Interest linkages between the US,UK and German interest rates: should the UK join the European Monetary Union?

In light of continuing mixed results in the literature, this paper re‐examines the German Dominance Hypothesis (GDH) and considers whether the UK should join the Eurozone. For this purpose, short‐term interest rate relationships between the UK, Germany, the Eurozone and the USA, for the period January 1982 to June 2007, are studied. The policy implication of a loss of monetary autonomy for the UK in favour of Germany or the European Central Bank (ECB) would give support to the UK joining the EMU as an economic response. From the early 1980s the Bundesbank’s responsibility was to use money growth targets to keep average inflation rate down in the long run. This long run objective suggests that an appropriate methodology for testing the GDH is to test whether the German stochastic trend is a driving stochastic trend. In other words we determine whether a permanent shock to the German interest rate has a permanent effect on the UK interest rate. To this end the structural shocks in a VECM are identified by imposing long‐run restrictions of the type developed in King et al. (1991). We apply the same techniques to testing whether the UK has suffered a loss of monetary autonomy in favour of the ECB.     

Interest Rate Pass-Through: Empirical Results for the Euro Area

Abstract. This paper empirically examines the interest rate pass‐through at the euro area level. The focus is on the pass‐through of official interest rates, approximated by the overnight interest rate, to longer‐term market interest rates, which, in turn, are a proxy for the marginal costs for banks to attract deposits or grant loans, and therefore passed through to retail bank interest rates. Empirical results, on the basis of a (vector) error‐correction and vector autoregressive model, suggest that the pass‐through of official interest to market interest rates is complete for money market interest rates up to three months, but not for market interest rates with longer maturities. Furthermore, the immediate pass‐through of changes in market interest rates to bank deposit and lending rates is found to be at most 50%, whereas the final pass‐through is typically found to be close to 100%, in particular for lending rates. Empirical results for a sub‐sample starting in January 1999 show qualitatively similar findings and are supportive of a quicker interest rate pass‐through since the introduction of the euro. It is shown that the difference between the adjustment speed of bank deposit and lending rates (typically around one versus three months since the common monetary policy) can to a large extent significantly be explained by credit risk considerations.     

Surplus liquidity,central bank losses and the use of reserve requirements in emerging markets

Since the turn of the millennium, stocks of foreign reserves held by central banks in many emerging markets and developing countries have exceeded currency in circulation. To steer money market rates, these central banks have been absorbing liquidity from, rather than providing it to, the banking sector in their regular monetary policy operations. When interest rates in countries with major reserve currencies are low, the yield on foreign reserves is low. A higher interest rate on liquidity‐absorbing operations may expose central banks to losses. Although a central bank is not a profit‐maximizing institution, central bank losses can undermine the independence of the central bank. Using data for a large panel of central banks, this paper provides some evidence that central banks tend to apply low‐remunerated reserve requirements when profitability is at stake.     

Monetary policy rules with PID control features: evidence from the UK,USA and EU

ABSTRACT

This paper considers the extent to which the monetary policy operations of three major central banks can be regarded as an application of Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) control rules. The paper outlines the general PID framework and estimates a series of dynamic models to identify how interest rate policy adjustments are affected by the rate of inflation and the level of macroeconomic activity. The paper examines data for the UK, the USA and the Eurozone. The results suggest that the PID rules can provide a useful theoretical and empirical framework for estimating central bank responses to the inflation and macroeconomic activity variables by improving the explanatory power of the Taylor rule model and determining the effect of the parameters.     

LIQUIDITY,MONEY CREATION AND DESTRUCTION,AND THE RETURNS TO BANKING*

We build on our earlier model of money in which bank liabilities circulate as a medium of exchange. We investigate optimal bank behavior and the resulting provision of liquidity under a range of central bank regulations. In our model, banks issue inside money under fractional reserves, facing the possibility of excess redemptions. Banks consider the float resulting from money creation and make reserve‐management decisions that affect aggregate liquidity conditions. Numerical examples demonstrate positive bank failure rates when returns to banking are low. Central bank interventions may improve banks' returns and welfare through a reduction in bank failure.     

Money Demand in an EU Accession Country: A VECM Study of Croatia

The paper estimates the money demand in Croatia using monthly data from 1994 to 2002. A failure of the Fisher equation is found, and adjustment to the standard money‐demand function is made to include the inflation rate as well as the nominal interest rate. In a two‐equation cointegrated system, a stable money demand shows rapid convergence back to equilibrium after shocks. This function performs better than an alternative using the exchange rate instead of the inflation rate as in the ‘pass‐through’ literature on exchange rates. The results provide a basis for inflation rate forecasting and suggest the ability to use inflation targeting goals in transition countries during the EU accession process. Finding a stable money demand also limits the scope for central bank ‘inflation bias’.     

Neo‐Fisherism and inflation control

According to conventional central banking wisdom, an inflation‐targeting central bank should increase (decrease) its nominal interest rate target when inflation is above (below) its target. According to neo‐Fisherites, conventional central bankers have the sign wrong. Essentially all mainstream macroeconomic models tell us that increases in nominal interest rates increase inflation—in the short run and in the long run. This paper reviews neo‐Fisherian theory and evidence and addresses issues relating to inflation control in low real interest rate environments.     

