Price dispersion and seller heterogeneity in retail food markets

Price dispersion, i.e. a homogeneous product being sold at different prices by different sellers, is among the most replicated findings in empirical economics. The paper assesses the extent and determinants of spatial price dispersion for 14 perfectly homogeneous food products in more than 400 retailers in a market characterized by the persistence of a large number of relatively small traditional food stores, alongside large supermarkets. The extent of observed price dispersion is quite high. When prices in an urban area (where the spatial concentration of sellers is higher) are compared with those in smaller towns and rural areas, differences in search costs and the potentially higher degree of competition do not yield lower prices. Other counteracting factors, including differences in seller costs and consumer incomes, make prices, on average, higher in the urban area for 11 of the 14 products considered. For many, but not all, the products supermarkets proved to be less expensive than traditional retailers, although average savings from food shopping at supermarkets were extremely low. Finally, the results of the study provide evidence that retailers have different pricing strategies and these differences also emerge for supermarkets belonging to the same chain. The results presented in the paper suggest that a variety of factors play a role in explaining price dispersion. In addition to differences in seller costs, the contemporaneous heterogeneity of retailers (in terms of services provided) and consumers (in terms of search costs and preferences) makes the emergence of monopolistic competition possible as well as allowing small traditional food retailers to remain in business.     

Seller curation in platforms

This article explores why market platforms do not expel low-quality sellers when screening costs are minimal. I model a platform market with consumer search. The presence of low-quality sellers reduces search intensity, softening competition between sellers and increasing the equilibrium market price. The platform admits some low-quality sellers if competition between sellers is intense. Recommending a high-quality seller and this form of search obfuscation are complementary strategies. The low-quality sellers enable the recommended seller to attract many consumers at a high price and the effect of the recommendation is strengthened as low-quality sellers become more adept at imitating high-quality sellers.     

Selling Time and Selling Price: The Influence of Seller Motivation

We consider the role that seller motivation plays in determining selling time, list price and sale price. A new survey of home sellers suggests that sellers are heterogeneous in their motivation to sell. Our findings are that a seller who, at the time of listing, has a planned date to move sells more quickly than one who does not. Also, the shorter the planned time until a move at the time of listing, the shorter the actual duration of marketing time. We find that seller motivation affects sale price, but not the list-price markup. Our results suggest that theoretical models of the housing search process should be recast to allow for heterogeneous sellers.     

Number of sellers,average prices,and price dispersion

A variety of models provide differing predictions regarding the effect of an increase in the number of competitors in a market (seller density) on prices and price dispersion. We review different approaches to generating equilibrium price dispersion and then empirically estimate the relationship between seller density, average product price and price dispersion in the retail gasoline industry using four unique gasoline price data sets. Controlling for station-level characteristics, we find that an increase in station density consistently decreases both price levels and price dispersion across four geographical areas.     

FHA Mortgage Discount Points, House Prices and Consumer Behavior

The allocation of FHA discount points between buyers and sellers has recently been the subject of empirical investigation. The research reported here examines this relationship in more detail. Regression equations were estimated for separate price categories of housing using dummy variables for the number of discount points being charged. Separate equations were also estimated for periods when points were rising and when they were falling. The results essentially are that sellers attempt to shift all of the discount points to buyers and frequently are successful. However, in certain situations the points are shared between buyers and seller.     

Role of resource gap and value appropriation: effect of reputation gap on price premium in online auctions

In this study, we draw on the resource‐based view of the firm and on value‐based models of strategy to examine when firms appropriate value from their superior resources. We argue for the need to take into account the role of the resource gap between competitors rather than the absolute resource stock of the focal firm when examining the resource‐performance relationship. In particular, we investigate whether the ability of a reputable seller to command a price premium is influenced by the reputation gap (i.e., the reputation differences between the focal seller and its closest competitor standardized by the reputation stock of both sellers). We test our hypotheses on 72 matched pairs of online transactions screened from more than 2,000 auctions of new mobile phones on the Polish Internet auction site Allegro. We find that the ability of a reputable seller to command a price premium (1) increases with the size of the reputation gap between the focal seller and its matched competitor, and (2) becomes increasingly smaller for each additional unit of the seller reputation gap. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Modelling the effect of buyer and seller power on the margins of commodity plastics

