Surplus liquidity,central bank losses and the use of reserve requirements in emerging markets

Since the turn of the millennium, stocks of foreign reserves held by central banks in many emerging markets and developing countries have exceeded currency in circulation. To steer money market rates, these central banks have been absorbing liquidity from, rather than providing it to, the banking sector in their regular monetary policy operations. When interest rates in countries with major reserve currencies are low, the yield on foreign reserves is low. A higher interest rate on liquidity‐absorbing operations may expose central banks to losses. Although a central bank is not a profit‐maximizing institution, central bank losses can undermine the independence of the central bank. Using data for a large panel of central banks, this paper provides some evidence that central banks tend to apply low‐remunerated reserve requirements when profitability is at stake.     

Asset-based Reserve Requirements: Some Reservations

Abstract

Thomas Palley's (2004) paper ‘Asset-based reserve requirements: reasserting domestic monetary control in an era of financial innovation and instability’ has radical implications for monetary policy and the operations of central banks in the money markets. This comment argues that Palley's proposal may be impractical today because it overlooks banks' holding of excessive reserves (or claims on such reserves), and because reserves allocated for particular kinds of business cannot be isolated in bank balance sheets or markets. In particular, once differential reserves are imposed on particular kinds of business, banks may respond to changes in reserve requirements by varying their assets in less predictable ways than the scheme suggests. A central bank's willingness to use differential reserve requirements will be inhibited by the current policy doctrine that emphasises control of a stable money market rate of interest. In any case, it is doubtful if interest rates or reserve requirements could have the specific targeted effects that Palley's model suggests.     

Interest rate policy and interbank market breakdown

Using a DSGE-model with interbank market frictions, calibrated to match the frequency of financial crises, I investigate central banks' ability to prevent credit-related recessions by following an interest rate rule which accounts for financial conditions —an approach called ‘leaning against the wind’. The model's key feature is that boom-bust cycles emerge as a result of a savings glut and moral hazard in the banking sector. Although financial conditions predict crises, the policy maker cannot break the boom-bust cycle and reduce the crisis-frequency. When crises become more likely, low inflation forces the central bank to decrease the interest rate despite its intention to do otherwise. Responding to crisis-predictors eventually dilutes the primary objective of stabilizing inflation and leads to higher inflation volatility. The results suggest that central banks should refrain from leaning against the wind.     

NOMINAL GDP TARGETING AND CENTRAL BANK CONSERVATIVENESS

In the literature on monetary economics, there is the ‘inflationary bias’ result which predicts that the rate of inflation will be biased towards a higher level under discretionary monetary policy than under a rule‐based policy regime. It is established that a credible nominal target can eliminate this ‘inflationary bias’. In this paper, we examine the case of nominal GDP targeting, which is a rule‐based monetary regime. Depending on the degree of conservativeness by the central bank, we show in a stylized model the choice of different combination of inflation and real GDP targets can still result in an ‘inflationary bias’, and there also exists the possibility of a ‘dis‐inflationary bias’.     

Life‐Cycle Patterns of Interest‐Rate Mark‐Ups in Small‐Firm Finance*

We derive empirical implications from a theoretical model of bank–borrower relationships. The interest‐rate mark‐ups of banks are predicted to follow a life‐cycle pattern over the age of the borrowing firms. Because of endogenous bank monitoring by competing banks, borrowing firms initially face a low mark‐up, and thereafter an increasing mark‐up as a result of informational lock‐in, until it falls for older firms when the lock‐in is resolved. By applying a large sample of predominantly small unlisted firms and a new measure of asymmetric information, we find that firms with significant asymmetric‐information problems have a more pronounced life‐cycle pattern of interest‐rate mark‐ups. Additionally, we examine the effects of concentrated banking markets on interest‐rate mark‐ups. The results indicate that the life cycle of mark‐ups is mainly driven by asymmetric‐information problems and not by concentration. However, we find evidence that bank market concentration matters for older firms ? 2 Correction added after online publication on 20^th February 2012; the original text read ‘However, we find evidence that bank market concentration for older firms’, omitting the word ‘matters’.
     

