The performance of individual investors in structured financial products

This paper is the first to measure individual investors’ realized risk-adjusted performance in structured financial products, which represent one of the key financial innovations in recent times. Based on a large database of trades and portfolio holdings for 10,652 retail investors in discount and bonus certificates and common stocks, we find that (1) investors typically realize negative alphas in structured financial products, even when transaction costs are ignored. (2) Their underperformance increases with product complexity, which results from the higher implicit price premiums charged by the issuing banks for the more complex products and from the investors’ poor selection of products that have complex payoff specifications. (3) Investors also make poor choices when selecting the underlying assets for their structured product investments. This is merely a reflection of the poor stock selection abilities which also leads to a significant underperformance for their equity portfolios. (4) Certificate and stock investors are prone to the disposition effect. Overall, these findings suggest that retail investors may require some form of protection to avoid incurring these losses.     

Retail banking and behavioral financial engineering: The case of structured products

We apply cumulative prospect theory and hedonic framing to evaluate discount reverse convertibles (DRCs) and reverse convertible bonds (RCBs) as important examples of structured products from a boundedly rational investor’s point of view. While common expected utility theory would also conclude that DRCs and RCBs are of interest to investors with moderate return expectations and underestimated stock return volatility, that theory would overestimate the market success of DRCs and underestimate that of RCBs in comparison to a situation with bounded rationality. Hedonic framing and relatively low subjectively felt competence levels of investors are decisive for the demand for RCBs.     

Risk classes for structured products: mathematical aspects and their implications on behavioral investors

The new regulation of the EU for financial products (UCITS IV) prescribes Value at Risk (VaR) as the benchmark for assessing the risk of structured products. We discuss the limitations of this approach and show that, in theory, the expected return of structured products is unbounded while the VaR requirement for the lowest risk class can still be satisfied. Real-life examples of large returns within the lowest risk class are then provided. The results demonstrate that the new regulation could lead to new seemingly safe products that hide large risks. Behavioral investors that choose products only based on their official risk classes and their expected returns will, therefore, invest into suboptimal products. To overcome these limitations, we suggest a new risk-return measure for financial products based on the martingale measure that could erase such loopholes.     

How do financial analysts implement the Sum-of-the-Parts (SOTP) valuation framework?

In this study, we investigate how financial analysts implement the Sum-of-the-Parts (SOTP) valuation framework. Although SOTP constitutes a popular valuation approach among sophisticated practitioners and investors, it is mostly ignored by researchers and academics. We adopt a structured content analysis of 265 equity research reports written by 33 investment brokerage houses for 140 UK-based firms. We find that analysts typically use EBITDA multiples to implement SOTP. Furthermore, financial analysts are more likely to consider SOTP the dominant or preferred valuation model in their report. We show that managers disclose a greater quantity of segmental information if their firms are considered difficult to analyze and value by investors and creditors, thereby decreasing the information asymmetry with their capital providers. In specific circumstances, we document that financial analysts identify more segments in their SOTP analysis compared to the reportable segments in the firms' annual reports based on IFRS 8. We argue that the financial analysts' choice to employ a greater number of segments in their SOTP models might be primarily driven by their effort to support their reports' optimistic target prices. Finally, although SOTP seems theoretically ideal to estimate the value of a multi-segment firm, we do not find empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that SOTP significantly outperforms a full-blown Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model, when the latter is used separately to value the company as a whole.     

Co-monotonicity of optimal investments and the design of structured financial products

We prove that, under very weak conditions, optimal financial products on complete markets are co-monotone with the reversed state price density. Optimality is meant in the sense of the maximization of an arbitrary preference model, e.g., expected utility theory or prospect theory. The proof is based on a result from transport theory. We apply the general result to specific situations, in particular the case of a market described by the Capital Asset Pricing Model or the Black–Scholes model, where we derive a generalization of the two-fund-separation theorem and give an extension to APT factor models and structured products with several underlyings. We use our results to derive a new approach to optimization in wealth management, based on a direct optimization of the return distribution of the portfolio. In particular, we show that optimal products can (essentially) be written as monotonic functions of the market return. We provide existence and nonexistence results for optimal products in this framework. Finally we apply our results to the study of bonus certificates, show that they are not optimal, and construct a cheaper product yielding the same return distribution.     