The effectiveness of monetary policy in steering money market rates during the financial crisis

The financial crisis has deeply affected money markets and thus, potentially, the proper functioning of the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission. Therefore, we analyze the effectiveness of monetary policy in steering euro area money market rates by looking at (i) the predictability of money market rates on the basis of monetary policy expectations and (ii) the impact of extraordinary central bank measures on money market rates. We find that during the crisis money market rates up to 12 months still respond to revisions in the expected path of future rates, even though to a lesser extent than before August 2007. We attribute part of the loss in monetary policy effectiveness to money market rates being driven by higher liquidity premia and increased uncertainty about future interest rates. Our results also indicate that the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy measures as of October 2008 were effective in addressing the disruptions in the euro area money market. In fact, our estimates suggest that non-standard monetary policy measures helped to lower Euribor rates by more than 80 basis points. These findings show that central banks have effective tools at hand to conduct monetary policy in times of crises.     

Fixed exchange rates,independent central banks and price stability in postcommunist countries: Conservatism and credibility

Central bank independence (CBI) and fixed exchange rates are used by governments to achieve stable prices. This article analyzes the mechanisms through which the two monetary institutions could work: Indirectly via a disciplinary effect on money growth rates or via an additional credibility effect on inflation expectations and the cost of capital. I further explain how both discipline and credibility are affected by the distinct flaws of independent central banks and fixed exchange rates: central banks lack transparency and fixed exchange rates take many shapes and are routinely devalued. The argument is tested with quarterly data from postcommunist countries for years 1991 to 2007. The findings show a strong disciplinary effect of monetary institutions on rates of M2 change and an effect on inflation controlling for money growth, but credibility does not extend to lower real short‐term market interest rates. Political institutions do condition the effect of central bank independence, while the types of fixed exchange rates affect money growth rates and inflation to different degrees.     

Competition among banks and the pass-through of monetary policy

This paper introduces monopolistically competitive financial intermediaries into the New Keynesian DSGE setting. Modelling bank market power explicitly contributes to understanding two empirical facts: (i) The short-run transmission of changes in money market rates to bank retail rates is far from complete and heterogeneous. (ii) Stiffer competition among commercial banks implies that loan rates correlate more tightly with the policy rate. In my model, the degree of monopolistic competition in the banking sector has a sizeable impact on the pass-through of changes in the policy rate. In particular, a more competitive market for bank credit amplifies the efficiency of monetary policy.     

WEALTH,ASSET PORTFOLIO,MONEY DEMAND AND POLICY RULE

I look at the linkages between monetary policy and asset wealth using quarterly data for the USA. I show that a positive interest rate shock leads to a fall in aggregate wealth and an important change in portfolio composition: housing wealth gradually decreases, but the effects are very persistent; and financial wealth quickly shrinks, but the impact is short‐lived. I also find that the money market can be characterized as follows: (i) the money demand has a large interest elasticity and a small output elasticity; and (ii) the estimated monetary policy reaction function highlights the special focus given by the central bank to developments in monetary aggregates. These features call for an approach whereby monetary authorities put more emphasis on tracking wealth developments, in particular, given the asset portfolio rebalancing between money holdings and financial and/or housing assets.     

Monetary transmission with multiple policy rates: evidence from Turkey

Quantitative easing policies have led to persistent divergence between officially announced policy rates and short-term money market rates in many economies, making it challenging to assess the stance of monetary policy in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Lack of data variation in short-term interest rates across time dimension has made it difficult to identify the monetary transmission mechanisms. In order to shed some light on this topic, we make advantage of a specific period from Turkey during which the central bank deliberately allowed the policy rates to diverge frequently from the interbank rates due to capital flow management purposes. Using bank-level flow data from this episode, we investigate the relationship between various short-term interest rate measures and bank loan/deposit rates through panel estimation methods. Our findings suggest that interbank rates are more relevant than central bank’s officially announced rates for the transmission of monetary policy when the two diverge from each other persistently. Interbank rates particularly play a key role in the pricing of loans and deposits. These findings provide helpful guidance for evaluating the monetary stance under unconventional policies.     

Symmetric or Asymmetric Interest Rate Adjustments? Evidence from Southeastern Europe

The purpose of this paper is to examine how effectively the wholesale interest rates are transmitted to the retail rates and whether the interest rate passthrough is symmetric or asymmetric in Greece, Bulgaria, and Slovenia. The disaggregated general‐to‐specific methodology is applied for testing the symmetry hypothesis in these economies. It is evident from our results that variations exist across the countries examined regarding the monetary transmission process and the symmetry hypothesis alike. This can be interpreted as an indication of a different level of competition, development, and liberalization among the banking systems in these Southeastern European economies.     

