Measures of the riskiness of banking organizations: Subordinated debt yields,risk-based capital,and examination ratings

Recently there have been a number of recommendations to increase the role of subordinated debt (SND) in satisfying bank capital requirements as a preferred means to discipline the risk-taking behavior of systemically important banks. One such proposal recommended using SND yield spreads as the triggers for mandatory supervisory action under prompt corrective action guidelines introduced in US banking legislation in the early 1990s. Currently such action is prompted by bank capital ratios. Evidence from previous research suggests that yield information may be a better predictor of bank problems. This paper empirically analyzes potential costs and benefits of using SND signals to trigger prompt corrective action.     

Market discipline of banks: Why are yield spreads on bank-issued subordinated notes and debentures not sensitive to bank risks?

The default risk sensitivity of yield spreads on bank-issued subordinated notes and debentures (SNDs) decreased after banks started issuing trust-preferred securities (TPS). The too-big-to-fail (TBTF) discount on yield spreads is absent prior to the LTCM bailout, but the size discount doubles after the LTCM bailout. Prior to TPS issuance and the LTCM bailout, SND yield spreads are sensitive to conventional firm-specific default risk measures, but not after the bailout. We find paradigm shift in determinants of yield spreads after the LTCM bailout. Yield spreads on TPS are sensitive to default risks and can provide an additional source of market discipline.     

Do subordinated debt holders discipline bank risk-taking? Evidence from risk management decisions

I test the market discipline of bank risk hypothesis by examining whether banks choose risk management policies that account for the risk preferences of subordinated debt holders. Using around 500,000 quarterly observations on the population of U.S. insured commercial banks over the 1995–2009 period, I document that the ratio of subordinated debt affects bank risk management decisions consistent with the market discipline hypothesis only when subordinated debt is held by the parent holding company. In particular, the subordinated debt ratio increases the likelihood and the extent of interest rate derivatives use for risk management purposes at bank holding company (BHC)-affiliated banks, where subordinated debt holders have a better access to information needed for monitoring and control rights provided by equity ownership. At non-affiliated banks, a higher subordinated debt ratio leads to risk management decisions consistent with moral hazard behavior. The analysis also shows that the too-big-to-fail protection prevents market discipline even at BHC-affiliated banks.     

强制性次级债与商业银行的公司治理

对于商业银行而言,次级债除了具有补充资本、融通资金的功能外,还具有特殊的公司治理功效。基于这一视角,本文对次级债在商业银行公司治理中功效的比较优势进行了论述,介绍了强制性次级债市场约束效用的两步骤分析框架,并就强制性次级债政策提供了相应评论。本文得出以下研究结论:恰当的强制性次级债政策有助于商业银行公司治理的完善以及国内金融生态的改善;为了确保MSDP(MandatorySubordinatedDebtPolicy)的投资者确实具备对银行风险变化进行监督和有所反应的动机,应该对由“内部人”持有的债券数量进行限制并完善信息披露制度;加快推进国有商业银行的股份制改革,培育市场化的发债主体和机构投资者是实施MSDP的必要基础条件。     

Bank Contingent Capital: Valuation and the Role of Market Discipline

This paper develops a structural model to evaluate contingent capital notes (CCN) of Basel III under alternative regulatory closure rules. Our dynamic model has a fixed default barrier and at specific discrete time points an additional higher default barrier depending on the closure threshold. The closed-form expressions of CCN and subordinated debts (SD) in the simple Merton model are presented to understand the convex relationship between the price and capital ratio trigger of CCN and to examine the effects of closure rules on CCN and SD through their derivatives’ properties. Our numerical results in the more general model show that a lax closure rule increases the price of SD and distorts the risk information of issuing banks, but not so for CCN. The policy implications are that CCN are more effective than SD in terms of enhancing market discipline because the price/yield information of CCN is more sensitive to the issuing bank’s risk than SD and will not be distorted by regulatory closure rules.     

Raising rival's costs in the securities settlement industry

The competition between a central securities depository (CSD) and a custodian bank is analyzed in a Stackelberg model. Investor banks decide whether to use the services of the CSD or of the custodian bank, depending on the prices and their preferences for their inhomogeneous services. Since the custodian bank uses services provided by the CSD as input, the CSD can raise its rival's costs. The CSD's equilibrium market share is higher than socially optimal, unless the CSD is not allowed to charge negative prices. This result has important policy implications that are related to a discussion currently taking place in the securities settlement industry.     