Information provision in financial markets

We set up a rational expectations model in which investors trade a risky asset based on a private signal they receive about the quality of the asset, and a public signal that represents a noisy aggregation of the private signals of all investors. Our model allows us to examine what happens to market performance (market depth, price efficiency, volume of trade, and expected welfare) when regulators can induce improved information provision in one of two ways. Regulations can be designed that either provide investors with more accurate information by improving the quality of prior information, or that enhance the transparency of the market by improving the quality of the public signal. In our rational expectations equilibrium, improving the quality of the public signal can be interpreted as a way of providing information about the anticipations and trading motives of all market participants. We find that both alternatives improve market depth. However, in the limit, we show that improving the precision of prior information is a more efficient way to do so. More accurate prior information decreases asymmetric information problems and consequently reduces the informativeness of prices, while a more accurate public signal increases price informativeness. The volume of trade is independent of the quality of prior information and is increasing in the quality of the public signal. Finally, expected welfare can sometimes fall as prior information or the public signal become more precise.     

Using corporate social responsibility performance to evaluate financial disclosure credibility

Due to the paucity of immediate and direct information about financial disclosure credibility, it is often difficult for investors to assess the credibility of financial disclosures (e.g. whether reported earnings are biased). Given this situation, the present study proposes and finds that investors use additional cues, such as information about corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance, to form overall impressions about management's honesty, credibility, and trustworthiness. Similar to other findings in the halo effect literature, we find that these overall impressions subsequently influence both investors' assessments of financial disclosure credibility and the prices they are willing to pay for a company's stock. The findings support the theoretical framework on financial disclosure credibility by (1) showing that management credibility is an important tool that investors use to assess disclosure credibility and (2) suggesting that management credibility is a multidimensional latent construct for which CSR performance can be one of several relevant indicators.     

Accounting information,disclosure, and expected utility: Do investors really abhor uncertainty?

Investors are said to “abhor uncertainty,” but if there were no uncertainty they could earn only the risk‐free rate. A fundamental result in the analytical accounting literature shows that investors buying into a CARA‐normal CAPM market pay lower asset prices, gain higher ex‐ante expected returns, and obtain higher expected utility, when the market payoff has higher variance. New investors obtain similar “welfare” gains from risk under a log/power utility CAPM. These results do not imply that investors “abhor information.” To realize investors' ex‐ante expectations, the subjective probability distributions representing market expectations must be accurate. Greater payoff risk can add to investors' expected utility, but higher ex‐post(realized) utility comes from better information and more accurate ex‐ante expectations. An important implication for accounting is that greater disclosure can have the simultaneous effects of (i) exposing more fully or perceptibly firms' payoff uncertainty, thereby increasing new investors' expected utility, and (ii) improving market estimates of firms' payoff parameters (means, variances, covariances), thereby giving investors a better chance of realizing their expectations. Paradoxically, better information can be valuable to new investors by exposing more fully and more accurately the risk in firms' business operations and results–new investors maximizing expected utility want both more risk and better information.     

The Uses and Abuses of Finite Risk Reinsurance

Finite risk reinsurance has become the subject of investigations, litigation, and possibly new regulation. This article provides an overview of finite risk solutions and products, describing their main features and their legitimate role in helping (mainly) industrial companies manage timing, funding, and insurance risks.
Finite risk solutions generally take the form of structured insurance products designed to help companies manage risks often regarded as exotic or "tail" risks, such as environmental or asbestos liability. Although such products are underwritten by insurance or reinsurance companies, they typically involve limited risk transfer (hence the name "finite risk") while providing the insured companies with a means of pre-funding their expected losses, or what is often called "pre-loss financing." Of course, companies could choose to self-insure such risks by establishing a reserve for future losses. But finite risk provides a more credible and transparent alternative—one that reassures investors both by capping the liability and eliminating the possibility for manipulation of reserves.
Abuses of finite risk products usually concern the degree to which transactions are accounted for, disclosed, and represented to investors as achieving "significant risk transfer" when there is little or no such transfer. In the authors' words, "Users of finite should ask themselves whether the transaction helps the financial statements clearly represent the true economic income and risks of the business and, if not, then consider not doing the deal."     

