Bank Failure,Mark‐to‐market and the Financial Crisis

This paper is concerned with the allegation that fair value accounting rules have contributed significantly to the recent financial crisis. It focuses on one particular channel for that contribution: the impact of fair value on the actual or potential failure of banks. The paper compares four criteria for failure: one economic, two legal and one regulatory. It is clear from this comparison that balance sheet valuations of assets are, in two cases, crucial in these definitions, and so the choice between ‘fair value’ or other valuations can be decisive in whether a bank fails; but in two cases fair value is irrelevant. Bank failures might arise despite capital adequacy and balance sheet solvency due to sudden shocks to liquidity positions. Two of the most prominent bank failures cannot, at first sight, be attributed to fair value accounting: we show that Northern Rock was balance sheet solvent, even on a fair value basis, as was Lehman Brothers. The case study evidence is augmented by econometric tests that suggest that mark‐to‐market accounting has had only a very limited influence on the perceived failure risk of banks.     

Tainted portfolios: How impairment accounting rules restrict security sales

Contrary to claims that fair value accounting exacerbated banks’ securities sales during the recent financial crisis, we present evidence that suggests – if anything – that the current impairment accounting rules served as a deterrent to selling. Specifically, because banks must provide evidence of their ‘intent and ability’ to hold securities with unrealized losses, there are strong incentives to reduce, rather than increase, security sales when market values decline to avoid ‘tainting’ their remaining securities portfolio. Validating this concern, we find that banks incur greater other‐than‐temporary impairment (OTTI) charges when they sell more securities. We then find that banks sell fewer securities when their security portfolios have larger unrealized losses (and thus larger potential impairment charges), and these results are concentrated in banks with homogenous securities portfolios, expert auditors, more experienced managers, and greater regulatory capital slack. Overall, our results suggest that – contrary to critics’ claims – the accounting rules appear to have reduced banks’ propensity to sell their securities during the financial crisis.     

The influence of accounting enforcement on earnings quality of banks: Implications of bank regulation and the global financial crisis

We study the effects of country-level accounting enforcement on earnings quality of banks and whether bank regulation substitutes or complements the effect of accounting enforcement on bank earnings quality. We also examine whether the influence of accounting enforcement on bank earnings quality changed after the global financial crisis. Using a sample of listed banks from 40 countries between 2001 and 2014, and abnormal loan loss provisions (ALLP) as our main proxy for earnings quality, we document a consistent and strong association between accounting enforcement and bank earnings quality. More specifically, an increase in accounting enforcement decreases the level of ALLP and decreases the propensity to manage earnings to avoid losses. Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence that bank regulation complements the effect of accounting enforcement on bank earnings quality. Finally, unlike in the pre-crisis period, we find a positive association between accounting enforcement and income-decreasing ALLP in the post-crisis period, which indicates that stronger accounting enforcement is associated with more conservative earnings and higher loan loss reserves. Overall, our results indicate that accounting enforcement reduces opportunistic earnings management.     

Market reactions to policy deliberations on fair value accounting and impairment rules during the financial crisis of 2008–2009

Fair value accounting (FVA) has been blamed for amplifying the financial crisis of 2008–2009. We investigate investor and creditor reactions to policymaker deliberations, recommendations and decisions about FVA and impairment rules in the banking industry. If FVA was a key contributor to the financial crisis as some industry pundits and academic research suggest, we first should observe positive stock market reactions to proposals that relax FVA rules and negative reactions when policymakers support FVA. Second, we investigate cross-sectional stock price reactions to bank-specific factors that potentially contributed to pro-cyclical contagion. Third, we examine whether banks that have fewer alternative sources of information about fair values experience relatively negative reactions to potential relaxation of FVA and impairment rules. Finally, we investigate credit market reactions to these policy deliberations, recommendations and decisions by examining changes in credit default swap spreads for a subset of banks in our sample.     

How prompt was regulatory corrective action during the financial crisis?

This paper empirically investigates the incidence of regulatory forbearance during the financial crisis. Using an option pricing technique in concert with valuation data gathered from failed bank sales, I find that failed banks consistently underreported the level of impairment in loan portfolios during the financial crisis period of 2008–2010, helping these market value insolvent banks to report adequate capital for regulatory purposes. Impairment-adjusted capital ratios provide evidence of regulatory forbearance for up to 18 months prior to seizure. Analyses of bank coverage ratios reveal that coverage ratios are negatively and significantly related to impairment levels and are significantly lower for banks with critically low levels of capital.     

