Can consumer complaints reduce product reliability? Should we worry?

We analyze a monopolist's pricing and product reliability decision in a model where consumers are entitled to product replacement if the product fails, but have heterogeneous costs of exercising this right. Our main result shows that, under some conditions, a decrease in consumers expected to claim cost leads to a decrease in product reliability but an increase in profit and welfare. This result is robust to a number of extensions. Our results are in line with anecdotal evidence suggesting that changes in consumers’ claiming cost can be induced by both third parties (governments, consumers’ organizations, private enterprises, etc.) and firms. More precisely, since, under some conditions, profit and welfare align, public initiatives oriented to lower consumers’ claiming cost will be ultimately joined by firms that benefit from further increases in complaints.     

House prices and consumer welfare

We develop a new approach to measuring changes in consumer welfare due to changes in the price of owner-occupied housing. In our approach, an agent's welfare adjustment is defined as the transfer required to keep expected discounted utility constant given a change in current house prices. We demonstrate that, up to a first-order approximation, there is no aggregate change in welfare due to price increases in the existing housing stock. This follows from a simple market clearing condition where capital gains experienced by sellers are exactly offset by welfare losses to buyers. We show that this result holds (approximately) even in a model that accounts for changes in consumption and investment plans prompted by current house price changes. There can, however, be changes in welfare due to additions to the stock of housing, or to changes in the price of renovating and upgrading the existing stock of housing. For the United States, we estimate the welfare cost of house price appreciation to be an average of $127 per household per year over the 1984–1998 period.     

影响独立学院发展的深层次矛盾与制度性支撑条件

本文介绍了独立学院的由来、特征、运作模式,深入探讨了独立学院目前存在的核心问题,即规模发展权、招生计划控制权、收费标准制定权等与市场运作机制的矛盾,层次定位与属地化管理的矛盾,经营性与公益性的矛盾,个性化发展与宏观政策统一性的矛盾.     

Trip Chaining: Who Wins Who Loses?

This paper studies how trip chaining (combining commuting and shopping or commuting and child care) affects market competition: in particular, pricing and the equilibrium number of firms as well as welfare. We use a monopolistic competition framework, where firms sell differentiated products as well as offering differentiated jobs to households, who are all located at some distance from the firms. The symmetric equilibriums with and without the option of trip chaining are compared. We show analytically that introducing the trip chaining option reduces the profit margin of the firms in the short run, but increases welfare. The welfare gains are, however, smaller than the transport cost savings. In the free-entry long-run equilibrium, the number of firms decreases but welfare is higher. A numerical illustration gives orders of magnitude of the different effects.     

Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms

Previous research examining mixed duopolies shows that the use of an optimal incentive contract for the public firm increases welfare and that privatization reduces welfare. We demonstrate that these results do not generalize to a mixed oligopoly with multiple private firms. We derive the optimal incentive contract for a public firm that weighs both profit and welfare and show that its use may either increase or decrease welfare depending on the number of private firms and the exact nature of costs. We also identify the conditions that determine whether or not privatizing the public firm facing an optimal incentive contract reduces welfare. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project

We examine the asymptotic behavior of two strategyproof mechanisms discussed by Moulin for public goods – the conservative equal costs rule (CER) and the serial cost sharing rule (SCSR) – and compare their performance to that of the pivotal mechanism (PM) from the Clarke–Groves family. Allowing the individuals’ valuations for an excludable public project to be random variables, we show under very general assumptions that expected welfare loss generated by the CER, as the size of the population increases, becomes arbitrarily large. However, all moments of the SCSR’s random welfare loss asymptotically converge to zero. The PM does better than the SCSR, with its welfare loss converging even more rapidly to zero.     

Let students pay for their higher education: Debate concerning free and subsidized education based on sunk cost theory

Governments across the world are grappling with the question about the funding of subsidized higher education (HE). Critics of free or subsidized HE have argued that higher rate of return of graduates serves as enough extrinsic motivation, adding, to the argument that the free or subsidized HE results in lack of intrinsic motivation. Further, critics support their assertion by citing lagging academic performance in countries where HE is free or heavily subsidized. Proponents of the state funding have cited the role of externalities and equal opportunities as the reason for subsidized HE. This study has used sunk cost theory to understand whether making students pay for their own education would impact on their performance and retention by enhancing intrinsic motivation in addition to analyzing the role of parents and the culture. Results indicate that students are impacted by sunk cost fallacy, as opposed to the earlier findings by Ketel et al. (2016), and that making them shoulder part of the tuition fees in form of contribution or student loans would result in “selection effects” where some sort of positive fee (after scholarships and grants) is paid by the students.     