Implications for brokerage firms’ financial disclosures: From CSR perspectives

Given the importance of transparency in today's financial environment, it is surprising that limited research has examined investors’ attitudes toward brokerage firms’ financial disclosures and how their attitudes toward brokerage firms’ financial disclosures influence subsequent responses such as perceived trust and attitude toward brokerage firms. Research on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices and the Social Contract Theory suggests that investors may put a relatively high value on brokerage firms that practice financial disclosures responsibly. This research probed the relevance of this assumption by testing the relations among investors’ attitudes toward brokerage firms’ financial disclosures, attitudes toward CSR practices, perceived trust toward brokerage firms, attitudes toward brokerage firms and behavioral intentions toward brokerage firms with a survey study. The study used brokerage firms’ financial disclosures in general as the focus of this study's survey questions and a convenience sample consisting of investors. The results suggested that investors’ positive attitudes toward brokerage firms’ financial disclosures positively enhanced their attitudes toward brokerage firms’ CSR practices and perceived trust toward brokerage firms, whereas investors’ attitudes toward brokerage firms’ CSR practices mediated their attitudes toward financial disclosures to enhancing their perceived trust toward brokerage firms. Moreover, investors’ attitudes toward brokerage firms mediated their perceived trust toward brokerage firms on enhancing their behavioral intentions toward brokerage firms.     

Pro forma accounting disclosures: The effect of reconciliations and financial reporting knowledge on nonprofessional investors' judgments

Regulation G requires companies that report non-GAAP or “pro forma” earnings provide a reconciliation. While nonprofessional investors are a large, heterogeneous population with varying degrees of financial reporting knowledge, previous research treats them as a homogenous group. The study examines how differences in financial reporting knowledge and information viewing behavior affect the influence of reconciled pro forma earnings disclosures on nonprofessional investors' judgments. Lower-knowledge investors appear to incorporate information on differences between GAAP and pro forma earnings in their judgments as long as they view this information in the reconciliation. However, higher-knowledge investors appear to consistently incorporate information on differences between GAAP and pro forma earnings in their judgments regardless of the relative amount of time they spend viewing the reconciliation relative to other disclosures. Our results suggest that knowledge differences influence how nonprofessional investors acquire and use information on differences between GAAP and pro forma earnings.     

Does the truth rest with the minority? Divergent views on nonfinancial firms' financial investments from the private equity market

We investigate how the seasoned equity market evaluates nonfinancial firms that recently bought wealth management products (WMPs). Using a sample of Chinese firms, we find that the stock market reacts less positively to private equity placements (PEPs) by firms that recently purchased WMPs (i.e., quasi-deposits) than to those that did not. Further analysis suggests that compared with retail investors, sophisticated (i.e., institutional and high-net-worth) investors pay a higher price for the shares of these WMP-buying firms. After PEPs, we find that the long-term operating performance and firm value of WMP-buying firms are higher than those of non-buying firms. Overall, the findings suggest that: (i) engaging in shadow banking activities (buying WMPs) does not mean a firm is distracted, and (ii) sophisticated investors are less concerned than retail investors about a firm's shadow banking activities.     

Australia's switch to international financial reporting standards: a perspective from account preparers

This study reports the findings of a structured telephone survey on adoption of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) from 60 firms drawn from among Australia's top 200 corporations. Although we find evidence of strong systematic variation in survey responses with factors such as firm size, industry background and expected impacts on financial performance, the general results indicate that many respondents have not been well prepared for the transition and are generally very sceptical about the claimed benefits of IFRS as enunciated in the government's Corporate Law Economic Reform Program. The results have implications to other international reporting jurisdictions, particularly the European Union, where adoption of IFRS is already underway.     

Portfolio insurance and prospect theory investors: Popularity and optimal design of capital protected financial products

Portfolio insurance strategies are used on both the institutional and the retail side of the asset management industry. While standard utility theory struggles to provide an explanation, this study justifies the popularity of portfolio insurance strategies in a behavioral finance context. We run Monte Carlo simulations as well as historical simulations for popular portfolio insurance strategies and benchmark strategies in order to evaluate the outcomes using cumulative prospect theory. Our simulation results indicate that most portfolio insurance strategies are the preferred investment strategy for a prospect theory investor. Moreover, the analysis provides insights into how portfolio insurance products should be designed and structured to meet the preferences of prospect theory investors as accurately as possible.     