Managing financial market expectations: The role of central bank transparency and central bank communication

In this paper, we study the influence of central bank transparency and informal central bank communication on the formation of money market expectations. The sample covers nine major central banks from January 1999 to July 2007. We find, first, that transparency reduces the bias in money market expectations and dampens their variation. Second, informal communications help manage financial market expectations by reducing the variation of expectations. Third, various subcategories of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) transparency index lead to a smaller bias in expectations (in particular, evaluation of policy outcome and explanation of interest rate decisions) and to a reduction in the variation of expectations (in particular, explicit prioritization of objectives and provision of information on unanticipated macroeconomic disturbances).     

Home sweet host: A cross‐country perspective on prudential and monetary policy spillovers through global banks

Prudential regulation of banks is multi‐layered: policy changes by home‐country authorities affect banks’ global operations across many jurisdictions; policy changes by host‐country authorities shape banks’ operations in the host jurisdiction regardless of the nationality of the parent bank. Do these policies create (unintended) cross‐border spillovers? Similarly, monetary policy actions by major central banks may also have effects on the behaviour of banks in other countries. This paper examines the effect that changes in home‐ and host‐country prudential measures have on cross‐border dollar credit provision, and how these interact with US monetary policy. We first run panel regressions with both layers of regulation, to examine which has a greater effect on cross‐border lending. We then use a novel approach to decompose growth in cross‐border bank lending into separate home, host and common components, and then match each with the corresponding home or host policies. Our results suggest that prudential policies can have spillover effects, which depend on the instrument used and on whether a bank's home or host country implemented them. Home policies tend to have larger spillovers on cross‐border US dollar lending than host policies. We also find that a tightening of US monetary policy can compound the spillovers of some prudential measures.     

Competition among banks and the pass-through of monetary policy

This paper introduces monopolistically competitive financial intermediaries into the New Keynesian DSGE setting. Modelling bank market power explicitly contributes to understanding two empirical facts: (i) The short-run transmission of changes in money market rates to bank retail rates is far from complete and heterogeneous. (ii) Stiffer competition among commercial banks implies that loan rates correlate more tightly with the policy rate. In my model, the degree of monopolistic competition in the banking sector has a sizeable impact on the pass-through of changes in the policy rate. In particular, a more competitive market for bank credit amplifies the efficiency of monetary policy.     

Identifying monetary policy shocks with changes in open market operations

In this paper, we reexamine the effects of monetary policy shocks by exploiting the information contained in open market operations. A sticky price model is developed where money is the counterpart of securities deposited at the central bank. The model's solution reveals that a rise in central bank holdings of open market securities can be interpreted as a monetary expansion. Estimates of vector autoregressions for US data are further provided showing that reactions to an unanticipated rise in open market securities are consistent with common priors about a monetary expansion, i.e., a decline in the federal funds rate, a rise in output, and inertia in price responses. Compared to federal funds rate shocks, prices do not exhibit a puzzling behavior and a larger fraction of the GDP forecast error variance can be attributed to open market shocks. However, the explanatory power of the latter has decreased since federal funds rate targets have been announced.     

Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

THE IMPACTS OF “SHOCK THERAPY” UNDER A BANKING CRISIS: EXPERIENCES FROM THREE LARGE BANK FAILURES IN JAPAN*

A bank failure can have various adverse consequences for clients; these adverse impacts differ depending on which bank takes over the failed banks’ operations. In this paper, we show how the new banks’ management strategies are important in mitigating the short‐ and long‐run consequences. We focus on the clients of three large failed Japanese banks and examine their responses in terms of increased bankruptcies and changes in market valuation after the banks’ operations were taken over. The results imply that the choice of “shock therapy” or “soft budget constraints” had dramatically different consequences in resolving the bad loan problems in Japan.     