In the last decade, large sectors of the chemical and plastics industries in the U.S.A. and West Europe have suffered drastic declines in price and gross margin during periods of low use of industry capacity. This paper shows that the major changes in gross margin observed for some commodity plastics can be modelled successfully in terms of the balance between buyer power and seller power. These industries have visibility of prices and industry occupacity and comparable concentrations of sellers and important buyers. The modelling follows Burgess (1982) in expressing buyer and seller power as simple functions of buyer and seller concentrations, industry occupacity and ‘cohesion’ between sellers. This work provides a first practical test of this new approach. It is shown that the model fits the observed data best if the ‘cohesion’ declines as occupacity declines. It is suggested that the approach would be useful in understanding the behaviour of other ‘near-commodity’, capital-intensive businesses, and in helping to distinguish between those businesses where margins are likely to remain relatively stable and those which might face drastically declining margins if the industry occupacity declines or new entrants change the balance between sellers and buyers.     

Warranty,Seller Reputation,and Buyer Experience: Evidence From EBAY Used Car Auctions

Using data from the eBay car auction market, we test several predictions regarding warranties, seller reputation and buyer experience in the determination of the final price. We find that the presence of a warranty generates a price premium, but that its magnitude decreases when the seller has a more established reputation. Compared to private sellers, professional dealers, who are ‘repeated‐game players’ in the market, benefit less from a warranty and its substitutability for seller reputation is relatively small. In addition, a buyer with greater experience tends to pay less for a warranty or for a professional dealership.     

Assessing the Market Value of Real Estate Property with a Geographically Weighted Stochastic Frontier Model

In this study we consider the problem of sellers, buyers and real estate appraisers in determining the price for a house, taking into account the characteristics of the house and its location as well as the goals of these three different parties. The appraiser's job is to determine the fair market value of the house, while the buyer and seller want to find, respectively, the lowest and highest feasible price for it. We combine recent developments in geography and econometrics to develop an approach that determines local estimates of property values from the perspectives of the buyer, seller and appraiser, taking into account the characteristics of the house as well as its location. We illustrate our approach analyzing closing prices in one residential real estate market.     

COSTLY BUYER SEARCH IN LABORATORY MARKETS WITH SELLER ADVERTISING*

In this experiment, sellers simultaneously choose prices and advertising strategies. Buyers either purchase at an advertised price or search sequentially for other prices. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, sellers charge a high unadvertised price or advertise a price chosen from a lower interval. Increases in search or advertising costs raise equilibrium prices and affect equilibrium advertising intensity. Empirical results are consistent with most comparative static predictions. Sellers, however, price much lower and advertise more intensely than predicted. Consequently, market outcomes more closely resemble a perfect information, Bertrand‐like equilibrium than the imperfect information, mixed strategy equilibrium with significant seller market power.     

Relationship quality as a resource to build industrial brand equity when products are uncertain and future-based

This article extends our understanding of industrial branding and the influence of buyer–seller relationships by examining key constructs within an industrial context where products are uncertain and future-based. SEM results elicited from 249 buyer surveys empirically validate satisfaction, trust and commitment as dimensions of relationship quality, and show that buyer–seller relationship quality facilitates direct and indirect seller brand equity accruals. Findings reveal that while focusing on sellers' corporate and product brands is good advice for building buyer–seller relationships, seller resource allocations to these areas should vary depending upon the selected target market segment(s). Findings support that sellers should place more focus on developing quality relationships with buyers than they should in focusing on the non-relational attributes of their corporate brands; however, if sellers choose to bypass building high quality customer relationships, they should instead funnel resources into their product brand offerings. Findings demonstrate that buyers credit their own skills and acumen when evaluating products with which they are confident, and ascribe increased value to the involvement of the seller as their attitude and certainty decrease. These findings provide strategic guidance to the sellers of uncertain and future-based industrial products.     

Exclusionary discounts

We consider a two-period model with two sellers and one buyer. Although we assume it is efficient for the buyer to purchase from both sellers in each period, we show that when the buyer's valuations are inter-temporally linked and at least one seller is financially constrained, exclusion can sometimes arise in equilibrium (i.e., the buyer purchases all of its requirements from the same seller in each period). The exclusionary equilibria are supported by contract offers in which the excluding seller's incremental price to supply the contestable part of demand is below its marginal cost and sometimes negative. Our findings contribute to the literatures on market-share contracts, bundling, all-units discounts, and loyalty discounts.     

Pricing behavior in United States manufacturing industries: A statistical study using disaggregated data

We investigate the relationship between industrial market structure and price flexibility (the administered-pricing hypothesis) across United States manufacturing industries by embedding market-structure variables in a model relating relative price variability (dispersion) and inflation. While we find support for a positive relationship between variability and inflation, we do not find that high seller concentration lessens the impact of inflation on price variability. We do find that the larger the efficient-sized plant, the lower the impact of inflation on variability. We also find strong effects of input prices and degree of product durability on relative price variability.     

