Does Direct Democracy Increase Voter Turnout? Evidence from the 2004 General Election

Abstract . This empirical study seeks to broaden the interpretation of the “rational voter model” so as to include the potential effects of “direct democracy” on the voter participation rate. Direct democracy is assumed to take two forms: initiatives and popular referenda. This study tests the hypothesis that direct democracy may not on balance significantly affect voter turnout because, although it may elevate the expected gross benefits of voting by “empowering voters,” the transactions/information costs correlative with direct democracy raise the costs of voting. Using cross‐section analysis for the 50 states for the 2004 general election, this study finds that the existence of initiatives and/or referenda does not significantly influence voter turnout.     

Voting with a Hand on the Bible and Not on the Wallet: The 1996 Video Poker Referendum in Louisiana

Abstract . The 1996 gambling referendum in Louisiana provided a unique opportunity to study voters' preferences. At the time of the referendum, video poker machines legally operated in all of Louisiana's 64 parishes (counties). Video poker was voted down in 31 parishes and retained in 33 parishes. Voters also allowed the New Orleans land‐based casino and 15 riverboat casinos to continue their operations. The extant horse racing and pari‐mutuel betting were not voted on. We examine the economic, demographic, and religious factors that influenced how people voted on the issue of legalized video poker. This study is of interest because in recent years, legalized gambling has been expanding around the world. We know of no other referendum on gambling that covered an area as large as an entire U.S. state—all of Louisiana—and offered voters control over gambling in their locality. Months before the 1996 referendum, the news media suggested several factors that might determine the outcome of the vote. The media concluded that concern over jobs would be the major influence on the outcome. Other important factors included a campaign against gambling by Southern Baptist churches and the simultaneous national presidential election. We investigate whether these factors, along with demographic factors such as age and education, influenced the results of the gambling referendum. Surprisingly, we found no clear evidence that the economic health of a parish or the preexisting size of its gambling industry determined the vote. The presence of Southern Baptists in a parish increased the likelihood that gambling would be voted down. Democratic voters tended to vote for gambling, as did black voters. Age and education levels of voters did not appear to influence their votes on gambling. Voters in parishes that bordered other states were more likely to retain gambling. Overall, it appeared that personal values were more important in determining voter behavior than financial considerations. People were voting with their hearts, not their pocketbooks.     

Modeling undecided voters to forecast elections: From bandwagon behavior and the spiral of silence perspective

Forecasting election results has been a highly attractive activity among political and social scientists. Different forecasting methods have been proposed, but those based on public opinion polls are the most common. However, there are challenges to using opinion polls, especially because they neglect undecided voters. Due to the significant number of undecided participants and their impact on voting outcomes, we analyze the potential behavior of undecided voters by considering opinion polls and sentiment based on voter expectation from the perspective of the bandwagon effect and the spiral of silence. We establish a hierarchical Bayesian forecasting model to predict voting results, and apply it to the 2016 United States presidential election and the 2016 Brexit referendum. The results of our model suggest that voting outcomes are more predictable when fully utilizing the impact of undecided voters. The results indicate that integrating aggregated polls into the hierarchical Bayesian framework is a strong predictor for forecasting outcomes, and they provide evidence for the influence of sentiment based on voter expectation in forecasting election results.     

Voting power in municipal annexation elections

In many American states, municipal annexation and consolidation require concurrent majority votes of all affected jurisdictions. The effectiveness and fairness of this voting procedure have been criticized on the grounds that a small minority of voters can frustrate the preferences of the overall majority. This paper investigates the extent to which the relative ability of voters in large and small jurisdictions to influence voting outcomes in procedures requiring concurrent majorities is influenced by jurisdictional size. The Banzhaf index, which counts the number of case4s in which a given voter could reverse the overall group decision by changing positions on an issue, is applied to this problem of concurrent voting majorities. Mathematical analysis indicates that the ratio of power between voters in small and large jurisdictions approximately equals the inverse of the square root of the ratio of their population size.     