The relative contributions of equity and subordinated debt signals as predictors of bank distress during the financial crisis

Bank supervisors utilize early warning signals to predict which banks are likely to become distressed. Previous research has found that market discipline signals do not significantly improve out-of-sample forecasts relative to accounting-based signals. Most of that evidence, however, comes from periods in the 1990s when the U.S. economy and banking system were healthy, potentially neutralizing an advantage of market signals to incorporate new information quickly. For the period between the fourth quarters of 2006 and 2012, we assess the accuracy of two market signals – expected default frequency (EDF) and subordinated note and debenture (SND) yield spreads – relative to accounting-based signals in forecasting which publicly traded BHCs would become distressed. In 2008, EDF signals were relatively more accurate, but they did not lead to economically significant reductions in missed distress events relative to other signals. Supervisors would have been better off devoting slack resources to monitor BHCs with high commercial real estate concentrations. As the crisis subsided, a failure probability model developed from bank failures in the 1980s and early 1990s was consistently the most accurate signal. For the two dozen BHCs with actively traded SNDs, yield spreads over Treasuries were extremely poor predictors of distress because the spreads were distorted by too-big-to-fail subsidies. The Tier 1 leverage ratio was the most accurate distress signal for these large BHCs. In sum, the evidence to justify systematic reliance on market signals by supervisory agencies to forecast bank distress remains weak.     

A Cross‐Country Analysis of the Bank Supervisory Framework and Bank Performance

Ongoing changes in the structure and nature of banking, as well as banking crises across the globe have focused the attention of policy makers on the appropriate structure, scope, and degree of independence of banking supervision. Key issues for banking supervision structure are whether there should be one or multiple supervisory authorities, and whether the central bank should be involved in bank supervision. The issue pertaining to the scope of supervision is whether bank supervisory authorities should supervise other financial service industries, including in particular securities and insurance. Finally, the issue regarding the independence of supervisory authorities is the degree to which bank supervisors should be subject to political and economic policy pressure and influence. How these issues are addressed is important, because policies that fail to provide for an appropriate bank supervisory framework may undermine bank performance and even lead to full‐scale banking crises. The intense interest policy makers have shown in these issues has not been matched, however, by researchers. In particular, there is very little systematic empirical evidence on how, or indeed whether, the structure, scope, or independence of bank supervision affects the banking industry. This paper addresses this gap in three respects. First, drawing on the existing literature, we discuss the various policy issues surrounding the structure, scope, and degree of independence of bank supervision. Second, we provide comparative information on the actual choices that have been made regarding these three aspects of supervision across a wide range of developed and emerging market economies. Third, using both country‐specific data for 55 countries in all parts of the world, and data for over 2,300 individual banks in those countries, we examine the relationship between the structure, scope, and independence of bank supervision and one key dimension of the banking industry – bank profitability. Our results indicate, at most, a weak influence for the structure of supervision on bank performance. In particular, we find some evidence that a single‐supervisor system enhances bank performance. However, following our discussion of the caution one must use in interpreting data on the supervisory framework, our re‐estimates using an alternative source of data on the structure of supervision failed to duplicate this result. Our results have a bearing on a key dimension of the policy debate on how to structure supervision. In particular, given the dearth of empirical evidence on the issues, advocates of one form or another of supervisory structure have asserted that a particular change is likely to affect (favorably or adversely, as the advocate sees fit) the performance of banks. Our results provide little support at best to the belief that any particular bank supervisory structure will greatly affect bank performance. This is significant, because it suggests that the on‐going debate might more broadly focus on the impact of the supervisory structure on other aspects of the health of the banking system, including individual bank safety and soundness, systemic stability, and the development of the banking system.     

Funding advantage and market discipline in the Canadian banking sector

We employ a comprehensive data set and a variety of methods to provide evidence on the magnitude of large banks’ funding advantage in Canada in addition to the extent to which market discipline exists across different securities issued by the Canadian banks. The banking sector in Canada provides a unique setting in which to examine market discipline along with the prospects of proposed reforms because Canada has no history of government bailouts, and an implicit government guarantee has been in effect consistently since the 1920s. We find that large banks have a funding advantage over small banks after controlling for bank-specific and market risk factors. Large banks on average pay 80 basis points and 70 basis points less, respectively, on their deposits and subordinated debt. Working with hand-collected market data on debt issues by large banks, we also find that market discipline exists for subordinated debt and not for senior debt.     

