共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 453 毫秒
1.
Siegfried K. Berninghaus Christian Korth Stefan Napel 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2007,17(5):579-603
This paper investigates agents who face a stylized pecuniary ‘game of life’ comprising the ultimatum game and the dictator
game. Utility may but need not be attached to equity and reciprocity, as formalized by Falk and Fischbacher (Games Econom Behav, 54(2): 293–315, 2006) but, critically, this social component of preferences cannot be conditioned on whether an ultimatum or a dictator game is
played. Evolutionary fitness of agents is determined solely by material success. Under these conditions, a strong preference
for reciprocity, but little interest in equity as such evolves. Possible exogenous constraints that link reciprocity and equity
concerns imply long-run levels of both which depend on the relative frequency of ultimatum vs. dictator interaction in agents’
multi-game environment.
Financial support from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
2.
Pelikan (J Evol Econ 21:341–366, 2011) develops an interesting conceptual framework that adds to prior work on generalised Darwinism. Despite claims to the contrary
we show that it is similar to the approach developed by Hodgson and Knudsen (J Evol Econ 16(4):343–366, 2006a, J Econ Behav Organ 75(1):12–24, 2010a, b), Aldrich et al. (J Evol Econ 18(5):577–596, 2008) and others. Pelikan also mischaracterises the Hodgson–Knudsen position over Lamarckism. We show why the term is misleading
(rather than strictly wrong) when applied to social evolution. 相似文献
3.
Truncated distributions commonly arise in economics and related areas, see, for example, Lee (Econ Lett 3:165–169, 1979), Lien (Econ Lett 19:243–247, 1985; Econ Lett 20:45–47, 1986), Burdett (Econ Lett 52:263–267, 1996), Sercu (Insur: Math and Econ 20:79–95, 1997), Abadir and Magdalinos (Econom Theory 18:1276–1287, 2002), and Horrace (J Econom 126:335–354, 2005). In this note, we consider the most commonly encountered truncated distributions with heavy tails: the truncated t distribution and the truncated F distribution. For each of these distributions, we derive explicit expressions for the moments and estimation procedures by
the method of moments and the method of maximum likelihood. An application is illustrated to a popular data set in the econometric
literature.
相似文献
4.
This paper, which builds on Chipman (The economist’s vision. Essays in modern economic perspectives, 131–162, 1998), analyzes a simple model formulated by Hurwicz (Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) of two agents—a polluter and a pollutee—and two commodities: “money” (standing for an exchangeable private good desired
by both agents) and “pollution” (a public commodity desired by the polluter but undesired by the pollutee). There is also
a government that issues legal rights to the two agents to emit a certain amount of pollution, which can be bought and sold
with money. It is assumed that both agents act as price-takers in the market for pollution rights, so that competitive equilibrium
is possible. The “Coase theorem” (so-called by Stigler (The theory of price, 1966) asserts that the equilibrium amount of pollution is independent of the allocation of pollution rights. A sufficient condition
for this was (in another context) obtained by Edgeworth (Giorn Econ 2:233–245, 1891), namely that preferences of the two agents be “parallel” in the money commodity, whose marginal utility is constant. Hurwicz
(Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) argued that this parallelism is also necessary. This paper, which provides an exposition of the problem, raises some questions
about this result and provides an alternative necessary and sufficient condition. 相似文献
5.
Gianluigi Guido M. Irene Prete Alessandro M. Peluso R. Christian Maloumby-Baka Carolina Buffa 《International Review of Economics》2010,57(1):79-102
The aim of the present study is to examine the role of ethical dimensions and product personality in the purchasing intention
of organic food products. The Prospect method (Caprara et al. in Test Psicomet Metodol 7(3–4):113–128, 2000), which integrates the Five factors model of personality (cf. Digman in Annu Rev Psychol 41(1):417–440, 1990) and the Theory of planned behavior (Ajzen in Organ Behav Hum Decis Process, 50(2):179–211, 1991) extended to an ethical dimension, was employed, by using a Structural Equation Modeling approach. Results showed that moral norms—i.e., personal beliefs regarding what is right or wrong (Parker et al. in Br J Soc Psychol, 34(2):127–137, 1995)—can be considered the main motivator of purchasing intention, and they are, in turn, affected by subjective norms and product personality traits of Naturalness and Authenticity. Marketing implications for firms operating in the organic food industry are discussed, in their intent to shift from a “niche”
market to a broader diffusion of these products. 相似文献
6.