An indifference trap of voting

In this paper strategic situations of voting and abstentions are analysed in a three-candidate voting model where voters are indifferent to various alternatives and candidates are interested in winning the election and seeing their most preferred alternative being realized. A specific decision problem is analysed, described by an Indifference Trap Game, with respect to, e.g., the corresponding Nash equilibria, perfect equilibria, and maximin solution. A second-best outcome is contained in the choice set of all three solutions while the Nash equilibrium concept is compatible with the Pareto efficient outcomes of the game.An alternative scenario where candidates suffer from incumbency but voters still are indifferent to some alternatives also supports the second-best outcome. Again, various solutions concepts are applied. We conclude that indifferent voters imply an eminent coordination problem for the candidates in the given voting game which, in general, ends up in inefficient outcomes. The inherent complexity of the decision situation cannot be sufficiently reduced to single out one and only one outcome.     

Can People Explain Their Own Vote? Introspective Questions as Indicators of Salience in the 1995 Quebec Referendum on Sovereignty

Most scholars doubt that voters are able to explain their own vote. We argue that introspective questions whereby respondents are invited to tell, in their own words, the reasons why they vote the way they do, provide useful information on which considerations are most salient in their voting decisions. We show that open-ended questions about reasons for voting Yes or No in the 1995 Quebec referendum on sovereignty help us to sort out subgroups of voters for whom a given consideration is more salient.     

Appeasement and compromise under a referendum threat

Standard legislative bargaining models assume that an agreed-upon allocation is final, whereas in practice there exist mechanisms for challenging passed legislation when there is lack of sufficient consensus. Such mechanisms include popular vote requirements following insufficient majorities in the legislature. This paper analyzes a one-period legislative bargaining game whose outcome can be challenged through a referendum. I study the effects of this institution on the bills passed in the legislature and analyze the incentives it provides for reaching legislative deals. The proposer party’s trade-off between a larger winning prize and a more threatening opponent in the referendum summarizes the bargaining problem. The results indicate that measures of post-bargaining power do not necessarily translate into higher equilibrium payoffs and that the equilibrium bill may include no concessions from the majority to the minority party. Moreover, caps on campaign spending may incentivize a costly referendum over unanimity in the legislature. These results carry policy implications for regulating various forms of post-bargaining power, such as campaign finance laws for referenda.     

Voter turnout in a multidimensional policy space

Many factors influence the likelihood of citizens turning out to vote. In this paper we focus our attention on issue voting, that is, on the likelihood that different policies offered by politicians affect the probability of voting. If voters consider both the benefits and the costs of voting, rational voters will only vote when politicians offer differentiated policies. In a multidimensional policy space this implies that citizens only vote when they perceive enough difference on the issues they care about the most. We investigate the role of voter abstention due to indifference in a unidimensional and a multidimensional policy setting using data from the US National Election Studies for 1972–2000 and find support for our predictions: voters perceiving a small difference between the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties are less likely to vote; and voters who perceive the two parties as more different on a larger number of issues are significantly more likely to vote.     

Weighted representative democracy

We propose a new system of democratic representation. Any voter can choose any legislator as her representative; thus, different legislators can represent different numbers of voters. Decisions in the legislature are made by weighted majority voting, where the weight of each legislator is determined by the number of voters she represents. We show that, if the size of the electorate is very large, then with very high probability, the decisions obtained in the legislature agree with those which would have been reached by a popular referendum decided by simple majority vote.     

The behaviour of betting and currency markets on the night of the EU referendum

We study the behaviours of the Betfair betting market and the sterling/dollar exchange rate (futures price) during 24 June 2016, the night of the EU referendum. We investigate how the two markets responded to the announcement of the voting results by employing a Bayesian updating methodology to update prior opinion about the likelihood of the final outcome of the vote. We then relate the voting model to the real-time evolution of the market-determined prices as the results were announced. We find that, although both markets appear to be inefficient in absorbing the new information contained in the vote outcomes, the betting market seems less inefficient than the FX market. The different rates of convergence to the fundamental value between the two markets lead to highly profitable arbitrage opportunities.     