An Experimental Analysis of the Impact of Intermediaries on the Outcome of Bargaining Games

We conduct an experimental analysis of the bargaining between a buyer and a seller of the exchange of a single good by means of an intermediary or broker. We examine how an intermediary affects the price, the likelihood of a successful negotiation, and the time it takes to complete a negotiation. We first examine the impact of the intermediary as a pure middleman, and then as an information source about the distribution of seller and buyer reservation prices. The results show that an intermediary, whether or not informed, increases the sale price, reduces the likelihood of an agreement, and increases the time to reach an agreement (though the number of bargaining rounds declines). The results suggest that the benefits of brokerage may be predominantly in the matching of buyers and sellers rather than in facilitating bargaining.     

Market structure and business performance: An evaluation of buyer/seller power in the pims database

This paper explores the patterns of buyer and seller structure among business units in the PIMS database and how buyer/seller structure is related to profit outcomes, both long-term through the product life cycle and short-term between periods of boom and recession. Businesses with a favourable structure (few sellers, many buyers buying items of low importance) typically maintain margins through the product life cycle, but if there are many sellers facing few and determined buyers, margins and profitability are likely to deteriorate in recession and to continue to decline through the life cycle.     

Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition*

A monopoly seller advising buyers about which of two goods fits their needs may be tempted to recommend the higher margin good. For the seller to collect information about a buyer’s needs and provide truthful advice, the profits from selling both goods must be similar enough, i.e., within an implementability cone. The optimal regulation controls pricing distortions and information-collection incentives separately via price regulation and fixed rewards respectively. This no longer holds when the seller has private information about costs as both problems interact. We study whether competition and the threat by buyers to switch sellers can substitute for regulation.     

A simulation of business-to-business decision making in a relationship marketing context

The dynamic and interactive SUGARSCAPE simulation is adapted to represent agent-based relationship marketing models in business-to-business exchanges. Computer-generated selling agents operate in complex environments using relationship marketing approaches that may or may not be uniformly distributed inside their organizations. The intricate nature of these models also allows for diverse combinations of buyer traits that impact their decisions as well as seller profitability. These features include individual and firm exchange experiences, the ability to identify and to become loyal to sellers, and the sharing of information within and among buyer firms. Relationship marketing is played out or operationalized based on pricing tactics that show differences between asking prices and post-exchange value.     

Brand or Variety Choices and Periodic Sales as Substitute Instruments for Monopoly Price Discrimination

We study the puzzle that sellers often employ diverse strategies in terms of carrying multiple brands and holding periodic sales. These two selling tools can be substitute instruments to induce consumer self selection and implement price discrimination. We analyze the factors that affect a seller’s choice between the two pricing instruments and show how different combinations of the two instruments can be optimal under alternative market conditions. A seller may, surprisingly, increase her total number of offers when it becomes more costly to carry brands or hold sales if there are decreasing marginal costs of the alternative selling tool.     

Shopping for Information: Implications of Consumer Learning for Optimal Pricing and Product Design*

I study a seller's pricing problem where consumers perform costly product research about value before purchase. They buy the product when sufficiently optimistic about value and cease research when sufficiently pessimistic. I find that the seller encourages product research when prior belief about value is high, even though he could sell immediately for a high price. The prior affects both expected value and how additional information changes consumers' beliefs. I show that an increase in research cost affects equilibrium price nonmonotonically. Finally, when the seller chooses price and product value dispersion, the optimal level of dispersion need not be extremal.     

Seller reputation: From word-of-mouth to centralized feedback

Reputation is one of the most important incentives for trade and cooperation. Using the complete selling history of 125,135 sellers on Eachnet.com (an eBay equivalent in China), we show that sellers with a longer successful selling record enjoyed more repeat business, reached more buyer regions, sold in more product categories, and had a higher completion rate even before Eachnet introduced a centralized feedback system. Since the centralized feedback system, the difference between reputable and non-reputable sellers has decreased in terms of repeat business but enlarged in terms of market expansion. These findings suggest that while reputation can facilitate trade through buyer experience and word-of-mouth, it is not as effective as centralized feedback. Our study also shows that, although completion rate and transaction price are the two outcomes most often examined in the literature, seller reputation is important for buyer clientele, market reach, business scope and market survival.