Is the monetary policy rule responsive to exchange rate changes? The case of Indonesia,Malaysia, the Philippines,and Thailand 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Yu Hsing 《International Review of Economics》2009,56(2):123-132
Extending Obstfeld and Rogoff (J Econ Perspect 9:73–96, 1995), Ball (Monetary policy rules, University of Chicago Press, pp. 127–144, 1999), Svensson (J Int Econ 50: 155–183, 2000), Taylor (Am Econ Rev 91: 263–267, 2001), Gali and Gertler (J Econ Perspect 21:25–46, 2007), and others, this paper finds that central banks in the Philippines and Thailand respond negatively to the current real
exchange rate and positively to the lagged real exchange rate whereas central banks in Indonesia and Malaysia do not react
to the current or lagged real exchange rate. For the Philippines and Thailand, the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients
of the current and lagged real exchange rates is zero cannot be rejected at the 5% level. Central banks in these four countries
respond positively to the inflation rate and the output gap, suggesting that the concept of a simple or an extended Taylor
rule would apply to these countries. Monetary policy reaction functions for Indonesia and Thailand are steeper than those
for Malaysia and the Philippines and would be more responsive to a change in the inflation rate.
相似文献
7.
This paper studies the optimal pricing of a two-sided monopoly platform when one side is affected by congestion. We show that
the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy (or skewed pricing) depends not only on the relative magnitude of the sides’ price
elasticities of demand but it also depends on the marginal congestion cost that an agent imposes on the others. Compared with
the no-congestion case, this pricing strategy gives rise to some interesting features that violate the results of Rochet and
Tirole (J Eur Econ Assoc 1:990–1029 in 2003, Rand J Econ 37:645–667 in 2006). In the case of equal price elasticities of demand, the no-congested side is charged the highest price. On the other hand,
in the case of different price elasticities, the platform congestion pricing depends on a certain threshold of the marginal
congestion cost. We show, under some conditions, that the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy is reversed. In the social context,
the Rochet and Tirole’s (J Eur Econ Assoc 1:990–1029 in 2003) cost allocation condition is modified by the congestion cost. We show that the congestion does not only affect the buyers’
contribution to the sellers’ surplus, but it also affects the sellers’ contribution to the buyers’. 相似文献
8.
Graciela Chichilnisky 《Economic Theory》2012,49(2):293-307
Market objectives can conflict with long-term goals. Behind the conflict is the impatience axiom introduced by T. Koopmans to describe choices over time. The conflict is resolved here by introducing a new concept,
sustainable markets. These differ from Arrow-Debreu markets in that traders have sustainable preferences and no bounds on short sales. Sustainable preferences are sensitive to the basic needs of the present without sacrificing
the needs of future generations and embody the essence of sustainable development (Chichilnisky in Soc Choice Welf 13(2):231–257,
1996a; Res Energy Econ 73(4):467–491, 1996b). Theorems 1 and 2 show that limited arbitrage is a necessary and sufficient condition describing diversity and ensuring the existence of a sustainable market equilibrium
where the invisible hand delivers sustainable as well as efficient solutions (Chichilnisky in Econ Theory 95:79–108, 1995; Chichilnisky and Heal in Econ Theory 12:163–176, 1998). In sustainable markets prices have a new role: they reflect both the value of instantaneous consumption and the value of
the long-run future. The latter are connected to the independence of the axiom of choice at the foundations of mathematics
(Godel 1940). 相似文献
9.
Siegfried K. Berninghaus Karl-Martin Ehrhart Marion Ott Bodo Vogt 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2007,17(3):317-347
It is the main aim of our paper to study network formation in experimental setups in discrete and continuous time. Our design
is inspired by the theoretical model on network formation by Bala and Goyal (Econometrica, 68(5): 1181–1229, 2000) as well as the experiments by Callander and Plott (J. Public Econ., 89: 1469–1495, 2005) and Falk and Kosfeld (IEW Working Paper, University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland, No. 146, 2003). In particular, we analyze the role of star-shaped networks which are strict Nash-equilibria of the corresponding network
formation game. Our experimental results show that strict Nash networks prove to be a good indicator for predicting network
formation, particularly in continuous time. In explaining our results, it turns out that, among others, the complexity in
coordinating on stars, the inequity aversion against unequal payoff distribution in the network, and the groups’ degrees of
activity are the most important determinants for the formation of strict Nash networks.