Can utility optimization explain the demand for structured investment products?

In this paper, we first show that for classical rational investors with correct beliefs and constant absolute or constant relative risk aversion, the utility gains from structured products over and above a portfolio consisting of the risk-free asset and the market portfolio are typically much smaller than their fees. This result holds irrespectively of whether the investors can continuously trade the risk-free asset and the market portfolio at no costs or whether they can just buy the assets and hold them to maturity of the structured product. However, when considering behavioural utility functions, such as prospect theory, or investors with incorrect beliefs (arising from probability weighting or probability misestimation), the utility gain can be sizable.     

Beyond payoff diagrams: how to present risk and return characteristics of structured products

The market for structured products in Germany and Switzerland experienced a decade of rapid growth before the financial crisis. When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, however, it became apparent that many private investors had not been aware of the risks involved in these certificates. There is evidence that the success of some of the most popular products was due to behavioral biases of investors. There is also concern that the complexity and diversity of the products was accompanied by low transparency. In practice, the information provided to investors is still often focused on payoff diagrams. For the future development of the market, it is important to improve investors’ information and understanding. To this end, this paper analyzes the information requirements and proposes a risk and return survey to provide relevant and comprehensive information on market risk. Specifically, we propose to (1) illustrate the return probability distribution in three different ways, in particular a rolling dice analogy, (2)  apply the Leland model to specify the risk and return tradeoff, and (3) include a specific measure of active risk. We illustrate these measures and information tools for a sample of stylized products.     

The effects of the method used to present a complex item on the face of a financial statement on nonprofessional investors' judgments

Our study is motivated by standard setters' (FASB, 2010; IASB, 2010a) interest in better understanding the effects of item complexity and disaggregation of financial information on users' decision processes. We examine whether the method used to present a complex item on a financial statement influences nonprofessional investors' judgments. We also examine whether disaggregation influences how different levels of item complexity are associated with judgments. Using a 2 × 2 between-subjects experiment, we manipulate variables representing presentation method (disaggregation versus aggregation) and level of item complexity (which is defined pension cost with high versus low volatility). With a sample of 114 nonprofessional investors, we find that when the complex item defined pension cost is disaggregated into its component parts and displayed in different sections of the statement of comprehensive income, nonprofessional investors acquire more information about the item and are able to more accurately understand the function of the item. This, in turn, helps the nonprofessional investors decide whether the information is useful in certain judgments. Additionally, we find that when a complex item is disaggregated, nonprofessional investors place even greater weight on their perceptions of level of item complexity in certain judgments. The results of this study are of value to managers, standard setters, and investors. For instance, results suggest that disaggregating a complex item across a financial statement can help nonprofessional investors learn how the component(s) driving a complex item relates to different economic events, improving their ability to understand and process the information in their judgments.     

Short-selling bans and institutional investors' herding behaviour: Evidence from the global financial crisis

The literature on short-selling restrictions focusses mainly on a ban's impact on market efficiency, liquidity and overpricing. Surprisingly, little is known about the effects of short-sale constraints on herd behaviour. Since institutional investors have come to dominate mature stock markets and rely extensively on short sales, constraining these traders may influence the asset pricing process. We investigate six stock markets that faced bans during the recent global financial crisis. Our empirical evidence shows that short-selling restrictions exhibit either no influence on herding formation or induce adverse herding. This implies a higher dispersion of returns around the market compared to rational asset pricing, which can be interpreted as an increase in uncertainty among stock market investors.     

Financial instruments,financial reporting,and financial stability

I review new empirical evidence from the recent financial crisis on the relation between financial reporting and financial stability. I draw the following conclusions: First, there is still no evidence that fair value accounting caused widespread fire sales of asset or contagion. Second, the empirical evidence suggests that accounting and regulation might have contributed to the crisis by allowing several banks to delay actions. Third, even if share prices reacted positively to the relaxation of fair value accounting rules during the crisis, the origin of the problem might be lax rules that allowed banks to run into financial and regulatory problems. Fourth, fair values can be relevant for assets that a bank intends to hold until maturity if that bank strongly relies on short-term financing. Fifth, the recognition of fair values is no substitute for information that allows investors to judge a bank's risk exposure and the validity of reported fair values.