(Un)Conventional monetary policy and bank risk-taking: A nonlinear relationship

This paper investigates the effect of monetary policy - especially unconventional monetary policy - on bank risk-taking behavior in Europe over the period 2000–2015. Using a dynamic panel model with a threshold effect, we estimate this effect on two measures of bank risk: the Distance to Default, which reflects the market perception of risk, and the asymmetric Z-score, which corresponds to an accounting-based measure of the risk. We find that loosening monetary policy (via low interest rates and increasing central banks' liquidity) has a harmful effect on banks’ risk, confirming the existence of the risk-taking channel. Moreover, we show that this relationship is nonlinear, i.e., with the sustainable implementation of unconventional monetary policies, the effects are stronger below a certain threshold.     

BANK EFFICIENCY AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MONETARY POLICY

Advances in information technology and bank consolidation have altered the way banks operate by necessitating that banks control costs and provide services efficiently to remain competitive. Given the unique role bank operations play in the transmission of monetary policy, a key unresolved question is whether bank efficiency alters monetary policy outcomes. Using a stochastic frontier approach to measure cost‐efficiency and panel data of U.S. bank balance sheets, we show that banks with greater cost‐efficiency are more sensitive to monetary shocks. (JEL E52, E44, E51)     

The Bernanke and Blinder Model in an Open Economy: The Italian Case

Abstract. This paper analyzes the functioning of monetary policy transmission mechanisms in Italy from 1984 to 1998, highlighting the role performed by the credit system. We extend the Bernanke and Blinder model (1988) to the case of an open economy under a quasi‐fixed exchange rate regime, deriving analytically the conditions for the functioning of the three monetary policy channels generally identified in the literature (‘money’, ‘exchange rate’ and ‘credit’). These conditions explain the partial effectiveness of monetary policy in achieving price and income targets, while maintaining external equilibrium. By means of a structural VECM analysis, we evaluate the effectiveness of the transmission of monetary policy through the three channels.     

CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS AND THE FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR CAUSED BY BANK CAPITAL

This paper develops a computable dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks, a portion of which may be constrained by capital adequacy requirements and the remainder of which may not, in order to examine what effects the capital requirements and bank capital induce in the macroeconomy. Applying the parameterized expectations algorithm, the model economy shows that binding bank capital constraints induce the financial accelerator, the hump‐shaped dynamic behaviour of output, and ineffectuality of monetary policy, and that all the results are derived from the individual banks’ cross‐sectional asymmetric responses that are consistent with the empirical evidence.     

The bank lending channel of monetary policy in EU countries during the global financial crisis

The study examines the existence of the bank lending channel of monetary policy in European Union (EU) countries. The paper advances current research on the monetary transmission mechanism in the following ways: Firstly, we analyze the differences between ‘old’ Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and ‘new’ EU countries. Secondly, we examine the key bank characteristics and monetary policy indicators that may have an impact on the bank lending channel. We assume that short-term market interest rates and monetary aggregate M2 affect banks' activities. We apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) with pooled data from 1999 to 2012. We show that in the pre-crisis period the effect of changing the short-term market interest rates on the bank lending channel of monetary policy is more pronounced among ‘old’ EMU countries, whereas the effect of M2 is significant during the period of the global financial crisis (GFC) among ‘old’ EMU countries. Last but not least the important finding is that banks in ‘new’ EU countries react differently to monetary shocks.     