Vertical externalities and control of politicians

A major role of (repeated) elections is to create incentives for politicians to act in the interests of voters. This paper considers the disciplining role of elections in countries with either one or two levels of government. Simple retrospective voting strategies which are based on cut-off levels with respect to expenditure and tax rates are considered. It is shown that the power of voters is weakened if a second independent level of government is added. However, voters can partially reinforce their power by making politicians not only liable for their own policy, but also for the policy carried out at each other level of government. Received: June 30, 2000 / Accepted: April 4, 2001     

Capitalization and the Voucher: An Analysis of Precinct Returns from California''s Proposition 174

In 1993, Californians voted on a school voucher initiative. We hypothesize that homeowners in good school districts understood the voucher to be a threat to their property values and thus voted against it. Precinct returns from Los Angeles County confirm this hypothesis. We also examine an alternative hypothesis explaining the relationship between school quality and precinct returns. According to the alternative, voters perceived the initiative to be a referendum on public school quality. To distinguish between the two hypotheses, we compare the voting patterns of homeowners and renters. The comparison does not favor one hypothesis over the other.     

Dynamics in the fragmentation of political party systems

Fragmentation is an important dimension of political party systems. It concerns the proliferation of minor parties and the willingness of voters to vote for them. Past research relates party fragmentation to the voting system in a country; by Duverger's hypothesis, fragmentation should be highest in counties with proportional representation. The entropy measure is used to quantify fragmentation. The upper limit of fragmentation is analyzed in 24 countries, and the patterns of change in fragmentation are identified with mathematical difference equations, testing the idea that voters and parties evolve toward an equilibrium in fragmentation. The highest level of fragmentation is found comparable with a psychological limit on human information processing. In 17 of 22 countries, fragmentation moves toward an equilibrium, regardless of the type of voting system, and countries with higher equilibrium levels usually evolve more slowly. The results affirm the stability of democratic governments but raise questions about voters' strategies and suggest that some voters may try to control fragmentation when they vote.     

A Statistical Approach to Assess Referendum Results: the Venezuelan Recall Referendum 2004

This article presents a statistical approach to assess the coherence of official results of referendum processes. The statistical analysis described is divided in four phases, according to the methodology used and the corresponding results: (1) Initial Study, (2) Quantification of irregular certificates of election, (3) Identification of irregular voting centers and (4) Estimation of recall referendum results.
The technique of cluster analysis is applied to address the issue of heterogeneity of the parishes with respect to their political preferences.
The Venezuelan recall referendum 2004 is the case study we used to apply the proposed methodology, based on the data published by the "Consejo Nacional Electoral" (CNE-National Electoral Council). Finally, we present the conclusions of the study which we summarize as follows: The percentage of irregular certificates of election is between 22.2% and 26.5% of the total; 18% of the voting centers show an irregular voting pattern in their certificates of election, the votes corresponding to this irregularity are around 2,550,000; The result estimate, using the unbiased votes as representative of the population for the percentage of YES votes against President Chávez is 56.4% as opposed to the official result of 41%.     

Regional heterogeneity and U.S. presidential elections: Real-time 2020 forecasts and evaluation

This paper exploits cross-sectional variation at the level of U.S. counties to generate real-time forecasts for the 2020 U.S. presidential election. The forecasting models are trained on data covering the period 2000–2016, using high-dimensional variable selection techniques. Our county-based approach contrasts the literature that focuses on national and state level data but uses longer time periods to train their models. The paper reports forecasts of popular and electoral college vote outcomes and provides a detailed ex-post evaluation of the forecasts released in real time before the election. It is shown that all of these forecasts outperform autoregressive benchmarks. A pooled national model using One-Covariate-at-a-time-Multiple-Testing (OCMT) variable selection significantly outperformed all models in forecasting the U.S. mainland national vote share and electoral college outcomes (forecasting 236 electoral votes for the Republican party compared to 232 realized). This paper also shows that key determinants of voting outcomes at the county level include incumbency effects, unemployment, poverty, educational attainment, house price changes, and international competitiveness. The results are also supportive of myopic voting: economic fluctuations realized a few months before the election tend to be more powerful predictors of voting outcomes than their long-horizon analogs.     

