强制性次级债与商业银行的公司治理

对于商业银行，而言，次级债除了具有补充资本、融通资金的功能外，还具有特殊的会司活理功效，基于这一视角．本文对次级债在商业银行公司治理中功效的比较优势进行了论述，介绍了强制性次级债市场约束效甩的两步骤分析框架．并就强制性次级债政策提供了相应评论。本文得出以下研究结论：恰当的强制性次级债政策有助于商业银行公司治理的完善以及国内金融生态的改善：为了确保MSDP（Mandatory Subordinated Debt Policv）的投资者确实具备时银行风险变化进行监督和有所反应的动机，应该对由“内部人”持有的债券数量进行限制并完善信息技露制度；加快推进国有商业银行的股份制改革，培育市场化的发债主体和机构投资者是实施MSDP的必要基础条件。     

商业银行次级债券发行：绩效、挑战与发展策略

本文首先对商业银行发行次级债券这项金融制度安排的制度绩效进行了全面深入的分析,认为商业银行发行次级债还面临着来自认识偏误、市场基础脆弱、银行财务承受能力不高、制度基础不健全等方面的现实挑战.本文认为,要应对这些挑战,充分发挥次级债券的制度绩效,必须从金融基础建设,次级债发行、流通的市场化、规范化和标准化,信息披露机制健全,债券信用评级制度完善和机构投资者队伍培育等方面积极努力.     

商业银行次级债新规：资本约束和市场约束双重功效

中国银监会于2009年10月21日向各大商业银行下发《关于完善商业银行资本补充机制的通知》,对次级债券的发行做了比较大的调整和修改。次级债券具有资本约束和市场约束双重功能,此次次级债改革不仅有利于次级债资本约束能力提高,同时也加强了其市场约束。如何进一步提高次级债券对商业银行的约束功能,可以从继续坚持次级债为资本金补充重要手段、大力发展次级债发行和交易市场、减轻政府对商业银行的隐性担保和扩大次级债的投资群体四个方面着手。     

对当前商业银行密集发行次级债补充资本金的思考

当前，我国商业银行补充资本金的一个常用手段是发行次级债，但我国商业银行次级债市场存在发行目的单一、互持问题严重、市场约束失效的问题。提高商业银行的经营管理水平，改善银行负债结构以及改善银行风险管理，拓宽商业银行次级债市场参与主体，让商业银行以外的机构投资者更多地参与次级债市场以分散银行体系的风险，这样才能达到通过发行次级债补充资本金以提高银行抗风险能力的目的。     

商业银行次级债新规:资本约束和市场约束双重功效

中国银监会于2009年10月21日向各大商业银行下发《关于完善商业银行资本补充机制的通知》,对次级债券的发行做了比较大的调整和修改。次级债券具有资本约束和市场约束双重功能,此次次级债改革不仅有利于次级债资本约束能力提高,同时也加强了其市场约束。如何进一步提高次级债券对商业银行的约束功能,可以从继续坚持次级债为资本金补充重要手段、大力发展次级债发行和交易市场、减轻政府对商业银行的隐性担保和扩大次级债的投资群体四个方面着手。     

次级债对我国商业银行市场约束功能的研究

主要讨论次级债对我国商业银行市场约束的效用。首先,简述了市场约束及次级债的含义和作用;简单介绍了次级债发挥市场约束作用的有效性;引出了我国商业银行次级债的发展历程。其次,通过对我国次级债发行的现状分析,总结出了我国商业银行发行次级债的问题及其相关原因——尤其是在发挥市场约束方面。最后,根据得出的问题和原因,提出了几项解决我国商业银行次级债的市场约束功能的建议,旨在进一步促进我国商业银行次级债的市场约束作用的发挥。     

美国次级债危机与我国商业银行抵押价值评估管理

美国次级债危机给全球金融体系带来了强烈冲击,本文从不动产抵押价值评估的角度,分析了危机中暴露出来的问题.首先对次级债发行机理和危机基本原因进行介绍;然后重点从抵押在信贷决策中的定位、不动产价值周期性波动预警、抵押风险管理、抵押价值评估理论及方法等方面分析了美国金融机构不动产抵押价值评估管理中的问题;最后在总结我国商业银行抵押风险管理现状及问题的基础上,提出具有科学性、合理性和可操作性的建议:加强系统性风险预警、明确抵押在信贷决策中的地位和作用、完善抵押价值评估管理政策、制定商业银行内部评估技术操作规范、加快抵押数据库建设和改变抵押价值评估委托关系等.     