Grants structure when the type of public project is endogenous

This paper gives an insight into changes in intergovernmental grants structure, focusing on the type of public project. Presenting a simple model which incorporates the endogenous determination of project type and grants structure, the results show that as the relative cost encountered by central government in collecting public funds increases, the central government tends to choose types of projects which local governments prefer and adopt block grant systems. The resulting equilibrium is compared with an optimal solution based on an utilitarian welfare function. Received: December 22, 2000 / Accepted: September 20, 2001     

Social security and two-earner households

In the past decades, elimination of the pay-as-you-go system in U.S. has been extensively discussed and studied. Such an elimination would also eliminate the intragenerational redistribution done by the following policies of social security. Due to spousal and survivor׳s benefit provisions, US Social Security system redistributes (mostly) to single-earner married households. Since retirement benefits are a concave function of past mean earnings, the system redistributes from high earners to low earners. Finally, existence of a cap on social security taxable earnings makes the system regressive. This paper quantifies redistributive, labor supply, and welfare implications of these policies using a general equilibrium life-cycle model. Agents start out as permanently married or single and with education levels and wage profiles, where the latter depend both on education and gender. The household is the decision maker and decides on labor supply of its member(s) and saving. Elimination of these policies results in a 5.5% rise in labor force participation of married females, while increasing aggregate welfare by 0.4%. A majority of households experience positive gains in welfare. Single-earner married households incur large welfare losses (as big as 1.1%), whereas two-earner households with high skilled spouses experience substantial welfare gains (as big as 1.9%).     

公允价值计量、资产价值变动与审计收费——基于2009—2012年沪深上市公司的经验证据

公允价值计量具有价值相关性,但也存在资产估价的风险性,这一会计估计风险对以风险成本为基础的审计定价及其变化至关重要。以后金融危机时期2009--2012年沪深上市公司的数据为样本,实证研究公允价值计量下的资产价值变动对审计收费的影响,结果显示：持有资产价值变动总体和公允价值变动损益、资产减值损失分项均显著正向影响审计收费,这表明持有资产价值变动幅度越大,审计收费越高;在持有资产价值变动总体正向影响审计收费的强度逐年显著增强的情况下,公允价值变动损益对审计收费正向影响的显著性提升,但是影响强度下降;资产减值损失对审计收费正向影响的强度和显著性均逐年提升,这表明审计收费蕴含公允价值估计风险和资产计价的公允性。     

How should heavy-duty trucks be taxed?

This paper develops and implements an analytical framework for estimating optimal taxes on the fuel use and mileage of heavy-duty trucks in the United States, accounting for external costs from congestion, accidents, pavement damage, noise, energy security, and local and global pollution. The analysis allows for endogenous fuel economy, increased auto travel in response to reduced truck congestion, and distinguishes driving by truck type and region. We estimate the optimal (second-best) diesel fuel tax at $1.12 per gallon and implementing it increases welfare by $1.34 billion per annum. Optimizing over both fuel and mileage taxes, and differentiating mileage taxes by vehicle type and region, yields progressively higher welfare gains. The most efficient tax structure involves a diesel fuel tax of 69 cents per gallon and charges on trucks that vary between 7 and 33 cents per mile; implementing this tax structure yields estimated welfare gains of $2.06 billion.     

Uncertainty perception in bidding for Product-Service Systems under competition

This research investigates what impact of uncertainty perception arising from the existence of competition has on the pricing decision for Product-Service Systems (PSS) under uncertainty. PSS provision is an increasingly important area for many businesses and competition increases cognitive pressures on providers even further. We present an experimental study with industrial costing and bidding experts from the defence and aerospace sector. The study consisted of an experimental set-up via two questionnaires which differed in the existence of competition in the bidding scenario. The findings showed that bidding decision makers changed their evaluation of the cost estimate due to the introduction of competition but kept their evaluations of the profit margin and price bids constant. Furthermore, the participants listed the relevant sources of uncertainty that influenced their decision-making process. This research contributes to the literature in two ways. First, our findings showed that predictions from current theory regarding decision-making of cost estimation and pricing are not confirmed when competitively bidding for PSS. Second, we show uncertainty sources that influenced the decision makers and identified p the importance of internal processes of the PSS provider and environmental uncertainty.     