A political economy model of road pricing

In this paper, we use a simple majority voting model to study the introduction of urban congestion tolls. The model allows for different types of uncertainty and considers different uses of the toll revenues. The following results are obtained. First, we show that individual uncertainty with respect to modal substitution costs may imply that a majority votes against road pricing ex ante, although a majority would have been in favor after its introduction ex post. Moreover, if a majority is against road pricing ex ante, there will also be no majority for organizing an experiment that would take away the individual uncertainty. Second, political uncertainty with respect to the use of the revenues corroborates the finding that ex ante more voters will be against the introduction of tolls. Third, both types of uncertainty suggest that fewer voters are against road pricing when toll revenues are used to subsidize public transport than when they are redistributed to all voters. Importantly, the results of this paper are consistent with a number of recent empirical observations on efforts to introduce road pricing, including the systematic rejection of road pricing in referenda, the more favorable attitudes towards road pricing after than before its introduction, and tying the toll revenues to support public transport.     

Comparing the impact of management support on police officers’ perceptions of discretionary power and engagement: Australia,USA and Malta

Abstract

This paper uses Social Exchange Theory as a lens for comparing the impact of management support upon police perceptions of discretionary power and employee engagement, across three countries. A survey-based, self-report process collected data from 193 police officers in Australia, 588 from the USA, and 249 from Malta. Structural equation modelling was used to analyse the data. The findings suggest a significantly different management support context across the three countries, as well as significantly different perceptions of discretionary power. Across the three countries, police perceived relatively poor satisfaction with organizational management support and only some engagement levels. However, USA police perceived significantly more discretionary power than the other country samples. These findings provide greater clarity about the link between management support, discretionary power and engagement for the police officers. Since employee engagement likely affects policing outcomes, the findings suggest that poor management support of police officers could negatively affect the provided service. Potential strategies to enhance police engagement include (a) training police managers about how to manage so as to promote greater engagement, and (b) modifying police managers’ performance indicators in line with achieving better police engagement.     

Economy and Race: Interactive Determinants of Property Crime in the United States, 1958-1995

ABSTRACT Drawing upon rational choice, routine activity, and social disorganization theories, this study investigates changes in rates of property crime known (reported) to police in the United States from 1958 to 1995. Predictor variables include changes in rates of inflation; technological, cyclical, and frictional unemployment; arrest rates for property crimes disaggregated by race (ARPCDR); the interaction of ARPCDR and technological unemployment (to test effects of rising unemployment on whites versus blacks); and a measure of police provisioning. A Beach-MacKinnon Full Maximum-Likelihood FGLS AR1 Method (accompanied by residual analysis) is employed. Significant positive effects are established for (a) inflation, (b) cyclical unemployment, (c) frictional unemployment, and (d) the interaction of white arrest rates and technological unemployment. Police provisioning is not found to be significant. Policy implications are explored along with future policy considerations.     

Intergenerational conflict and the political economy of higher education funding

We examine how a population's age distribution and a growing divide between the ethnic composition of older and young generations is likely to affect support for higher education funding. Using detailed survey data on voter preferences for higher education funding and precinct-level vote returns from locally-funded community college bond referenda in California, we find that older voters are significantly less supportive of higher education funding than younger voters and that support among older non-Hispanic white voters is particularly weak when those voters reside in a jurisdiction where the college-age population is more heavily Hispanic.     

Union security rights at the polls: A call for modeling right-to-work voting

From 1944 to 1986, 19 states held 27 referendums on right-to-work legislation, with 22.5 million people voting on the proposals. Despite its prominence as a public issue, most research on right-to-work laws focuses on their industrial relations impacts, and not on employees’ individual rights to refrain from joining unions or those same employees’ responsibilities to support their bargaining unit representative. Nor has there been any research on what citizen groups determine those rights and responsibilities in a right-to-work referendum. This study explores a potential operational model of anti-right-to-work voting with a multiple regression analysis of Missouri’s 1978 right-to-work election results, and hopes to serve as a stimulus to additional research on these particular dimensions of the right-to-work issue.