Did the Market Signal Impending Problems at Northern Rock? An Analysis of Four Financial Instruments

The academic literature has regularly argued that market discipline can support regulatory authority mechanisms in ensuring banking sector stability. This includes, amongst other things, using forward‐looking market prices to identify those credit institutions that are most at risk of failure. The paper's key aim is to analyse whether market investors signalled potential problems at Northern Rock in advance of the bank announcing that it had negotiated emergency lending facilities at the Bank of England in September 2007. A further aim of the paper is to examine the signalling qualities of four financial market instruments (credit default swap spreads, subordinated debt spreads, implied volatility from options prices and equity measures of bank risk) so as to explore both the relative and individual qualities of each. The paper's findings, therefore, contribute to the market discipline literature on using market data to identify bank risk‐taking and enhancing supervisory monitoring. Our analysis suggests that private market participants did signal impending financial problems at Northern Rock. These findings lend some empirical support to proposals for the supervisory authorities to use market information more extensively to improve the identification of troubled banks. The paper identifies equities as providing the timeliest and clearest signals of bank condition, whilst structural factors appear to hamper the signalling qualities of subordinated debt spreads and credit default swap spreads. The paper also introduces idiosyncratic implied volatility as a potentially useful early warning metric for supervisory authorities to observe.     

Seniority Differentials in High Yield Bonds: Evolution,Valuation, and Ratings

Almost 20 years ago, one of the coauthors of this article published a study that reported finding systematically wider yield spreads on senior corporate bonds than on subordinated bonds with the same credit rating, but issued by different companies. The study also showed that this difference in spreads did not represent a market “anomaly” or failure to price risk correctly, but instead reflected differences in the actual, and hence the expected, loss rates of the securities. And such differences were in turn shown to stem from the practice of the rating agencies—which was abandoned about ten years ago—of rating a given issuer's subordinated debt two “notches” below that of its senior debt. Partly in response to this finding, all of the major agencies modified their use of this “two‐notch” convention by initiating in‐depth fundamental analysis of subordinated issuers on a case‐by‐case basis. In the meantime, the near disappearance of subordinated debt in the high yield market since the global financial crisis and its partial replacement by secured debt has furnished the authors of this article with a seemingly related “anomaly” to explore—namely, the tendency of secured bonds to have higher yields than samerated senior unsecured bonds. As in the earlier study of the senior‐subordinated puzzle, the authors' analysis confirms that the market has been properly pricing the relative risks of the different securities by showing that the actual loss rates of the secured issues have been systematically higher than those of like‐rated senior unsecured issues. The clear suggestion of these findings, as in the case of the earlier study, is that those investors who have chosen to incur the costs of analyzing expected loss rates instead of relying solely on the ratings have been rewarded for their efforts. And if the past is a guide to the future, this article may also succeed in spurring the rating agencies to make further refinements to their methods.     

Does the market discipline banks? New evidence from regulatory capital mix

While bank capital requirements permit a bank to freely substitute between equity and subordinated debt, lenders and investors view debt and equity as imperfect substitutes. It follows that, after controlling for the level of regulatory capital, the mix of debt in capital isolates the role that the market plays in disciplining banks. I document that the mix of debt in capital affects bank behavior, but only when investors can impose real constraints. In particular, the mix of debt reduces the probability of failure and future distress for BHC-affiliated institutions (where the investor has control rights through an equity position) and for stand-alone banks before the Basel Accord (when debt issues included restrictive covenants). However, substituting equity for subordinated debt at the bank holding company level or in stand-alone banks since the Basel Accord (where the investor has few protections) only increases the probability of distress and failure.     

Supervisor and Market Analysts: What Should Research be Seeking?

This article is primarily directed towards examining the desirability of incorporating market signals in the process of supervision of commercial banks by regulators and insurers. But the ideas developed here can also be applied to the general problem of using market information to assess the solvency and safety of any financial or non-financial institution.Market prices and yields of securities anticipate actions by regulators, central banks, and other players due to the fact that such actions may materially influence the risk and the expected return associated with investment decisions pertaining to those securities. It is well known that the yield curve of government securities such as T-bills, T-notes and T-bonds reflect the market's consensus regarding the actions that the Federal reserve may take as they pertain to the valuation of such securities. The extent to which the market has already discounted the future actions of the central bank will no doubt play a role in the way in which the central bank may think about its actions, its actual effect and how it relates to its intended effects.The extent to which market prices can provide useful guides depends on the underlying market structure and the practices in the industry.While markets may do lot of the hard work in aggregating and incorporating future actions, the task of supervision and regulation can never be put on automatic pilot. Ideally, supervisory policies should effectively combine the market signals with initiatives that serve to maintain the safety and the soundness of the underlying markets. I will begin by exploring the extent to which equity prices may be used as a signal of bank credit risk. I will then explore the advantages and disadvantages of using subordinated debt securities to derive a market signal.     

