A fractionally cointegrated VAR analysis of economic voting and political support

We use a fractionally cointegrated vector autoregressive model to examine the relationship between Canadian political support and macroeconomic conditions. This model is well suited for the analysis because it allows multiple fractional time series and admits simple asymptotic inference for the model parameters and tests of the hypotheses of interest. In the long‐run equilibrium, we find that support for the Progressive Conservative Party was higher during periods of high interest rates and low unemployment, while support for the Liberal Party was higher during periods of low interest rates and high unemployment. We also test and reject the notion that party support is driven only by relative (to the United States) economic performance. Indeed, our findings suggest that US macroeconomic variables do not enter the long‐run equilibrium of Canadian economic voting (political opinion poll support) at all.     

非均衡最优规划模型解的经济政策意义

本文根据非均衡理论的最优规划模型 ,探讨了在凯恩斯失业均衡和抑制性通货膨胀均衡下 ,几个主要的经济变量P、W、G、T、M、A对于家庭消费C和产出Y (或就业L)的影响。主要的结论是 :在凯恩斯失业状态下 ,刺激消费的同时 ,积累仍不可忽视 ;计划经济国家长期过分注重积累的传统经济政策思想是不合理的 ;平衡或盈余的财政政策是计划经济国家的明智之举 ;计划经济国家长期实行低工资水平的政策是错误的     

The NAIRU reconsidered: why labour market deregulation may raise unemployment

According to the mainstream theory of equilibrium unemployment, persistent unemployment is caused mainly by ‘excessive’ labour market regulation, whereas aggregate demand, capital accumulation and technological progress have no lasting effect on unemployment. We show that the mainstream non‐accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) model is a special case of a general model of equilibrium unemployment, in which aggregate demand, investment and endogenous technological progress do have long‐term effects. It follows that labour market deregulation does not necessarily reduce steady‐inflation unemployment. Theoretically, if the decline in real wage growth claims owing to deregulation is smaller than the ensuing decline in labour productivity growth and in the warranted real wage growth, then in that case steady‐inflation unemployment may increase. Empirical evidence for 20 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (1984–1997) indicates that the impact of labour market deregulation on OECD unemployment is zero, and possibly negative (causing a higher rate of unemployment).     

Unobserved Heterogeneity,Exit Rates,and Re‐Employment Wages

Exit rates from unemployment and re‐employment wages decline over a period of unemployment, after controlling for worker observable characteristics. We study the role of unobserved heterogeneity in an economy with asymmetric information and directed search. We show that the unique equilibrium is separating and that skilled workers have more job opportunities and higher wages. The composition of the unemployed varies with the duration of unemployment, so average exit rates and wages fall with time. The separating equilibrium relies on performance‐related pay schemes and the ability of firms to commit to renting an input that is complementary to worker skills.     

ESTIMATING INCENTIVE AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF NONSTATIONARY UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS

The distribution of unemployment duration in our equilibrium matching model with spell‐dependent unemployment benefits displays time‐varying exit rates. Building on semi‐Markov processes, we translate these rates into an expression for the aggregate unemployment rate. Structural estimation using German microdata allows us to discuss the effects of an unemployment benefit reform (Hartz IV). The reform reduced unemployment by less than 0.1 percentage points. Contrary to general beliefs, the net wage for most skill and regional groups increased. Taking the insurance effect of unemployment benefits into account, however, the reform is welfare reducing for 76% of workers.     

Excess supply equilibria

This paper addresses a fundamental problem in economic theory: How can there be equilibria of the economic system where some commodity is in excess supply, yet that commodity's relative price shows no tendency to fall? Of course, the principal example of such a phenomenon is an economy experiencing a prolonged period of involuntary unemployment of the labor force during which there is no significant change in the real wage.In the following pages, I shall describe a two-commodity, general equilibrium model that has a continuum of unemployment equilibria, one for any given unemployment rate. The important feature of this model is that workers establish their wage rates in an attempt to maximize expected utility. The information upon which these wage setting decisions are based is provided by actual labor market transactions.Despite the voluntary nature of the wage setting decision, I shall argue that each equilibrium of this economy exhibits involuntary unemployment in the Keynesian sense. For there will always be another equilibrium with a lower real wage, a higher level of employment, and at which (at least when workers are risk neutral) each worker achieves a higher level of expected utility.     

Unemployment and Crime: Is There a Connection?

