Eigenvector Method

The criticisms of Utility Theory focus on either its axioms or the construction of utility functions. Here we present a method which avoids the problems of uniqueness encountered in the construction of utility functions when using either the certainty equivalence method or the probability equivalence method. The method is based on the construction of ratio scale value functions from reciprocal pairwise comparisons and Saaty's Eigenvector Method. We show that under the assumption of cardinal consistency utility functions are a particular case of these ratio scales. Reciprocal pairwise comparisons allow decision makers to relax the transitivity assumption and help to derive a unique scaling of preferences.     

Linear cumulative prospect theory with applications to portfolio selection and insurance demand

Abstract The present paper combines loss attitudes and linear utility by providing an axiomatic analysis of corresponding preferences in a cumulative prospect theory (CPT) framework. In a sense we derive a two-sided variant of Yaari’s dual theory, i.e., nonlinear probability weights in the presence of linear utility. The first important difference is that utility may have a kink at the status quo, which allows for the exhibition of loss aversion. Also, we may have different probability weighting functions for gains than for losses. We apply the model to both portfolio selection and insurance demand. Our results show that CPT with linear utility has more realistic implications than the dual theory since it implies only a weakened variant of plunging. Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 91B08, 91B28, 91B30 Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D81, G11, G22