相似文献
10.
Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with semipublic firms 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed market where a firm jointly owned by the public sector and private domestic
shareholders (a semipublic firm) competes with n private firms. We show that there is an equilibrium in which firms take production decisions simultaneously. This result
is strikingly different from that obtained by Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998), who shows that when a public firm competes with n private firms all firms producing simultaneously in the same period cannot be sustained as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
outcome. Our result differs from that of Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) for two reasons: firstly, we consider that there is a semipublic firm rather than a public firm. Secondly, Pal (Econ Lett
61:181–185, 1998) considers that the public firm is less efficient than private firms while in our paper all firms are equally efficient. 相似文献
11.
Ensar Yilmaz 《Empirica》2010,37(3):253-269
This paper firstly discusses the impact of inflation on real output in different theoretical models and then investigates
this impact empirically in an economy facing persistent high inflation. We find some evidence of Sidrauski’s (Am Econ Rev
57:534–544, 1967) superneutrality of money for Turkey in the long run. However, it seems that inflation affects real output negatively in
the short run. These results are more compatible with a class of utility functions in which real money balances and consumption
are perfect complements as Asako (Econometrica 51(5):1593–1596, 1983) elucidates. 相似文献
12.
Beat Hintermann 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2011,49(3):327-349
Market power in permit markets has been examined in some detail following the seminal work of Hahn (Q J Econ 99(4):753–765,
1984), but the effect of free allocation on price manipulation with market power in both product and permit market has not been
fully addressed. I show that in this case, the threshold of free allocation above which a dominant firm will set the permit
price above its marginal abatement costs is below its optimal emissions in a competitive market, and that overall efficiency
cannot be achieved by means of permit allocation alone. In addition to being of general economic interest, this issue is relevant
in the context of the EU ETS. I find that the largest German, UK and Nordpool power generators received free allowances in
excess of the derived threshold. Conditional on having price-setting power in both the electricity and permit markets, these
firms would have found it profitable to manipulate the permit price upwards despite being net permit buyers. 相似文献
13.
Dimitris K. Christopoulos 《Empirica》2007,34(3):273-280
This short paper explores the relationship between investment and saving rates in a sample of 13 OECD countries over the period
1885–1992. To this end, I employ panel cointegration tests based on the maximum likelihood approach developed by Johansen
(J Economic Dynamics Control 12:231–254, 1988) instead of conventional panel cointegration residual based tests, in order to draw sharper conclusions. Using estimation
techniques appropriate for heterogeneous panels I find a low degree of capital mobility for the sub-periods 1921–1992 and
1950–1992. The findings overwhelmingly support the hypothesis of perfect capital mobility in the short run.
相似文献
Dimitris K. ChristopoulosEmail: |
14.
Erik J. Balder 《Economic Theory》2011,48(1):47-65
For games with discontinuous payoffs Simon and Zame (Econometrica 58:861–872, 1990) introduced payoff indeterminacy, in the form of endogenous sharing rules, which are measurable selections of a certain payoff
correspondence. Their main result concerns the existence of a mixed Nash equilibrium and an associated sharing rule. Its proof
is based on a discrete approximation scheme “from within” the payoff correspondence. Here, we present a new, related closure
result for games with possibly noncompact action spaces, involving a sequence of Nash equilibria. In contrast to Simon and
Zame (Econometrica 58:861–872, 1990), this result can be used for more involved forms of approximation, because it contains more information about the endogenous
sharing rule. With such added precision, the closure result can be used for the actual computation of endogenous sharing rules
in games with discontinuous payoffs by means of successive continuous interpolations in an approximation scheme. This is demonstrated
for a Bertrand type duopoly game and for a location game already considered by Simon and Zame. Moreover, the main existence
result of Simon and Zame (Econometrica 58:861–872, 1990) follows in two different ways from the closure result. 相似文献
15.