我国商业银行次级债发行现状研究

我国商业银行次级债发行规模较2003年、2004年发行之初已经有了很大上升。目前,发行期限主要以10年期和15年期为主,但次级债市场主要由16家上市银行主导。我国次级债市场的健康发展,需要规范次级债的发行,培育多元机构投资主体,完善次级债信息披露以及次级债评级、发行主体评级制度。     

我国次级债发行存在的问题及建议

次级债作为一种主动负债工具,是商业银行筹资的重要举措.我国次级债发行不论是在发行规模上还足在结构设计、定价方面都取得了长足的进步.但目前我国次级债发行成本较高、金融机构相互持有较为普遍.进一步发展次级债需要加强外部监管、完善信息披露,并且健全内部控制制度,提高商业银行抗风险能力.     

次级债市场发展与中国商业银行资本金结构调整

对于商业银行而言,发行次级债是一种快速、高效、便捷的资本补充方式,也是一种主功、长期的负债来源。我国商业银行资本充足率的现状和发展趋势预示着次级债的发行将呈上升趋势。但是和国外商业银行相比,目前我国商业银行的次级债发行尚处于起步阶段,国外商业银行的一些成熟的经验和做法值得我们借鉴。本文在分析我国次级债市场前景的基础上,对中外商业银行发行次级债的目的、募集方式、发行期限、定价、类型、持有对象作了比较和借鉴,提出了现阶段我国商业银行发行次级债的发展策略。     

An Analysis of European Banks' SND Issues and its Implications for the Design of a Mandatory Subordinated Debt Policy

During the last twenty years an increasing number of proposals to improve bank market discipline through the introduction of a mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSDP) have been presented and critically discussed by academic economists and bank regulators. While theoretical issues are key in this debate, a proper understanding of the market for banks' subordinated notes and debentures (SND) and the main features of securities is also considered relevant for the potential introduction, design and goals setting of such a policy. This paper builds on information concerning issuers, investors, markets, pricing and the technical features of securities to critically discuss these aspects. Data on over 1800 European banks SND issues completed during the 1988–2000:Q1 period together with information on primary and secondary market functioning are presented.     

地方政府干预、境外战略投资者引入与城市商业银行治理

本文以8家城市商业银行的42份年报作为研究样本,利用主元分析法实证研究了地方政府和境外战略投资者对城市商业银行公司治理的影响,及其作用于城市商业银行的具体机制。研究结果表明,地方政府对城市商业银行治理产生了负面影响,境外战略投资者在一定程度上抑制了地方政府对城市商业银行的干预,促进了城市商业银行治理的改善。为了提升城市商业银行公司治理水平,本文建议地方政府进一步退出城市商业银行,取消城市商业银行中境外战略投资者持股比例监管限制,鼓励外资派驻更多的董事和高管实质性参与城市商业银行的经营管理。     

Basel II and the Need for Bank Distress Resolution Procedures*

It is argued that without increased market discipline Basel II is not likely to resolve the regulatory problem caused by explicit and implicit guarantees of depositors and other creditors of banks. One way to enhance market discipline is to implement proposals for mandatory subordinated debt. For these proposals to achieve their objective, the non‐insurance of holders of subordinated debt must be credible. Increased credibility of non‐insurance of one or several groups of creditors could be enhanced if distress resolution procedures for banks were pre‐specified, and if they made possible bank failures without serious disruption of the financial system. The existence of rules for dealing with banks in distress not only enhances the credibility of non‐insurance of some creditors, it also allows for predictability of distress resolution costs for shareholders and management of banks. Such costs—if predictable—reduce the moral hazard incentives caused by deposit insurance schemes.     

Do subordinated debt holders discipline bank risk-taking? Evidence from risk management decisions

I test the market discipline of bank risk hypothesis by examining whether banks choose risk management policies that account for the risk preferences of subordinated debt holders. Using around 500,000 quarterly observations on the population of U.S. insured commercial banks over the 1995–2009 period, I document that the ratio of subordinated debt affects bank risk management decisions consistent with the market discipline hypothesis only when subordinated debt is held by the parent holding company. In particular, the subordinated debt ratio increases the likelihood and the extent of interest rate derivatives use for risk management purposes at bank holding company (BHC)-affiliated banks, where subordinated debt holders have a better access to information needed for monitoring and control rights provided by equity ownership. At non-affiliated banks, a higher subordinated debt ratio leads to risk management decisions consistent with moral hazard behavior. The analysis also shows that the too-big-to-fail protection prevents market discipline even at BHC-affiliated banks.     