A panel of Swedish counties over the years 1988–1999 is used to study the effects of unemployment on property crime rates. The period under study is characterized by turbulence in the labor market—the variation in unemployment rates was unprecedented in the latter part of the century. Hence, the data provide a unique opportunity to examine unemployment effects. According to the theory of economics of crime, increased unemployment rates lead to higher property crime rates. A fixed‐effects model is estimated to investigate this hypothesis. The model includes time‐ and county‐specific effects and a number of economic and socio‐demographic variables to control for unobservables and covariates. The results show that unemployment had a positive and significant effect on some property crimes (burglary, car theft and bike theft).     

A disequilibrium model of real wages,employment and unemployment for the U.S.A. during 1930–1965

The well known Lucas-Rapping (1969, 1970) U.S. Labour market model has been estimated with a simple disequilibrium estimation method. Neither the wage rate nor the employment level are found to adjust to clear the labour market within the unit time period. The elasticity of labour supply in the short run is found to be high which is consistent with the recent theories of real business cycle. Adjustment in employment towards equilibrium is faster than the adjustment in the wages. The rate of unemployment is satisfactorily explained by the excess supply rate without the need for the lagged unemployment rate. Thus our unemployment equation is superior to the Lucas-Rapping equation based on the equilibrium framework.I am grateful Professors J. W. Nevile, V. K. Srivastava, the editor of this Journal, Professor Baldev Raj and two referees for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. I wish to thank Kris Corcoran for her excellent research assistance. The research contained in this paper is financed by a grant from the Faculty of Commerce and Economics.     

UNEMPLOYMENT POLICIES IN AN ECONOMY WITH ADVERSE SELECTION

This paper studies the effects of unemployment policies in a simple static general equilibrium model with adverse selection in the labour market. Firms offer a contract that induces the self‐selection of workers. In equilibrium, all unskilled workers are screened out and some skilled workers are rationed out. It is shown that the provision of unemployment insurance raises involuntary unemployment by encouraging adverse selection, while unemployment assistance – or subsidy to unemployment – reduces involuntary unemployment. A simple efficiency wage model is also presented to show that either of the two policies reduces employment by taxing effort and subsidizing shirking. The key is whether the social role of unemployment is a sorting device or a worker discipline device.     

Unemployment hysteresis and the natural rate of vacancies

On the basis of macro data from 10 OECD countries, I find that the job vacancy rate outperforms the unemployment rate as a reliable measure of domestic inflationary pressure. Moreover, while the rate of unemployment affects inflation primarily through its difference, the vacancy rate operates through a level effect as well. In most countries, a unique equilibrium rate of vacancies seems to coexist with a drifting equilibrium rate of unemployment. I show that this result is consistent with existing theories of unemployment hysteresis that focus on depreciation of human capital and search activity during unemployment spells. First version received: October 1997/Final version received: June 2001     

NOMINAL WAGE INDEXATION,QUASI‐EQUILIBRIA AND REAL WAGE DYNAMICS

In contrast to the traditional static approach to indexation, this paper analyses the dynamic consequences for real wages of the mechanism that links nominal wages to inflation. Revisiting a contribution by Dehez and Fitoussi on macroeconomic fluctuations , I analyse a monetary overlapping generations small open economy in which full indexation is interpreted as the occurrence of a dynamic ‘quasi‐equilibrium’. In the suggested framework, the nominal wage is linked to the inflation rate by a specific indexation formula whose shape relies on unions' bargaining positions. Assuming a constant peg for the real interest rate and the superneutrality of money, I show that the economy has a unique long‐run quasi‐equilibrium allocation whose stability depends only on the behaviour of the monetary authority. Moreover, I show how the operating of a ‘wage‐aspiration effect’ might lead to the persistence of involuntary unemployment.     

Growth and unemployment in a shirking efficiency wage model

Abstract.  The relationship between growth and unemployment in a general equilibrium shirking efficiency wage model is explored. In contrast to past work on this subject, detected shirkers are not dismissed but instead incur a monetary punishment. As a result of this modification, the model can account for a stable rate of unemployment when there is positive population growth and/or technological growth in the economy. Moreover, I show that institutions and policies that limit the ability of firms to punish detected shirkers or restrict their use of discretionary bonuses can increase unemployment and reduce the economy's long run growth rate. JEL Classification: E0, J41     

Do good workers hurt bad workers—or is it the other way around?*

I study the effect of worker heterogeneities on wages and unemployment in a directed search model. A worker's productivity in a given firm depends both on his type and on a worker–firm specific component. Firms advertise unconditional wage offers only. The resulting equilibrium is inefficient, with a too high wage premium for high‐type workers, and too few high‐type jobs. This reduces the welfare of high‐type workers. My findings contrast with the findings in the literature on labor market segmentation, where it is argued that the existence of high‐type workers forces down wages and reduces welfare for low‐type workers.     