Central banking,free banking,and financial crises

A Summary View In the Keynesian view, the central bank is a part of an extramarket remedy to a market malady. Investment markets are inherently unstable; government control of the economy's money supply is an important element in macroeconomic stabilization policy. The case against central banking—and for free banking—reverses the characterization of both remedy and malady. Free banking is a part of a market remedy to an extramarket malady. Even this stark reversal understates the case for free banking. It would remain valid even if we take the dramatic and chronic fiscal irresponsibility of the Treasury as given. Periodic crises that will inevitably occur in such a debt-ridden economic environment would be more ably countered by the market forces of free banking than by the policy moves of a central bank. But the extent of the Treasury's fiscal irresponsibility is itself dependent upon whether the Treasury can count on an accommodating central bank. Free banking limits the scope of this potential source of instability while at the same time enhancing the market's ability to deal with whatever instabilities that may persist.     

Money Creation in the Eurozone: An Empirical Assessment of the Endogenous and the Exogenous Money Theories

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to strengthen our understanding of the money creation process in the Eurozone for 1999–2016 period, through an empirical assessment of two main monetary theories, namely the (Post Keynesian) endogenous money theory and the (Monetarist) exogenous money theory. By applying a VAR and VECM methodology, we analyse the causal relationship among monetary reserves (or monetary base), bank deposits and bank loans. Our empirical analysis supports several propositions of the Post Keynesian endogenous money theory since (i) bank loans determine bank deposits, and (ii) bank deposits in turn determine monetary reserves.     

Central Banking and Post-Keynesian Economics

Abstract

The Post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money has given much attention to the role of the central bank in the money creation process. Circuit theory has neglected this role, in so far as it has focused on the relationship between banks and firms within a monetary production economy. The aim of this paper is therefore twofold. First, it intends to fill this gap in circuit theory, by providing a role for the central bank in settlement of interbank debts. Secondly, it aims at reinforcing the Post-Keynesian analysis of central bank money by considering both the money-purveying and the credit-purveying roles of the settlement institution in the interbank market. The result of this analysis is a more comprehensive theory of endogenous money, where the lender-of-last-resort facilities of a central bank are viewed as an endogenous phenomenon involving both a money creation and a credit operation between the central bank and the domestic banking system. In such a framework, monetary policy consists of setting the base rate of interest at a level that enables banks to limit their bilateral debt position in the interbank market, so as not to disrupt the workings of the payment system by either an illiquidity or an insolvency crisis.     

Institutional arrangements and public debt threshold limits

Inter-governmental Organisations, such as the IMF and OECD, advocate a medium-term reduction in deficit spending and public debt accumulation among advanced economies to satisfy conditions of fiscal sustainability. Buttressing the need for fiscal austerity, Reinhart and Rogoff claim to have identified a so-called tipping point, beyond which public debt accumulation negatively affects economic growth. While recent data seem to indicate that some Eurozone (non-sovereign) economies have reached a tipping point, for other advanced (sovereign) economies, such as the US, UK and Japan, this is not clear. The mainstream tipping point literature however does not recognise the importance of institutional arrangements for the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy. Furthermore, the literature sheds little light on the transmission mechanism between high public debt and low economic growth. This article draws on the principles of Modern Monetary Theory to discuss institutional arrangements and to justify the theoretical and empirical focus on Eurozone economies. The empirical analysis unpacks the transmission mechanism(s) to reveal that Eurozone economies have reached a public debt threshold limit with respect to long-term interest rates.     

A classroom experiment in monetary policy

The authors propose a classroom experiment implementing a simple version of a New Keynesian model suitable for courses in intermediate macroeconomics and money and banking. Students play as either the central bank or members of the private sector. The central banker sets interest rates to meet twin objectives for inflation and the output gap or to meet only an inflation target. In both settings, private sector agents are concerned with correctly forecasting the inflation rate. The authors show that an experiment implementing this setup is feasible and yields results that enhance understanding of the New Keynesian model of monetary policy. They propose alternative versions where the central bank is replaced by a policy rule and provide suggestions for discussing the experimental results with students.     

Over- and Underbidding in Central Bank Open Market Operations Conducted as Fixed Rate Tender

Abstract. Open market operations play a key role in allocating central bank funds to the banking system and thereby in steering short‐term interest rates in line with the stance of monetary policy. Many central banks apply so‐called ‘fixed rate tender’ auctions in their open market operations. This paper presents, on the basis of a survey of central bank experience, a model of bidding in such tenders. In their conduct of fixed rate tenders, many central banks faced specifically an ‘under‐’ and an ‘overbidding’ problem. These phenomena are revisited in the light of the proposed model, and the more general question of the optimal tender procedure and allotment policy of central banks is addressed.     

准备金制度功能的异化与我国准备金政策的取向

"利率走廊"调控是当前国际最新的利率调控范式,加拿大等国在"利率走廊"调控基础上,实行零准备制度,这使人们误认为准备金制度似乎走到头了.实际情况并非如此,其实行零准备金并非抛弃准备金制度,而是在利率调控的新背景下,以准备金为零的制度.它的机制和功能与传统准备金制度有很大的异化,但是却代表着准备金制度发展演变的趋势.所以研究准备金制度功能异化的动因,以及它未来的变动趋势,对于我国准备金制度的规范完善具有重要的借鉴意义.