THE IMPACT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE ON FEMALE EMPLOYMENT IN JAPAN

This article examines the impact of the minimum wage on employment, focusing on women in their 20s and 30s, who are known to be typical low‐wage workers in Japan. The results, based on a panel estimation, suggest that the minimum wage has a measurable impact on employment; the workers whose current wage is below the revised minimum wage are about 20–30 percentage points less likely to be employed in the following year than comparable low‐wage workers who are not affected by the revision of the minimum wage. The estimation results are sensitive to the choice of the control group. (JEL J23, J38, J88)     

Do Scarring Effects of Low‐Wage Employment and Non‐Employment Differ BETWEEN Levels of Qualification?

This study investigates how the effects of low‐wage employment and non‐employment on wage prospects vary depending on qualification. Based on theories on signalling effects, human capital and job search, we discuss why there may be heterogeneity in state dependence in both labour market states. We find that episodes of low‐wage employment incur a significantly lower risk of future non‐employment than episodes of non‐employment for low‐qualified workers. In contrast, for workers with a middle or high level of qualification the risk of non‐employment is not significantly different when being low‐paid instead of not employed.     

A SEARCH‐EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH TO THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION ON LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES

We analyze the impact of the U.S. skill‐biased immigration influx that took place between 2000 and 2009 within a search and matching model that allows for skill heterogeneity, differential search cost, and capital‐skill complementarity. We find that although the skill‐biased immigration raised the overall net income to natives, it had distributional effects. Specifically, unskilled native workers gained in terms of both employment and wages. Skilled native workers, however, gained in terms of employment but lost in terms of wages. Nevertheless, in an extension where skilled natives and immigrants are imperfect substitutes, even the skilled wage rises.     

Comparing earnings profiles in urban areas of an LDC: rural-to-urban migrants vs. native workers

"We use Tanzanian data to test a recently proposed hypothesis that rural-to-urban migrants have an incentive to supply greater work effort than native urban workers, because of the migrants' positive probability of returning to the low-wage rural areas. We treat the choice between public- and private-sector employment as endogenous and, for theoretical and empirical reasons, distinguish migrants with access to rural land from those without access. Our results show that migrants in both sectors face lower initial wage offers than native urban workers. But, the wage gap is eliminated within a decade or less, and thereafter, migrants surpass the wage offers of native workers."     

Worker displacement during the transition: Experience from Slovenia1

The Slovenian transition created labor displacements that were bigger than those experienced in North America in the 1980s. In Slovenia, probability of both layoffs and quits fell with worker tenure, firm profitability and expected severance costs. Individuals facing a higher probability of displacement accepted slower wage growth than otherwise comparable workers. The incentives to avoid displacement were strong – workers that actually were displaced faced a slow process of transiting out of unemployment with only one‐third finding re‐employment. Correcting for selection, real wage losses for displaced workers are comparable to those reported for displaced workers in North America.     

HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND LABOR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM*

We analyze an equilibrium labor market with on‐the‐job search and experience effects (as workers learn by doing). The analysis yields a Mincer wage equation with worker fixed effects and endogenously determined firm fixed effects. Equilibrium sorting—where over time more experienced workers also tend to move to better paid employment—has a significant impact on wage inequality.     

An Efficiency Enhancing Minimum Wage

We consider an economy with a tax on all labor earnings. We discover that a slightly binding minimum wage on one sector can enhance efficiency. The minimum wage attracts high‐reservation wage workers into the minimum‐wage sector. If the labor demand curve in the free sector is quite flat, the vast majority of workers displaced by the minimum wage find employment in the free sector, raising aggregate employment. This displacement of workers by the only slightly binding minimum wage has negligible effects on efficiency. So efficiency and tax revenue rise as the minimum wage pulls labor out of untaxed leisure, where too much of the labor force is lurking, into taxed work.     

Does Employee Body Weight Affect Employers' Behavior?

In this paper, we study the possible segregation of overweight individuals already established in the labor market when firms make decisions on hiring, firing, and promoting. Most existing studies use wage equations to document wage differences, but little is known about the reason for the differences and the sorting of workers. Using an equilibrium search model, search frictions are taken into account. Additionally, sorting is examined using a logit model. We find that wage differences between workers who have a normal weight and workers who are overweight or obese can be explained by differential firm behavior, with respect to both the job‐offer arrival rate and the probability of being promoted.     