Global Investment Environment of the Post‐Quantitative Easing World: The ‘new‐old’ and ‘new‐new’ Normal

Global markets since late 2007 are not ‘normal’, where normal means market conditions we would expect to observe going forward in the absence of any new economic shocks. Financial markets have been dominated by extraordinary central bank policies that were created to deal with challenging market conditions reflecting heightened risk aversion and illiquidity. Markets in the future will have some characteristics that look more like the market conditions observed in the pre‐crisis period, which I call the ‘new‐old normal’ and other conditions that differ from the past, which I call the ‘new‐new normal’. I first review what happened during the financial crisis in terms of developments in three asset classes, equities, fixed income and currencies, to place the forward‐looking view in proper context. Then the transition period from the quantitative easing (QE) era of exceptional monetary policy to post‐QE markets is discussed. Post‐transition, we will see some features of the post‐QE world that will resemble pre‐crisis market conditions, the ‘new‐old normal’ with higher policy interest rates, wider cross‐country interest differentials, lower cross‐asset return correlations and a resurgence of the importance of cross‐country differences in fundamentals in international investing. However, some features of the post‐QE investment environment will be unlike anything observed in the past: the ‘new‐new normal’ with reduced liquidity and more days of exceptionally large volatility and asset price moves due to regulatory effects resulting in a reduced ability of market‐makers to provide inventory buffers for counterparties and electronic trading venues that shut down trading in high volatility periods; low inflation; flatter yield curves; and emerging markets providing less opportunity for diversification gains as they converge to developed financial market characteristics.     

CAN SECRET INTERVENTION BE COMPATIBLE WITH A NON‐PROFITMAKING CENTRAL BANK AND A FUNDAMENTAL‐CONSISTENT TARGET?

The coexistence of secret intervention operations and “the signaling channel” (Mussa. The Role of Official Intervention, 1981) seems confusing. Vitale ( Journal of International Economics, 49, 1999, 245–267) resolves this puzzle by employing an asymmetric information framework and an assumption of a fundamental‐inconsistent target for the exchange rate. Ferré and Manzano ( International Journal of Finance and Economics, 14, 2009, 378–393) follow Vitale's microstructure framework and argue that the central banks' profitability motivation offers a rationale for their secret intervention even under a target consistent with the fundamentals. However, that the authority uses its superior information to obtain speculative profits through secret intervention in the market is not a typical goal for central banks. To theoretically explain the opaqueness in non‐profitmaking central banks' exchange rate policies, we employ a model of a central bank's optimization by considering that no bank really knows the exact fundamental rate and they take into account the possible bad consequences of announcing the intervention. We also show that, in passing the bank's private information to market participants, a bank's announcement of the intervention size is equivalent to revealing its target rate. (JEL E58, F39)     

Interest Rate Pass-Through: Empirical Results for the Euro Area

Abstract. This paper empirically examines the interest rate pass‐through at the euro area level. The focus is on the pass‐through of official interest rates, approximated by the overnight interest rate, to longer‐term market interest rates, which, in turn, are a proxy for the marginal costs for banks to attract deposits or grant loans, and therefore passed through to retail bank interest rates. Empirical results, on the basis of a (vector) error‐correction and vector autoregressive model, suggest that the pass‐through of official interest to market interest rates is complete for money market interest rates up to three months, but not for market interest rates with longer maturities. Furthermore, the immediate pass‐through of changes in market interest rates to bank deposit and lending rates is found to be at most 50%, whereas the final pass‐through is typically found to be close to 100%, in particular for lending rates. Empirical results for a sub‐sample starting in January 1999 show qualitatively similar findings and are supportive of a quicker interest rate pass‐through since the introduction of the euro. It is shown that the difference between the adjustment speed of bank deposit and lending rates (typically around one versus three months since the common monetary policy) can to a large extent significantly be explained by credit risk considerations.     

BANK MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS – AN EVALUATION OF THE ‘FOUR PILLARS’ POLICY IN AUSTRALIA*

This paper examines the efficiency consequences of bank mergers and acquisitions with particular reference to the ‘four pillars’ policy preventing mergers among the four major banks. Using data envelopment analysis, the technical efficiencies of banks operating in Australia over the period from 1983 to 2001 are estimated. A second‐stage regression is used to evaluate ex‐post efficiency performance of banks involved in mergers and acquisitions. The empirical results demonstrate that for the time being mergers among the four major banks may result in much poorer efficiency performance in the merging banks and the banking sector.