Does Subordinated Debt Play a Role for Market Discipline?

This paper examines the link between the issuance of subordinated debt by commercial banks and market discipline. Using cross-sectional and time-series data from 2002 to 2007, we empirically examine the relationship between banks' risk level and their decisions to issue subordinated debts in Taiwan. In particular, we test the hypothesis that the commercial banks with low risk levels prefer to issue subordinated debts more than high-risk banks do, and we reject the hypothesis. We conclude that the application of subordinated debt is not a mature channel for providing market discipline for commercial banks in Taiwan. We offer potential reasons for this finding and discuss the policy implications of our findings.     

Does the market discipline banks? New evidence from regulatory capital mix

While bank capital requirements permit a bank to freely substitute between equity and subordinated debt, lenders and investors view debt and equity as imperfect substitutes. It follows that, after controlling for the level of regulatory capital, the mix of debt in capital isolates the role that the market plays in disciplining banks. I document that the mix of debt in capital affects bank behavior, but only when investors can impose real constraints. In particular, the mix of debt reduces the probability of failure and future distress for BHC-affiliated institutions (where the investor has control rights through an equity position) and for stand-alone banks before the Basel Accord (when debt issues included restrictive covenants). However, substituting equity for subordinated debt at the bank holding company level or in stand-alone banks since the Basel Accord (where the investor has few protections) only increases the probability of distress and failure.     

战略投资者、公司治理与银行绩效——对中国城市商业银行的实证研究

基于中国8家城市商业银行的数据,采用截面数据和序列数据相结合的方法,对战略投资者参与中国城市商业银行治理的理论机理及其影响城市商业银行绩效的途径进行的分析表明:境外战略投资者可以促进城市商业银行改善公司治理,从而提升中国城市商业银行的绩效;国有股权比例与银行盈利性、第一大股东持股比例与银行资本充足率、董事会规模与银行盈利性均成负相关关系;股权集中度对银行盈利性和安全性均成正相关关系;管理层介入董事会比例对银行的盈利性和安全性的影响都不显著;独立董事比例对银行的盈利性有很强的正面影响。     

国有商业银行公司治理结构的特殊性及其改革

公司治理结构的所有原则都来源于商业银行活动的基本实践.银行治理结构的缺陷最终会损害银行的竞争力,增大银行体系的风险.在当前面临外资银行激烈竞争的新形势下,建立国有商业银行良好的公司治理结构应是银行业改革的首要议题.鉴于我国国有商业银行公司治理结构的特殊性,其公司治理机制的构建应从利益相关者治理的角度出发,顺应国际公司治理的发展趋势,科学地借鉴国外公司治理的典型模式,通过有效的激励机制和内部控制体系,完善信息披露制度,以及逐步健全外部治理等措施,实现国有商业银行富有成效的改革,促进金融行业国际竞争力和资源配置效率的提高.     

论国有商业银行引进境外战略投资者的必要性

针对国有商业银行在股份制改造过程中引进境外战略投资者,国内存在截然相反的两种观点。实践表明,引进境外战略投资者有利于银行的持续改革与制度创新,有利于在资本市场成功筹资与上市,对于降低改革成本、尽快改善公司治理水平具有重要的现实意义。     

Default Risk Estimation,Bank Credit Risk,and Corporate Governance

This study explores the relationship between credit risks of banks and the corporate governance structures of these banks from the perspective of creditors. The cumulative default probabilities are estimated for a sample of US commercial and savings banks to measure their risk taking behavior. The results show that one year and five year cumulative default probabilities are time‐varying, with a significant jump observed in the year prior to the financial crisis of 2008–09. Generally speaking, corporate governance structures have a greater impact on US commercial banks than on savings institutions. We provide evidence that, after controlling for firm specific characteristics, commercial banks with larger boards and older CFOs are associated with significantly lower credit risk levels. Lower ownership by institutional investors and more independent boards also have lower credit risk levels, although these effects are somewhat less significant. For all the banks in our sample, large board size, older CFO, and less busy directors are associated with lower credit risk levels. When we restrict the sample to consider the joint effects of the governance variables, the results on board size and busy directors are maintained.