RESIDUAL WAGE DISPARITY AND COORDINATION UNEMPLOYMENT*

How much of residual wage dispersion can be explained by an absence of coordination among firms? To answer, we construct a dynamic directed search model with identical workers where firms can create high‐ or low‐productivity jobs and are uncoordinated in their offers to workers, calibrated to the U.S. economy. Workers can exploit ex post opportunities once approached by firms, and can conduct on‐the‐job search. The stationary equilibrium wage distribution is hump‐shaped, skewed significantly to the right, and, with baseline parameters, generates residual dispersion statistics 75–90% of those found empirically. However, the model underestimates the average duration of unemployment.     

WILL TAX‐BASED HEALTH INSURANCE REFORMS HELP THE SELF‐EMPLOYED STAY IN BUSINESS?

The self‐employed face a tax‐induced disadvantage relative to wage and salary workers when it comes to the payment of health insurance premiums. This paper uses a panel of individual tax return data to test whether lower health insurance premium costs because of an expanded tax incentive result in longer periods of self‐employment. The results suggest that households claiming the deduction are indeed less likely to exit self‐employment. Equalizing the treatment of health insurance premiums for the self‐employed and wage workers by allowing full deductibility from Self‐Employment Contributions Act (SECA) taxes would result in a 7% decrease in the probability of exit. (JEL H32, I18, L26)     

ON THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF WAGE OFFERS*

This article investigates signaling and screening roles of wage offers in a single‐play matching model with two‐sided unobservable characteristics. It generates the following predictions as matching equilibrium outcomes: (i) “good” jobs offer premia if “high‐quality” worker population is large; (ii) “bad” jobs pay compensating differentials if the proportion of “good” jobs to “low‐quality” workers is large; (iii) all firms may offer a pooling wage in markets dominated by “high‐quality” workers and firms; or (iv) Gresham's Law prevails: “good” types withdraw if “bad” types dominate the population. The screening/signaling motive thus has the potential of explaining a variety of wage patterns.     

On the Provision of Insurance against Search‐Induced Wage Fluctuations*

Should workers be provided with insurance against search‐induced wage fluctuations? To answer this question, I rely on the numerical simulations of a model of on‐the‐job search and precautionary savings. The model is calibrated to low‐skilled workers in the United States. The extent of insurance is determined by the degree of progressivity of a non‐linear transfer schedule. The fundamental trade‐off is that a more generous provision of insurance reduces incentives to search for better‐paying jobs, which increases the cost of providing insurance. I show that progressivity raises the search intensity of unemployed workers, which reduces the equilibrium rate of unemployment, but it lowers the search intensity of employed job seekers, which reduces the output level. I also solve numerically for the optimal non‐linear transfer schedule. The optimal policy is to provide little insurance up to a monthly income level of $1350, so as to preserve incentives to move up the wage ladder, and nearly full insurance above $1450. This policy reduces the standard deviation of labor income net of transfers by 34 per cent and generates a consumption‐equivalent welfare gain of 0.7 per cent. The absence of private savings does not fundamentally change the shape of the optimal transfer function, but tilts the optimal policy towards more insurance, at the expense of a less efficient allocation of workers across jobs.     

Minimum wage,on-the-job search and employment: On the sectoral and aggregate equilibrium effect of the mandatory minimum wage

We study the impact of a minimum wage in a segmented labor market in which workers are at different stages of their careers. At the end of a learning-by-doing period, workers paid the minimum wage quit “bad jobs” for better-paying “good jobs”, following an on-the-job search process with endogenous search intensity. A rise in the minimum wage reduces “bad jobs” creation and prompts workers to keep their “bad jobs” by reducing on-the-job search intensity. The ambiguous impact on unqualified employment replicates and explains the findings of several empirical studies. However, a minimum wage rise reduces overall employment and output.     

IS MINIMUM WAGE AN EFFECTIVE ANTI‐POVERTY POLICY IN JAPAN?