排污费与可转让排污许可证的比较——基于社会福利和制度实施层面的分析

排污费和可转让许可证制度是基于市场化环境规制的两种手段,这两种手段从理论上讲均能实现外部成本内部化,但可能在执行过程中带来不同的交易成本,对社会环境福利形成不同的收益。由于在制度设计上要获得厂商的边际收益函数和边际控制成本函数,但这种信息的获得很困难。对边际收益函数和边际控制成本函数的不同估计,造成的社会福利扭曲不同。在制度的实施层面,两种制度设计运作机理的不同,在现实的操作层面也会带来不同的排污结果。     

Allocation of public funds to R&;D: a portfolio choice-styled decision model and a biotechnology case study

A decision problem—allocating public research and development (R&D) funding—is faced by a planner who has ambiguous knowledge of welfare effects of the various research areas. We model this as a reverse portfolio choice problem faced by a Bayesian decision-maker. Two elements of the planner’s inferential system are developed: a conditional distribution of welfare ‘returns’ on an allocation, given stated preferences of citizens for the different areas, and a minimum risk criterion for re-allocating these funds, given the performance of a status quo level of funding. A case study of Canadian public research funds expended on various applications of agricultural biotechnology is provided. The decision-making methodology can accommodate a variety of collective expenditure and resource allocation problems.     

Indirect taxation with shadow cost of public funds in mixed oligopoly

We adopt a mixed oligopoly model, where a state-owned welfare-maximizing public firm competes with a profit-maximizing private firm, to compare the welfare effects of the specific and ad valorem tax in the presence of the shadow cost of public funds. Following the assumption of most previous literature that total output is constant under specific and ad valorem taxation, we find that, when the shadow cost of public funds exists, the tax policy must be adjusted according to the privatization level of the public firm; if the privatization level is low (medium, high), the government needs to adopt ad valorem (specific, ad valorem) tax. Moreover, the private firm will earn a higher (lower) profit under ad valorem tax than under specific tax, if the public firm is not fully privatized and the shadow cost of public funds is high (low).     

A descriptive analysis of audit price changes in the UK 1991–95

This paper examines changes in the audit fees of quoted public limited companies in the UK during the period from 1991 to 1995. After controlling for changes in the size, complexity and risk of auditees, it is shown (based on a logarithm audit fee model) that the audit market experienced a 9.7% reduction in inflation-adjusted fees over this five-year period. The results also provide evidence of overall fee reductions by each of the Big Six. On closer examination, a mixture of fee increases, decreases and no changes were observed for auditees of the Big Six and for the groups of medium-sized and small audit firms investigated. These results, which pertain to a period when market concentration increased markedly (Beattie and Fearnley, 1994; Peel, 1997; Pong, 1999), offer some amelioration of the concerns of the purchasers of audit services that, in general, audit fees will rise in response to an increase in dominance by a few large firms.     

Securing a Better Deal From Investors in Public Infrastructure Projects

Abstract

The return on capital is a major contributor to the cost of design, build, finance and operate (DBFO) contracts, under which public infrastructure is financed and delivered by private companies. The article presents a method for evaluating the rates of return targeted by bidders and applies this to 10 contracts commissioned by the UK National Health Service. The presence of significant excess returns is identified in each case. We argue that, if the rate of return projected by an investor exceeds a benchmark cost of capital, derived using standard capital budgeting techniques, then a reduction in the fee to be paid by the public authority is justified.     

Auctions with endogenous participation

We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies and entry decisions for both first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions when participation is endogenous. We show that there is a pure strategy entry equilibrium where only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point actually bid. In this context, both types of auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrary to the predictions of the fixed number of bidders literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry. As in the fixed-n literature, we show that first-price auctions generate more expected revenue than second-price auctions when buyers are risk-averse. Finally, we characterize the optimal auction – the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue – by using a direct revelation mechanism. The optimal auction involves a reserve price larger than the optimal reserve price in the fixed-n literature. The winner's payment is the second highest bid less the participation cost and losers receive a subsidy equal to the participation cost. Received: 17 August 1998 / 21 September 1999     

Managerial overconfidence,overinvestment, and R&D spillover

This paper examines whether a firm will select an overoptimistic manager when a cost‐reduction investment has a spillover effect. We consider a Cournot competition model where R&D investment ex ante occurs before the process of product market competition. Our analysis reveals that there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium for firms to delegate overoptimistic managers. We show that only when the spillover effect is sufficiently high do firms benefit from delegation. Furthermore, the equilibrium confidence level and investment decision first decrease and then increase as the spillover parameter changes. As the initial production cost increases, the equilibrium performance becomes worse.     

LOCATION OF VERTICALLY LINKED OLIGOPOLISTS

This paper examines the geographical equilibrium of location of N vertically linked firms and its relation to the creation of an industrial cluster. In a two-region spatial economy, a monopolist firm supplies an input to N consumer goods firms that compete in quantities. When the transport cost of the input increases, downstream firms prefer to agglomerate where the upstream firm is located, to save in production cost. However, simultaneous increases in the transport cost of the input and of the consumer good or increases in the number of downstream firms lead to a relative dispersion of these firms, to reduce competition and locate closer to the local final consumer. In contrast to Mayer (2000) , when both transport costs increase, the location decision of downstream firms is based more on the geographical point that maximizes accessibility to the local final consumer than on the geographical point that minimizes the production cost.