The 2007–2009 financial crisis and bank opaqueness

Doubts about the accuracy with which outside investors can assess a banking firm’s value motivate many government interventions in the banking market. Although the available empirical evidence is somewhat mixed, the recent financial crisis has reinforced a common assessment that banks are unusually opaque. This paper examines bank equity’s trading characteristics during “normal” periods and two “crisis” periods between 1993 and 2009. We find only limited (mixed) evidence that banks are unusually opaque during normal periods. However, consistent with theory, crises raise the adverse selection costs of trading bank shares relative to those of nonbank control firms. A bank’s balance sheet composition significantly affects its equity opacity, but we cannot detect specific balance sheet categories that have robust effects.     

Does Fair Value Accounting Exacerbate the Procyclicality of Bank Lending?

This study investigates whether fair value accounting contributes to the procyclicality of bank lending. Using banks’ approval/denial decisions on residential mortgage applications to capture banks’ supply of credit, I find no evidence that fair value accounting has procyclical effects on bank lending over the past two business cycles. I further identify two reasons for this result. First, the main accounting item distinguishing fair value accounting from historical cost accounting—unrealized gains and losses on available‐for‐sale securities—does not affect lending decisions. Second, unrealized gains and losses on available‐for‐sale securities are not procyclical, as the risk‐free interest rate rises during some expansionary periods, resulting in unrealized losses, while the risk‐free interest rate (and sometimes the default spread) falls during some recessionary periods, resulting in unrealized gains.     

Agency problems,accounting slack,and banks’ response to proposed reporting of loan fair values

We investigate the determinants of bank representatives’ responses to the United States Financial Accounting Standard Board’s 2010 Exposure Draft that proposes fair value measurement for most financial instruments. Over 85% of the 2971 comment letters were received from bank representatives, with most bank-affiliated letters addressing—and opposing—one issue: fair value measurement of loans. The Exposure Draft proposes that companies report both fair value and amortized cost measures for loans; thus, the proposal should result in increased levels of loan-related information and improved financial reporting transparency. We investigate three reasons for bank representatives’ resistance. First, fair value measurement should result in less accounting slack than the current incurred-loss model for loan impairments; therefore, we propose that representatives from banks that historically utilized that slack will resist fair value measurement for loans. Second, we propose that agency problems are an important motivating factor because bank representatives reaping more private benefits from their franchises have less incentive to support increases in financial reporting transparency. Third, we test whether the most common reasons for opposition included in the comment letters are associated with negative letter writing. Our analyses support the first two determinants of bank representatives’ resistance to the Exposure Draft. Specifically, accounting slack and lower demand for accounting transparency are strongly associated with resistance to the standard. However, we find that stated reasons for resistance are not associated with letter writing. Specifically, representatives at firms with difficult to value loans and firms that mostly hold loans to maturity are no more likely to resist the standard than others. The narrow scope of bank representatives’ comments and our empirical findings suggest that bankers’ responses to the Exposure Draft may be more driven by concerns over reduced availability of accounting slack and accompanying de facto regulatory forbearance than by the conceptual arguments they offer. Our results have implications for standard setters, who must navigate special interests as they attempt to promulgate high quality accounting standards, and for users of financial statements who must consider how political forces shape generally accepted accounting principles.     

Have SFAS 166 and SFAS 167 improved the financial reporting for securitizations?

Critics have alleged that securitization accounting prior to 2010 was among the causes of the recent financial crisis. In response to this criticism, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) implemented two new accounting standards, SFAS 166 and SFAS 167, to improve the financial reporting for securitizations. Bank regulators have stated their belief that SFAS 166/167 will result in a consolidated balance sheet (and risk-based capital ratios based thereupon) that better reflects a bank's exposure to risk related to securitized assets. We document that, by ceding retained power or influence through the servicing/special servicing functions to third parties, SFAS 166/167 resulted in real effects to the extent that banks (particularly those that were weakly capitalized) achieved their accounting objectives in the post-SFAS 166/167 period through legitimate transaction structuring in line with the intent of the new rules. Further, we use capital market participants’ assessments of risk retention by sponsoring banks as a benchmark, and provide evidence consistent with bank regulators’ beliefs. In particular, following SFAS 166/167, equity investors of sponsoring banks do not consider (consider) as risk relevant securitized assets that receive off-balance sheet (on-balance sheet) treatment. Securitized assets that are consolidated under SFAS 166/167 exhibit the same risk relevance as assets that are not securitized, despite contractual provisions that would seem to imply substantial risk transfer.     