This paper considers whether the minimum wage is a well‐targeted antipoverty policy by examining the backgrounds of minimum‐wage workers. Whether raising the minimum wage reduces employment for unskilled workers is also investigated. An examination of micro data from a large‐scale government household survey, the Employment Structure Survey (Shugyo Kozo Kihon Chosa), reveals that approximately half of minimum‐wage workers belong to households with annual incomes of more than 5 million yen as a non‐head of household. A regression analysis indicates that an increase in the minimum wage moderately reduces the employment of male teenagers and middle‐aged married women, while it encourages the employment of high‐school age youth.     

ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH,PRODUCTIVITY SHOCKS,AND THE INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS PROCESS*

Individual labor earnings observed in worker panel data have complex, highly persistent dynamics. We investigate the capacity of a structural job search model with on‐the‐job search, wage renegotiation by mutual consent, and i.i.d. productivity shocks to replicate salient properties of these dynamics, such as the covariance structure of earnings, the evolution of individual earnings mean, and variance with the duration of uninterrupted employment, or the distribution of year‐to‐year earnings changes. Structural estimation of our model on a 12‐year panel of highly educated British workers shows that our simple framework produces a dynamic earnings structure that is remarkably consistent with the data.     

NETWORK SEARCH: CLIMBING THE JOB LADDER FASTER

We introduce an irregular network structure into a model of frictional, on‐the‐job search in which workers find jobs through their network connections or directly from firms. We show network‐found jobs have higher wages, and thus better‐connected workers climb the job ladder faster. The mean field approach allows us to formulate heterogeneous workers' recursive problem tractably. Our calibration is consistent with several empirical findings because of a composition—not information—effect. We also introduce new model‐consistent evidence: Job‐to‐job switches at higher ladder rungs are more likely to use networks.     

Do good workers hurt bad workers—or is it the other way around?*

I study the effect of worker heterogeneities on wages and unemployment in a directed search model. A worker's productivity in a given firm depends both on his type and on a worker–firm specific component. Firms advertise unconditional wage offers only. The resulting equilibrium is inefficient, with a too high wage premium for high‐type workers, and too few high‐type jobs. This reduces the welfare of high‐type workers. My findings contrast with the findings in the literature on labor market segmentation, where it is argued that the existence of high‐type workers forces down wages and reduces welfare for low‐type workers.     

Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions

A natural holdup problem arises in a market with search frictions: Firms have to make a range of investments before finding their employees, and larger investments translate into higher wages. In particular, when wages are determined by ex post bargaining, the equilibrium is always inefficient: Recognizing that capital-intensive production relations have to pay higher wages, firms reduce their investments. This can only be prevented by removing all the bargaining power from the workers, but this, in turn, depresses wages below their social product and creates excessive entry of firms. In contrast to this benchmark, we show that efficiency is achieved when firms post wages and workers can direct their search toward more attractive offers. This efficiency result generalizes to an environment with imperfect information where workers only observe a few of the equilibrium wage offers. We show that the underlying reason for efficiency is not wage posting per se, but the ability of workers to direct their search toward more capital-intensive jobs.     

AN EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODEL WHEN FIRMS OBSERVE WORKERS' EMPLOYMENT STATUS*

This article considers an equilibrium search model, where firms post wages using information on workers' employment status. Earnings differentials between workers of different employment statuses are driven by firms' ability to discriminate workers' reservation wages. I study how these wage policies depend on firms' and workers' characteristics, and how these policies affect the wage distribution. The model delivers new predictions for the amount of wage dispersion that can be generated with search models and provides a better representation of the left tail of the wage distribution in the presence of a legal minimum wage than standard equilibrium search models.     

IT'S ABOUT TIME: IMPLICATIONS OF THE PERIOD LENGTH IN AN EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODEL

Empirical evidence suggests that transitions between employment states are highly clustered around the first day of each workweek or month. I analyze the effect of this phenomenon by presenting an equilibrium search model in which the period length is a parameter determining the degree of clustering. Infinitesimally short periods result in a continuous‐time model with bilateral meetings, whereas longer time periods introduce the possibility of recall or simultaneity of job offers. In this environment, I show that the period length has a profound effect on equilibrium outcomes, including the unemployment rate, unemployment duration, and the cross‐sectional wage distribution.