The Effect of Lender Identity on a Borrowing Firm's Equity Return

Previous research demonstrates that a firm's common stock price tends to fall when it issues new public securities. By contrast, commercial bank loans elicit significantly positive borrower returns. This article investigates whether the lender's identity influences the market's reaction to a loan announcement. Although we find no significant difference between the market's response to bank and nonbank loans, we do find that lenders with a higher credit rating are associated with larger abnormal borrower returns. This evidence complements earlier findings that an auditor's or investment banker's perceived “quality” signals valuable information about firm value to uninformed market investors.     

Testing for Opaqueness in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Bond Credit Ratings

The question of whether banks are relatively more opaque than non-banking firms is empirically investigated by analyzing the disagreement between rating agencies (split ratings) on 2,473 bonds issued by European firms during the 1993–2003 period. Four main results emerge from the empirical analysis. First, fewer bank issues have split ratings overall, but the predicted probability of a split rating is higher for banks after controlling for risk and other issue characteristics. Second, subordinated bonds are subject to more disagreement between rating agencies. Third, bank opaqueness increases with financial assets and decreases with bank fixed assets. Fourth, bank opaqueness increases with bank size and capital ratio. The implications of these findings for regulatory policy are also discussed. All errors remain those of the author. This paper was prepared while the author was visiting the Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate at the Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Florida.     

推进信贷资产证券化需进一步探索的几个问题

当前,我国信贷资产证券化虽然仍处于试点阶段,但是推进力度正在加大。为在进一步加强风险防控的同时调动金融机构参与资产证券化活动的积极性,文章围绕“选择什么样的证券化基础资产”“发起机构应留多大比例的次级档资产支持证券”“怎样拓宽资产证券化产品的投资者范围”等现实问题展开深入探讨,就进一步推动资产证券化市场活跃发展、助力经济结构调整提出相关政策建议。     

Contrasting Worldviews at Bank and Securities Market Regulators

Bank and securities regulators operate with different attitudes about the appropriate regulation of financial institutions and markets. Bank regulators’ prudential oversight protects depositors from worrying about the repayment of their bank claims. In contrast, securities market regulators tend to presume that security markets (almost) always clear quickly at prices close to the asset's fundamental value. These regulators seek to assure full disclosure of information, which facilitates active securities trading. In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) investor protection duties are tailored to the financial sophistication of individual investors.     

Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation

Trading losses associated with information asymmetries can be mitigated by designing securities which split the cash flows of underlying assets. These securities, which can arise endogenously, have values that do not depend on the information known only to informed agents. Bank debt (deposits) is an example of this type of liquid security which protect relatively uninformed agents, and we provide a rationale for deposit insurance in this content. High-grade corporate debt and government bonds are other examples, implying that a money market mutual fund-based payments system may be an alternative to one based on insured bank deposits.     

Bank underwriting of debt securities: modern evidence

This article examines debt securities underwritten by Section20 subsidiaries of bank holding companies relative to thoseunderwritten by investment houses. Consistent with a net certificationeffect for banks, bank underwriting of lower credit rated firmsto whom the bank lends results in relatively higher prices (loweryields). We find no evidence of conflicts of interest even whenan issue is used to repay bank debt. Further, banks bring arelatively larger proportion of small issues to the market.Contrary to the contention that universal banking stunts availabilityof finance to small firms, bank underwritings appear to benefitsmall firms.     

Monitoring and Controlling Bank Risk: Does Risky Debt Help?

We examine whether mandating banks to issue subordinated debt would enhance market monitoring and control risk taking. To evaluate whether subordinated debt enhances risk monitoring, we extract the credit‐spread curve for each banking firm in our sample and examine whether changes in credit spreads reflect changes in bank risk variables, after controlling for changes in market and liquidity variables. We do not find strong and consistent evidence that they do. To evaluate whether subordinated debt controls risk taking, we examine whether the first issue of subordinated debt changes the risk‐taking behavior of a bank. We find that it does not.