Friederike Mengel 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2009,19(3):397-415
We analyze a local interaction model where agents play a bilateral prisoner’s dilemma game with their neighbors. Agents learn
about behavior through payoff-biased imitation of their interaction neighbors (and possibly some agents beyond this set).
We find that the Eshel et al. (Am Econ Rev 88:157–179, 1998) result that polymorphic states are stochastically stable in such a setting is not robust. In particular, whenever agents
use information also of some agents beyond their interaction neighbors, the unique stable outcome is one where everyone chooses
defection. Introducing a sufficiently strong conformist bias into the imitation process, we find that full cooperation always
emerges. Conformism is thus identified as a new mechanism that can stabilize cooperation.
相似文献
Friederike MengelEmail: |
16.
This paper proposes a three-parameter statistical model of income distribution by exploiting recent developments on the use
of deformed exponential and logarithm functions as suggested by Kaniadakis (Phys A 296:405–425, 2001; Phys Rev E 66:056125, 2002; Phys Rev E 72:036108, 2005). Formulas for the shape, moments and standard tools for inequality measurement are given. The model is shown to fit remarkably
well the personal income data for Great Britain, Germany and the United States in different years, and its empirical performance
appears to be competitive with that of other existing distributions. 相似文献
17.
The Coasean theory of the firm (Coase in Economica 4:386–405, 1937) has flourished with the theory of incomplete contracts. Transaction costs in the form of enforcement costs have been deemed to be the main determinants of the decision to ‘make’ versus ‘buy’. Surprisingly, this stream of literature has almost neglected that transaction costs may also generate incomplete property rights (Coase in J Law Econ 3:1–44, 1960). As firm’s activities entail both contractual and property rights, these two domains interfere each other on the decision to carry out a transaction within the firm. When property rights are incomplete, potential externalities may increase the cost of using the price mechanism to procure the assets needed in a given transaction. The resulting ‘Coasean firm’ would not only centralize incomplete contracts under a unified governance system, but it will also aggregate incomplete property rights under a unified ownership structure. 相似文献
18.
Paresh Kumar Narayan 《International Advances in Economic Research》2008,14(3):280-290
In this paper we analyze per capita incomes of the G7 countries using the common cycles test developed by Vahid and Engle
(Journal of Applied Econometrics, 8:341–360, 1993) and extended by Hecq et al. (Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 62:511–532, 2000; Econometric Reviews, 21:273–307, 2002) and the common trend test developed by Johansen (Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 12:231–254, 1988). Our main contribution is that we impose the common cycle and common trend restrictions in decomposing the innovations into
permanent and transitory components. Our main finding is permanent shocks explain the bulk of the variations in incomes for
the G7 countries over short time horizons, and is in sharp contrast to the bulk of the recent literature. We attribute this
to the greater forecasting accuracy achieved, which we later confirm through performing a post sample forecasting exercise,
from the variance decomposition analysis.
相似文献
Paresh Kumar NarayanEmail: |
19.
Spatial Welfare Economics Versus Ecological Footprint: A Sensitivity Analysis Introducing Strong Sustainability 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
The aim of this paper is a sensitivity analysis with the core-periphery model of ‘new economic geography’ put forward in Grazi
et al. (Environ Resour Econ 38:135–153, 2007). This model comprises interregional trade, agglomeration advantages and resource (land) use or environmental externalities.
Grazi et al. (2007, GBR) compare a social welfare (SW) indicator with the ecological footprint (EF) indicator for measuring spatial sustainability
of a set of land use configurations. Their main result is that the SW and the EF indicator can yield completely different
rankings and only for extreme parameterizations of environmental externalities the rankings coincide. We adapt the model by
interpreting total natural land as a resource constraint and differentiate between weak and strong sustainability. In a sensitivity
analysis we show that the main results of GBR (2007) correspond to the case of weak sustainability in our adapted model version. In the case of strong sustainability our adapted
model version shows the same welfare rankings for both indicators without the extreme parameterization that is necessary to
obtain the same results in the original GBR (2007) model. 相似文献
20.
We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information
on the states of nature. Our aim was to describe the equilibrium price formation and analyze how the lack of information may
affect the allocation of resources. To do so, we adapt to an asymmetric information scenario a variant of the Shapley–Shubik
game introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (J Math Econ 39:391–400, 2003 ). 相似文献