NAIRU Estimates for Germany: New Evidence on the Inflation–Unemployment Tradeoff

Meaningful estimates of the non‐accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) within a Phillips curve framework require an identified tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. However, observations of inflation and unemployment are equilibrium points giving rise to a simultaneity problem. We assess conventional identifying assumptions in the literature on the German NAIRU in a general bi‐variate equations system of inflation and unemplyoment. We use a data‐driven method for identification based on shifts in the relative volatility of shocks to unemployment and inflation to identify the tradeoff for Germany. Our results support models which estimate a contemporaneous effect of unemployment on inflation and those which model inflation and unemployment jointly.     

MEAN‐PLUS‐NOISE FACTOR MODELS: AN EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION

In this paper I propose an alternative factor model whose common factor follows a mean‐plus‐noise process. While the existing methods for factor models should be valid for this model, their performance may be misleading in small samples. Because the likelihood function of this model is not tractable, I estimate this model by Bayesian methods. When applied to US macroeconomic time series, we find that the estimated mean‐plus‐noise factor is useful for predicting real personal income, industrial production and unemployment at long prediction horizons.     

Heterogeneity, Job Creation and Unemployment Volatility

In this paper, I explore the impact of match‐specific heterogeneity at the job creation margin on business cycle fluctuations. I show that this form of heterogeneity alone does not help to amplify labor market volatility, either under full or under asymmetric information. First, I show analytically that, under full information, heterogeneity has no first‐order effect on the response of unemployment and job creation to productivity, and actually tends to dampen the response of market tightness. Then, in a series of calibrations, I show that with both full and asymmetric information, the model delivers labor market volatilities close to the representative‐agent, full‐information benchmark.     

Running out of time: Limited unemployment benefits and reservation wages

We study unemployment insurance (UI) in an equilibrium environment in which unemployed workers only receive benefits for a finite length of time. Although all workers have identical productivity and leisure value, the random arrival of job offers creates ex-post differences with respect to their time remaining until benefit expiration. Firms, which are also homogeneous, can exploit these differences, leading to an endogenous wage distribution.This allows us to examine the equilibrium effect of policy changes in both the size and length of UI benefits. Surprisingly, an increase in benefits can actually cause wages to fall, which is contrary to the predictions of on-the-job-search models. Moreover, we explain well-documented patterns of how the hazard rate of exiting unemployment responds to these policy changes. Our theory also explains why this hazard rate jumps at the time of benefit exhaustion.     

Trade‐Induced Unemployment: How Much Do We Care?

It is a common perception that a government, especially in the face of elections, is particularly sensitive to the presence of trade‐induced unemployment. In this paper, I ask: how much weight does the incumbent politician actually attach to unemployment resulting from trade? To answer, I build a model that captures government's sympathy to trade‐affected workers and allows me to decompose the channels through which trade‐induced unemployment affects the level of sectoral protection chosen by a politically‐driven incumbent official. I provide empirical evidence that the US government is very sensitive to the presence and the magnitude of trade‐induced unemployment. Specifically, I estimate the weight that the office holder attaches to the welfare of trade‐affected workers to be positive, significant, and four times larger than the weight on the welfare of those who are not affected by trade.     

Creative destruction and unemployment in an open economy model

I develop a model of endogenous economic growth and search and matching frictions in the labour market. I study the effect of trade liberalization between two identical economies on long‐run unemployment and show that bilateral trade liberalization has a steady state effect on unemployment that is negative for countries with a relatively larger R&D sector and positive for countries with a smaller R&D sector.     

Unemployment and Growth in the Long Run: an Efficiency‐Wage Model With Optimal Savings*

An efficiency‐wage model of steady‐state equilibrium with labor‐augmenting technical progress is developed to explore the long‐run relationship between unemployment and growth. The rate of productivity growth is either specified exogenously or determined endogenously. In both cases, we preserve key results of the Shapiro–Stiglitz efficiency‐wage analysis without growth. Our model, however, also yields some striking new results. For instance, an exogenous increase in the growth rate may raise the rate of efficiency‐wage unemployment, and a once‐for‐all rise in the labor force may reduce the unemployment rate in the endogenous‐growth case.