Usefulness of fair values for predicting banks’ future earnings: evidence from other comprehensive income and its components

This paper examines whether fair value adjustments included in other comprehensive income (OCI) predict future bank performance. It also examines whether the reliability of these estimates affects their predictive value. Using a sample of bank holding companies, we find that fair value adjustments included in OCI can predict earnings both 1 and 2 years ahead. However, not all fair value-related unrealized gains and losses included in OCI have similar implications. While net unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities are positively associated with future earnings, net unrealized gains and losses on derivative contracts classified as cash flow hedges are negatively associated with future earnings. We also find that reliable measurement of fair values enhances predictive value. Finally, we show that fair value adjustments recorded in OCI during the 2007–2009 financial crisis predicted future profitability, contradicting criticism that fair value accounting forced banks to record excessive downward adjustments.     

Bank valuation and accounting discretion during a financial crisis

This paper shows that banks overstate the value of distressed assets and their regulatory capital during the US mortgage crisis. Real estate-related assets are overvalued in banks' balance sheets, especially those of bigger banks, compared to the market value of these assets. Banks with large exposure to mortgage-backed securities also provision less for bad loans. Furthermore, distressed banks use discretion over the classification of mortgage-backed securities to inflate their books. Our results indicate that banks' balance sheets offer a distorted view of the financial health of the banks and provide suggestive evidence of regulatory forbearance and noncompliance with accounting rules.     

Impact of International Financial Reporting Standard adoption on key financial ratios

Although previous research has investigated the economic consequences of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) adoption, there is little evidence on the impact of IFRS adoption on key financial ratios. To fill this gap, we examine this issue in a continental European country (Finland). Our results show that the adoption of IFRS changes the magnitude of the key accounting ratios. Moreover, we extend the literature by showing that the adoption of fair value accounting rules and stricter requirements on certain accounting issues are the reasons for the changes observed in accounting figures and financial ratios.     

Equity valuation in practice: The influence of net financial expenses

This study investigates the relevance of net financial expenses with respect to equity valuation in an IFRS accounting regime. According to the residual earnings valuation model, income related to balance sheet items that are recorded at fair value is not applicable for valuation purposes. There are no residual earnings associated with these items because the balance sheet provides ‘perfect’ value estimates for the items in question. In accordance with the contention that under IFRS, aggregate net financial liabilities are recorded at a book value that is close to fair value, this study demonstrates that net financial expenses are not associated with the market prices of stocks. The investigation discusses the empirical findings in light of the enduring controversies regarding the use of fair value accounting.     

A Review of the Role of Financial Reporting in the Global Financial Crisis

The aim of this article is to review the recent literature that examines the performance of financial reporting in the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). In analysing the GFC a large number of commentators have attributed blame to financial reporting, in particular to the use of fair values (FVs) in reporting financial instruments in bank balance sheets. Based on a review of the emerging evidence, the main conclusions are that: (i) there is no empirical evidence that fair‐value accounting (FVA) during the GFC added to the severity of the crisis; (ii) further research is required to determine whether FVA in the years immediately preceding the crisis exacerbated the GFC because of the possibility that some of the FV gains reported may have been illusory; (iii) the existing literature has largely ignored the role of financial reports in the determination of a firm's cost of capital, although it is through this avenue that, in a crisis, financial reporting could play its most significant role; and (iv) the bulk of the commentary associated with financial reporting and the GFC has revolved around the valuation objective of financial reporting, even though financial reports also have a stewardship objective. Failure of financial reporting to satisfy this objective in the years preceding the GFC could have exacerbated the crisis. More consideration needs to be given to this latter issue to enable a complete assessment of the role of financial reporting in the GFC.     

Fair Value‐related Information in Analysts’ Decision Processes: Evidence from the Financial Crisis

We use a sample of conference calls and analyst research reports from international banks to examine how financial analysts request and communicate fair value‐related information in their valuation process. We find that analysts devote considerable attention to fair value‐related topics. Most of the conference call questions and references in research reports pertain to fair value reclassifications and fair value changes of liabilities resulting from banks’ own credit risk. The accounting impact of these one‐time effects during the financial crisis and a lack of corresponding firm disclosures help to explain the prevalence of these two topics. The content of the questions and references suggests that analysts have different motives for their interest in fair value‐related information. While some analysts adjust reported earnings for unrecognised fair value changes of reclassified assets, most of the observed analysts exclude banks’ own credit risk effects from reported earnings. Thus, the use of fair value‐related information varies substantially across analysts and across instruments.     

How can we effectively resolve the financial crisis: Empirical evidence on the bank rehabilitation plan of the Japanese government

When the Japanese economy experienced a serious financial crisis in the late 1990s, the government attempted to promptly resolve this crisis by injecting public funds into bank capital, requiring these banks to compose and implement a rehabilitation plan. This paper empirically investigates whether this plan (the Business Revitalization Plan) worked effectively, emphasizing the inconsistency between strengthening the soundness of the banking industry (preventing bank failures) and expanding credit supply (improving macroeconomy). We present empirical evidence on this inconsistency and argue that the government failed to promptly resolve the serious financial crisis in Japan due to this reason.     

The interest rate pass-through in the Euro area during the global financial crisis

This paper uses panel vector autoregressive (VAR) models for euro area member countries to explore the widening of retail bank interest rate spreads that emerged in the course of the global financial crisis. We find that the interest rate pass-through was generally complete on impact before the outbreak of the financial crisis, but became significantly distorted in the period thereafter, which hampered the effectiveness of monetary policy. Empirical evidence suggests that the decrease in the interest rate pass-through can be related to a change in the structural parameters characterizing the economies and a substantial increase in the average size of structural shocks. DSGE model simulations show that an increase in the frictions that banks are subject to can explain the decrease in the retail bank interest rate pass-through.     

Bank recapitalization and economic recovery after financial crises

Does support to distressed banks early on during financial crises mitigate the macroeconomic consequences of financial distress, and if so does it matter what form the intervention takes? We analyze the effects of government and central bank interventions in 69 systemic banking crises since 1980, of which 29 are part of the recent global financial crisis. Our estimation approach controls for the correlation between intervention measures and the time-invariant component of unobservable crisis severity. We find that timely bank recapitalizations substantially reduce the duration of recessions, underscoring the distortions caused by zombie banks and the costs of regulatory forbearance.     

Competition and financial stability in European cooperative banks

Cooperative banks are a driving force for socially committed business at the local level, accounting for around one fifth of the European Union (EU) bank deposits and loans. Despite their importance, little is known about the relationship between bank stability and competition for these small credit institutions. Does competition affect the stability of cooperative banks? Does the financial stability of banks increase/decrease when competition is higher? We assess the dynamic relationship between competition and bank soundness (both in the short and long run) among European cooperative banks between 1998 and 2009. We obtain three main results. First, we provide evidence in line with the competition-stability view proposed by Boyd and De Nicolò (2005). Bank market power negatively “Granger-causes” banks' soundness, meaning that there is a positive relationship between competition and stability. Second, we find that this fundamental relationship does not change during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Third, we show that increased homogeneity in the cooperative banking sector positively affects bank soundness. Our findings have important policy implications for designing and implementing regulations that enhance the overall stability of the financial system and in particular of the cooperative banking sector.     

Role of financial regulation and innovation in the financial crisis

Using the financial and macroeconomic dataset of 132 countries, this study empirically analyzes the effects of financial regulations and innovations on the global financial crisis. It shows that regulatory measures such as restrictions on bank activities and entry requirements have decreased the likelihood of a banking crisis, while capital regulation and government ownership of banks have increased the likelihood of a currency crisis. Financial innovation has contributed to the banking crisis but contained the currency crisis. This study also shows that judicious implementation of regulatory measures is critical to financial stability because some regulations, if implemented simultaneously, can further aggravate or alleviate a crisis.